Civello v. Equinix Incorporated et al

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WO
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
Melissa Civello,
Plaintiff,
v.
Equinix Incorporated,
Defendant.
No. CV-25-01028-PHX-KML
ORDER
In December 2024, Arizona-based Melissa Civello sued her California-based
employer Equinix Incorporated (“Equinix”) and related individuals in California state court
for gender discrimination and related claims. (Doc. 1-1 at 1.) The defendants removed the
case to the Northern District of California, and that court transferred the case to the District
of Arizona because it found “all of the alleged conduct giving rise to her claims occurred
outside of California.” (Doc 29 at 1.) In July 2025, this court granted Equinix’s motion to
dismiss with leave to amend (Doc. 46) and Civello filed a first amended complaint (“FAC”)
later that month (Doc. 47). Equinix again moves to dismiss all claims. (Doc. 56.) Equinix’s
motion is granted and Civello’s claims are dismissed without leave to amend.
I. Background
Civello was hired by California-headquartered Equinix in July 2021 as a
cybersecurity engineer. (Doc. 47 at 2.) She worked remotely from Arizona at all relevant
times. (Doc. 47 at 2.) Most of her colleagues also appear to have worked outside California;
most relevantly, Civello’s supervisors Eric Meyer worked from Florida and Jon Taylor
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worked from Georgia.1 (Doc. 46 at 2.) Civello alleges she “consistently interfaced” with
California employees and executives, some of whom she names, and worked on some
California programs. (Doc. 47 at 2-3.)
During her employment, Civello alleges her direct supervisor, Eric Meyer, excluded
her from training opportunities and critical meetings (some of which “involved California-
based leadership”), belittled her in group settings, and dismissed her contributions. (Doc.
47 at 2-3.) She was also left off of key communications and removed from leadership
opportunities. (Doc. 47 at 3.) Projects she led were attributed to male colleagues and she
was not permitted to present them, and she was removed from a project entirely for
challenging a male colleague. (Doc. 47 at 3.) She alleges this constituted gender
discrimination which affected her compensation because she was denied an earned
promotion and because her bonus was lower than what she had earned (and what male
colleagues received). (Doc. 47 at 11.) Finally, Civello was “terminated without clear cause”
in June 2023. (Doc. 47 at 3.) Civello alleges “Eric Meyer . . . made the decision” to
terminate her employment. (Doc. 47 at 13.)
Civello alleges she raised concerns regarding this treatment—specifically, “her
exclusion from security training opportunities offered to male counterparts”—to Charles
Lin, Equinix’s California-based chief of staff. (Doc. 47 at 2-3.) She also “reported”
Meyer’s behavior to California-based colleague Eric Fisch. (Doc. 47 at 3.) She states she
“escalat[ed] her compensation concerns to HR and leadership,” but does not provide further
detail as to this report or others. (Doc. 47 at 13; see Doc. 60 at 20.)
She alleges Equinix’s “core employment policies, reporting channels, and HR
structure were all designed and administered out of California,” so the alleged adverse
actions “were either implemented, ratified, or originated from California leadership.” (Doc.
47 at 4.) And “several” actions occurred “following meetings with or direction from
1 Civello’s original complaint pleaded causes of action against these supervisors as well as
other individuals; because she did not serve them, the supervisors and others were
dismissed. (Doc. 44; see Doc. 46 at 2.) Civello nonetheless identifies these individuals as
defendants in her response in opposition to Equinix’s second motion to dismiss. (Doc. 60
at 1.) The court addresses only those defendants who have not already been dismissed.
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California-based supervisors or collaborators.” (Doc. 47 at 3.) She also states the “relevant
decision-makers” were based in California. (Doc. 47 at 4.) But the only decision-makers
she identifies by name or specific action are Meyer and Taylor, and neither of them worked
from California. (See Doc. 47.)
Civello alleges five causes of action based on California law and Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act: discrimination/disparate treatment based on gender, harassment and
hostile work environment, gender discrimination, retaliation, and wrongful termination.
She also pleads one claim under the federal and California Equal Pay Acts and two
contract-related claims under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
(“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. §1001, et seq.2
II. Legal Standard
“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)
(internal citations omitted)). This is not a “probability requirement,” but a requirement that
the factual allegations show “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted
unlawfully.” Id. A claim is facially plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Id. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for
relief will . . . be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its
judicial experience and common sense.” Id.
