Arnone v. Gonzalez, Jr.

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NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA - SAN FERNANDO VALLEY DIVISION
In re:
GERARDO ERNESTO GONZALEZ, JR.,
Debtor.
ANGELA ARNONE,
Plaintiff,
v.
GERARDO ERNESTO GONZALEZ, JR.,
Defendant.
Case No.: 1:24-bk-10450-MB
Chapter 7
Adv. No.: 1:24-ap-01028-MB
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTIONS
FOR RECONSIDERATION
Hearing Held:
Date: April 27, 2026
Time: 2:30 p.m.
Place: Courtroom 303
21041 Burbank Blvd.,
Woodland Hills, CA 91367
And via ZoomGov video and audio
Background
On February 2, 2026, the Court issued its “Memorandum of Decision re: Cross Motions for
Summary Judgment” in the above-captioned adversary proceeding. Adv. Dkt. 76 (the “Memorandum”).
Consistent with that Memorandum, the Court thereafter entered an order granting the Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment filed by defendant Gerardo Gonzalez (“Defendant”) [Adv. Dkt. 51], and denying
the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by plaintiff Angela Arnone (“Plaintiff”) [Adv. Dkt. 56]. Adv.
Dkt. 92. The order was followed by a judgment which provides that “the debt alleged by Plaintiff and
tried in this adversary proceeding is dischargeable and was discharged pursuant to Defendant’s
bankruptcy discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 727.” Adv. Dkt. 91 at 2 (the “Judgment”).
FILED & ENTERED
APR 30 2026
CLERK U.S. BANKRUPTCY COURT
Central District of California
BY DEPUTY CLERK	Cetulio
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Plaintiff’s Motions for Reconsideration
On February 9, 2026, Plaintiff filed the following documents with this Court (collectively, the
“Motions for Reconsideration”):
(a) “Plaintiff’s Record-Supported Supplement Identifying Material Facts Overlooked or
Mischaracterized” [Adv. Dkt. 79];
(b) a “Motion to Alter or Amend Ruling Pursuant to F.R.B.P. 9023” [Adv. Dkt. 80];
(c) a “Motion to Stay Entry of Judgment and Objection to Entry” [Adv. Dkt. 81];
(d) a “Motion for Amended or Additional Findings (Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7052; Fed. R. Civ. P.
52(b))” [Adv. Dkt. 82]; and
(e) “Plaintiff’s Request for Judicial Notice in Support of Post-Judgment Motions” [Adv. Dkt.
83].
The Appeal
On March 13, 2026, Plaintiff filed a notice of appeal of the Judgment entered against her in this
adversary proceeding. Adv. Dkt. 97. Plaintiff’s appeal to the U.S. Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the
Ninth Circuit is pending under BAP case number CC-26-1066. See Adv. Dkt. 117.
However, the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure (the “Bankruptcy Rules”) provide:
(1) In General. If a party files in the bankruptcy court any of the following motions—and
does so within the time allowed by these rules—the time to file an appeal runs for all
parties from the entry of the order disposing of the last such remaining motion:
(A) to amend or make additional findings under [Bankruptcy] Rule 7052, whether or
not granting the motion would alter the judgment;
(B) to alter or amend the judgment under [Bankruptcy] Rule 9023; [or]
(C) for a new trial under [Bankruptcy] Rule 9023….
(2) Notice of Appeal Filed Before a Motion Is Decided. If a party files a notice of appeal
after the court announces or enters a judgment, order, or decree—but before it disposes
of any motion listed in (1)—the notice becomes effective when the order disposing of
the last such remaining motion is entered.
Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8002(b).
Because Plaintiff filed her notice of appeal before the Court disposed of the Postjudgment
Motions, the notice of appeal does not become effective until after the Court issues an order disposing of
the Motions for Reconsideration. See id. This order denies the Postjudgment Motions on the merits.
