USA v. Likens

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WO
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
United States of America,
Plaintiff,
v.
Cody Christian Likens,
Defendant.
No. CR-25-01354-001-TUC-AMM (MSA)
REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATION
Pending before the Court is Defendant Cody Christian Likens’s motion to suppress.
The Court will recommend that the motion be denied.
Factual Findings
This case arises from a vehicle stop on October 3, 2024. At around 7:00 p.m., a
dispatcher for the Oro Valley Police Department (OVPD) broadcasted an “Attempt to
Locate,” stating that an anonymous person had called and reported that Defendant was
driving while on a suspended license. (Tr. 6.) The dispatcher confirmed in the radio
broadcast that Defendant’s license was suspended. (Tr. 7, 50.) OVPD Officer Kristofer
Brandstrom received this initial broadcast, as well as a similar (but unverified) broadcast
about Defendant that went out at around 9:30 p.m. (Tr. 7–8; Pl.’s Ex. 2.)
Around 15 minutes after the second call, Officer Brandstrom saw Defendant driving
a flatbed truck near the intersection of Oracle Road and Water Harvest Way.1 (Tr. 11–13.)
Officer Brandstrom ran a records check, though he does not recall whether it confirmed the
1 Officer Brandstrom had encountered Defendant before and recognized him after
pulling alongside Defendant’s truck and observing him through the open window. (Tr. 13.)
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suspension of Defendant’s license. (Tr. 14.) He then activated his emergency lights and
initiated a traffic stop. (Tr. 14.) The stop began at 9:49 p.m. (Tr. 11–12; Pl.’s Ex. 7.)
Officer Brandstrom approached Defendant’s truck and told Defendant that he had
been stopped because of a suspended license, and Defendant acknowledged that his license
was suspended. (Pl.’s Ex. 7.) At 9:59 p.m., Officer Brandstrom removed Defendant from
the truck and placed him under arrest. (Pl.’s Ex. 7.) A few minutes later, at 10:03 p.m.,
OVPD Officer Timothy Fletcher requested a tow truck, and another officer conducted a
canine sniff of the truck. (Tr. 19–20, 24; Def.’s Ex. 20.) Officers then conducted an
inventory search of the truck, discovering a firearm and silencer in a secured container.
(Tr. 20–21.) The tow truck arrived at 10:18 p.m. (Tr. 24.)
Discussion
Defendant argues that the traffic stop was not supported by reasonable suspicion.
He also argues that the inventory search was pretextual and thus invalid. The Court finds
that both the stop and search were constitutional.
I. The stop was supported by reasonable suspicion.
A traffic stop must be supported by at least reasonable suspicion. Kansas v Glover,
589 U.S. 376, 380 (2020) (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417–18 (1981)).
Reasonable suspicion exists when, based on the “totality of the circumstances,” an officer
has “a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of
criminal activity.” Cortez, 449 U.S. at 417–18. This standard requires more than a “hunch”
that criminal activity is occurring but “considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a
preponderance of the evidence.” United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989) (quoting
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968)).
Officer Brandstrom’s testimony establishes reasonable suspicion for the traffic stop.
It is unlawful in Arizona for a person to drive a motor vehicle on a public highway while
his license is suspended. A.R.S. § 28-3473(A). Officer Brandstrom testified that, at around
7:00 p.m., a dispatcher broadcasted an “Attempt to Locate” relating to Defendant.
(Tr. 6–7.) He testified that the broadcast included an anonymous person’s report that
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Defendant was driving while on a suspended license and also the dispatcher’s independent
confirmation that Defendant’s license was suspended. (Tr. 7, 48.) He further testified that
the call notes on his computer showed that independent confirmation. (Tr. 50–51.)2 Officer
Brandstrom could reasonably rely on the dispatcher’s personal knowledge. See United
States v. Fernandez-Castillo, 324 F.3d 1114, 1118 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[T]he dispatcher’s
knowledge is properly considered as part of our analysis of reasonable suspicion.”). And
as less than three hours had passed when Officer Brandstrom encountered Defendant, that
information easily provided reasonable suspicion (and likely probable cause) to believe
that Defendant was driving on a suspended license.
