(PC) Stokes v. Chief Medical Officer et al

1:26-cv-07048Caed13 oct. 2026

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
TRAVON LEWIS STOKES,
Plaintiff,
v.
CHIEF MEDICAL OFFICER, et al.,
Defendants.
Case No. 1:26-cv-07048-FJS (PC)
ORDER DIRECTING CLERK OF COURT TO
RANDOMLY ASSIGN DISTRICT JUDGE TO
ACTION
ORDER DENYING WITHOUT PREJUDICE
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR
APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL
(ECF No. 18)
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO
DENY PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER
(ECF No. 18)
FOURTEEN (14) DAY DEADLINE
Plaintiff Travon Lewis Stokes (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in
forma pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The court has not yet
screened the complaint.
I. MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER
On October 8, 2026, Plaintiff filed a motion for temporary restraining order. (ECF No.
18.) In the motion, Plaintiff moves for an emergency temporary restraining order and preliminary
injunction compelling the Warden and Chief Medical Officer of Kern Valley State Prison to
immediately transfer Plaintiff to an outside hospital emergency room for full color duplex
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vascular mapping and to issue a permanent wheelchair chrono. (Id. at 7.) Plaintiff also seeks
appointment of pro bono counsel. (Id.) Plaintiff further requests an immediate federal protective
order and subpoena to compel the Warden of Kern Valley State Prison to “pull, preserve, and log
the unedited main dayroom surveillance camera footage and all active body-worn camera
recordings” of staff members present during Dr. Nguyen’s September 27, 2026, physical
examination. (Id. at 6.)
Plaintiff incorporates the allegations in his complaint regarding his “severe lower
extremity muscle wasting, advanced circulatory degradation, and debilitating neurological
dizziness spanning over two years.” (ECF No. 6 at 2.) Plaintiff further alleges that “his vascular
baseline has collapsed into a terminal crisis” such that he now requires emergency care. (Id. at 2.)
Plaintiff alleges that the physical examination conducted by the responding institutional
physician, Dr. Nguyen, on September 27, 2026, was insufficient and constituted physical assault
and gross malicious neglect. (Id. at 4–5.) After Dr. Nguyen concluded his examination, Plaintiff
alleges custody staff used the pretext of cell count time to coerce him to return to his cell without
diagnostic scanning, a transport wheelchair, or emergency cardiovascular stabilization. (Id. at 5–
6.) Plaintiff alleges that forcing him to wait until October 14, 2026, for a delayed vascular
ultrasound, while forcing weight-bearing movements, guarantees rapid tissue necrosis or a fatal
pulmonary embolism. (Id. at 3.)
Plaintiff contends that he satisfies the requirements for preliminary injunctive relief.
Plaintiff insists that the body camera evidence of Dr. Nguyen’s physical examination establish a
textbook case of Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference. Further, without immediate outside
emergency hospital intervention and a transport wheelchair, Plaintiff faces an imminent threat of
permanent tissue necrosis, a ruptured deep vessel, or a fatal pulmonary embolism. Finally,
Plaintiff contends the prison faces zero administrative hardships by executing an emergency
ambulance transport, whereas Plaintiff faces immediate physical destruction.
A. Legal Standard
“A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right.” Winter
v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008) (citation omitted). “A plaintiff seeking a
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preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to
suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his
favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” Id. at 20 (citations omitted). An injunction
may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to relief. Id. at 22 (citation
omitted).
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and in considering a request for
preliminary injunctive relief, the court is bound by the requirement that as a preliminary matter, it
have before it an actual case or controversy. City of L.A. v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102 (1983);
Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S.
464, 471 (1982). If the court does not have an actual case or controversy before it, it has no power
to hear the matter in question. Id. Requests for prospective relief are further limited by 18 U.S.C.
§ 3626(a)(1)(A) of the Prison Litigation Reform Act. That statute requires that the court find the
“relief [sought] is narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary to correct the violation of
the Federal right, and is the least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation of the Federal
right.” Id.
Furthermore, the pendency of this action does not give the court jurisdiction over prison
officials in general. Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 491–93 (2009); Mayfield v.
United States, 599 F.3d 964, 969 (9th Cir. 2010). The court’s jurisdiction is limited to the parties
in this action and to the viable legal claims this action is proceeding on. Summers, 555 U.S. at
491−93; Mayfield, 599 F.3d at 969.
B. Discussion
Plaintiff has not met the requirements for the injunctive relief he seeks in this motion. The
court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental
entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Plaintiff’s
complaint, or any portion thereof, is subject to dismissal if it is frivolous or malicious, if it fails to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or if it seeks monetary relief from a defendant
who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
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As noted above, the court has not yet screened the complaint. As such, this action does not
yet proceed on any cognizable claims, no defendant has been ordered served, and no defendant
has yet made an appearance. Thus, the court at this time lacks personal jurisdiction over any
named defendants or other individuals who might be involved in determining whether Plaintiff is
experiencing a medical emergency and what, if any, medical care is warranted.
To the extent Plaintiff believes he is in danger, he has other avenues of relief available to
him, including filing a petition for writ of habeas corpus in state court. E.g., People v. Brewer,
235 Cal. App. 4th 122, 138, 185 Cal. Rptr. 3d 104, 114 (2015) (a California trial court may grant
habeas corpus petitioner’s prospective relief to redress recurring, persistent deprivations of
prisoners’ rights at correctional facilities). The issue is not that Plaintiff’s allegations are not
serious or that he is not entitled to relief if sought in the proper forum. The issue is that Plaintiff
cannot use this action to obtain the relief he seeks. The seriousness of Plaintiff’s allegations
concerning feared impending harm cannot and do not overcome a jurisdictional bar. Zepeda v.
United States Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 753 F.2d 719, 727 (9th Cir. 1985) (“A federal
court may issue an injunction if it has personal jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter
jurisdiction over the claim; it may not attempt to determine the rights of persons not before the
court.”)
II. MOTION TO APPOINT COUNSEL
With respect to Plaintiff’s request for appointment of pro bono counsel, Plaintiff does not
have a constitutional right to appointed counsel in this action, Rand v. Rowland, 113 F.3d 1520,
1525 (9th Cir. 1997), rev’d in part on other grounds, 154 F.3d 952, 954 n.1 (9th Cir. 1998), and
the court cannot require an attorney to represent Plaintiff pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1).
Mallard v. U.S. Dist. Court for the S. Dist. of Iowa, 490 U.S. 296, 298 (1989). In certain
exceptional circumstances, however, the court may request the voluntary assistance of counsel
pursuant to section 1915(e)(1). Rand, 113 F.3d at 1525.
Without a reasonable method of securing and compensating counsel, the court will seek
volunteer counsel only in the most serious and exceptional cases. In determining whether
“exceptional circumstances exist, a district court must evaluate both the likelihood of success on
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the merits [and] the ability of the [plaintiff] to articulate his claims pro se in light of the
complexity of the legal issues involved.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
The court has considered Plaintiff’s request but does not find the required exceptional
circumstances. Even if it is assumed that Plaintiff has made serious allegations which, if proved,
would entitle him to relief, his case is not exceptional. This court is faced with similar cases filed
almost daily by prisoners who must also conduct legal research and draft pleadings without the
assistance of counsel and with limited access to the law library.
Furthermore, at this stage in the proceedings, the court cannot determine whether Plaintiff
is likely to succeed on the merits. Plaintiff’s complaint has not yet been screened, and therefore
the court cannot evaluate the likelihood of success on the merits. Finally, based on a review of the
record in this case, the court does not find that Plaintiff cannot adequately articulate his claims.
III. ORDER AND RECOMMENDATION
Accordingly, it is HEREBY ORDERED as follows:
1. The Clerk of the Court is DIRECTED to randomly assign a district judge to this action;
and
2. Plaintiff’s motion for appointment of counsel, (ECF No. 18), is DENIED, without
prejudice.
Furthermore, it is HEREBY RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s motion for temporary
restraining order, (ECF No. 18), be DENIED.
These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States district judge
assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l)(B). Within fourteen
(14) days after being served with a copy of these findings and recommendations, a party may file
written objections with the court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate
Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Objections, if any, shall not exceed fifteen (15) pages
or include exhibits. Exhibits may be referenced by document and page number if already in the
record before the court. Any pages filed in excess of the 15-page limit may not be considered.
The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may result in the
waiver of rights on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 838–39 (9th Cir. 2014). This
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recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(1) should not
be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: October 13, 2026 ______________________
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Case 1:26-cv-07048-KES-FJS Document 21 Filed 10/13/26 Page 6 of 6

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