Smarthealth Incorporated v. Chemotechnique MB Diagnostics AB et al

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
WO
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
Smarthealth Incorporated,
Plaintiff,
v.
Chemotechnique MB Diagnostics AB, et al.,
Defendants.
No. CV-25-00115-PHX-JJT
ORDER
At issue is Defendant Chemotechnique MB Diagnostics AB’s Motion to Dismiss
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2) and Joinder in Dormer Laboratories Inc.’s Motion
(“Motion to Dismiss”) (Doc. 12, Mot.), to which Plaintiff Smarthealth Incorporated
responded (Doc. 45, Resp.), Chemotechnique replied (Doc. 51, Reply), and both parties
sur-replied. (Docs. 56–57). The Court finds this matter appropriate for resolution without
oral argument. See LRCiv 7.2(f). For the reasons set forth below, the Court denies
Chemotechnique’s Motion to Dismiss.
I. BACKGROUND
Smarthealth, also known as “SmartPractice,” is an Arizona entity that manufactures
and sells patch tests to diagnose allergic contact dermatitis. (Doc. 36, FAC, ¶¶ 6, 33, 36.)
Generally, patch tests are comprised of an allergen, also called a “hapten,” and a chamber
that is applied to the skin and directly delivers the allergen. (Id. ¶ 29.) Chemotechnique, a
Swedish entity, manufactures its own allergens and chambers for patch testing. (Id. ¶¶ 2–
3.) Allergens must be licensed by the Federal Drug Administration (“FDA”) to be legally
Case 2:25-cv-00115-JJT Document 58 Filed 03/16/26 Page 1 of 12

- 2 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
sold and distributed in the United States. (Id. ¶ 31.) Smarthealth’s products are licensed by
the FDA (id. ¶ 33, 36), but Chemotechnique’s products are not (id. ¶¶ 2–4).
Chemotechnique maintains no place of business in the United States. (Doc. 12-1,
Def. Decl., ¶ 5.) It has no employees, bank accounts or property in the United States. (Id.
¶¶ 5–6.) It does not pay taxes, register to do business, or maintain sales contracts with
anyone in the United States. (Id.) Its products are distributed to the United States by a
Canadian-based distributor, Dormer, which also distributes the products in Canada. (Id.
¶ 9.) In addition to distributing Chemotechnique’s products, Dormer also markets the
products at trade shows, on its interactive website, and in publications. (See FAC ¶¶ 42,
45, 50, 53, 58, 60, 70, 72, 74, 76.)
Chemotechnique’s business developer, David Alsheimer-Niklasson, avers that
Chemotechnique has no involvement in or control over Dormer’s marketing materials and
website that Dormer uses to sell its products. (Def. Decl. ¶¶ 10–13.) Chemotechnique’s
only independent marketing efforts, according to Mr. Alsheimer-Niklasson, include
maintaining a passive, informational website, circulating a quarterly e-newsletter to
subscribers around the world, and posting on social media accounts. (Id. ¶ 15.)
Mr. Alsheimer-Niklasson also acknowledges that, in the last decade, Chemotechnique’s
staff attended eight trade shows held in major U.S. cities where members of industry-
leading groups meet and lecturers share relevant research. (Id. ¶ 16.) At these trade shows,
Chemotechnique “distributes its yearly product catalogue and leaflet to international
participants,” examples of which are attached to Mr. Alsheimer-Niklasson’s declaration.
(Id. ¶ 18; see id. at 11–112, 128–34.)
Smarthealth sued Chemotechnique and Dormer on three claims: (1) false
advertising under the Lanham Act; (2) common law unfair competition; and (3) tortious
interference with contractual relations. (FAC ¶¶ 101–17.) The crux of Smarthealth’s claims
is that Chemotechnique and Dormer are using false or misleading statements in their
advertisements that give consumers the wrong impression that Chemotechnique’s products
are licensed by the FDA for sale in the United States. (Id. ¶¶ 1–5.) Chemotechnique now
Case 2:25-cv-00115-JJT Document 58 Filed 03/16/26 Page 2 of 12

