Brown v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company

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WO
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
Nicole Brown,
Plaintiff,
v.
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Company,
Defendant.
No. CV-24-00368-PHX-ROS
ORDER
Before the Court is Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 47), to which
Plaintiff filed a Response (Doc. 49), and Defendant filed a Reply (Doc. 51). Defendant’s
Motion will be decided without oral argument. See LRCiv 7.2(f).
For the reasons that follow, the Court will grant Defendant’s Motion for Summary
Judgment.
I. BACKGROUND
All facts set forth below are undisputed or not subject to reasonable dispute based
on proffered admissible evidence unless otherwise noted.1
Plaintiff Nicole Brown, a Black woman, worked for Defendant State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Company from April 2003 to December 2023. (Doc. 49 at 4.) In
2012, Plaintiff was promoted to the position of Claims Team Manager (“TM”) responsible
1 Plaintiff’s evidentiary objections are resolved infra. Notably, the series of complaints
against Plaintiff are not hearsay because they are not offered for the truth of the matter
asserted (i.e., that Plaintiff actually engaged in the accused conduct or behaviors). Rather,
they are offered to show that the complaints were made and substantiated the others, which
Plaintiff does not dispute.
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for overseeing a team of Claims Specialists2 (Id. ¶ 7.) Each TM reports to a Section
Manager (“SM”) who supervises a team of TMs. In turn, each SM reports to a Claims
Manager (“CM”).
On February 17, 2014, an internal investigation was initiated after two of Plaintiff’s
team members filed complaints “alleg[ing] Brown is condescending, disrespectful and is
creating a hostile work environment.” (Doc. 47-1 at 127.) Though the investigation did not
definitively find Plaintiff violated State Farm’s anti-harassment policy, it “did reveal
concerns among several witnesses interviewed” regarding Plaintiff’s “micromanaging,
disrespect, condescending tone and [her] controlling nature.” (Id. at 128.) Three of the four
other team members interviewed for the investigation corroborated the allegations of the
two complainants that “Brown is condescending, negative; controlling, abrupt, and a
micromanager.” (Id. at 129.) Plaintiff’s then-SM, Rosalinda Hockman, also recalled
“receiv[ing] a complaint from employees indicating Brown was condescending towards
them” soon after Plaintiff became a TM. According to Hockman, “Brown was very
receptive to [Hockman’s] constructive feedback and made changes to her style.” (Id.)
Between December 2020 and March 2021, multiple other employees made similar
complaints about Plaintiff; an investigation found no clear violation of State Farm’s
policies but recommended Plaintiff be provided verbal coaching. (Doc. 47-1 at 137.)
In December 2022, Cindy Castillo-Wilson took over as Plaintiff’s SM. (Doc. 47-1
at 78.) SM Castillo-Wilson reported to CM Conall Murphy, who was Ms. Brown’s second-
level supervisor from 2020 to September 2023.3 (Doc. 49 at 4.) In turn, CM Murphy was
directly supervised by Michael Payne, who took over as Vice President of Operations
(“VPO”) in late 2021. (Id. at 5.)
In January 2023, SM Castillo-Wilson received a complaint from Jessica Poppe, one
2 Though some of Plaintiff’s team members have titles such as “Claim Representative” and
“Claim Processor,” the Court refers to them generally as Plaintiff’s “team members” or
“subordinates.”
3 Paul Robichaux became Plaintiff’s CM sometime in September 2023 and attended the
misconduct review meeting where it was unanimously agreed Plaintiff should be demoted.
However, CM Robichaux played little role in the alleged discrimination and retaliation
because the ultimate decision-making authority was with CM Murphy and VPO Payne.
(Doc. 49-1 at 147.)
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of Plaintiff’s team members. Poppe’s allegations echoed prior concerns of Plaintiff’s
“actions and tone” making Poppe feel bullied, dismissed, and berated, and that Plaintiff did
not “feel like a safe person” to communicate with. (Doc. 47 at 3.) After multiple other
employees made similar complaints about Plaintiff in April 2023,4 SM Castillo-Wilson
contacted State Farm’s Human Resources & Development Department (“HR&D”) for
advice on how to proceed.
On May 18, 2023, SM Castillo-Wilson met with Plaintiff to discuss the complaints
against her and to provide verbal coaching regarding Plaintiff’s responsibility as TM to
create a safe working environment and how “to incorporate a more supportive, inclusive
and caring style” in communicating with her team members. Castillo-Wilson did inform
Plaintiff that “[f]ailure to demonstrate immediate, consistent, and sustained improvement
may result in further action up to and including termination.” During this meeting, Plaintiff
alleges she told Castillo-Wilson she “was concerned these complaints related to [her] status
as a [B]lack woman supervisor and are consistent with stereotypical complaints against
[B]lack females in the workplace and the company’s response to those complaints was
influenced by [her] status as a [B]lack woman.” (Doc. 49-1 at 37.) The next day, Plaintiff
sent an email “rebuttal” to Castillo-Wilson’s summary of their meeting, objecting to
Plaintiff’s subordinate’s accounts of the various incidents in which Plaintiff was allegedly
argumentative and bullying.
After her meeting with SM Castillo-Wilson, Plaintiff called HR&D and spoke with
Carol Lee Nelson, stating Castillo-Wilson was “not being supportive” and that Plaintiff
“thought that her leader was supporting [Plaintiff’s] employees and not her.” According to
Plaintiff, she also shared with Nelson her concerns that her team member’s complaints
were racially biased.5 Plaintiff did not request an investigation into her complaints about
4 Plaintiff asserts, without evidence, that this “stream of complaints” was her team’s
“concerted effort to push back against her” because they were “frustrated” by her holding
the team accountable. (Doc. 49 at 2.)
5 Plaintiff generally asserts she “shared those same concerns Ms. Nelson” that she had
shared with Castillo-Wilson. (Doc. 49-1 at 38.) Plaintiff’s account is disputed by Nelson
in her deposition testimony. In particular, Nelson disagrees that Plaintiff communicated
“any concern that either her leader or her subordinate employees were treating her
differently because of her race.” (Doc. 47-1 at 176.) On May 19, 2023, Plaintiff sent an
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Castillo-Wilson. A week later, Nelson reached back out to Plaintiff, asking how she might
try to address Plaintiff’s concerns, but Plaintiff told Nelson the matter concerning her
complaints about Castillo-Wilson could be closed. (Doc. 49-1 at 38.) Ultimately, HR&D
determined an investigation was not warranted and Plaintiff’s complaints to Nelson did not
constitute an alleged policy violation.
