Quan v. Estepa et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
Ngo Van Quan,
Plaintiff
-vs-
Unknown Estepa, et al.,
Defendants.
CV-25-2407-PHX-DJH (JFM)
Report & Recommendation
I. MATTER UNDER CONSIDERATION
Petitioner, whose true name is Van Quan Ngo (see Status Report, Doc. 17 at 1;
Order 12/1/25, Doc. 15), filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241on July 10, 2025 (Doc. 1) challenging, inter alia, his continued detention pending
removal. Petitioner was detained at the time in in the Federal Detention Center, Florence,
Arizona.
Petitioner’s Petition alleges that he was a citizen of Viet Nam, was ordered
removed in May 2025, has been detained since March 31, 2025, received a Decision to
Continue Detention on June 29, 2025, and that there is good reason to believe his removal
is not significantly likely to occur in the reasonably foreseeable future. He seeks release
pursuant to Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001). He also asserts claims: (a) that he
cannot be removed to Viet Nam absent efforts to return him to a third country or
considering whether to allow him to remain; and (b) that given the unlikelihood of removal
to Vietnam, ICE policy requires that pre-1995 Vietnamese immigrants should be released
within 90 days of the deportation order. (See Service Order 9/10/25, Doc. 6 at 2.)
Service and a response were ordered (Doc. 6), and on October 9, 2025, Respondents
filed a Response (Doc. 14). Respondents argue Petitioner has not met his burden of
establishing a prima facie showing that Zadvydas applies, including failing to show his
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detention as of the time of the Petition was “prolonged”, and travel documents had been
successfully submitted to Vietnam and the Government is currently able to remove people
to Vietnam. Respondents do not address Petitioner’s other contentions.
Petitioner’s Reply was due by November 13, 2025. None was filed.
The undersigned took the matter up, and inter alia ordered the parties to file status
reports on Petitioner’s current status in light of the lack of a current listing of Petitioner as
a detainee on the Government’s website. (Order 12/1/25, Doc. 15.)
On December 6, 2025, Respondents filed a Status Report (Doc. 17) reporting that
Petitioner was removed on November 18, 2025. Petitioner has not filed a notice of change
of address. On December 8, 2025 Petitioner was ordered (Doc. 18) to show cause why
the case should not be dismissed as moot, and why it should not be dismissed for failure
to prosecute in light of the failure to file a notice of change of address as previously ordered
in the Notice of Assignment issued July 10, 2025 (Doc. 3-1 at 2 (warning that dismissal
could result from failure to file a notice of change of address). Similar warnings were in
the orders filed July 30, 2025 (Doc. 4, at 2) and September 10, 2025 (Doc. 6 at 2). See
LRCiv 83.3(d) (mandating notice of change of address).
Petitioner has not filed a notice of change of address, and has not responded to the
Order to Show Cause (Doc. 18), and his copy of the various orders have been returned
undeliverable. (See Docs. 19, 20.)
The matter is now ripe for consideration. Accordingly, the undersigned makes the
following proposed findings of fact, report, and recommendation pursuant to Rule 8(b),
Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28
U.S.C. § 636(b) and Rule 72.2(a)(2), Local Rules of Civil Procedure.
II. APPLICATION OF LAW TO FACTS
A. MOOTNESS OF HABEAS PETITION
“Article III of the Constitution limits federal ‘Judicial Power,’ that is, federal-court
jurisdiction, to ‘Cases’ and ‘Controversies.’” U.S. Parole Commission v. Geraghty, 445
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U.S. 388, 395, 100 S.Ct. 1202, 1208 (1980). This limitation restricts the jurisdiction of the
federal courts to cases where there is a possible judicial resolution. Id. A moot action is
not subject to a judicial resolution.
A moot action is one in which the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the
outcome. The test for mootness is whether the court can give a party any effective relief
in the event that it decides the matter on the merits in their favor. “That is, whether the
court can ‘undo’ the effects of the alleged wrongdoing.” Reimers v. Oregon, 863 F.2d
630, 632 (9th Cir. 1989).