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Legal Standards
Taking the Motions for Reconsideration as a whole, Plaintiff seeks reconsideration of the Court’s
entry of the Judgment in favor of Defendant pursuant to Bankruptcy Rules 7052 and 9023. A motion for
reconsideration filed within 14 days of the entry of judgment is treated as a motion to alter or amend a
judgment under Bankruptcy Rule 9023, incorporating Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Civil Rule”)
59(e). Am. Ironworks & Erectors, Inc. v. N. Am. Const. Corp., 248 F.3d 892, 898–99 (9th Cir. 2001);
Benson v. Wells Fargo Equip. Fin., Inc., No. 8:25-cv-01101, 2025 WL 2958871, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Oct.
17, 2025). This rule permits a party to file a motion: (a) for a new trial, (b) to alter or amend the
judgment, or (c) to amend or add to the bankruptcy court’s findings of fact. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9023
(incorporating Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e)); Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7052 (incorporating Fed. R. Civ. P. 52).
Civil Rule 59(e) allows for reconsideration if the court “(1) is presented with newly discovered
evidence, (2) committed clear error or the initial decision was manifestly unjust, or (3) if there is an
intervening change in controlling law. There may also be other, highly unusual circumstances warranting
reconsideration.” School Dist. No. 1J v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th Cir. 1993) (internal
citation omitted).
Motions for reconsideration are an “extraordinary remedy, to be used sparingly in the interests of
finality and conservation of judicial resources.” Kona Enters., Inc. v. Estate of Bishop, 229 F.3d 877,
890 (9th Cir. 2000). “Indeed, a motion for reconsideration should not be granted, absent highly unusual
circumstances, unless the [bankruptcy] court is presented with newly discovered evidence, committed
clear error, or if there is an intervening change in the controlling law.” Id. “Unhappiness with the
outcome is not included within the rule; unless the moving party shows that one of the stated grounds for
reconsideration exists, the Court will not grant a reconsideration.” Gish v. Newsom, No. 20-755, 2020
WL 6054912, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 9, 2020) (quoting Roe v. LexisNexis Risk Sols. Inc., No. 12-6284,
2013 WL 12134002, at *2 (C.D. Cal. May 2, 2013)).
Sua Sponte Summary Judgment
As one of her bases for reconsideration, Plaintiff contends that the Court “deprived [her] of the
ability to marshal record evidence and legal authority responsive to the grounds ultimately adopted by
the court” by sua sponte entering summary judgment pursuant to Civil Rule 56(f). Adv. Dkt. 80 at 9-10;
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Adv. Dkt. 81 at 3. As an initial matter, the Court did not sua sponte enter summary judgment on
Plaintiff’s claims under 11 U.S.C. §§ 523(a)(2)(A), (a)(2)(B) and (a)(6) because both parties moved for
summary judgment on these claims. Accordingly, this argument only applies to her claims under 11
U.S.C. §§ 727(a)(2)(A), (a)(4)(A) and (a)(7).
“Sua sponte entry of summary judgment is proper if ‘there is no genuine dispute respecting a
material fact essential to the proof of movant’s case.’” Buckingham v. United States, 998 F.2d 735, 742
(9th Cir. 1993) (quoting Cool Fuel, Inc. v. Connett, 685 F.2d 309, 311 (9th Cir. 1982)). “Before a court
makes a sua sponte grant of summary judgment, ‘a litigant must be given reasonable notice that the
sufficiency of his or her claim [or defense] will be in issue.’” Verizon Delaware, Inc. v. Covad
Commc'ns Co., 377 F.3d 1081 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Buckingham, 988 F.2d at 742); see also Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 326 (1986) (“district courts are widely acknowledged to possess the
power to enter summary judgments sua sponte, so long as the losing party was on notice that she had to
come forward with all of her evidence,” citing 10A Wright & Miller’s Federal Practice and Procedure §
2720 (2d ed. 1983)). “‘Reasonable notice implies adequate time to develop the facts on which the
litigant will depend to oppose summary judgment.’” Buckingham, 988 F.2d at 742 (quoting Portsmouth
Square v. Shareholders Protective Comm., 770 F.2d 866, 869 (9th Cir. 1985)).
The Court finds that Plaintiff had reasonable notice that the sufficiency of her section 727 claims
was at issue for several reasons.