On May 26 and June 7, 2023, SM Castillo-Wilson held two more coaching sessions
with Plaintiff to discuss her team members’ complaints. On June 8, 2023, Castillo-Wilson
sent Plaintiff an email recapping the prior day’s meeting; Plaintiff responded to the email
on June 9, objecting to “the misleading manner of the email,” (Doc. 49-1 at 39), and
asserting Plaintiff was “being held accountable to a different standard” than other TMs who
were not similarly treated after allegedly being involved in “more egregious” situations,
(Doc. 49-1 at 178).6 That same day, Plaintiff again reached out to Nelson and asked to
reopen and investigate Plaintiff’s complaint against Castillo-Wilson.
Also on June 9, 2023, another complaint was filed concerning Plaintiff’s negative
interactions with her team members. As a consequence of the multiple similar complaints
against Plaintiff in a relatively short time, HR&D decided to recommend a formal
investigation into the complaints. On or about June 14, 2023, after SM Castillo-Wilson was
notified of the new complaint and investigation by HR&D, she ceased any efforts to
address the complaints herself and played no further role in the investigation regarding
Plaintiff. (Doc. 47-1 at 70–74.)
The investigation was assigned to investigator Brenda Colon with State Farms’s
HR-Investigations (“HRI”) team. Colon interviewed eleven of Plaintiff’s current or former
team members, most of whom corroborated the allegations concerning Plaintiff’s behavior
email “rebuttal” to Castillo-Wilson’s recap of their May 18 meeting in which Plaintiff
referred to the complaints against her as “stereotypical.” Although Plaintiff asked Nelson
to review this (and other) emails she sent to Castillo-Wilson, there is no evidence Plaintiff
told Nelson what she meant by “stereotypical,” and Nelson testified she and Plaintiff did
not discuss what this meant. (See id. at 179.)
6 In her Declaration, Plaintiff characterizes her June 9 email as “pointing out how white
managers with similar complaints had been treated differently and without repercussions
for similar conduct.” (Doc. 49-1 at 39.) But in the actual text of her email, Plaintiff did not
mention race, stereotyping, or any other word explicitly or implicitly appearing to tie her
alleged differential treatment to her race. (See id. at 178.)
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and interactions with team members. (Doc. 47 at 5–6.) During Colon’s investigation,
another complaint was submitted by one of Plaintiff’s subordinates; VPO Payne requested
to meet with both Colon and the new complaining employee to discuss the complaint, and
the employee reiterated much of what Colon allegedly had heard from the other employees.
According to Colon’s report of her investigation:
The majority of witnesses interviewed, described their work environment as
stressful[,] indicated that [Plaintiff’s] behavior as a leader adds an additional
layer of stress, anxiety, and fear many described as “hostile” and not fitting
of a “servant leader.” Several employees were hesitant to speak to HRI and
expressed fear of retaliation.
(Doc. 47-1 at 227.)
On July 25, 2023, Colon interviewed Plaintiff, in the presence of CM Murphy and
CM Vanessa Patricia Walters. Colon shared with Plaintiff the feedback gathered from her
investigation and the interviews of Plaintiff’s current and former subordinates. Plaintiff
denied any wrongdoing, claiming the employees fabricated the allegations concerning her
behavior to avoid being held accountable for their own shortcomings.7 (Doc. 47-1 at 232.)
In the interview, Plaintiff also shared her concerns that the complaints against her, as well
as SM Castillo-Wilson’s handling of those complaints, were racially biased, stating “[t]he
only thing I’m guilty of is managing while Black.” (Id.) After the interview, Colon
discussed Plaintiff’s allegations with CM Murphy and CM Walters, advising that in her
opinion a separate, independent investigation was now necessary regarding Plaintiff’s
discrimination complaint.
On August 4, 2023, HRI investigator Cindy Smith was assigned to investigate
Plaintiff’s allegations of discrimination. As part of her investigation, Smith examined HR
and management records and interviewed both SM Castillo-Wilson and Plaintiff. Plaintiff
claimed there were multiple times non-Black TMs were treated more favorably by Castillo-
Wilson for similar incidents, but provided only one specific incident in early 2023
involving TM Bobbie Wade. This incident, which Plaintiff had previously mentioned in
7 Notably, Plaintiff presents apparently conflicting explanations for the allegations
concerning her behavior. On the one hand, Plaintiff asserts the allegations are untrue; but
alternatively, Plaintiff implicitly admits to some of the alleged behaviors by arguing other
TMs who displayed such behaviors were not similarly investigated or demoted.
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her June interview with Colon, occurred while Plaintiff was out of town and TM Wade
assisted Plaintiff’s team members as necessary. After one of Plaintiff’s team members, Lisa
Reynolds, made a mistake, Wade attempted to provide coaching; this prompted a negative
reaction from Reynolds, which prompted Wade to angrily raise her voice in response.
Despite this, SM Castillo-Wilson did not take further action against Wade because Wade
allegedly self-reported the incident to Castillo-Wilson, acknowledged the impropriety of
her response, discussed how she would approach the situation differently in the future, and
had no prior history of complaints. After conducting multiple interviews and reviewing the
relevant information, Smith completed a draft summary of her investigation findings on
October 9, 2023, noting she found no evidence substantiating Plaintiff’s allegations.
On September 12, 2023, Colon and VPO Payne met to discuss the findings of
Colon’s investigation. VPO Payne agreed with Colon’s conclusion that there was sufficient
evidence, corroborated by multiple witnesses, to establish Plaintiff violated State Farm’s
anti-harassment policy by creating “an uncomfortable and intimidating work environment
for her team.” (Doc. 47-1 at 227.) On September 20, 2023, Colon completed the first draft
summary of her findings; on September 26, Colon then distributed the draft summary to
VPO Payne and Plaintiff’s new CM, Paul Robichaux,8 in advance of a misconduct review
meeting set for September 29, 2023, to determine what discipline, if any, should be
administered.