III. Analysis
A. Administrative Exhaustion
Civello pleads five causes of action under California’s Fair Employment and
Housing Act (“FEHA”) and Title VII, both of which require that plaintiffs exhaust their
administrative remedies before filing a lawsuit. For her FEHA claims, Civello timely filed
2 Civello’s opposition to the motion to dismiss substantially exceeds the page limit, at 20
pages of text and in a smaller font size than is permissible. The court considers the
opposition but future non-compliance with page limits will result in the striking of the
document.
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an administrative complaint before the California Civil Rights Department (“CRD”) and
received a Right-to-Sue Notice (Doc. 53). See Pollock v. Tri-Modal Distribution Servs.,
Inc., 491 P.3d 290, 295 (Cal. 2021). Civello therefore appears to have exhausted her claims
under California Law. The court will assume for purposes of this order she also properly
exhausted under Title VII. See Surrell v. Cal. Water Serv. Co., 518 F.3d 1097, 1104 (9th
Cir. 2008) (for purposes of exhaustion under Title VII, construing charge filed with
California to be constructively filed with EEOC due to worksharing agreement, despite
state notice’s direction to separately file with EEOC); see also Stiefel v. Bechtel Corp., 624
F.3d 1240, 1245 (9th Cir. 2010) (when a plaintiff “receives a right-to-sue letter from the
state agency, thereby becoming entitled to an EEOC right-to-sue letter, the plaintiff need
not file a separate complaint with the EEOC nor receive an EEOC right-to-sue letter in
order to file suit”).3
B. Time Bar
Assuming as the court has that Civello administratively exhausted, her Title VII
claims are nonetheless subject to a 300-day time-bar. The governing portion of Title VII
requires a plaintiff to file an EEOC charge within 180 days after the alleged unlawful
practice, or 300 days if the plaintiff first files with a state agency with authority to grant
relief. § 2000e-5(e)(1). The 300-day statute of limitations applies here because of Civello’s
CRD filing (as Equinix concedes). (Doc. 56 at 11.) In general, events that occurred before
the 300-day window are not actionable. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S.
101, 113 (2002) (continuing violations doctrine generally does not permit courts to
consider discriminatory acts which took place before 300-day window). This remains true
even when those events are directly related to acts which did occur within the 300 days
because “[e]ach discrete discriminatory act starts a new clock for filing charges alleging
3 Equinix moved for judicial notice of CRD filing instructions and a sample Right-to-Sue
Notice for a dual-filed charge (Doc. 57), as well as worksharing agreements between the
CRD and EEOC from 2022-2024 (Doc. 62). These motions are unopposed and are granted.
See Knox v. Contra Costa Cnty., No. 20-CV-01449-JCS, 2022 WL 2290686, at *10 (N.D.
Cal. June 24, 2022) (taking judicial notice of worksharing agreements because they are
public records not subject to reasonable dispute and collecting cases where courts did the
same).
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that act.” Id. “Discrete acts” include termination and failure to promote. Id. at 114. The
exception to this general rule involves hostile work environment claims. That type of claim
is not a discrete act because its “very nature involves repeated conduct.” Id. at 115.
Accordingly, as long as at least one “act contributing to [a hostile work environment] claim
occurs within the filing period, the entire time period of the hostile environment may be
considered by a court for the purposes of determining liability.” Id. at 117.
Because Civello filed her agency charge on April 23, 2024, events that occurred
before June 28, 2023 will generally not be actionable. (Doc. 53.) The only event Civello
alleges within that 300-day time period is her allegedly wrongful and discriminatory
termination on June 29, 2023. (Doc. 47 at 15.) Prior discrete facts which support her
discrimination, reprisal, and wrongful termination claims, such as the failure to promote
her, cannot be considered—Civello’s claims must succeed or fail based on the single timely
event: a termination allegedly without cause (see Doc. 47 at 13). Id. at 115 (agreeing with
case holding plaintiff cannot “use a termination that fell within the limitations period to
pull in the time-barred discriminatory act”). And a termination without cause alone does
not suggest discrimination, reprisal, or wrongful termination based on gender occurred.
These claims therefore fail.