- 3 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
moves to dismiss Smarthealth’s claims for lack of personal jurisdiction under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2).
II. LEGAL STANDARD
For a federal court to adjudicate a matter, it must have jurisdiction over the parties.
Ins. Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 701 (1982).
There are two types of personal jurisdiction: general and specific. General jurisdiction is
not at issue here. (See Resp. at 13–14 (Smarthealth conceding that there is no general
jurisdiction over Chemotechnique in Arizona).) Neither is specific jurisdiction within a
particular state at issue. (See id. at 2 n.2 (Smarthealth conceding that Chemotechnique has
no contacts with Arizona).) Rather, Smarthealth argues that this Court has nationwide
specific jurisdiction over Chemotechnique pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
4(k)(2), known as the “federal long-arm statute.” Pebble Beach Co. v. Caddy, 453 F.3d
1151, 1159 (9th Cir. 2006).
Rule 4(k)(2) establishes personal jurisdiction over a defendant if the following three
conditions are met: (1) the claims arise under federal law; (2) the defendant is not subject
to jurisdiction in any state’s courts of general jurisdiction; and (3) exercising jurisdiction
comports with due process. Id.; see Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(2).
Due process requires that a non-resident, non-consenting defendant have sufficient
minimum contacts with the forum so that “maintenance of the suit does not offend
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326
U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (citation modified). The focus of this analysis is “on the relationship
among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation.” Briskin v. Shopify, Inc., 135 F.4th 739,
750 (9th Cir. 2025). Whether a defendant has sufficient minimum contacts with the forum1
turns on three elements. Morrill v. Scott Fin. Corp., 873 F.3d 1136, 1142 (9th Cir. 2017).
First, the defendant “must purposefully direct his activities or consummate some
transaction with the forum or resident thereof; or perform some act by which he
1 The due process analysis under Rule 4(k)(2) “is nearly identical to traditional personal
jurisdiction analysis but rather than considering contacts between the defendant and the
forum state, we consider contacts with the nation as a whole.” Ayla, LLC v. Alya Skin Pty.
Ltd., 11 F.4th 972, 979 (9th Cir. 2021) (citation modified).
Case 2:25-cv-00115-JJT Document 58 Filed 03/16/26 Page 3 of 12

- 4 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
purposefully avails himself of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum, thereby
invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.” Id. Second, “the claim must be one which
arises out of or relates to the defendant’s forum-related activities.” Id. And third, “the
exercise of jurisdiction must comport with fair play and substantial justice, i.e. it must be
reasonable.” Id. The plaintiff bears the burden of satisfying the first two elements while the
defendant bears the burden of negating the third. Id. All three elements are required for
jurisdiction to lie. Id.
At the motion to dismiss stage, “the plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that
the court has jurisdiction” and “need only make a prima facie showing of jurisdictional
facts to withstand the motion” when, as here, no evidentiary hearing is held. In re W. States
Wholesale Nat. Gas Antitrust Litig., 715 F.3d 716, 741 (9th Cir. 2013), aff’d sub nom.
Oneok, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc., 575 U.S. 373 (2015). The facts alleged in the complaint are
generally accepted as true unless controverted by affidavit. Data Disc, Inc. v. Sys. Tech.
Assocs., Inc., 557 F.2d 1280, 1284 (9th Cir. 1977). But when facts contained in the parties’
affidavits conflict, that conflict must be resolved in the plaintiff’s favor. Rio Props., Inc. v.
Rio Int’l Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007, 1019 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted).
III. ANALYSIS
Neither party contests that the first two conditions of Rule 4(k)(2)—that the claims
arise under federal law and that Chemotechnique is not subject to any state court’s
jurisdiction—are met.2 Rather, the parties sharply contest whether jurisdiction meets the
due process standard under the minimum contacts test.
A. Purposeful Direction
To meet the first element of the minimum contacts test, the plaintiff must show the
defendant “either (1) purposefully availed himself of the privilege of conducting activities
2 Even if they had, this action plainly arises under federal law—the Lanham Act—and the
record indicates that Chemotechnique is not subject to the general jurisdiction of Arizona
or anywhere else in the United States. (See Def. Decl. ¶¶ 4–7.) Chemotechnique could
avoid Rule 4(k)(2) jurisdiction only by designating a suitable state forum in which
Smarthealth could have sued, but it does not attempt to do so at all. Fitbit, Inc. v.
Koninklijke Philips N.V., 336 F.R.D. 574, 582 (N.D. Cal. 2020) (citing Merial Ltd. v. Cipla
Ltd., 681 F.3d 1283 (Fed. Cir. 2012)).
Case 2:25-cv-00115-JJT Document 58 Filed 03/16/26 Page 4 of 12