First, as the party seeking denial of Defendant’s discharge under section 727, Plaintiff had the
burden of proof under a preponderance of the evidence standard and had the ultimate the burden of
persuasion. See W. Wire Works, Inc. v. Lawler (In re Lawler), 141 B.R. 425, 429 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1992).
Plaintiff had a full and fair opportunity to proffer evidence and argument supporting her position on her
section 727 claims. Plaintiff herself moved for summary judgment on such claims, contending that no
issue of material fact existed to preclude entry of summary judgment on them. See Adv. Dkt. 56 at 2:22-
28. In Defendant’s opposition to summary judgment on those claims, Defendant argued that Plaintiff
“has not offered sufficient evidence to establish the required factors for denial of discharge….” Adv.
Dkt. 62 at 7-10. In so arguing, Defendant cited his declaration in support of his opposition. See id. In
her reply to Defendant’s opposition, Plaintiff failed to address or dispute Defendant’s assertions of fact
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regarding her claims under under § 727. See Adv. Dkt. 67. Instead, she erroneously asserted that his
opposition “lack[ed] any evidentiary support” regarding them. Id. at 8:20-21. In a summary judgment
posture, “if a party … fails to properly address another party’s assertion of fact as required by [Civil]
Rule 56(c), the court may … consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(e)(2). Relying on the undisputed evidence before it, the Court found that Plaintiff had not met her
burden of proof.
Second, Plaintiff had four months to develop the facts on which she sought summary judgment,
i.e., between October 13, 2024, when she served her Defendant with her first discovery request, and
February 28, 2025, when discovery closed. See Adv. Dkt. 29 at 2:15-16; Adv. Dkt. 31 at 2 (¶ 3). The
Court finds that this provided her an adequate opportunity to develop the facts. Indeed, with discovery
closed, she would not have had any further opportunity to conduct discovery before trial.
Third, on multiple occasions, the Court gave Plaintiff oral notice that it may dispose of the
adversary proceeding on summary judgment. A bankruptcy court’s statements to the parties at a hearing
may be sufficient notice under Civil Rule 56(f). See Otte v. Naviscent, LLC (In re Martinez), 624 B.R.
883, 898 (N.D. Cal. 2021) (holding that bankruptcy court complied with Civil Rule 56(f) where it
informed parties at a hearing that it would consider an issue in an amended summary judgment ruling
and, at a later hearing, “stated that it was prepared to rule on the outstanding issue and would allow each
side ‘an opportunity to fully present their arguments on it’”). As set forth in the Memorandum:
On February 26, 2025, the Court held a status conference in this adversary proceeding. At
the status conference, the Court discussed with the parties their intention to resolve
this adversary proceeding by filing motions for summary judgment. On March 27,
2025, Defendant and Plaintiff each filed a motion for partial summary judgment.
Adv. Dkt. 76 at 8:1-4 (emphasis added). At the start of the hearing on the parties’ summary judgment
motions, the Court explained that the hearing was “the opportunity for the parties to make their oral
arguments.” Adv. Dkt. 111 at 4:2-4; see also id. at 4:16-17 (Plaintiff stating her preference that the
Court enter summary judgment on the parties’ papers alone), 30-31 (Court stating at conclusion of the
hearing that a trial would be scheduled only “if there are claims that survive” the Court’s summary
judgment ruling).
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Under these circumstances, the Court finds that Plaintiff had reasonable notice such that the
Court’s entry of summary judgment under Civil Rule 56(f) on her section 727 claims was appropriate.
Plaintiff also contends that the Court’s entry of summary judgment on her claims under section
727 was improper because “material discovery [wa]s outstanding” regarding “withheld financial records
and tax returns.” Adv. Dkt. 80 at 9:13-18. Plaintiff is mistaken. The deadline for all discovery to be
completed, including the date by which all responses to discovery requests were due, was February 28,
2025. Adv. Dkt. 31 at 2 (¶ 3). Despite Plaintiff’s assertion that she “repeatedly raised discovery
obstruction and incomplete production,” see Adv. Dkt. 80 at 9:13, Plaintiff never filed any motion
relating to discovery. After February 28, 2025, discovery was closed and Plaintiff’s outstanding
discovery requests, if any, had expired. No discovery was outstanding at the time, and no other
discovery would have been permitted prior to any trial in the matter.