Defendant’s arguments to the contrary are not persuasive. He first argues that
Officer Brandstrom lacked reasonable suspicion because he relied on the dispatcher’s
report, and the dispatcher’s report was based on the anonymous caller’s report. (Tr. 78.) It
is true that “[f]or a third-party report of suspected criminal activity to form the basis of an
officer’s reasonable suspicion, that report must possess sufficient indicia of reliability.”
Fernandez-Castillo, 324 F.3d at 1117. The dispatcher here, though, did not simply relay
the first caller’s report; the dispatcher relayed the report and the dispatcher’s independent
confirmation. As noted, Officer Brandstrom could reasonably rely on the latter.3
Defendant next argues that the Government and Officer Brandstrom have repeatedly
and falsely characterized “the two 911 callers as ‘self-identified neighbors’” when in fact
they were anonymous. (Doc. 54 at 2.) Defendant asserts that this is “a deliberate attempt
2 Officer Brandstrom testified that, when he runs a records check, the computer brings
up a page with the subject’s picture and driving record. (Tr. 49.) To see the subject’s driving
status, he has to double-click to get to another page. (Tr. 49.) Because he could not recall
whether he double-clicked into the page for Defendant’s driving status, the Court asked
whether “the only person that had confirmed . . . that the license was suspended was the
dispatcher who passed along the information to [him].” (Tr. 50.) Officer Brandstrom
responded affirmatively, and the Court followed up by asking “how was it confirmed [by
the dispatcher].” (Tr. 50.) He responded that the comments of the call screen showed
confirmation that Defendant’s license was suspended. (Tr. 50.) Thus, Officer Brandstrom
testified about two paths to learning Defendant’s driving status: a records check, which he
could not recall completing; and the radio broadcast, which he recalled receiving and which
was verified on the call screen. The Court clarifies this only because the Government’s
supplemental brief, which was prepared without the benefit of the transcript, does not
accurately reflect Officer Brandstrom’s testimony. (See Doc. 44 at 2.)
3 The dispatcher relayed the second call without independently confirming it. (See
Pl.’s Ex. 2.) So, that call did not add to Officer Brandstrom’s reasonable suspicion.
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to assign unwarranted indicia of credibility to the callers, recasting what were in fact
anonymous, police-directed informants as if they were concerned identified citizen
witnesses.” (Id.) Officer Brandstrom, however, did not testify that the callers identified
themselves as Defendant’s neighbors; he agreed that the callers were anonymous. (Tr. 37.)
While the Government’s response to the motion to dismiss does state that the callers “self-
identified as neighbors of Cody Likens,” that response was a mere proffer of information.
(Doc. 29 at 1.) Discrepancies between proffers and later testimony are not uncommon and
thus do not show bad faith. The testimony is what governs and is what the Court relied on
here. It is also what the Government relied on in its supplemental brief. (See Doc. 44 at 5
(describing the callers as “anonymous”).)
Defendant next argues that the Government is “seeking to convert a civilian
dispatcher’s unverified assumption [that his license was suspended] into the linchpin of
reasonable suspicion and to resuscitate that assumption through a misapplied collective-
knowledge doctrine.” (Doc. 54 at 3.) However, as discussed above, the testimony is that
the dispatcher confirmed the caller’s report. Defendant also argues that Officer Brandstrom
is not credible because, contrary to his testimony that there were two “Attempts to Locate,”
OVPD records show that there was only one “Attempt to Locate” logged in relation to the
second call at 9:30 p.m. (Id. at 3–4.) The first call at 7:00 p.m., he says, was logged as
“Suspicious Activity” and closed as “No Contact” after officers could not locate him. (Id.)
Even if that is true, it does not affect the Court’s conclusion. There is no dispute that there
were two radio broadcasts. Officer Brandstrom testified about the content of the first
broadcast, and the Court finds his testimony credible. In this Court’s view, a discrepancy
as to how the call was administratively logged is not the type of conflict or contradiction
that warrants rejection of his testimony.
Finally, Defendant argues that there are timestamp irregularities and gaps in the call
log that “materially impair the Government’s ability to reconstruct a lawful basis for its
actions.” (Doc. 54 at 9.) The key facts, however, are undisputed. There were two calls, and
the first provided reasonable suspicion for the stop. The purported discrepancies do not
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change those facts and thus do not affect the Court’s conclusion.
II. The inventory search was valid.
Inventory searches are “a well-defined exception to the warrant requirement.”
Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 643 (1983). An inventory search is valid only if it is
conducted “in conformance with the standardized procedures of the local police department
and in furtherance of a community caretaking purpose, such as promoting public safety or
the efficient flow of traffic.” United States v. Torres, 828 F.3d 1113, 1118 (9th Cir. 2016)
(citing United States v. Cervantes, 703 F.3d 1135, 1141 (9th Cir. 2012)). “[A]n inventory
search must not be a ruse for a general rummaging in order to discover incriminating
evidence.” Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 4 (1990). That said, “the mere presence of a
criminal investigatory motive or a dual motive—one valid, and one impermissible—does
not render an [inventory] search invalid.” Snitko v. United States, 90 F.4th 1250, 1262
(9th Cir. 2024) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Johnson, 889 F.3d 1120,
1126 (9th Cir. 2018) (per curiam)). “When the police conduct would have been the same
regardless of the officer’s subjective state of mind, no purpose is served by attempting to
tease out the officer’s ‘true’ motivation.” United States v. Bowhay, 992 F.2d 229, 231
(9th Cir. 1993).
The inventory search here was valid. To begin, the officers had a proper community
caretaking purpose in towing the truck: they were removing a traffic hazard. “Whether an
impoundment is warranted under the community caretaking doctrine depends on the
location of the vehicle and the police officers’[] duty to prevent it from creating a hazard
to other drivers or from being a target for vandalism or theft.” United States v. Caseres,
533 F.3d 1064, 1075 (9th Cir. 2008). Defendant was pulled over on the northbound side of
Oracle Road, just north of Water Harvest Way. (Tr. 42.) Officer Brandstrom testified, and
his bodycam video shows, that the truck was parked on an uphill slope in a dark area that
lacked streetlights. (Tr. 19; Pl.’s Ex. 7.) Officer Brandstrom testified that these conditions
made the truck a traffic hazard. (Tr. 19, 42.) The Court finds that his belief was reasonable.
Defendant points out that, in the past, officers had let him go and had let his brother
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retrieve his vehicle. (Tr. 32, 69.) He points out that the October 3 stop occurred near his
home, such that his brother could have been at the scene within minutes, and that he was
talking to his mother during the stop. (Tr. 68–69; Pl.’s Ex. 7.) The officers no doubt could
have addressed the traffic hazard in a way that was more favorable to Defendant. But
Defendant offers no authority for the proposition that an officer must exercise his discretion
in the least intrusive way possible, nor has the Court found any. Persuasive authority holds
otherwise. See United States v. Vick, 145 F.4th 191, 198 (1st Cir. 2025) (stating that
“officers are not constitutionally required to select the least intrusive—or most optimal—
way of fulfilling their community caretaking responsibilities” (internal quotation marks
and brackets omitted) (citation omitted)).
Next, the officers complied with OVPD policy. First, OVPD policy provides that a
vehicle must be towed “[w]henever a person in charge or in control of a vehicle is arrested”
(subject to one exception) or “when the community caretaker doctrine would reasonably
suggest that the vehicle should be towed.” (Pl.’s Ex. 4 at 4.) As stated above, the officers
had a proper community caretaking purpose. In addition, towing was required because the
officers had arrested Defendant, and parking the truck in a safe location (the one exception)
was not a reasonable option. (Tr. 42 (Q: “So, you could have parked that vehicle in the Oro
Valley Marketplace, could you have not?” A: “We were up the hill from Oro Valley
Marketplace. That would have required us to drive Mr. Likens’s vehicle and make a U-
turn at Tangerine and Oracle and then back down and park it for him. That’s not something
we typically would do.”).)
Second, the OVPD search policy applies only to “stored or impounded vehicle[s].”
(Pl.’s Ex. 4 at 4.) “The impoundment of an automobile is a seizure within the meaning of
the Fourth Amendment,” and “[a] seizure results if ‘there is some meaningful interference
with an individual’s possessory interests in that property.’” Miranda v. City of Cornelius,
429 F.3d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U.S. 56, 61 (1992)).
Defendant’s truck was impounded once he was arrested and officers decided to tow it. This
undoubtedly was a “meaningful interference” with his possessory interest in the truck. See
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Impound, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024) (“To place (something, such as a car or
other personal property) in the custody of the police or the court.”). Furthermore, Officer
Fletcher, who participated in the search of Defendant’s truck, testified that officers
routinely conducted inventory searches on the roadside before towing. (Tr. 55.) As such,
Defendant’s truck was subject to search.