- 5 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
in the forum, or (2) purposefully directed his activities towards the forum.” Pebble Beach
Co., 453 F.3d at 1155 (citation modified). When, as here, a plaintiff’s claims sound in tort,
courts apply the purposeful direction test. Herbal Brands, Inc. v. Photoplaza, Inc., 72 F.
4th 1085, 1091 (9th Cir. 2023) (applying the purposeful direction test to false advertising
and tortious interference claims).
To determine whether the defendant’s actions constitute purposeful direction, courts
apply the “effects” test developed in Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789–90 (1984). The
Calder test requires that “the defendant allegedly must have (1) committed an intentional
act, (2) expressly aimed at the forum state, (3) causing harm that the defendant knows is
likely to be suffered in the forum state.” Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme, 433
F.3d 1199, 1206 (9th Cir. 2006) (citation modified). “The proper question is not where the
plaintiff experienced a particular injury or effect but whether the defendant’s conduct
connects [it] to the forum in a meaningful way.” Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 290 (2014).
In other words, the relationship between the defendant, the forum state, and the litigation
“must arise out of contacts that the defendant himself creates with the forum State” and not
just “the defendant’s contacts with persons who reside there.” Id. at 284–85 (emphasis in
original). Mere foreseeability that the forum will be affected is insufficient to satisfy the
Calder test—rather, there must be “something more.” Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin
Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 805 (9th Cir. 2004); Herbal Brands, Inc., 72 F.4th at 1092;
accord Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 111 (1987)
(plurality opinion).
Smarthealth lists many examples of what it believes to be Chemotechnique’s
contacts with the United States. The Court will address only one. Mr. Alsheimer-Niklasson
declared that Chemotechnique’s staff “distributes its yearly product catalogue and leaflet”
at trade shows held in the United States. (Def. Decl. ¶¶ 16–18.) Chemotechnique has
attended eight of these trade shows in the last decade (id. ¶ 16), some of which are led by
the American Contact Dermatitis Society (“ACDS”) whose membership, according to
Smarthealth’s evidence, is almost exclusively based in the United States (Resp. at 4–5;
Case 2:25-cv-00115-JJT Document 58 Filed 03/16/26 Page 5 of 12

- 6 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Doc. 45-3 ¶¶ 3–11). The product catalogue and leaflet clearly market Chemotechnique’s
products, indicate distribution capability to the United States and, most importantly, bear
the same purportedly false or misleading language that form the basis for Smarthealth’s
claims, including the phrases “high quality,” and “most advanced.” (Compare FAC ¶ 58
with Def. Decl. at 13, 134; compare FAC ¶ 74 with Def. Decl. at 131.) These are precise
phrases that, according to Smarthealth, deceived professionals in the United States into
purchasing Chemotechnique’s products “believing them to have the same approvals, and
to have undergone the same rigorous safety and efficacy testing, as [Smarthealth’s] FDA-
approved and cleared products.” (FAC ¶ 93.) According to Smarthealth, it lost revenue and
market share because of Chemotechnique’s marketing. (Id. ¶¶ 94–95.) Smarthealth alleges,
and Chemotechnique does not controvert, that Chemotechnique was “informed of the false
and misleading nature of their advertisements and the unfair nature of their competition
against SmartPractice.” (Id. ¶ 97.)
The first Calder element3 requires that an act is intentional, which “has a specialized
meaning” in the context of specific personal jurisdiction and refers “to an intent to perform
an actual, physical act in the real world, rather than an intent to accomplish a result or
consequence of that act.” Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 806. Chemotechnique admits that
its staff physically distributed material that contained the allegedly false or misleading
statements in the United States, so the act was plainly intentional.
Under the second Calder element, “[t]he proper question is not where the plaintiff
experienced a particular injury or effect but whether the defendant’s conduct connects him
to the forum in a meaningful way.” Walden, 571 U.S. at 290. Here, Chemotechnique’s staff
traveled to the United States almost every year for the last decade and physically distributed
its own marketing material at major industry events. The evidence demonstrates that some
of these events are led by a group of predominantly U.S.-based medical professionals. (See
3 Neither party directly applies the Calder elements to Chemotechnique’s distribution of
product catalogs and leaflets specifically; they focus on many other purported contacts that
Chemotechnique has with the United States. Still, it was Chemotechnique that verified this
activity and attached an example of its marketing material to its’ business developer’s
declaration. Consideration of that activity and that material is fairly before the Court, and
both parties have had a full and fair opportunity to address it.
Case 2:25-cv-00115-JJT Document 58 Filed 03/16/26 Page 6 of 12