Present at the September 29 misconduct review meeting were Colon, VPO Payne,
CM Murphy, CM Robichaux, and HR&D manager Cami Hubert. The group discussed
Colon’s findings in comparison with discipline previously issued against other employees
who committed similar policy violations. The misconduct review meeting unanimously
concluded with the decision “that level reduction was the most appropriate course of
action.”9 (Doc. 47-2 at 53–54.) VPO Payne claimed he and CM Murphy were ultimately
8 Colon’s email distributing the draft summary is not in evidence. However, in Robichaux’s
deposition, counsel referred to the exhibit having been sent “to Michael Payne and Paul
Robichaux with several ccs.” (Doc. 47-2 at 50.) The Court will assume the “several ccs”
included the other individuals who attended the September 29 misconduct review meeting.
9 The team considered the substantiated allegations and demotions in similar cases, along
with other factors that favored demotion as the appropriate response. These factors
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responsible for the decision to demote Plaintiff. (Doc. 49-1 at 147.)
Prior to the misconduct review meeting, on September 22, 2023, Plaintiff filed a
charge of discrimination with the EEOC. The EEOC notified State Farm of Plaintiff’s
charge on October 1, 2023.10 On October 13, 2023, CM Robichaux informed Plaintiff of
her demotion as had been decided at the September 29 misconduct review meeting.
Plaintiff notified State Farm on December 12, 2023, of her intent to terminate her
employment, effective December 27, 2023.11 Plaintiff thereafter filed a second charge with
the EEOC on January 9, 2024, alleging she was constructively discharged in retaliation for
engaging in protected activity. On January 18, 2024, the EEOC issued a notice of right to
sue with respect to Plaintiff’s charges of discrimination and retaliation.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is granted if the pleadings and supporting documents, viewed
in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, “show that there is no genuine issue as
to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). The
moving party bears the initial responsibility of presenting the basis for its motion and
identifying those portions of the record that it believes demonstrates the absence of a
genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. The non-moving party must then
point to specific facts establishing there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial. Id.
At summary judgment, the Court considers only admissible evidence. See Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(B). When considering a motion for summary judgment, a court should not
weigh the evidence or assess credibility; instead, “the evidence of the non-movant is to be
included: Plaintiff’s history of being coached after complaints for similar behaviors;
Plaintiff’s lack of accountability and remorse; and management’s lack of confidence in
Plaintiff’s ability to make the necessary behavioral adjustments to remain in a leadership
position.
10 October 1, 2023, was a Sunday, so State Farm did not receive effective notice of
Plaintiff’s EEOC Charge until October 2, 2023.
11 Plaintiff asserts she told State Farm “her resignation would be effective at the conclusion
of her paid time off . . . on February 2, 2024,” but “State Farm preemptively made her
employment termination effective December 27, 2023.” (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 47–48.) However,
Plaintiff does not suggest State Farm acted improperly in setting this effective termination
date.
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believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). A genuine issue of material fact exists “if the
[admissible] evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-
moving party.” Id. at 248. In ruling on the motion for summary judgment, the Court will
construe the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Barlow v.
Ground, 943 F.2d 1132, 1135 (9th Cir. 1991).
III. ANALYSIS
A. Preliminary Objections
Plaintiff objects to the entirety of Defendant’s asserted facts “on the basis that the
evidence cited is inadmissible based on State Farm failed [sic] to comply with the Court’s
order . . . requiring each party to file a Rule 26(a)(3) disclosure by the December 13, 2024
deadline.” Pretrial disclosures under Rule 26(a)(3) “must be made at least 30 days before
trial” unless otherwise ordered by the Court. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(3). The original district
judge hearing this matter issued a Case Management Order on April 22, 2024, setting the
deadline for pretrial disclosures as December 13, 2024. (Doc. 14.) On December 31, 2024,
the parties jointly moved to refer the case to a magistrate judge for a settlement conference,
(Doc. 39), which was conducted on March 5, 2025 (Doc. 50). Although Defendant failed
to file their pretrial disclosure by the original deadline of December 13, 2024, Plaintiff has
failed to establish she suffered any prejudice as a result or why the draconian sanction of
excluding all of Defendant’s evidence is justifiable. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1) (excusing
a failure to timely file pretrial disclosures if “substantially justified” or “harmless”). Indeed,
the trial setting was delayed while the parties pursued a possible settlement, and Plaintiff
does not suggest Defendant intends to rely on evidence that was not otherwise disclosed.
Plaintiff specifically objects to Defendant’s account of an incident involving Lisa
Reynolds and TM Bobbie Wade as inadmissible hearsay.12 (See Doc. 49 at 3:19.) With
respect to this incident, it is undisputed that Wade’s conduct was wrongful and similar to
the conduct of which Plaintiff was accused by her subordinates. But Defendant’s account
12 Notably, Plaintiff’s own account of the Reynolds incident, which she offers to show
Wade was similarly situated to Plaintiff, is itself likely based on inadmissible hearsay.
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of the Reynolds incident is not hearsay because it is not offered to prove the truth of this
account; rather, it is offered to show why “Castillo-Wilson did not take any further action
regarding the incident.” (See Doc. 47 at 8:18–19.) Although Plaintiff might dispute whether
Wade in fact took responsibility for her actions, she cannot dispute Castillo-Wilson’s
reasoning and perception of the incident. Castillo-Wilson’s reasons why she did not believe
discipline was necessary for Wade are nonhearsay evidence relevant to whether Wade was
similarly situated to Plaintiff.
As relevant to the Court’s analysis, Plaintiff disputes the following facts from
Defendant’s Motion: (1) State Farm recommended “verbal coaching” after the February
2021 complaint (Doc. 47 at 2:28–3:1); (2) Nelson’s account of whether Plaintiff alleged
race-based discrimination against her team members and SM Castillo-Wilson (id. at 4:13–
5:1); (3) “HR&D recommended Plaintiff be formally investigated for policy violations”
(id. at 5:15); and (4) the “implied assertion that Mr. Murphy and Mr. Payne did not know
about Ms. Brown’s discrimination complaints” (Doc. 49 at 3:28–4:1).
First, there is no genuine dispute of material fact regarding State Farm’s
recommendation for verbal coaching of Plaintiff after the February 2021 complaint.
Plaintiff proffers CM Murphy’s deposition testimony to seemingly suggest verbal coaching
was not warranted based only on the “Findings” section of the investigation summary. But
significantly, Plaintiff does not dispute verbal coaching was the recommended action.
