Coda v. Gunther

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
Julia Beth Coda,
Petitioner,
v.
Warden Gunther, et al.,
Respondent.
No. CV-25-03055-PHX-DWL (ASB)
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
TO THE HONORABLE DOMINIC W. LANZA, UNITED STATES DISTRICT
JUDGE:
Pending before the Court is Petitioner Julia Beth Coda’s pro se Petition for a Writ
of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (Doc. 1). Petitioner is in the custody of the
Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”). Respondent timely filed an Answer to the Petition
(Doc. 17), and no Reply followed. For the reasons that follow, undersigned recommends
the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied and dismissed without prejudice.
I. BACKGROUND
Petitioner filed her Petition on August 25, 2025. (Doc. 1.) Petitioner is serving a
sentence of 57 months’ imprisonment for a conviction in the United States District Court
for the Central District of California for Use of Interstate Commerce Facilities in the
Commission of a Murder-for-Hire, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1958. (Doc. 17-1 at 13.)
At the time she filed the Petition, Petitioner was incarcerated at the minimum security
satellite camp located at the Federal Correctional Institution-Phoenix (“FCI-Phoenix”), in
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Phoenix, Arizona, in the District of Arizona. (Doc. 1 at 1.) Now, Petitioner remains in the
custody of the Federal Bureau of Prisons, but it appears that she has been transferred
prerelease custody at a “halfway house” overseen by BOP’s Residential Reentry
Management field office in Long Beach California, located in the Central District of
California.1 See Federal BOP, Find an Inmate, https://www.bop.gov/inmateloc/ (last
visited February 13, 2026). Indeed, Petitioner apparently sent an email to the Clerk of
Court on January 26, 2026, indicating she would be housed at a halfway house in California
effective February 3, 2026. (Doc. 18.)
In her Petition, Petitioner includes two Grounds. In her first Ground, she argues
that BOP has refused to accurately calculate her sentence to reflect 65 federal time credits
(FTCs) that she earned by successfully completing programming under the First Step Act
(“FSA”) for 195 days. (Doc. 1 at 6, 17.) Second, Petitioner contends she “has the right to
obtain her accurately stacked First Step Act and Second Chance Act credits in accordance
with the Director of BOP’s memo (dated 6/17/25) instructing [P]etitioner to be eligible to
be transferred into prerelease custody.” (Id. at 7.) Essentially, Petitioner contends she was
engaging in programming (for which she is eligible for FTCs) when she inadvertently
declined to participate in another mandatory program. (See id. at 12.) Petitioner’s
declination was reversed within a day. (Id.) However, due to that apparently inadvertent
declination, Petitioner was disallowed for the entire period of time she had programmed
(195 days, or 65 FTCs). (Id.) Petitioner argues she should receive those credits. (Id.)
Petitioner asserts she exhausted her administrative remedies within BOP before
filing her Petition, and she provides documentation to support that assertion. (Doc. 1 at 2-
4, Doc. 1-1 at 23-39.) For relief, Petitioner requests she be credited with those 65 FTCs
and “order the BOP to accurately stack First Step Act and Second Chance Act credits in
accordance with the Director of BOP’s memo (dated 6/17/25) instructing [P]etitioner to be
eligible to be transferred into prerelease custody.” (Doc. 1 at 7.)
1 The Court takes judicial notice of the BOP Inmate Locator, which is publicly
available on the BOP’s website. See United States v. Basher, 629 F.3d 1161, 1165 n.2 (9th
Cir. 2011) (taking judicial notice of same).
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In his Answer to the Petition, Respondent argues that the Petition is not ripe, the
Court “lacks subject matter jurisdiction to review [BOP’s] placement decisions and
individualized determinations regarding prerelease custody placement of inmates still in
Bureau custody”, and Petitioner does not have a liberty interest in the application of the
credits for early release. (Id. at 5-6, 9-10.)
II. DISCUSSION
Writ of habeas corpus relief extends to a person in federal custody if the federal
prisoner can demonstrate he “is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or
treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). A federal prisoner may seek a writ
of habeas corpus to challenge the manner of the execution of his sentence pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2241. Hernandez v. Campbell, 204 F.3d 861, 864 (9th Cir. 2000); Tucker v.
Carlson, 925 F.2d 330, 331 (9th Cir. 1990) (challenges to the execution of a sentence are
“maintainable only in a petition for habeas corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241”);
see also United States v. Giddings, 740 F.2d 770, 772 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that a
petitioner may challenge the execution of a sentence by bringing a petition under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241). Petitioner challenges the execution of her sentence.