Because summary judgment was proper under these circumstances, the Court declines to
reconsider its entry of the Judgment in favor of Defendant.
Prepetition Transfers
In ruling on Plaintiff’s section 727(a)(2)(A) claim, the Court considered whether certain
prepetition transfers that Defendant made to his wife, Andrea, were made with the intent to hinder, delay,
or defraud Plaintiff. See Adv. Dkt. 76 at 21-25. In her Motions for Reconsideration, Plaintiff contends
that the Memorandum overlooked or failed to address certain transactions. See Adv. Dkt. 82 at 10 (§
VII). However, as was explained in the Memorandum, the Court did not consider payments Defendant
allegedly made postpetition because Plaintiff did “not allege a cause of action under § 727(a)(2)(B),” but
rather alleged a cause of action under only clause (A) of section 727(a)(2). See Adv. Dkt. 76 at 22:7-9.
Nevertheless, Plaintiff is correct that the Memorandum did not address the Defendant’s transfer
of $1,150 to Andrea dated January 9, 2024. Compare Adv. Dkt. 56-5 at 54 (evidencing such transfer)
with Adv. Dkt. 76 at 23-24 (Tables 2 and 3 omitting such transfer). However, even if the Court had
included the $1,150 transfer, the Court’s analysis would not change. Taking into account that
transaction, as set forth in Table 3 of the Memorandum, the net amount transferred in January of 2024
would be $2,762, not $1,612. See Adv. Dkt. 76 at 24:18-19. As a result, after accounting for transfers
from Andrea to Defendant, Defendant transferred to Andrea an average of $505 each month, not $409.
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See id. at 24:19, 24:21-22. When isolating for months where the net amount Defendant’s transfers were
greater than $0, Defendant transferred to Andrea an average of $833 each month, not $689. See id. at
24:19, 24:22-24. Even after taking into account the $1,150 transfer, “[n]othing about this evidence
suggests that these payments were made with the intent to hinder, delay or defraud any creditor. Instead,
they tend to corroborate Defendant’s testimony that he frequently, although inconsistently, transferred to
Andrea an estimated $600 per month to satisfy his domestic support obligations to her.” Id. at 24:24-27.
Separately, the Court declines to consider the ATM withdrawals as part of Defendant’s transfers
to Andrea in satisfaction of his domestic support obligations to her. Plaintiff does not cite, and the Court
cannot locate, any testimony of Defendant that he paid his domestic support obligations to Andrea in
cash. Even still, nothing about the ATM withdrawals suggests that Defendant made those withdrawals
with the intent to hinder, delay or defraud any creditor. Plaintiff alleges that the ATM withdrawals “were
on days related to litigation,” presumably referring to the UD Action discussed in the Memorandum.
See Adv. Dkt. 82 at 10:18-19. However, Plaintiff does not specify, and the Court cannot locate, any
developments in the UD Action that were contemporaneous with Defendant’s ATM withdrawals. The
Court is simply not persuaded that these evidence transfers made with the intent to hinder, delay or
defraud any creditor.
Because these amended or additional findings are immaterial to the Court’s decision to enter the
Judgment in favor of Defendant, the Court declines to amend the Memorandum to include them.
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Remainder of Arguments in Motions for Reconsideration
The remainder of Plaintiff’s arguments in the Motions for Reconsideration misconstrue various
parts of the Memorandum or merely express unhappiness with the outcome, neither of which are a basis
for reconsideration. See Gish v. Newsom, 2020 WL 6054912, at *2. At this juncture, if Plaintiff
disagrees with the Court’s decision, her remedy is to prosecute her appeal from the Judgment in favor of
Defendant.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ORDERED that the Motions for Reconsideration are
DENIED.
Date: April 30, 2026
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