Finch v. Block Incorporated et al

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WO
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
Mara Finch,
Plaintiff,
v.
Block Incorporated, et al.,
Defendants.
No. CV-25-04247-PHX-JJT
ORDER
At issue is pro se Plaintiff Mara Finch’s Reply to Defendants [sic] Motion to
Dissmiss [sic] (Doc. 45). While captioned a “reply,” Plaintiff’s filing is effectively a sur-
reply to Defendant Block, Inc.’s Reply in Support of Its Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 44.)
No party is permitted to file a sur-reply unless that party is granted leave and “valid
reasons for such additional briefing exists.” Fitzhugh v. Miller, No. CV-19-04632-PHX-
DWL, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57926, at *24 (D. Ariz. Apr. 2, 2020). Here, the Court
expressly restricted Plaintiff’s ability to file documents except for, inter alia, “one motion
for leave to file a sur-reply.” (Doc. 43 at 2 (emphasis in original.) Despite the clear
parameters set by this Court, Plaintiff did not request leave before filing her Sur-Reply.
Plaintiff’s failure to seek leave is sufficient grounds to strike her Sur-Reply. See Williams
v. City of Tempe, No. CV-17-02161-PHX-SMB, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112129, at *7–8
(D. Ariz. July 3, 2019), aff’d sub nom. Williams v. Albertsons Companies LLC, 822 F.
App’x 579 (9th Cir. 2020); see also, e.g., Silvas v. GMAC Mortg., LLC, No. CV-09-00265-
PHX-GMS, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 118854, at *7–8 (D. Ariz. Dec. 1, 2009), as amended
Case 2:25-cv-04247-JJT Document 46 Filed 12/01/25 Page 1 of 2

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(Jan. 5, 2010) (striking surreply where nothing therein “could be construed as a motion for
leave to file a surreply”).
Plaintiff also presents no extraordinary circumstances warranting the filing of her
Sur-Reply. See Fitzhugh, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57926, at *24 (noting “sur-replies are
highly disfavored and permitted only in extraordinary circumstances” and “discretion
should be exercised in favor of allowing a surreply only where a valid reason for such
additional briefing exists” (citations and quotation marks omitted)). In fact, Plaintiff’s Sur-
Reply purports to “correct” her responsive briefing and makes essentially the same
arguments she did before. (See Doc. 45 at 2.) This is precisely the kind of superfluous
motion practice that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Local Rules prohibit. These
Rules are deliberate and provide an intentional, tripartite process for parties to present their
arguments to a court. First, a party files a motion setting forth all their arguments. Second,
the opposing party responds to those arguments raised in the motion. Third, the party that
originally brought the motion may reply to the arguments raised in response. Absent
extraordinary circumstances, this is the end of motion practice. Otherwise, litigation would
become an endless Sisyphean task. The Court will therefore strike Plaintiff’s filing.
IT IS ORDERED striking Plaintiff’s Reply to Defendants [sic] Motion to Dissmiss
[sic] (Doc. 45).
Dated this 1st day of December, 2025.
Honorable John J. Tuchi
United States District Judge
Case 2:25-cv-04247-JJT Document 46 Filed 12/01/25 Page 2 of 2