McGuire v. Arizona Department of Corrections Rehabilitation and Reentry et al

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WO
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
Patt McGuire,
Plaintiff,
v.
Arizona Department of Corrections
Rehabilitation and Reentry, et al.,
Defendants.
No. CV-25-02855-PHX-SMB
ORDER
The Court now considers Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 40). The Motion is
fully briefed. The Court grants the Motion for the following reasons.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff is a chaplain with the Arizona Department of Corrections Rehabilitation
and Reentry (“ADCRR”). (Doc. 1 at 3, 5.) At bottom Plaintiff asserts that she was
subjected to disparate treatment and hostile behavior by her supervisor Marion Kidwell,
ADCRR employee Thomas Arbaugh, and Warden of La Paz D. Quintero. (Id. at 5.)
Plaintiff thus sues Kidwell, Arbaugh, Quintero, and ADCRR for violations Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, and for
defamation claim under Arizona law. (Id. at 3.)
II. LEGAL STANDARD
To survive a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(6) motion for failure
to state a claim, a complaint must meet the requirements of Rule 8(a)(2). Rule 8(a)(2)
requires a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
Case 2:25-cv-02855-SMB Document 68 Filed 05/12/26 Page 1 of 4

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relief,” so that the defendant has “fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon
which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (alteration in original)
(quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). This notice exists if the pleader sets
forth “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id.
Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) “can be based on the lack of a cognizable legal theory
or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.” Balistreri v.
Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988). A complaint that sets forth a
cognizable legal theory will survive a motion to dismiss if it contains sufficient factual
matter, which, if accepted as true, states a claim to relief that is “plausible on its face.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Plausibility does not equal
“probability,” but requires “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted
unlawfully.” Id. “Where a complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a
defendant’s liability, it ‘stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility . . . .’”
Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).
In ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the well-pleaded factual allegations
are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Cousins
v. Lockyer, 568 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir. 2009). However, legal conclusions couched as
factual allegations are not given a presumption of truthfulness, and “conclusory allegations
of law and unwarranted inferences are not sufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss.” Pareto
v. FDIC, 139 F.3d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1998). A court ordinarily may not consider evidence
outside the pleadings when ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. See United States
v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 907 (9th Cir. 2003). “A court may, however, consider
materials—documents attached to the complaint, documents incorporated by reference in
the complaint, or matters of judicial notice—without converting the motion to dismiss into
a motion for summary judgment.” Id. at 908.
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III. DISCUSSION
Defendants contend that all claims against ADCRR should be dismissed because
ADCRR is a non-jural entity that cannot be sued. (Doc. 40 at 4.) The Court agrees. Courts
in this District recognize that ADCRR is a non-jural entity that does not have the authority
“to sue or be sued in its own right as a separate and distinct legal entity.” Morgan v.
Arizona, No. CV 06-346-TUC-FRZ(JCG), 2007 WL 2808477, at *8 (D. Ariz. Sept. 27,
2007). Plaintiff does not materially dispute this point. The Court thus dismisses ADCRR
with prejudice.
Defendants next contend that Plaintiff’s Title VII and ADEA claims against
Kidwell, Arbaugh, and Quintero (collectively, the “Individual Defendants”) should be
dismissed because individuals cannot be held liable under Title VII or the ADEA. (Doc.
40 at 4.) The Court agrees. “The Ninth Circuit has consistently held individual defendants
cannot be held liable for damages under Title VII and ADEA.” Wilson v. Maricopa Cnty.
Cmty. Coll. Dist. Governing Bd., No. CV-19-00068-TUC-SHR, 2020 WL 10320897, at *5
(D. Ariz. Aug. 24, 2020). Plaintiff does not materially dispute this point. The Court thus
dismisses Plaintiff’s Title VII and ADEA claims against the Individual Defendants with
prejudice.
Defendants alternatively argue that the Eleventh Amendment bars Plaintiff’s ADEA
claim. The Court agrees. Courts in this District recognize that “[c]lear Eleventh
Amendment precedent prevents [claimants] from proceeding under the ADEA against the
state, state agencies, and individuals in their capacities as state officials.” Nash v. Arizona,
No. CV08-2383-PHX-NVW, 2009 WL 10673385, at *2 (D. Ariz. May 21, 2009). The
Court thus dismisses Plaintiff’s ADEA claim with prejudice.
Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s defamation claim is barred by A.R.S. § 12-821.01.
That statute requires litigants “who have claims against a public entity . . . or a public
employee” to file a notice of claim. § 12-821.01(A). Arizona courts require litigants to
strictly comply with this requirement. See Falcon ex rel. Sandoval v. Maricopa County,
144 P.3d 1254, 1256 (2006). Plaintiff does not dispute that she did not file a notice of
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claim. Accordingly, the Court agrees with Defendant and finds that Plaintiff’s defamation
claim is thus barred. The Court thus dismisses Plaintiff’s defamation claim with prejudice.
Plaintiff contends that Defendants’ Motion should be denied because Defendants
failed to abide by Local Rule of Civil Procedure 12.1(c). This rule requires Defendants to
certify, before filing their motion, that they “notified the opposing party of the issues
asserted in the motion and the parties were unable to agree that the pleading was curable
in any part by a permissible amendment offered by the pleading party.” Defendants did so
via email. Plaintiff fails to establish that Defendants’ Motion is procedurally improper or
otherwise violates the Local Rules.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED granting Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 40) with leave
to amend.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED granting Plaintiff leave to amend her Title VII
claim only. If Plaintiff so chooses, she must file an Amended Complaint no later than thirty
(30) days after the date this Order is issued.
Dated this 12th day of May, 2026.
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