Ferris v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration

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WO
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
Domini Alia Ferris,
Plaintiff,
v.
Commissioner of Social Security
Administration,
Defendant.
No. CV-24-00116-PHX-JAT
ORDER
Pending before the Court is Plaintiff Domini Alia Ferris’ counsel’s Motion for
Attorney Fees under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) and Memorandum in support thereof. (Docs. 17,
18). The Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (“Commissioner”) filed a
response indicating it “neither supports nor opposes Counsel’s request for attorney’s fees.”
(Doc. 19 at 3). The Court now rules.
I. BACKGROUND
After the Commissioner denied Plaintiff’s claim for disability benefits, Plaintiff
appealed the Commissioner’s decision before this Court. (Doc. 1 at 2). The parties
stipulated to remand the action for further administrative proceedings and stipulated that
Plaintiff be awarded $2,544.04 under the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”). (Doc. 12;
Doc. 15). Pursuant to those stipulations, the Court: (1) reversed the Commissioner’s
decision and remanded the case for further proceedings, and (2) awarded Plaintiff’s counsel
$2,544.04 in EAJA fees. (Doc. 13; Doc. 16).
On remand, an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) found Plaintiff was entitled to
Case 2:24-cv-00116-JAT Document 20 Filed 03/30/26 Page 1 of 4

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Social Security disability benefits beginning in June 2020. (Doc. 18-1 at 4). The
Commissioner issued a Notice of Award stating that $25,920.50 had been withheld for
payment of attorney fees. (Doc. 18-1 at 5 (stating the Commissioner “usually withhold[s]
25 percent of past-due benefits” and had withheld $25,920.50)).
Plaintiff’s counsel now seeks a fee award of $15,000 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1406(b). (Doc. 17 at 1).
II. LEGAL STANDARD
A court entering judgment in favor of a Social Security claimant represented by
counsel “may determine and allow as part of its judgment a reasonable fee for such
representation, not in excess of 25 percent of the total of the past-due benefits to which the
claimant is entitled by reason of such judgment.” 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A). Though “[t]he
statute does not specify how courts should determine whether a requested fee is
reasonable,” Crawford v. Astrue, 586 F.3d 1142, 1148 (9th Cir. 2009), the Supreme Court
has made clear that the first step is to respect “the primacy of lawful attorney-client fee
agreements,” Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 793 (2002). A court may deviate
downward from a requested fee award “if the attorney provided substandard representation
or delayed the case, or if the requested fee would result in a windfall.” Crawford, 586 F.3d
at 1151. “Because the [Commissioner] has no direct interest” in how the award is
apportioned between client and counsel, district courts must independently “assure that the
reasonableness of the fee is established.” Id. at 1149.
In determining whether fees sought under § 406(b) are reasonable, the Court
considers the contingent-fee agreement, the character of the attorney’s representation, and
the achieved result. Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 808. Although not controlling, courts may also
consider the number of hours spent representing the claimant and the attorney’s normal
hourly billing rate for non-contingent-fee cases in determining reasonableness. Id. at 808–
09. Finally, if a claimant’s attorney receives fees under both the EAJA and § 406(b), the
attorney must “refund to the claimant the amount of the smaller fee.” Id. at 796 (citation
omitted).
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III. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff contracted to pay 25% of her past-due benefits on a contingent fee basis for
work performed by her counsel in this action. (Doc. 18-2). The Commissioner set aside
$25,920.50 for attorney fees and Counsel requests a portion of this amount— $15,000—
in fees under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b). Counsel’s itemization of services indicates 10.4 hours of
services rendered, which equates to a rate of $1,442.30 per hour ($15,000/10.4 hours).
(Doc. 18-3 at 2). If awarded the requested attorney fees under § 406(b), Counsel will
reimburse Plaintiff the $2,544.04 EAJA fee award. Counsel thus seeks net attorney fees in
the amount of $12,455.96 or $1,197.69 per hour, which is on the high end of effective
hourly rates that have been previously approved in this Circuit. See Young v. Colvin, No.
CV-11-538-PHX-SMM, 2014 WL 590335, at *2 (D. Ariz. Feb. 14, 2014) (citing Crawford,
586 F.3d at 1153) (noting approval of effective hourly rates of $519, $875, and $902); see
also Hopkins v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., No. CV-18-08129-PCT-DGC, 2024 WL
3010939, at *1 (D. Ariz. June 14, 2024) (effective hourly rate of $231.94); Mize v. Comm’r
of Soc. Sec. Admin., No. CV-21-00330-TUC-JGZ, 2024 WL 3951986, at *2 (D. Ariz. Aug.
27, 2024) (effective hourly rate of $350.79).
However, the $1,197.69 net rate is still within the range of reasonableness. See
Williams v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., No. CV-20-00136-PHX-JAT, 2025 WL 1342821,
at *2 (D. Ariz. May 8, 2025) (approving an effective hourly rate of $1,482.05); see also
Roegner v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., No. CV-20-01974-PHX-DLR, 2024 WL 5106647,
at *1 (D. Ariz. Dec. 13, 2024) (approving an effective hourly rate of $1,912.35); McCabe
v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., No. CV-22-00192-PHX-DLR, 2025 WL 460744, at *1 (D.
Ariz. Feb. 11, 2025) (approving an effective hourly rate of $1,513.51).
Furthermore, upon review of the record, the Court finds no indication that Counsel
engaged in any substandard performance or undue delay in prosecuting Plaintiff’s case.
Indeed, through Counsel’s efforts, Plaintiff was awarded all benefits for which she applied.
The Court also acknowledges the inherent risk of loss that attaches to contingent-based
representation and the fact that Counsel has requested a fee considerably less than the 25%
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maximum amount authorized by § 406(b). Accordingly, the Court concludes that a fee
award of $15,000 is reasonable and will approve an award in this amount.
Because Plaintiff’s counsel “must refund to the claimant the amount of the smaller
fee [between the attorney fees payable under both the EAJA and § 406(b)],” Gisbrecht,
535 U.S. at 796, the Court will order Plaintiff’s counsel to refund the $2,544.04 EAJA
award to Plaintiff upon Plaintiff’s counsel’s receipt of the attorney fees awarded by this
Order.
IV. CONCLUSION
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s counsel’s Motion for Attorney Fees under 42
U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A), (Doc. 23), is GRANTED in the amount of $15,000.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s counsel shall, after receipt of the
above-awarded fee, refund to Plaintiff the fee previously awarded under the EAJA, in the
amount of $2,544.04.
Dated this 30th day of March, 2026.
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