Second, there is no genuine dispute of material fact regarding Nelson’s account of
Plaintiff’s allegations against SM Castillo-Wilson. Plaintiff points to her sworn declaration
asserting she “shared those same concerns with Ms. Nelson and expressed [her]
apprehension about Ms. Castillo-Wilson’s follow-up/response.” (Doc. 49-1 at 38.) Even if
this general assertion was sufficient to dispute whether Plaintiff specifically alleged racial
discrimination by her team members and SM Castillo-Wilson, this dispute is not material
as Plaintiff has not proffered admissible evidence that Nelson relayed allegations of racial
discrimination to anyone else, particularly the supervisors responsible for Plaintiff’s
demotion, VPO Payne and CM Murphy.
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Third, it is true HR&D did not explicitly recommend Plaintiff be investigated “for
policy violations,” but it is otherwise undisputed HR&D relayed the complaints against
Plaintiff to VPO Payne with a request “to investigate the concerns” raised by Plaintiff’s
subordinates. (Doc. 47-1 at 197.)
Lastly, Plaintiff disputes Defendant’s factual statement that “[t]here is no evidence
Plaintiff ever approached or raised any issue of discrimination or differential treatment with
the managers to whom Castillo-Wilson reported at the time, Murphy and Michael Payne.”
But Plaintiff has not proffered admissible evidence to dispute this fact. Rather, Plaintiff
argues that that either Castillo-Wilson13 or Nelson must have relayed allegations of racial
discrimination to Murphy and Payne. But this is nothing other than mere speculation.
B. Race Discrimination
Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, it is unlawful for an employer “to
fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against
any individual with respect to [her] compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment” on account of the employee’s race. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). To survive
summary judgment on a race discrimination claim, a plaintiff must “create a triable issue
of fact regarding discriminatory intent.” Alozie v. Ariz. Bd. of Regents, 431 F. Supp. 3d
1100, 1111 (D. Ariz. 2020) (quoting Habib v. Matson Navigation Co., 694 F. App’x 499,
500–01 (9th Cir. 2017)). To meet this burden, a plaintiff may produce “direct or
circumstantial evidence demonstrating that a discriminatory reason more likely than not
motivated” the adverse action; alternatively, a plaintiff may rely on the McDonnell Douglas
burden-shifting framework to raise a rebuttable presumption of discrimination.14 Pac.
Shores Props., LLC v. City of Newport Beach, 730 F.3d 1142, 1158 (9th Cir. 2013).
13 Although SM Castillo-Wilson forwarded to Murphy Plaintiff’s June 9 email, Plaintiff’s
references therein to the allegations being “stereotypical” are too general, without more, to
establish Murphy understood Plaintiff to be alleging racial discrimination.
14 The parties appear to agree McDonnell Douglas is the applicable framework here. In any
event, because Defendant has proffered a legitimate, nondiscriminatory motivation, the
McDonnell Douglas framework is appropriate: “Under either approach, [Plaintiff] must
produce some evidence suggesting” an adverse employment action “was due in part or
whole to discriminatory intent.” See McGinest v. GTE Serv. Corp., 360 F.3d 1103, 1123
(9th Cir. 2004).
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To establish a prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas, Plaintiff must show:
(1) she belongs to a protected class; (2) she was qualified for her position; (3) she was
subject to an adverse employment action; and (4) similarly situated individuals outside her
protected class were treated more favorably. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S.
792, 802 (1973). “The burden of production, but not persuasion, then shifts to the employer
to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged action.” Chuang
v. Univ. of Cal. Davis, Bd. of Trustees, 225 F.3d 1115, 1123–24 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing
McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802)). “If the employer does so, [Plaintiff] must show
that the articulated reason is pretextual ‘either directly by persuading the court that a
discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that
the employer’s proffered explanation is unworthy of credence.’” Id. at 1124 (quoting Tex.
Dep’t of Cmty. Affs. v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981)).
It is undisputed Plaintiff belongs to a protected class15 and was subject to an adverse
employment action when she was demoted.16 (See Doc. 47 at 14.) However, Defendant
argues Plaintiff “cannot show (1) she was performing her job satisfactorily [i.e., she was
qualified for her position] or (2) that similarly situated individuals outside her protected
class were treated more favorably.” (Id.) Furthermore, even if Plaintiff established her
prima facie case, Defendant argues there is no evidence of intentional discrimination to
suggest Defendant’s proffered legitimate motive is pretextual. (Id. at 22–25.)
1. Satisfactory Job Performance
Plaintiff has met her prima facie burden to show a genuine dispute as to her
qualifications for the TM position from which she was demoted. Despite some prior history
of similar complaints, Plaintiff has also shown her history of favorable performance
15 Plaintiff alleges she suffered discrimination rooted in stereotypical tropes regarding
Black women. (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 41–42.) However, Plaintiff states a claim only for race-based,
not sex-based, discrimination. (Id. ¶ 54.)
16 In her Complaint, Plaintiff alleges she suffered multiple adverse employment actions,
including failures to promote her. However, the Court considers Plaintiff’s demotion to be
the particular action on which she states her claim, as Plaintiff has not argued nor proffered
evidence as to the others. For example, when relying on McDonnell Douglas for a failure
to promote claim, Plaintiff must show the job remained open or a non-Black individual was
promoted in her place.
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reviews and merit pay increases. (Doc. 49 at 23.) Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s soft
skills regarding positive interactions with her team members are also important
qualifications for a TM and that her subordinates’ complaints show Plaintiff’s
qualifications were lacking in this respect. (See Doc. 51 at 9.) But Plaintiff’s alleged
“deficiencies in fostering a positive environment,” (id.), also constitute Defendant’s
legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for demoting Plaintiff, so Defendant’s argument is
more properly resolved at the pretext stage. See Davenport v. Riverview Gardens Sch. Dist.,
30 F.3d 940, 944 (8th Cir. 1994) (“[B]y requiring plaintiff to disprove the alleged conduct
violations in order to establish his prima facie case, the district court essentially required
plaintiff, at the outset, to disprove defendant’s alleged business reasons for its adverse
employment action—in other words, to prove pretext and the ultimate issue of intentional
discrimination. The prima facie burden is not so onerous.”); Medina v. Multaler, Inc., 547
F. Supp. 2d 1099, 1126–27 (C.D. Cal. 2007); see also Aragon v. Republic Silver State
Disposal Inc., 292 F.3d 654, 659 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding a district court erred by requiring
a plaintiff to show not only he was qualified but “he was doing his job well enough to
eliminate the possibility that he was laid off for inadequate job performance,” thus
“conflat[ing] the minimal inference needed to establish a prima facie case with the specific,
substantial showing [the plaintiff] must make at the third stage of the McDonnell Douglas
inquiry to demonstrate that [the defendant’s] reasons for laying him off were pretextual”).