Finally, as to the scope of the search, OVPD policy requires that officers inventory
“[a]ll property,” including property in “the trunk and [in] any compartments or containers,
even if they are closed and/or locked.” (Pl.’s Ex. 4 at 4.) It further requires that officers “be
as thorough and accurate as practicable in preparing an itemized inventory,” as the
inventory policy is designed to “protect[] an owner’s property while the owner is in police
custody, to provide for the safety of officers and the public, and to protect the Department
against fraudulent claims of lost, stolen or damaged property.” (Id.) This is a proper policy,
as it is designed to produce an inventory and sufficiently limits officer discretion. See
Wells, 495 U.S. at 4 (stating that the policy “should be designed to produce an inventory”
and should not afford officers “uncanalized discretion”). The officers complied with the
policy here. The bodycam video shows that they searched the truck cabin and truck bed,
including any containers. (Pl.’s Ex. 7; Def.’s Ex. 20.) And the record contains an inventory
sheet with a list of around 50 items of personal property. (Pl.’s Ex. 5.) As such, the Court
finds that the officers carried out the inventory search in compliance with OVPD policy.
Defendant’s truck was towed in furtherance of a community caretaking purpose,
and the officers conducted the inventory search in conformance with OVPD’s standardized
procedures. Therefore, the Court finds that the inventory search was lawful.
Defendant’s challenges to the search are not persuasive. He first argues that the
officers violated OVPD policy by conducting a roadside search, because the policy does
not expressly authorize such searches. (Tr. 79.) But the policy does not prohibit them either.
Nor does it specifically authorize searches at any other location, such that the Court could
infer that unmentioned locations are excluded. In short, the policy authorizes inventory
searches without regard to a vehicle’s location, so the roadside search was not a violation.
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Defendant’s primary argument is that the search was pretextual. He raises numerous
points to support this argument: in April 2025, Officer Brandstrom released Defendant
after stopping him for driving on a suspended license (Tr. 32, 78); two days before the stop
at issue here, OVPD officers met with Defendant’s neighbors to talk about “catch[ing]”
Defendant (Tr. 29, 63; Doc. 54 at 8); the call for the tow occurred three minutes after
Defendant’s arrest (Tr. 59, 78); the police conducted a canine sniff of the truck (Tr. 41, 78);
the stop occurred close to Defendant’s home, such that his brother or mother could have
retrieved the truck in lieu of towing (Tr. 69, 80); the call was logged as a cite-and-release
rather than a custodial arrest (Doc. 54 at 9); the stop was prolonged beyond the time needed
to address the reason for the stop (id. at 10); and Officer Brandstrom and others conducted
a high-risk stop on Defendant two weeks after the stop at issue here (id. at 12, 15).
An extended analysis of the pretext issue is unnecessary. Pretextual traffic stops are
constitutional. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996). Pretextual inventory
searches are also constitutional, so long as they advance a bona fide community caretaking
purpose. Snitko, 90 F.4th at 1261 (“[A]t least in this circuit, ‘dual motives’ are permissible
in the inventory search context”); see Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 372 (1987)
(stating that the police must not act “in bad faith or for the sole purpose of investigation”
(emphasis added)). The Court has seen and heard enough to believe that OVPD was
targeting Defendant, and that the officers desired to search his truck for contraband. (See
Pl.’s Ex. 7 (showing Officer Brandstrom asking whether the truck contained contraband);
Def.’s Ex. 20 (showing the canine sniff).) But as explained above, Officer Brandstrom’s
testimony establishes that officers had a valid community caretaking purpose in towing the
truck. His testimony is credible and not disputed, nor is it undermined by the administrative
irregularities proffered by Defendant. (Doc. 54 at 14–15.) This second, permissible motive
means that the inventory search was valid notwithstanding any investigatory motive.
Conclusion
The stop was supported by reasonable suspicion, and the inventory search was valid.
Therefore, the Court recommends that the motion to suppress (Doc. 26) be denied.
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This recommendation is not immediately appealable to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The parties have 14 days to file specific written objections
with the district court. Fed. R. Crim. P. 59(b)(2). The parties have 14 days to respond to
objections. The parties may not file replies on objections absent the district court’s
permission. A failure to file timely objections may result in the waiver of de novo review.
United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc).
Dated this 19th day of December, 2025.
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