- 7 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Doc. 45-3 ¶¶ 3–11.) Chemotechnique’s nearly annual distribution of advertisements at
major meetings and events held by a predominantly U.S.-based group enables
Chemotechnique to directly market its products to an audience that is acutely interested in
contact dermatitis diagnostic tools in the United States. This conduct is intentional,
meaningful, and directly connects Chemotechnique to the United States.
The third Calder element requires the act to cause harm that Chemotechnique knew
was likely to be suffered in the United States. First, Chemotechnique clearly knew its staff
distributed marketing materials while physically present in the United States;
Mr. Alsheimer-Niklasson admits as much in his declaration. (Def. Decl. ¶ 18.) Second, the
marketing materials manifestly contain statements that Smarthealth alleges are false or
misleading. (See, e.g., id. at 13, 131, 134.) Third, Smarthealth alleges, and Chemotechnique
does not refute, that Chemotechnique was notified that statements used in its marketing
material were false or misleading. (FAC ¶ 97.) Data Disc., 557 F.2d at 1284 (holding that
the facts alleged in the complaint are generally accepted as true unless contradicted by
affidavit). It is reasonable to infer from these facts that Chemotechnique knew that
consumers who received marketing material in the United States may rely upon false or
misleading statements of Chemotechnique’s products. This is precisely the harm that
Smarthealth allegedly suffers because of, in part, Chemotechnique’s marketing at these
trade shows.
Chemotechnique argues that its attendance at trade shows is insufficient to establish
personal jurisdiction and cites to Holland American Line, Inc. v. Wartsila North America,
Inc., 485 F.3d 450, 460 (9th Cir. 2007). In Holland, the plaintiff sued defendants for
negligent inspection of the plaintiff’s ship that was destroyed in an engine fire off of Tahiti.
Id. at 453–54. The only connection that the defendants had to the United States was that
they “occasionally visited cruise ships” and advertised in publications that “incidentally”
made their way into the forum. Id. at 460. But these contacts were completely disconnected
from the claims at issue. Here, Chemotechnique’s contacts are distinguishable. It did not
merely attend trade shows; rather, it intentionally distributed advertisements containing
Case 2:25-cv-00115-JJT Document 58 Filed 03/16/26 Page 7 of 12

