O'Neil v. Maricopa, County of

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WO
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
Patricia O'Neil,
Plaintiff,
v.
County of Maricopa,
Defendant.
No. CV-25-00912-PHX-SHD
ORDER
Pending before the Court is Defendant County of Maricopa’s (“the County”) motion
to dismiss Plaintiff Patricia O’Neil’s Complaint for failure to state a claim under Federal
Rule of Procedure 12(b)(6). (Doc. 9.) O’Neil responded to the motion, and the County
replied. (Docs. 15, 16.) The motion will be granted with leave to amend.1
I. BACKGROUND
In February 2021, O’Neil began working for the County as a contractor. (Doc. 1
¶ 8.) A year and a half later, in June 2022, the County hired O’Neil as a Planning Specialist
in the Office of Preparedness and Response. (Doc. 1 ¶ 7.) Before and during O’Neil’s
employment with the County, she “volunteered with the Maricopa County Democratic
Party (“MCDP”) during her personal time.” (Id. at ¶ 11.)
In December 2020, two months before she began working with the County as a
contractor, O’Neil was elected First Vice Chairwoman of MCDP. (Id. at ¶ 12.) She became
Chairwoman in August 2023, about a year after the County hired her as an employee. (Id.
1 The parties did not request oral argument, and the Court does not believe oral
argument is necessary, so the motion will be decided without a hearing. See LRCiv 7.2(f).
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at ¶ 13.)
At the time O’Neil was hired as Planning Specialist, the County was operating under
the 2020 Code of Conduct (“2020 Code”). (Id. at ¶ 14.) The 2020 Code limited an
employee’s political activity while on duty:
L. Political Activity: While on-duty or representing the County, Employees
are expected to behave in an unbiased manner and without favoritism for or
against any political party or group or any member in order to promote public
confidence in government, government integrity, and the efficient delivery
of governmental services and to ensure that Employees are free from any
expressed or implied requirement or any political or other pressure of any
kind to engage or not engage in political activity.
(Id. at ¶ 14.) But, on February 28, 2024, the County Board of Supervisors adopted a new
Code of Conduct (“2024 Code”). (Id. at ¶ 16.) The 2024 Code specified that “[e]mployees
shall not . . . [b]e members of a political party’s national, state, or local committee” or “[b]e
officers or chairpersons of a partisan political club’s committee.” (Id. at ¶ 18.) O’Neil
alleges that while she signed and was hired under the 2020 Code, she was “never informed
of nor did she sign” the 2024 Code. (Id. at ¶¶ 15, 17.)
On April 1, 2024, O’Neil met with “Cathleen T[.] program manager for the Office
of Preparedness and Response, and Josh Y[.], a supervisor.” (Id. at ¶ 19.) They told O’Neil
“that someone had reported her ‘political membership’ to the County,” and informed her
that, as Chairwoman of MCDP, she was violating the 2024 Code. (Id. at ¶¶ 20, 21.)
Cathleen T. gave O’Neil “24 hours to decide whether she wanted to continue working for
the County or continue in her role with the MCDP, asserting that she could not do both.”
(Id. at ¶ 22.)
The next day, Joanne M., the Human Resources Group Manager, told O’Neil that
while she did not have to decide in 48 hours, “she would be put on administrative leave
pending an investigation into a potential violation of the [2024 Code].” (Id. at ¶ 23.) Eight
days later, on April 11, 2024, “Moline and Executive Director Jeanene F[.] invited [O’Neil]
to a video conference meeting,” where they informed O’Neil that she was violating the
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2024 Code, and gave her 24 hours to resign from MCDP or be terminated. (Id. at ¶¶ 24–
26.) O’Neil did not resign, and the County fired her. (Id. at ¶ 27.)
O’Neil filed this case against the County on March 19, 2025. (Doc. 1) She brings
two claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: (1) a “First Amendment Freedom of Association
Violation,” which asserts that the 2024 Code violates the First Amendment “on its face”;
and (2) a “First Amendment Retaliation for Political Party Association, which asserts that
the County violated the First Amendment when it fired O’Neil for holding office in MCDP.
