Miranda v. Tucson Deliveries LLC et al

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WO
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
Johandry Miranda,
Plaintiff,
v.
Tucson Deliveries LLC, et al.,
Defendants.
No. CV-25-02706-PHX-MTL
ORDER
Plaintiff filed this action for unpaid wages against Tucson Deliveries LLC and
William Serrano and Mirian V. Gutierrez Sanchez, a married couple. (Doc. 1.)
Plaintiff alleges that he was engaged by Defendants to perform appliance delivery
services in Viginia for approximately two weeks in July 2025.* (Doc. 17-1 ¶¶ 7-8) The
parties’ agreed-upon daily rate of pay was $300. (Id. ¶ 9.) Plaintiff alleges he worked
substantially more than 40 hours per week: 60 hours in the first work week and 48 hours
in the second. (Id. ¶ 10.) He did not get paid. (Id. ¶ 11.)
All Defendants were served but they failed to appear. (Docs. 8, 9, 10.) Default was
entered. (Doc. 12.) Plaintiff now moves for a default judgment. (Doc. 17.)
I.
The Court has reviewed the Motion for Default Judgment and the entire record.
Jurisdiction and venue are proper. The Court also finds that Plaintiff has satisfied all service
of process and notice requirements under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff
* Plaintiff appears to have been engaged to work for at least two weeks but separated after
working 9 days.
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has also satisfied the conditions for the entry of default and the entry of a default judgment
under Rule 55(a) and (b).
II.
The Court has considered the factors set forth in Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470,
1471-72 (9th Cir. 1986). The factors below are to be considered when deciding whether
default judgment is appropriate:
(1) the possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff, (2) the merits of
plaintiff’s substantive claim, (3) the sufficiency of the
complaint, (4) the sum of money at stake in the action, (5) the
possibility of a dispute concerning material facts[,] (6) whether
the default was due to excusable neglect, and (7) the strong
policy underlying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
favoring decisions on the merits.
Id. at 1471-72.
A.
The first, fifth, and sixth factors weigh in Plaintiff's favor. Denying default judgment
would leave Plaintiff without a remedy, because Defendants chose not to appear and defend
this case. PepsiCo, Inc. v. Cal. Sec. Cans, 238 F. Supp. 2d 1172, 1177 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
The fifth factor also supports default judgment because “all well-pleaded facts in the
complaint are taken as true . . . [therefore] no genuine dispute of material facts would
preclude granting” the Motion. Id. Additionally, the sixth factor warrants entering default
judgment because Defendants were properly served under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and the Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure. (Docs. 8-9) See Twentieth Century
Fox Film Corp. v. Streeter, 438 F. Supp. 2d 1065, 1071-72 (D. Ariz. 2006) (finding that a
defendant’s failure to answer is likely not a result of excusable neglect if the defendant is
served properly).
B.
The second and third Eitel factors, the merits of the claim and the sufficiency of the
complaint, are often “analyzed together and require courts to consider whether a plaintiff
has stated a claim on which [he] may recover.” Vietnam Reform Party v. Viet Tan-Vietnam
Reform Party, 416 F. Supp. 3d 948, 962 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (citation modified). Plaintiff has
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sufficiently alleged entitlement to relief on the merits. The Complaint provides an estimate
of the time that Plaintiff worked without adequate compensation under the Fair Labor
Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206, and the applicable State of Virginia wage-and-hour laws,
Va. Code Ann. § 40.1-28.8, et seq. Although Plaintiff does not have complete payment
records, that does not diminish Plaintiff's claim where the employer does not keep adequate
records for uncompensated work. See Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680,
687-88 (1946), superseded by statute on other grounds. Defendants did not appear in this
action, so it is presumed that they did not keep accurate records. Id. (“The burden shifts to
the employer to come forward with evidence of the precise amount of work performed or
with evidence to negative the reasonableness of the inference to be drawn from the
employee’s evidence.”). The Court finds that these factors weigh in Plaintiff's favor.
C.
Under the fourth factor, the Court considers the amount of money at stake related to
the seriousness of Defendant's conduct. See PepsiCo, Inc., 238 F. Supp. 2d at 1176. “If the
sum of money at stake is completely disproportionate or inappropriate, default judgment is
disfavored.” Streeter, 438 F. Supp. 2d at 1071.
Plaintiff seeks unpaid wages under three theories of recovery. He first seeks federal
unpaid minimum wages in the amount of $783 and liquidated damages of $783, which,
combined under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), is $1,566. (Doc. 17-1 ¶ 15)
Next, Plaintiff seeks unpaid Virginia statutory minimum wages in the amount of
$1,340.28, which, after trebling under Va. Code Ann. § 40.1-29(J), is $4,020.84.
(Doc. 17-1 ¶ 16) The Court finds, under Va. Code Ann. § 40.1-29(J), that Defendants
knowingly failed to pay Plaintiff wages because they engaged him to perform delivery
services, paid for expenses including the delivery truck and lodging, but failed to pay him
for the two workweeks of his employment along with some out-of-pocket expenses. (Doc.
1 ¶¶ 40-47) Trebling, therefore, is appropriate in this case.
Finally, Plaintiff seeks recovery of his unpaid agreed-upon daily rate of $300. For
the 9 days worked, Plaintiff seeks $2,700. (Doc. 17-1 ¶ 13.) After trebling under Va. Code
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Ann. § 40.1-29(J), this amount is $8,100.
Plaintiff is not entitled to multiple recoveries under all his unpaid wage theories for
the same hours worked. See Rodriguez v. Pride Dealer Servs. Inc., No. CV-23-01955-
PHX-ROS, 2024 WL 1991443, at *4 (D. Ariz. May 6, 2024) (“Plaintiff may not ‘stack’
these damages to recover both minimum wage and unpaid wage or unpaid overtime wages
damages for the same hours.”). Since the parties’ agreed upon daily rate of pay yields the
highest recovery, the Court will award Plaintiff $8,100 in unpaid wages. The Court finds
this amount is reasonable given the nature of the work performed and Defendant’s conduct
in failing to compensate Plaintiff. As a result, the fourth Eitel factor favors the entry of
default judgment.
D.
As the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure favor a decision on the merits, the seventh
factor generally weighs against default judgment. But the existence of Rule 55(b)
“indicates that ‘this preference, standing alone, is not dispositive.’” PepsiCo, Inc., 238 F.
Supp. 2d at 1177 (quoting Kloepping v. Fireman’s Fund, 1996 WL 75314, at *3 (N.D. Cal.
Feb. 13, 1996)). This factor is not sufficient on its own to preclude an entry of default
judgment.
* * *
Upon weighing all the Eitel factors, the Court finds that Plaintiff has a right to
default judgment.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Motion for Default Judgment (Doc. 17)
is GRANTED. Plaintiff is awarded judgment against Defendants Tucson Deliveries LLC
and William Serrano and Mirian V. Gutierrez (husband and wife) as follows:
A. For a trebled award of Plaintiff’s unpaid wages of $2,700 in the amount of
$8,100 for which Defendants Tucson Deliveries LLC and William Serrano
and Mirian V. Gutierrez (husband and wife) shall be jointly and severally
liable;
. . . .
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B. For Plaintiff’s attorneys’ fees and costs, a motion for attorneys’ fees and costs
will be filed under LRCiv 54.2; and
C. For post-judgment interest on the above amount at a rate of 3.51% per annum
as of this Order.
IT IS FINALLY ORDERED that the Clerk of Court must enter judgment
consistent with this Order and close this case.
Dated this 18th day of May, 2026.
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