Civello also alleges a hostile work environment on the basis of gender, for which
events before June 28 could be considered if she provided facts suggesting at least one
harassing act took place within the statutory period. Id. at 117. But in neither her hostile
work environment claim nor her wrongful termination claim does Civello allege the
termination occurred as a result of or as part of a hostile work environment. (Doc. 47 at 6-
10, 15-16). She also does not allege facts suggesting her work environment was hostile due
to her gender, instead stating “Plaintiff is a woman” in a paragraph that also provides a
bullet-point list of actions like “exerting authority over a subordinate” which could have
any number of non-discriminatory explanations (Doc. 47 at 7-9).4 Henry v. Regents of the
4 Notably, the complaint does link the adverse actions to national origin discrimination as
Civello claims, something which is not supported by any other allegation. (See Doc. 47 at
9 (“Plaintiff believes and thereon alleges that her National Origin was a factor in
Defendant’s adverse actions and hostile treatment.”).)
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Univ. of California, 37 F. Supp. 3d 1067, 1084 (N.D. Cal. 2014), aff’d, 644 F. App’x 787
(9th Cir. 2016) (dismissing Title VII hostile work environment claim at summary judgment
in part because “there are no facts, other than plaintiff’s speculation, that any of these
incidents were motivated by” the plaintiff’s protected characteristic). Ultimately, because
she does not allege the termination—the only event within the 300-day period—was a
result of a hostile work environment, her harassment claim also fails.
As this is Civello’s second attempt amending her complaint, the motion to dismiss
her Title VII claims is dismissed without leave to amend. See Platt Elec. Supply, Inc. v.
EOFF Elec., Inc., 522 F.3d 1049, 1060 (9th Cir. 2008) (no leave to amend where
amendment would be futile due to time-barred claims); Kneisler v. Legacy Health, 760 F.
Supp. 3d 1137, 1144 (D. Or. 2024) (same, in employment discrimination right-to-sue case).
C. FEHA Claims
Because of California’s presumption against extraterritorial application of state
statutes, FEHA’s extraterritorial application requires a “connection between California and
a crucial element of the claim.” Elzeftawy v. Pernix Grp., Inc., 477 F. Supp. 3d 734, 776
(N.D. Ill. 2020) (applying California law). The propriety of FEHA’s extraterritorial
application “is determined by the situs of both employment and the material elements of
the cause of action, as opposed to residence of the employee or the employer.” Russo v.
APL Marine Servs., Ltd., 135 F. Supp. 3d 1089, 1094 (C.D. Cal. 2015).
Courts determining the situs of employment evaluate whether an employee has “a
‘definite base of operations in California’ and perform[s] at least some work there.”
Elzeftawy, 477 F. Supp. 3d at 777; see also Hill v. Workday, Inc., 773 F. Supp. 3d 779, 793
(N.D. Cal. 2025) (noting the situs of employment consists of the employee’s “principal
place of work,” “definite base of operations,” or “location to which the employee’s work
is substantially connected”). Civello did not have a base of operations in California and
does not allege she performed any work there. (See Doc. 47.) Instead, Civello was an
Arizona resident and worked entirely from Arizona for non-California supervisors (Doc.
47). See Hill, 773 F. Supp. 3d at 794. Her allegations that she “interfaced” with California
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employees and collaborated on California projects (Doc. 47 at 2-3) do not imply a
connection substantial enough to place the situs of employment in California. Id. at 794-
95 (situs of employment was Maryland, where employee spent the majority of time, despite
employee interfacing with California employees and visiting California).
Next, Civello has again failed to plead California was the situs of the material
elements of the causes of action. This prong of the analysis depends on the location of the
“core of the claim.” Id.; see Elzeftawy, 477 F. Supp. 3d at 778 (examining location of “the
material elements of the cause of action . . . that is, the location of the alleged proscribed
conduct”). Here, the core of Civello’s FEHA claims is the discriminatory, harassing, and
retaliatory conduct and her wrongful termination. She alleges her supervisor Meyer was
the primary actor giving rise to these claims; for instance, by preventing her from attending
trainings and being assigned more work (Doc. 47 at 5-6), holding her to higher expectations
than others (Doc. 47 at 7), and forcing her to use paid time off in a more restrictive manner
than he did male colleagues (Doc. 47 at 5). She also alleges Jon Taylor passively condoned
and participated in this conduct. (Doc. 47 at 7.) But she does not allege any of these core
events took place in California and neither Meyer nor Taylor were based there. The same
is true as to her allegations of wrongful termination because she makes very clear Meyer
made the decision to terminate her. (Doc. 47 at 13.)