2. Similarly Situated Comparators
However, Plaintiff has failed to show similarly situated, non-Black employees were
treated more favorably. To establish similarly situated comparators, the individuals being
compared “need not be identical” but must be “similar ‘in all material respects.’” Ballou v.
McElvain, 29 F.4th 413, 423 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting Hawn v. Exec. Jet Mgmt., Inc., 615
F.3d 1151, 1157 (9th Cir. 2010)). Plaintiff asserts she has “provided the examples of
several non-[B]lack managers, who suffered no repercussions in response to complaints
like those levied against her: Amanda Alieto, Bobbie Wade, Stephanie Logan, Crystal
Huggins, and Linda Osborn-Jackson.” (Doc. 49 at 24.) But as to all but one of these
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individuals, Plaintiff has no evidence supporting her contentions beyond her own
testimony, which relies on unsubstantiated and inadmissible hearsay.17 (See Doc. 49-2 at
140–41, 144–46). Only as to TM Bobbie Wade does Plaintiff offer specific facts as to how
Wade was not similarly punished in response to a similar complaint regarding an
interaction with a subordinate. But the record is also clear Plaintiff and Wade were not
similarly situated—unlike with Plaintiff, there is no admissible evidence offered by
Plaintiff that Wade had a similar history of receiving such complaints, (see Doc. 47 at 20),
and there is undisputed admissible evidence that Wade self-reported the incident to SM
Castillo-Wilson while appearing to take responsibility and explaining future steps she
would take to avoid similar incidents in the future, (Doc. 47-1 at 213–16). Thus, the
incident with Wade is materially different such that it cannot support an inference Plaintiff
was treated more harshly for the same conduct simply because of her race.
3. Pretext
Because Plaintiff has not met her prima facie burden, the McDonnell Douglas
analysis ends. But even assuming Plaintiff had sufficient evidence of comparators,
Defendant has proffered a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for Plaintiff’s demotion
based on ongoing corroborated complaints concerning her behavior for which verbal
coaching failed to resolve. Plaintiff would thus bear the burden to show Defendant’s
legitimate reason is pretextual.
Under Title VII, “a plaintiff may not defeat a defendant’s motion for summary
judgment merely by denying the credibility of the defendant’s proffered reason for the
challenged employment action” or by “relying solely on the plaintiff’s subjective belief
that the challenged employment action was unnecessary or unwarranted.” Cornwell v.
Electra Cent. Credit Union, 439 F.3d 1018, 1028 n.6 (9th Cir. 2006). When relying on
indirect, circumstantial evidence to show pretext,18 “that evidence must be specific and
17 Even if Plaintiff’s evidence was admissible, her comparisons are too general to assess
whether these individuals were similar in all material respects.
18 Here, Plaintiff has no direct evidence of discriminatory intent. “Direct evidence is
‘evidence which, if believed, proves the fact of [discriminatory animus] without inference
or presumption.” Vasquez v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 349 F.3d 634, 640 (9th Cir. 2003). Even
if Plaintiff’s assertions of “stereotypical” language qualifies as circumstantial evidence
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substantial to defeat the employer’s motion for summary judgment.” E.E.O.C. v. Boeing
Co., 577 F.3d 1044, 1049 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Coghlan v. Am. Seafoods Co., 413 F.3d
1090, 1095 (9th Cir. 2005)). This “specific and substantial” standard, however, “is
tempered by [the Ninth Circuit’s] observation that a plaintiff’s burden to raise a triable
issue of pretext is hardly an onerous one.” France v. Johnson, 795 F.3d 1170, 1175 (9th
Cir. 2015).
In her Response, Plaintiff asserts she has provided sufficient evidence for a jury to
find Defendant’s asserted motive is pretextual “under a cat’s paw theory.” (Doc. 49 at 24.)
Under the “cat’s paw” or “rubber stamp” theory of liability, a “subordinate’s bias is
imputed to the employer if the plaintiff can prove that the allegedly independent adverse
employment decision was not actually independent because the biased subordinate
influenced or was involved in the decision or decisionmaking process.” Poland v. Chertoff,
494 F.3d 1174, 1182 (9th Cir. 2007). Here, Plaintiff argues the alleged bias of her
subordinates and/or SM Castillo-Wilson is imputed to Defendant given its “notice of the
discriminatory motives of the subordinates making complaints against [Plaintiff], the
inherently discriminatory nature of the complaints, and the obvious intent of the
subordinates to get rid of [Plaintiff].” (Doc. 49 at 24.) But regardless of whether and when
CM Murphy and VPO Payne knew Plaintiff had complained of racial discrimination,
Plaintiff’s argument fails for two reasons.
First, Plaintiff has not proffered specific and substantial admissible evidence
showing any biased subordinate influenced or was involved in the otherwise independent
decisions to investigate and demote her. Plaintiff asserts “State Farm essentially rubber
stamped those complaints and took the action the subordinates wanted.” (Doc. 49 at 24.)
But even if Plaintiff could show her subordinates’ complaints were motivated by
discriminatory animus,19 Plaintiff does not offer admissible evidence that Defendant
from which a jury could infer her subordinates’ complaints were discriminatory, Plaintiff
must also show a sufficient nexus between her subordinates’ discriminatory complaints
and the ultimate decision to demote her. See id. (“Vasquez has not shown the necessary
nexus because Leeds conducted her own thorough investigation, and . . . Vasquez presents
no evidence that discriminatory animus motivated Leeds’ decision.”).
19 Given the numerous complaints filed by Plaintiff’s subordinates, Plaintiff would
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“rubber stamped” those complaints without independent review and demoted Plaintiff
simply because her subordinates wished it. See Lakeside-Scott v. Multnomah Cnty., 556
F.3d 797, 807 (9th Cir. 2009) (“The facts before us here show a workplace in which the
initial report of possible employee misconduct came from a presumably biased supervisor,
but whose subsequent involvement in the disciplinary process was so minimal as to negate
any inference that the investigation and final termination decision were made other than
independently and without bias.”) Her claim is pure speculation, which is insufficient to
survive a motion for summary judgment.