- 8 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
allegedly false or misleading statements that are the crux of the claims while it attended
trade shows. This clear and meaningful connection between the act, the forum, and the
claims at bar was missing in Holland, but it is present here.
Chemotechnique also implies that personal jurisdiction under Rule 4(k)(2) needs to
be “sufficiently extensive to warrant invoking this exceptional rule.” (Mot. at 5–6.) But
this Circuit imposes no higher standard for a non-resident’s minimum contacts than what
is traditionally applied in the specific jurisdiction analysis. Ayla, LLC, 11 F.4th at 978 n.1.
Having met each element of the Calder test, Chemotechnique’s contact with the
United States is the “something more” that is required for the purposeful direction test.
Accordingly, Smarthealth meets the first element of the minimum contact test.
B. Nexus
To meet the second element of the minimum contacts test, “the claim must be one
which arises out of or relates to the defendant’s forum-related activities.” Morrill, 873 F.3d
at 1142. This inquiry does not demand “proof of causation—i.e., proof that the plaintiff’s
claim came about because of the defendant’s in-state conduct.” Ford Motor Co. v. Mont.
Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 592 U.S. 351, 362 (2021). While “[t]he first half of that
standard asks about causation . . . [] the back half, after the ‘or,’ contemplates that some
relationships will support jurisdiction without a causal showing.” Id. Still, the “relate to”
standard “does not mean anything goes,” and “relatedness requires a close connection
between contacts and injury.” Yamashita v. LG Chem, Ltd., 62 F.4th 496, 506 (9th Cir.
2023) (citation modified). In the Ninth Circuit, claims sufficiently relate to a defendant’s
forum contacts “if similar injuries will tend to be caused by those contacts” or “the
defendant should have foreseen the risk that its contacts might cause injuries like that of
the plaintiff.” Id. at 505–06.
As Chemotechnique itself asserts, “[t]his case is about alleged false advertising.”
(Reply at 2.) Smarthealth alleges that Chemotechnique made several statements in
advertisements that led physicians and medical professionals to believe Chemotechnique’s
products are: “(1) legally sold in the United States; (2) proven to be safe and effective; and
Case 2:25-cv-00115-JJT Document 58 Filed 03/16/26 Page 8 of 12

- 9 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
(3) that the physician and medical personnel legally can seek federal reimbursement for
[the] products if prescribed for Medicare patients.” (FAC ¶ 86.) The relevant statements
include: (1) the haptens are “high quality” (id. ¶ 58); and (2) the chambers are the “most
advanced” (id. ¶ 74). These statements appear in the product catalog and leaflet that
Chemotechnique admittedly distributes in the United States at major industry events. This
act clearly arises out of and relates to Smarthealth’s false advertising claims. Smarthealth
satisfies the second element of the minimum contact test.
C. Reasonableness
Because Smarthealth satisfies the first two prongs of the minimum contacts test, the
burden shifts to Chemotechnique to demonstrate a “compelling case” that exercising
jurisdiction over it is unreasonable. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477
(1985). Courts weigh seven factors to determine the reasonableness of jurisdiction over a
non-resident defendant.
The first factor considers the “the extent of the defendant’s purposeful interjection
into the forum state’s affairs.” Doe v. Deutsche Lufthansa Aktiengesellschaft, 157 F.4th
1103, 1113 (9th Cir. 2025). The Ninth Circuit has found this factor to be “analogous to the
purposeful direction factor.” Ayla, LLC, 11 F.4th at 984. Chemotechnique fails to address
this factor. In the absence of Chemotechnique’s argument otherwise, the Court finds that
Chemotechnique purposefully interjected itself into the affairs of the United States by
virtue of purposefully directing activity at the United States. This factor weighs in favor of
jurisdiction.
The second factor, which considers “the burden on the defendant of defending in
the forum” Doe, 157 F.4th at 1113, weighs against jurisdiction, but only slightly.
Chemotechnique has no agent or office anywhere in the United States. As Chemotechnique
contends, it would have to travel between Sweden and Arizona or, alternatively, consult
with its counsel across a nine-hour time difference. (Reply at 10.) Litigating in a foreign
country is an undeniable inconvenience, but it is mitigated by modern advances in
technology and this Court’s frequent use of electronic or telephonic means to conduct most
Case 2:25-cv-00115-JJT Document 58 Filed 03/16/26 Page 9 of 12