Civello does attempt to tie certain adverse events to Equinix’s California
headquarters, but these allegations do not satisfy FEHA’s requirements or even Rule 8
more generally. Civello states the termination took place after certain “high-level reviews
involving California-based executives,” but she does not allege those reviews played a role
in her termination. (Doc. 47 at 3.) She alleges Equinix headquarters paid her less than she
had earned in her salary and bonus, but she does not plead any specifics regarding who
made that decision, when, where, or on what basis. (Doc. 47 at 11.) See Elzeftawy, 477 F.
Supp. 3d at 779 (dismissing FEHA claims where “no facts [] indicate that any of the
aforementioned proscribed conduct occurred (or was ratified by [defendant] decision-
makers) in California”). She also states she reported some behavior to a California-based
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executive. (Doc. 47 at 2-3.) But even if this report could shift the situs of material elements
for the reprisal claim to California, she does not allege the report had anything to do with
her termination or other adverse actions, so it is irrelevant. Similarly, she alleges policies
and HR structures were designed and administered in California, but does not allege either
was the basis for any relevant event. (Doc. 47 at 4.) Instead, Civello relies upon the
conclusory allegation that “[t]he adverse actions . . . were either implemented, ratified, or
originated from California leadership.” (Doc. 47 at 4.) That is not enough to state a claim
under FEHA. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of
action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”).
Civello ultimately again fails to plead any relevant event took place in California or
any decision-maker made a relevant decision in California. Courts have found FEHA does
not apply in cases that are closer than this one. See Russo, 135 F. Supp. 3d at 1094
(California resident sued based on events which occurred on California-based vessel for
California company, but events took place outside California waters); Hill, 773 F. Supp.
3d at 794-95 (plaintiff alleged material event took place during in-person visit to California
and termination occurred or was approved in California); Anderson v. CRST Int’l, Inc., 685
F. App’x 524, 526 (9th Cir. 2017) (California resident working for California company
alleged sexual harassment by California colleague). Accordingly, Civello’s FEHA claims
are dismissed, this time without leave to amend because Civello has repeatedly failed to
cure the same deficiencies previously addressed by the court. Ascon Props., Inc. v. Mobil
Oil Co., 866 F.2d 1149, 1160 (9th Cir. 1989) (noting a “district court’s discretion to deny
leave to amend is particularly broad where plaintiff has previously amended the
complaint”).
D. California Equal Pay Act (“CEPA”) Claim
The court dismissed the CEPA claim in Civello’s original complaint because
CEPA’s barrier to extraterritorial application is even stronger than FEHA’s. (Doc. 46 at 6).
Plaintiffs who are residents of other states and who do not physically work in California
cannot lodge a CEPA claim even if all employment-related decisions were made in
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California. Cotter v. Lyft, Inc., 60 F. Supp. 3d 1059, 1063 (N.D. Cal. 2014); see also Ward
v. United Airlines, Inc., 466 P.3d 309, 312 (Cal. 2020) (California wage-and-hour law is
governed by where employee “principally” worked); Paparella v. Plume Design, Inc., No.
22-CV-01295-WHO, 2022 WL 2915706, at *6 (N.D. Cal. July 25, 2022) (dismissing
wage-and-hour complaint because plaintiff “is, and at all relevant times was, a resident of
Maricopa County, Arizona” and did not show his principal place of work was California).
Civello did not meaningfully improve her claim after the court dismissed it; she still
fails to plead she principally worked in California. (Doc. 47 at 2 (Civello “at all relative
times herein . . . resides in Chandler, County of Maricopa, State of Arizona”).) The claim
is now dismissed without leave to amend. See Ascon Props., Inc., 866 F.2d at 1160.
E. EPA claim
For the first time in her amended complaint, Civello alleged a claim under the
federal Equal Pay Act (“EPA”). That statute requires plaintiffs commence their actions
within two years after the cause of action accrues, or three years if the violation was
“willful.” 29 U.S.C. § 255(a). Willfulness requires a plaintiff to “show that her employer
either knew or showed reckless disregard for whether its conduct violated” the EPA. Olson
v. United States by & through Dep’t of Energy, 980 F.3d 1334, 1339 (9th Cir. 2020).
Civello alleges Equinix violated the EPA by under-paying her for about a year and by
paying her a 60% bonus when she had earned 120%. (Doc. 47 at 14.) Though the timeline
is unclear from the FAC, Civello concedes her allegations only “extend into March 2023.”
(Doc. 60 at 3.) Because the FAC was filed in July 2025, Civello needed to allege willfulness
to make her EPA claim timely.