Second, Plaintiff has not proffered specific and substantial admissible evidence
upon which a jury could find the complaints of Plaintiff’s subordinates were motivated by
discriminatory animus.20 In her deposition, Plaintiff affirmed the only evidence she has of
her subordinates’ race-based discrimination is “the terminology that was used to describe
[her].” (Doc. 47-1 at 60.) Specifically, Plaintiff asserts complaints of her being “loud,
aggressive, [and] yelling” is terminology rooted in a “a stereotypical trope of the ‘angry
[B]lack woman’ that pervades our culture.” (Doc. 49 at 9–10.) But without relevant
evidence, these facially race-neutral words are not sufficient to raise an inference of
discriminatory motive. See, e.g., Twymon v. Wells Fargo & Co., 462 F.3d 925, 934 (8th
Cir. 2006) (“Facially race-neutral statements, without more, do not demonstrate racial
animus on the part of the speaker.”); Kimble v. Quality Assist, Inc., No. 1:19-cv-02549-
JPB, 2022 WL 832424, at *9 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 21, 2022) (“[T]he Court is not persuaded that
being overly critical of Kimble and referring to Kimble as ‘angry’ or the like, without more,
support an inference of discrimination. Indeed, the plaintiffs in almost all of the cases
Kimble cites to bolster her argument regarding racial stereotyping were expressly labeled
as ‘angry black women.’”); Cromity v. City of Orlando, 702 F. Supp. 3d 1223, 1239 (M.D.
seemingly need to show either (1) every complaint was racially biased, or (2) the nonbiased
complaints alone were insufficient to provide a legitimate, nondiscriminatory basis for the
investigation and demotion. See Lakeside-Scott, 556 F.3d at 808–09 (finding a supervisor’s
“wholly independent decisionmaking negated any causal connection” to another’s bias
where the investigation did not “depend heavily” on the biased individual); Cromity, 702
F. Supp. 3d at 1242 & n.29.
20 Notably, Defendant devoted a significant portion of the Motion for Summary Judgment
to this argument, (see Doc. 47 at 16–19), but Plaintiff does not address it in her Response.
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Fla. 2023) (same).
Moreover, Plaintiff’s asserted personal knowledge or belief that such words are
“commonly used against [B]lack women in leadership positions” is not admissible to
establish these facially neutral words are circumstantial evidence of another’s
discriminatory animus.21 The Federal Rules of Evidence clearly distinguish between lay
opinion testimony under Rule 701 and expert opinion testimony under Rule 702. Because
Plaintiff has not sought to qualify herself as an expert witness, her opinion testimony must
meet the elements of admissibility under Rule 701, which states:
If a witness is not testifying as an expert, testimony in the form of an opinion
is limited to one that is:
(a) rationally based on the witness’s perception;
(b) helpful to clearly understanding the witness’s testimony or to
determining a fact in issue; and
(c) not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge
within the scope of Rule 702.
Fed. R. Evid. 701. Plaintiff’s opinion that she “reasonably believed the attacks on her were
discriminatory” based on perceived stereotypes against Black women in the workplace,
(Doc. 49 at 9–10), may be rationally based on Plaintiff’s own perception. But see United
States v. Gadson, 763 F.3d 1189, 1207 (9th Cir. 2014) (noting lay testimony was not
rationally based on a witness’s perception where the witness “essentially ‘spoon-fed his
interpretations of the phone calls and the government’s theory of the case to the jury,
interpreting even ordinary English language’” (quoting United States v. Freeman, 730 F.3d
590, 597 (6th Cir. 2013))). However, this opinion would not be relevant to establish racially
discriminatory intent because it is speculative in that it does not, without more, tie the
stereotypical biases to Plaintiff’s subordinates or anyone else at State Farm. See, e.g.,
Bickerstaff v. Vassar Coll., 196 F.3d 435, 456 (2d Cir.1999) (“[F]eelings and perceptions
of being discriminated against are not evidence of discrimination.”); Humphries v. City
Univ. of New York, No. 13 CIV. 2641 PAE, 2013 WL 6196561, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 26,
2013) (“Although use of the above adjectives to describe an employee could, in
21 Plaintiff has also submitted two facially inadmissible articles concerning the “Angry
Black Woman” stereotype. (Doc. 49-2 at 153, 162.) Even if these articles were admissible,
they are likely not relevant as they might only suggest Plaintiff’s subordinates or
supervisors were implicitly biased, rather than acting out of discriminatory animus.
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combination with other concrete factual allegations, support a claim of racial and/or gender
discrimination, here there are no such allegations. Without more, Humphries’ subjective
interpretation of her co-workers’ use of these critical but facially non-discriminatory terms
does not, itself, reveal discriminatory animus.”).
If Plaintiff’s opinion is instead that, based upon her particularized experience as a
Black woman and specialized knowledge of implicit biases against Black women in the
workplace, her subordinates’ facially race-neutral words establish they acted with a
discriminatory motive, this may involve “specialized knowledge” within the scope of
expert opinions under Rule 702. See United States v. Figueroa-Lopez, 125 F.3d 1241, 1246
(9th Cir. 1997) (law enforcement agents could testify that the defendant was acting
suspiciously, without being qualified as experts; however, the rules on experts were
applicable where the agents testified on the basis of extensive experience that the defendant
was using code words to refer to drug quantities and prices); Yu v. Idaho State Univ., 15
F.4th 1236, 1245 (9th Cir. 2021) (Miller, J., concurring) (“In other contexts, we have held
that an expert’s observations on a psychological phenomenon explaining a class of
behavior can be admitted to assist the jury.” (emphasis added)). Assuming Plaintiff is
qualified as an expert witness based on her gender, race, and lived experience, and even if
her opinion regarding implicit biases is undisputed, it does not constitute admissible
evidence of intentional discrimination by her subordinates. See White v. BNSF Ry. Co., 726
F. App’x 603, 604 (9th Cir. 2018) (affirming a district court’s exclusion of expert testimony
on implicit biases because the plaintiff “never explained how testimony regarding implicit
bias would be helpful to the jury in a disparate treatment case requiring evidence of
intentional discrimination”).