- 10 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
proceedings like scheduling conferences or discovery disputes. See Sinatra v. Nat’l
Enquirer, Inc., 854 F.2d 1191, 1199 (9th Cir. 1988) (“[M]odern advances in
communications and transportation have significantly reduced the burden of litigating in
another country.”); Ayla, LLC, 11 F.4th at 984 (noting that there are “unique burdens placed
upon one who must defend oneself in a foreign legal system,” but those “burdens do not
outweigh the contacts on which [the plaintiff’s] claims are premised”).
The third factor considers “the extent of conflict with the sovereignty of the
defendant’s state.” Doe, 157 F.4th at 1113. This weighs in favor of jurisdiction.
Chemotechnique does not address this factor and the Court is aware of no particular
conflict that adjudication in this forum creates with Sweden’s sovereignty. See, e.g., id. at
1114 (finding that a plaintiff’s claims predicated on harms arising from a foreign country’s
laws conflicts with that country’s sovereignty); Ayla, LLC,11 F.4th at 984 (finding that a
plaintiff’s claims involving only laws and activities occurring in the United States did not
conflict with a foreign country’s sovereignty).
The fourth factor considers “the forum state’s interest in adjudicating the dispute.”
Doe, 157 F.4th at 1113. Chemotechnique argues that all Smarthealth’s claims will proceed
against Dormer, so the United States’ interest in adjudicating this dispute does not turn on
whether this Court exercises its jurisdiction over Chemotechnique. (Reply at 10–11.) The
Court disagrees. The United States has an interest in protecting consumers from false or
misleading advertisements; hence its Legislature enacting federal law to prohibit that
conduct. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a). The fact that another party may be held accountable does
not necessarily satisfy this interest in toto. This factor weighs in favor of jurisdiction.
The fifth factor regards “the most efficient judicial resolution of the controversy”
and “focuses on the location of the evidence and witnesses.” Doe, 157 F.4th at 1114
(citation modified). According to Smarthealth, witnesses and evidence regarding customer
confusion are located in the United States. (Resp. at 17.) Smarthealth’s First Amended
Complaint also reflects this reality, as its claims center around U.S-based physicians’ and
medical professionals’ impression of advertisements from Chemotechnique. This factor
Case 2:25-cv-00115-JJT Document 58 Filed 03/16/26 Page 10 of 12

- 11 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
weighs in favor of jurisdiction, but only slightly because it “is no longer weighed heavily
given the modern advances in communication and transportation.” Doe, 157 F.4th at 1114
(citation modified).
The sixth factor assesses “the importance of the forum to the plaintiff’s interest in
convenient and effective relief.” Doe, 157 F.4th at 1113. Smarthealth argues that, without
jurisdiction here, it must “pursue duplicative litigation in, presumably, a foreign court, and
later pursue recognition of any judgment it obtains in order to enforce that judgment back
here in the U.S.” (Resp. at 17.) While certainly inconvenient, Smarthealth does not contend
that the relief it would be granted in other forums would be any less effective than what it
would receive here. This factor weighs in favor of jurisdiction, but only slightly for the
same reason that Chemotechnique’s inconvenience of litigating in a country foreign to it
would weigh against jurisdiction.
Finally, the seventh factor considers “the existence of an alternative forum,” which
Smarthealth bears the burden of disproving. Doe, 157 F.4th at 1113. Smarthealth fails to
do so and even presumes that it would “pursue duplicative litigation in . . . a foreign court”
if this Court declines jurisdiction. In so presuming, Smarthealth alludes to the existence of
a viable alternative forum. Accordingly, this factor weighs against jurisdiction.
In sum, the second and sixth factors effectively counterbalance each other, leaving
only the seventh factor weighing against jurisdiction while factors one, three, four and five
weigh in favor of jurisdiction. Chemotechnique fails to make a “compelling case” that
jurisdiction is unreasonable here, so Smarthealth meets the third and final element of the
minimum contacts test. Accordingly, Smarthealth establishes that subjecting
Chemotechnique to an action in the United States “would not offend traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice.” Ayla, LLC, 11 F.4th at 979.
IV. CONCLUSION
Having met all three conditions of Rule 4(k)(2), this Court can exercise personal
jurisdiction over Chemotechnique. The Court will set a scheduling conference pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16 by separate order.
Case 2:25-cv-00115-JJT Document 58 Filed 03/16/26 Page 11 of 12

- 12 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
IT IS ORDERED denying Defendant Chemotechnique MB Diagnostics AB’s
Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2) and Joinder in Dormer Laboratories
Inc.’s Motion (Doc. 12).
Dated this 16th day of March, 2026.
Honorable John J. Tuchi
United States District Judge
Case 2:25-cv-00115-JJT Document 58 Filed 03/16/26 Page 12 of 12