Civello does not properly allege Equinix willfully violated the EPA. The FAC
alleges Civello “received a 60% payout, with no valid justification” as to why male
employees received a 120% bonus instead. (Doc. 47 at 14.) It further alleges Equinix failed
to provide a compensation adjustment when Civello performed the duties of a Senior
Manager. (Doc. 47 at 13-14.) But nothing in the FAC beyond conclusory statements
supports the allegation Equinix did so willfully, knowingly, or recklessly. (See Doc. 47 at
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14 (“Defendants willfully or recklessly disregarded the fact that its [sic] conduct was in
violation of the . . . Equal Pay Act”).)
Civello is correct that she ties her allegations of EPA violations to Equinix’s specific
conduct of under-paying her, she does not tie her allegations of willfulness to any fact at
all. (Doc. 60 at 23.) Civello’s “bare allegations that ‘[Defendant’s] actions were willful,’
do not support an inference Defendant[] knew or showed reckless disregard for” its
violation of the EPA. Gage v. Arizona Bd. of Regents, 643 F. Supp. 3d 1013, 1022 (D. Ariz.
2022).
Accordingly, Civello’s federal EPA claim is dismissed without leave to amend
based upon the two-year statute of limitations. See Platt Elec. Supply, Inc., 522 F.3d at
1060.
F. ERISA-based claims
Civello’s original complaint pleaded state-law causes of action based on a contract
she alleges promised her stock options. (Doc. 1-1 at 77-79.) Civello mentioned ERISA in
pleading those claims, but the court interpreted Civello as attempting to allege contract-
related state-law claims. (Doc. 46 at 8 (noting both parties referred to Civello’s offer letter
as the relevant document underlying these claims).) The court granted Equinix’s motion to
dismiss these claims. (Doc. 46.) Civello then filed an amended complaint which altered
nothing except the headings for the ERISA-based causes of action. (Doc. 47 at 16-18.)
Before responding to Civello’s amended complaint, Equinix complained it could
not determine what ERISA plan Civello believed applied. (Doc. 48 at 3.) On July 28, 2025,
the court ordered Civello to produce the written contract underlying her ERISA claims by
August 4, 2025. (Doc. 50.) She did not. On August 5, 2025, the court gave Civello “a final
opportunity” to file this contract by August 8, 2025. (Doc. 52 at 1.) Again, she did not.
Despite ignoring those orders, Civello still opposes dismissal of her ERISA claims.
The FAC alleges a “written contract” entitled Civello to stock; it does not
specifically allege the contract is governed by ERISA, nor does it include any contract
language. (Doc. 47 at 16-18.) Civello’s response is many pages over the limit; her ERISA-
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related arguments are in portions of the motion which exceed the page limit and could be
ignored. (Doc. 60.) But as warned in the court’s August 5 order, if Civello chose not to
identify the basis for her ERISA claims, “defendants will be entitled to argue, and the court
will accept, that no such documents exist.” (Doc. 52 at 1 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P.
37(b)(2)(A)(ii)).) Equinix now argues there is no contract governed by ERISA. (Doc. 56 at
17-18 (“in the absence of such ‘contract,’ there is no basis to even conclude ERISA applies
. . . nothing in the Offer Letter suggests it constitutes an ERISA plan.”).) As warned, the
court accepts this argument. Civello has twice failed to plead the existence of an ERISA-
governed contract and twice failed to provide it despite the court’s direct orders.
Accordingly, the ERISA claims are dismissed without leave to amend.
IV. Conclusion
Equinix’s motions for judicial notice are granted. Its motion to dismiss Civello’s
first amended complaint for failure to state a claim is granted because she did not
sufficiently plead a California connection for her FEHA or CEPA claims, did not allege
discrimination, reprisal, harassment, and wrongful termination within Title VII’s 300-day
window, did not plead a willful violation of the federal EPA sufficiently to invoke a three-
year statute of limitations, and did not identify a basis for her ERISA claims.
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
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Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED the motion to dismiss (Doc. 56) is GRANTED and the First
Amended Complaint is DISMISSED without leave to amend. The Clerk of Court shall
enter judgment accordingly and close this case.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED the motions for judicial notice in support of the
motion to dismiss (Docs. 57, 62) are GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED the motion to strike plaintiff’s opposition (Doc. 61)
is DENIED as moot.
Dated this 13th day of November, 2025.
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