C. Retaliation
The McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework applies to Title VII retaliation
claims. Cornwell, 439 F.3d at 1035 (citing Yartzoff v. Thomas, 809 F.2d 1371, 1376 (9th
Cir. 1987)). “To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, a plaintiff must demonstrate:
(1) a protected activity; (2) an adverse employment action; and (3) a causal link between
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the protected activity and the adverse employment action.” Id. at 1034–35 (citing Steiner
v. Showboat Operating Co., 25 F.3d 1459, 1464 (9th Cir.1994)). If the employer proffers
a legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for its action, the plaintiff must then show the articulated
reason is pretextual because it is unworthy of credence or because a retaliatory reason more
likely than not motivated the action. Yartzoff, 809 F.2d at 1377.
It is undisputed Plaintiff’s EEOC charge is protected activity22 and Plaintiff’s
investigation23 and demotion were adverse employment actions. But Defendant argues the
admissible evidence establishes the decision to demote Plaintiff was made before anyone
at State Farm knew Plaintiff filed an EEOC charge, and Plaintiff has not met her burden to
produce admissible evidence establishing a causal link between the protected activity and
adverse employment action. (Doc. 47 at 20.)
Plaintiff has likely met her prima facie burden to show a causal link between her
protected activity and her investigation and demotion. A plaintiff may establish causation
with “circumstantial evidence such as the employer’s knowledge of the protected activities
and the proximity in time between the protected activity and the adverse action.” Dawson
v. Entek Int’l, 630 F.3d 928, 936 (9th Cir. 2011). Here, there is no causal nexus between
Plaintiff’s EEOC charge and her investigation and demotion because the decisions to
investigate and demote Plaintiff were made before State Farm received notice of her EEOC
charge. However, if Plaintiff’s May 2023 internal complaint is instead viewed as the
relevant protected activity, the initiation of an investigation roughly one month later might
be sufficient circumstantial evidence to show causation.
But even assuming Plaintiff has made a prima facie showing of causation, she has
22 Plaintiff alternatively argues her internal complaint regarding the “stereotypical”
allegations against her was also protected activity, but there are disputes as to who in fact
understood her complaint to be alleging race-based discrimination. Drawing every
inference in Plaintiff’s favor, the Court presumes this internal complaint qualifies as a
second instance of protected activity
23 Defendant asserts only an unwarranted investigation may sometimes qualify as an
adverse employment action, citing for comparison Coszalter v. City of Salem, 320 F.3d
968, 975 (9th Cir. 2003), and Ware v. Billington, 344 F. Supp. 2d 63, 76 (D.D.C. 2004).
Following Ninth Circuit precedent, the Court presumes this is such a case where “merely
investigating an employee—regardless of the outcome of that investigation—likely can
support a claim for Title VII retaliation.” Campbell v. Haw. Dep’t of Educ., 892 F.3d 1005,
1023 (9th Cir. 2018).
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failed to create a triable issue rebutting Defendant’s proffered legitimate reasons for
investigating and demoting Plaintiff. Plaintiff asserts four grounds24 to establish pretext:
(1) the asserted basis for Plaintiff’s investigation and demotion only warranted verbal
coaching prior to her protected activity; (2) Plaintiff received positive performance
feedback prior to the protected activity; (3) “Mr. Payne’s initial response to the protected
activity—criticizing Ms. Brown [sic] complaints as deflections of responsibility”; and (4)
Defendant’s inconsistent application of its own policies and practices. (Doc. 49 at 20–23.)
As to the first and second grounds, neither suggests Defendant’s legitimate reason
to demote Plaintiff is unworthy of credence as both are consistent with Defendant’s
proffered motivation. In light of Plaintiff’s generally positive performance record in the
past, prior isolated complaints regarding her behavior were found to only warrant verbal
coaching. But as similar complaints continued to accrue against Plaintiff, according to
Defendant it became apparent verbal coaching may not be sufficient to resolve the issue.
Simply because a full investigation and demotion was not warranted for each discrete
complaint does not suggest a full investigation and demotion was not warranted by the
unceasing cumulative effect of the complaints.25
Third, the record does not support Plaintiff’s characterization of Payne’s June 20
response to her complaint against SM Castillo-Wilson. As a threshold matter, it’s not clear
this response is properly attributable to Payne or if it amounts to more than a factual
statement on the meeting’s circumstances. The record of the meeting merely notes:
24 In her Response, Plaintiff relies on the temporal proximity only to show causation, not
pretext. (See Doc. 49 at 20–21.) In any event, the temporal proximity is likely sufficient
only to meet Plaintiff’s minimal prima facie burden and does little to refute Defendant’s
proffered legitimate reason for her investigation and demotion. See Kama v. Mayorkas,
107 F.4th 1054, 1060–61 (9th Cir. 2024) (noting cases where temporal proximity was
sufficient to show pretext involved a period of “only a few days” between the protected
activity and adverse action, while usually being accompanied by other evidence of pretext);
Hashimoto v. Dalton, 118 F.3d 671, 679–80 (9th Cir. 1997) (proximity of “a few months”
sufficient to infer causation but not to show pretext); see also Justice v. Rockwell Collins,
Inc., 117 F. Supp. 3d 1119, 1141 (D. Or. 2015), aff’d, 720 F. App’x 365 (9th Cir. 2017)
(finding proximity in time categorically insufficient to show pretext).
25 It is for this reason the complaints themselves are not hearsay, as it is irrelevant whether
Plaintiff in fact displayed the behaviors of which she was accused. Rather, the complaints
are offered to suggest State Farm reasonably investigated and believed demotion was
appropriate based on the number of complaints, their corroboration and substantiation, and
because less drastic action had not been effective in stopping new complaints.
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“[Payne] stated that Cindy has been a SM for a long time; none of that has been said about
her before. And now have allegations that are deflecting to Cindy.” (Doc. 49-1 at 57.)