(Id. at 5–8.)2 On April 16, 2025, the County moved to dismiss the Complaint, arguing
O’Neil’s claims are foreclosed by two Supreme Court cases—United States Civil Serv.
Comm’n v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers, AFL-CIO, 413 U.S. 548 (1973) and Broadrick
v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973). (Doc. 9 at 3.) The motion is fully briefed. (Docs. 15,
16.)
II. LEGAL STANDARD
“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true” and construed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, “to state a claim
to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (cleaned
up). A claim is plausible if the “plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.
In making this determination, legal conclusions are not accepted as true, nor are
“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements” considered. Id.; see also id. (“Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders naked
assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.” (cleaned up)). That said, “a complaint
attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations.”
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (emphasis added). A “well-pleaded
complaint may proceed even if . . . actual proof of those facts is improbable, and . . .
2 Though O’Neil cites Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976) in her Complaint, she has
not alleged, nor does she argue, that the County fired her because she is a Democrat. (See
generally, Docs. 1, 15.) Elrod’s framework is therefore inapplicable here. See 427 U.S. at
372 (holding that public employees may not be dismissed based solely on their political
party affiliation, as opposed to their leadership role in a partisan group, regardless of its
affiliation).
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recovery is very remote and unlikely.” Id. at 556 (cleaned up).
III. DISCUSSION
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two elements:
(1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated and
(2) that the violation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. See West
v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). Defendants argue that O’Neil’s claims fail at the first
step because even accepting her factual allegations as true, her claims fail as a matter of
law because she cannot show that the 2024 Code violates the First Amendment.3 The Court
agrees.
The Supreme Court has long held that federal and state governments may restrict
their employees from participating in certain partisan political activity. See Letter
Carriers, 413 U.S. at 556–57; Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 607. In Letter Carriers, the Court
considered whether the Hatch Act, which prohibited federal employees from “active
participation in political management or political campaigns,” violated the First
Amendment. 413 U.S. at 551. The plaintiffs argued that the Hatch Act unlawfully
prohibited federal employees from engaging in protected political activity, such as
becoming members of national political committees, “holding office in a political club,”
and “becom[ing] a precinct Democratic Committee Woman” in a “County Democratic
Committee.” Id. at 551 n.3. The Supreme Court held that “neither the First Amendment
nor any other provision of the Constitution invalidates a law barring this kind of partisan
political conduct by federal employees.” Id. at 556.
This principle applies with equal force to state and local governments. See
Broaderick, 413 U.S. at 605. In Broaderick, the Supreme Court considered language
nearly identical to that challenged by O’Neil—namely, an Oklahoma statute that prohibited
state employees from, among other things, being “a member of any national, state or local
committee of a political party, or an officer or member of a committee of a partisan political
3 O’Neil’s first claim is a facial attack on the 2024 Code, while her second claim is
an as applied challenge. (See Doc. 15 at 6–7.) Failure to show as a matter of law that the
2024 Code’s political participation restrictions violate the First Amendment is fatal to both
claims.
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club, or a candidate for nomination or election to any paid public office.” Id. at 606. Citing
Letter Carriers, the Court held that the Oklahoma statute did not violate the constitution.
See id. at 605, 618.
O’Neil’s claims are foreclosed by Letter Carriers and Broaderick. Like the
Oklahoma statute at issue in Broaderick, the 2024 Code prohibits County employees from
being “members of a political party’s national, state, or local committee” or “officers or
chairpersons of a partisan political club’s committee.” (Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 16–18.) And, as with
the plaintiff in Letter Carriers who wanted to be a “precinct Democratic Committee
Woman” in a “County Democratic Committee,” Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. at 551 n.3,
O’Neil challenges the 2024 Code’s prohibition of her role as Chairwoman of the Maricopa
County Democratic Party.