A. Venue
When Petitioner filed her Petition, she was incarcerated at FCI-Phoenix in the
District of Arizona. (See Doc. 1.) As discussed supra, Petitioner has since been transferred
to prerelease custody in the Central District of California. Because Petitioner was confined
in this District when she filed the Petition, this Court properly has jurisdiction. See Brown
v. United States, 610 F.2d 672, 677 (9th Cir. 1990) (§ 2241 petition must be brought in the
district of confinement). This Court may continue to exercise jurisdiction, notwithstanding
Petitioner’s transfer outside of this District. See Johnson v. Gill, 883 F.3d 756, 761 (9th
Cir. 2018); see also Francis v. Rison, 894 F.2d 353, 354 (9th Cir. 1990) (“‘[J]urisdiction
attaches on the initial filing for habeas corpus relief, and it is not destroyed by a transfer of
the petitioner and the accompanying custodial change.’” (quoting Santillanes v. U.S.
Parole Comm’n, 754 F.2d 887, 888 (10th Cir. 1985))). Venue is therefore proper in the
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District of Arizona.
B. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
“Federal courts are always ‘under an independent obligation to examine their own
jurisdiction,’ … and a federal court may not entertain an action over which it has no
jurisdiction.” Hernandez v. Campbell, 204 F.3d 861, 865 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting
FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 231 (1990)). To determine the issue of
subject matter jurisdiction, the Court considers the relevant statutory scheme and
controlling case law.
The FSA, enacted in 2018, included an amendment to 18 U.S.C. § 3624 concerning
the FSA’s creation of an earned time credit system. Bottinelli v. Salazar, 929 F.3d 1196,
1197 (9th Cir. 2019). The FSA added subsection (g) to 18 U.S.C. § 3624 for that purpose;
§ 3624(g) “details the criteria for when a prisoner becomes eligible, considering earned
time credit, for transfer to prerelease custody or supervised release.” Id. at 1198. Thus,
FSA credits often operate to make a prisoner eligible for an earlier release date.
Persons who “suffer[] legal wrong because of agency action” may generally seek
judicial review of the agency action, unless another statute provides otherwise. Reeb v.
Thomas, 636 F.3d 1224, 1226 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 702). In Reeb, the Ninth
Circuit considered the effect of 18 U.S.C. § 3625 on a prisoner’s ability to challenge a
discretionary determination made by BOP under 18 U.S.C. § 3621 through a petition for
habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. The Circuit observed that 18 U.S.C. § 3625
specifically states judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. §§
701-706) does not apply to “‘any determination, decision, or order’ made pursuant to 18
U.S.C. §§ 3621-3624.” Id. at 1227. The Reeb court continued, “[a] habeas claim cannot
be sustained based solely upon the BOP’s purported violation of its own program statement
because noncompliance with a BOP program statement is not a violation of federal law.”
Id. (citing Jacks v. Crabtree, 114 F.3d 983, 985 n.1 (9th Cir. 1997) and Reno v. Koray, 515
U.S. 50, 61 (1995)). Reeb held that when a prisoner’s “habeas petition alleges only that the
BOP erred in his particular case,” the district court lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate the
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merits of that petition. Id. at 1228-29. However, when a habeas petition alleges “that BOP
action is contrary to established federal law, violates the United States Constitution, or
exceeds its statutory authority,” judicial review “remains available.” Id. at 1228.
Under Reeb, this Court considers Petitioner’s specific challenge in her instant
Petition. 636 F.3d at 1228-29. Petitioner alleges in her Petition that BOP failed to credit
her for the 195 days she was programming, for a total of 65 FTCs. (Doc. 1 at 7.) She
argues that BOP is acting contrary to the FSA’s language the prisoners shall be released if
eligible, and therefore this Court has jurisdiction. (See id. at 13.) It appears, though, that
Petitioner’s challenge is to BOP’s individualized determination of her eligibility for credits
under § 3624(g), the type Reeb would indicate is exempted. Thus, the Court could arguably
dismiss the Petitioner for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Reeb, 636 F.3d at 1228.
In any event, though, the Petition is premature, as described infra, and undersigned
recommends dismissal on that basis.
C. Ripeness
Respondent argues Petitioner lacks standing because the Petition is not ripe. (Doc.
17 at 5.) Respondent asks the Court to deny the Petition as premature “because Petitioner’s
remaining term of imprisonment exceeds her FSA time credits” and Petitioner is therefore
“not eligible to have those ETCs applied to her sentence computation.” (Id. at 8.)
“A claim is not ripe for adjudication if it rests upon contingent future events that
may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all.” Texas v. United States, 523
U.S. 296, 300 (1998) (quoting Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Prods. Co., 473 U.S.