Furthermore, the record does not suggest anyone in this meeting knew or should have
known Plaintiff’s complaint against SM Castillo-Wilson involved allegations of racial
discrimination. Plaintiff generally asserts after her May 18 meeting with Castillo-Wilson
where she objected to the complaints against her, Plaintiff then “shared those same
concerns with Ms. Nelson and expressed [her] apprehension about Ms. Castillo-Wilson’s
follow-up/response.” (Doc. 49-1 at 38.) But in her deposition, Nelson testified Plaintiff
never raised any concerns she was being treated differently because of her race. (Doc. 47-
1 at 176–79.) And the report of the June 20 meeting does not suggest anyone involved
understood Plaintiff to be asserting race-based discrimination, instead describing Plaintiff’s
allegations to concern “feeling unsafe, unsupported, harassed, and asked to do things that
others are not being asked.” (Doc. 49-1 at 57.) Thus, even if Payne was not sympathetic to
Plaintiff’s complaint, Plaintiff does not have sufficient evidence suggesting Payne had any
reason to believe these complaints alleged race-based discrimination and thus constituted
a protected activity.
Fourth, Plaintiff’s assertions that Defendant deviated from its standard practices are
largely meritless. A deviation from an employer’s standard disciplinary process may serve
as circumstantial evidence of pretext. See, e.g., Vasquez v. City of Idaho Falls, 778 F.
App’x 415, 417 (9th Cir. 2019) (noting such deviation where an employer “immediately
disciplined [the employee] while refusing to explain the reason, failed to follow its
progressive disciplinary process, and denied [the employee] access to the personal
belongings he kept at work”); Porter v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr., 419 F.3d 885, 896 (9th Cir.
2005). Plaintiff argues Defendant’s investigation process deviated from its own practices
in four ways: (1) Payne “insisted on a full HR&D investigation” despite the typical
progressive discipline structure; (2) the failure to afford Plaintiff’s complaints against her
subordinates and SM Castillo-Wilson “a second independent investigation free from
influence by the first”; (3) the failure to “ignor[e] a complaining party’s disciplinary
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history”; (4) not pausing the first investigation into Plaintiff while Plaintiff’s own
complaints were being investigated. (Doc. 49 at 22–23.) But the record does not support
Plaintiff’s assertions:
(1) Plaintiff’s evidence does not suggest Payne ignored the progressive discipline
structure and “insisted on a full HR&D investigation.” Rather, the report of the
June 20 meeting shows Payne declined performing another environmental scan
of Plaintiff’s employees as they’d previously done, instead “asking if we need
to now do something different.” (Doc. 49-1 at 57.)
(2) The record shows Plaintiff’s complaints were, in fact, afforded a second
investigation independent of the investigation into the complaints of Plaintiff’s
subordinates. It may be true that two investigators, Smith and Colon, made
contact four times over a five-week period. (See Doc. 49 at 16–17.) But
according to Smith, some contact and information-sharing between the two
investigations would not be inconsistent with State Farm’s standard practices,
(see Doc. 49-1 at 243), and there is no evidence suggesting these few contacts
somehow tainted the independence of the investigations.
(3) Plaintiff fails to point to the record where this policy is noted, only noting Colon
had never before encountered a situation where the complaining party’s
disciplinary history was relevant to an investigation. But assuming such a policy
exists, Plaintiff’s complaints concerned other complaints made against her, thus
making similar past allegations of her behavior directly relevant to her claims
that the allegations against her were fabricated.
(4) Again, Plaintiff fails to point to the record where Colon suggested the first
investigation be paused pending the investigation into Plaintiff’s complaint. (See
Doc. 49 at 23.) Presumably, Plaintiff refers to a portion of Colon’s deposition
testimony wherein Colon explained that, after Smith initiated her investigation,
Colon told VPO Payne she “cannot close [her] investigative file nor can you
move forward and make any business decision pertaining to the outcome of
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[Colon’s] investigation until Cindy Smith has an opportunity” to investigate
Plaintiff’s complaints. (Doc. 49-1 at 200.) That appears to be what happened
here: Smith distributed her investigation findings on October 9, 2023, after
which CM Robichaux formally informed Plaintiff of her demotion on October
13, 2023. It is true that the disciplinary response to Colon’s findings was agreed
upon prior to the conclusion of Smith’s investigation. But the timing of
Robichaux’s disciplinary notice suggests State Farm in fact waited for Smith to
conclude her investigation before formalizing the decision to demote Plaintiff.
Thus, Plaintiff’s argument does little to show Defendant’s reasons for demoting
her were pretextual, as there is no evidence to suggest Defendant would have
been unable or unwilling to reconsider Plaintiff’s demotion if Smith’s
investigation had instead substantiated Plaintiff’s discrimination complaints.
Overall, there is a more fundamental reason Plaintiff cannot show Defendant’s
proffered explanation is unworthy of credence—Plaintiff does not clearly dispute the
behaviors of which she was accused, but rather she argues she was treated more harshly by
her subordinates and supervisors for these behaviors on account of her race. Indeed,
Plaintiff does not refute Defendant’s legitimate belief that “it had to investigate, and could
not ignore, the credible allegations of misconduct against her . . . accusations which, it turns
out, were found largely to be true.” See Campbell v. Haw. Dep’t of Educ., 892 F.3d 1005,
1023 (9th Cir. 2018). And even if the complaints were false, Plaintiff has no evidence
showing anyone at State Farm involved in the decision to demote her did not honestly
believe demotion was warranted by the numerous complaints regarding Plaintiff’s
behavior, even if prior isolated complaints of such behavior were not previously found to
substantiate policy violations. See Villiarimo v. Aloha Island Air, Inc., 281 F.3d 1054, 1063
(9th Cir. 2002) (“In judging whether Aloha’s proffered justifications were ‘false,’ it is not
important whether they were objectively false . . . . Rather, courts ‘only require that an
employer honestly believed its reason for its actions, even if its reason is foolish or trivial
or even baseless.’” (quoting Johnson v. Nordstrom, Inc., 260 F.3d 727, 733 (7th Cir.
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2001))). Defendants argue, and the Court agrees, “[e]ven if Plaintiff could conclusively
prove she had not engaged in the behaviors complained of by her employees . . . , she would
still fail to establish pretext because she has failed to produce any evidence that State
Farm’s justification that Plaintiff engaged in harassment was unworthy of belief.” (Doc. 51
at 9.)
IV. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff has failed to show genuine issues of material fact
exist as to both her discrimination and retaliation claims under Title VII. As such, the Court
will grant Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment in its entirety.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 47) is
GRANTED. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment in favor of Defendant and
close this case.
Dated this 19th day of March, 2026.
Honorable Roslyn O. Silver
Senior United States District Judge
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