O’Neil offers no meaningful distinction between her claims and those raised in
Letter Carriers and Broaderick. In fact, she does not appear to contest that Letter Carriers
and Broaderick preclude her claims, instead arguing that these cases were wrongly decided
and that subsequent amendments to the Hatch Act by Congress have overruled them. (Id.
at 5 (arguing that Letter Carriers and Broaderick should be “reassess[ed]” because they
“cannot be reconciled with Pickering [v. Board of Ed. of Tp. High Sch. Dist. 205, Will
Cnty., Ill., 391 U.S. 563 (1968)] after the congressional actions since the Hatch Act”); see
also id. at 9–13 (arguing that the Court should adopt the reasoning of the dissent in Letter
Carriers, rather than its majority opinion)).4
O’Neil’s arguments are unpersuasive. District courts must follow “controlling
Supreme Court precedent until it is explicitly overruled by the Supreme Court.” Miranda
v. Selig, 860 F.3d 1237, 1242–43 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Nunez-Reyez v. Holder, 646 F.3d
4 O’Neil’s response briefly argues that the 2024 Code prohibits not just membership
in a political committee, but registration as a Democrat. (Doc. 15 at 6–7.) As an initial
matter, the Complaint does not make this allegation. (See generally Doc. 1.) In any event,
it is inconsistent with the plain language of the 2024 Code, and with the Supreme Court’s
interpretation of similar language. See e.g., Broaderick, 413 U.S. at 615 (holding that the
Oklahoma statute was not “substantially overbroad” and that “whatever overbreadth may
exist should be cured through case-by-case analysis of the fact situations to which its
sanctions, assertedly, may not be applied”).
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684, 692 (9th Cir. 2011)). O’Neil asserts that Pickering is irreconcilable with Letter
Carriers. (Doc. 15 at 5.) But Pickering predates Letter Carriers and so could not have
overruled it. Indeed, the Supreme Court expressly considered Pickering when it decided
that the Hatch Act’s prohibitions on certain partisan political activity do not violate the
First Amendment. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. at 554, 564. Thus, to the extent O’Neil argues
that Pickering controls here, her argument is unavailing.
Further, Congress’s decision to amend the Hatch Act in 1993 does not render Letter
Carriers invalid. Short of constitutional amendment, it is the Supreme Court, not
Congress, that has the last word on whether legislation is constitutional. See Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 167 (1803). That Congress lifted some of the prescriptions at issue
in Letter Carriers does nothing to undermine the Supreme Court’s holding that those
prescriptions do not run afoul of the First Amendment.
In the end, the Supreme Court has considered whether government employees have
a First Amendment right to serve on local political committees during their employment.
It decided that they do not. O’Neil has thus failed to allege that the County has violated a
right secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States, and her claims will be
dismissed.
IV. LEAVE TO AMEND
O’Neil requests leave to amend her Complaint. (Doc. 15 at 15.) Although Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2) requires courts to “grant leave to amend freely when
justice so requires,” leave to amend is not required if “amendment would be futile, when it
would cause undue prejudice to the defendant, or when it is sought in bad faith.” Chappel
v. Lab’y Corp. of Am., 232 F.3d 719, 726 (9th Cir. 2000). O’Neil’s facial challenge to the
2024 Code is plainly precluded by Letter Carriers and Broaderick. Any amendment of
this claim would be futile and leave to amend will not be granted. Bonin v. Calderon, 59
F.3d 815, 845 (9th Cir. 1995) (“Futility of amendment can, by itself, justify the denial of a
motion for leave to amend.”) As currently alleged, O’Neil’s as-applied challenge also fails
as a matter of law. O’Neil cannot show that the County violated her First Amendment
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rights by firing her for her membership in, or leadership of, a partisan political group
irrespective of its political affiliation. But because leave to amend should be granted freely,
the Court will allow O’Neil to amend her second claim.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED granting the County’s Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a
Claim (Doc. 9). Count 1 is dismissed with prejudice. Count 2 is dismissed with leave to
amend. O’Neil shall file any amended complaint by Wednesday, March 4, 2026.
Dated this 11th day of February, 2026.
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