568, 580-81 (1985) (internal quotations omitted)). The ripeness doctrine is designed “to
prevent the courts, through avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling
themselves in abstract disagreements over administrative policies, and also to protect the
agencies from judicial interference until an administrative decision has been formalized
and its effects felt in a concrete way by the challenging parties.” Nat’l Park Hosp. Ass’n v.
Dep’t of Interior, 538 U.S. 803, 807-08 (2003) (quoting Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S.
136, 148-49 (1967)).
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“Under 18 U.S.C. § 3624(g)(1)(A), FSA earned time credits can be applied toward
prerelease custody or supervised release only when accumulated credits are equal to the
remainder of the prison term.” Turner v. Heisner, CV-22-00178-PHX-JAT (ESW), 2022
WL 2195348, at *3 (D. Ariz. May 16, 2022). “District courts throughout the Ninth Circuit
(including within the District of Arizona) have cited [18 U.S.C. § 3624(g)(1)(A)] in finding
§ 2241 petitions premature because they cannot award the relief sought under the FSA until
the petitioner’s recalculated time credits would equal the remainder of the imposed term of
imprisonment.” Cook v. Gunther, No. CV-25-00966-PHX-KML, 2025 WL 3170931, at
*1 (D. Ariz. Nov. 13, 2025) (citations omitted) (finding petition premature and declining
to consider other arguments in petition due to lack of ripeness).
At the time of Respondent’s Answer, Petitioner’s projected release date, assuming
good conduct but excluding the application of earned time credits (“ETCs”), was April 1,
2028. (Doc. 17 at 6.) That is 848 days from the date the Answer was filed on December 5,
2025. By December 5, 2025, Petitioner had accumulated 180 days of credits, and thus,
was ineligible to apply those credits because 180 days is less than 848 days. (See id.)
Moreover, Respondent points out that even if this Court were to apply the additional credits
that Petitioner seeks, the number of days of credits would still far short of the number of
days needed (848).2
To the extent that Petitioner is asking the Court to require that the BOP apply her
credits toward prerelease or supervised release, her request is not ripe for review because
she is not yet eligible for application of the credits. See Cook, 2025 WL 3170931, at *1
(citing inter alia Tapia v. Barron, 2:23-cv-01531-BJR-BAT, 2024 WL 2946184, at *4-5
(W.D. Wash. Jan. 12, 2024) (“[T]he Court finds because Petitioner is not yet eligible for
2 Undersigned further observes that Petitioner is now at a halfway house. Although
someone housed at such a facility remains “in custody” for purposes of habeas relief,
undersigned notes that part of Petitioner’s requested relief is transfer to prerelease custody.
(See Doc. 1 at 7.) Thus, to the extent that Petitioner seeks to be transferred to prerelease
custody, that portion of the Petition would appear to be moot. See Bisel v. Birholz, No. CV
22-7266 CJC, 2023 WL 2356691, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 2023) (dismissing § 2241
petition as moot where prisoner sought transfer to halfway house and was so transferred
during the pendency of the petition) (citing Green v. Jenkins, 859 Fed. App’x. 186, 197
(9th Cir. 2021)).
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application of time credits under the FSA, even though she may have accrued some credits,
her § 2241 Petition is not ripe for review and subject to dismissal without prejudice.”) and
Turner, 2022 WL 2195348, at *3 (“Because Petitioner is not yet eligible for application of
time credits under the FSA, the undersigned is persuaded by Respondent's argument that
the § 2241 Petition is not ripe for review.”). Indeed, Petitioner has “failed to establish an
immediate injury that would be redressed by the relief that she seeks.” Ford v. Chapman,
371 F. App’x 513, 513 (5th Cir. 2010); see also Tumbaco v. Birkholz, No. 2:23-cv-10663-
FMO-AJR, 2024 WL 47440235, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 9, 2024) (“[W]here, as here, a
prisoner alleges they were denied time credits under the FSA, the ripeness requirement is
not met until a favorable disposition of their claim would result in immediate release.”),
report and recommendation adopted, 2024 WL 4839791 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2024).
Therefore, undersigned concludes the Petition is not ripe and recommends dismissing the
Petition without prejudice.
RECOMMENDATION
Based on the foregoing,
IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 2241 (Doc. 1) be DENIED and DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
EFFECT OF RECOMMENDATION
This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of
Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. The
parties shall have 14 days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within
which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.
R. Civ. P. 6(a), 6(b) and 72. Thereafter, the parties have 14 days within which to file a
response to the objections.
Failure to timely file objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and
Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the
district court without further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114,
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1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to timely file objections to any factual determinations of the
Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the
findings of fact in an order of judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s
recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72.
Dated this 13th day of February, 2026.
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