A habeas petition may be rendered moot following a subsequent release from
custody, absent other, collateral consequences that flow from the complained of
imprisonment. Lane v. Williams, 455 U.S. 624 (1982). While the existence of such
collateral consequences is irrebuttably presumed in some habeas challenges to criminal
convictions, see e.g., Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968); Chacon v. Wood, 36 F.3d
1459 (9th Cir. 1994), no such presumption applies to habeas petitions challenging
deportation orders.
Here, Petitioner does not challenge his underlying removal order. Rather he
challenges primarily his continued detention pending the execution of that order.
However, although that detention has terminated, Petitioner has apparently been deported
and is precluded from re-entry into the country. Under those circumstances, there may yet
remain relief which may be granted. Reimers, supra. Moreover, Petitioner has not yet
been heard from on whether the matter is moot.
Finally, it is not apparent that Petitioner’s claims regarding the propriety of his
removal to Vietnam (as opposed to a third country) are rendered moot by his removal.
However, in light of Petitioner’s failure to prosecute, the Court need not resolve
these issues to dispose of this matter.
B. FAILURE TO PROSECUTE
“The authority of a court to dismiss sua sponte for lack of prosecution has generally
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been considered an ‘inherent power,' governed not by rule or statute but by the control
necessarily vested in courts to manage their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and
expeditious disposition of cases.” Link v. Wabash R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630-631 (1962).
“Accordingly, when circumstances make such action appropriate, a District Court may
dismiss a complaint for failure to prosecute even without affording notice of its intention
to do so or providing an adversary hearing before acting. Whether such an order can stand
on appeal depends not on power but on whether it was within the permissible range of the
court's discretion.” Id. at 633.
In determining whether an abuse of discretion has occurred, a number of factors are
relevant, including the plaintiff's diligence, the trial court's need to manage its docket, the
danger of prejudice to the party suffering the delay, the availability of alternate sanctions,
and the existence of warning to the party occasioning the delay. See, e.g., Hamilton v.
Neptune Orient Lines, Ltd., 811 F.2d 498, 499 (9th Cir.1987).
Despite having been given specific notice of his obligation to file a notice of change
of address, and an order (Doc. 18) specifically directing him to do so, Petitioner has failed
to keep his current address on file with the Court.
It is the duty of a party who has filed a pro se action to keep the Court apprised of
his or her current address and to comply with the Court's orders in a timely fashion. This
Court does not have an affirmative obligation to locate Petitioner. "A party, not the district
court, bears the burden of keeping the court apprised of any changes in his mailing
address." Carey v. King, 856 F.2d 1439, 1441 (9th Cir. 1988). Petitioner’s failure to keep
the Court informed of his new address constitutes failure to prosecute.
Petitioner has failed to prosecute this action, and dismissal is therefore within the
discretion of the Court. Link v. Wabash R. Co., supra. In the instant case, Petitioner
appears to have abandoned this action upon his release from custody. Petitioner has had
over four months since his release to file a notice of change of address. Further delay to
the Court and to Respondent is not warranted. Also, Petitioner has received adequate
warning of the potential of such action, and in light of Petitioner’s refusal to respond to
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the Court, less onerous sanctions will be ineffective.
III. RECOMMENDATION
IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Petitioner's Petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) and this action be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for
failure to prosecute. 1
Dated: January 7, 2026
25-2407r RR 26 01 06 on HC.docx
James F. Metcalf
United States Magistrate Judge
1 Rule 11(a), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, requires that in habeas cases the
“district court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it enters a final order
adverse to the applicant.” Such certificates are required in cases concerning detention
arising “out of process issued by a State court”, or in a proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2255
attacking a federal criminal judgment or sentence. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1). This case arises
under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, and does not attack a State court detention. Accordingly, no
ruling on a certificate of appealability is required, and no recommendation thereon will be
offered.
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