P.M.Q. v. Marysville Joint Unified School District et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
P.M.Q.,
Plaintiff,
v.
MARYSVILLE JOINT UNIFIED
SCHOOL DISTRICT,
Defendant.
Case No. 2:25-cv-1843-JDP
ORDER
Plaintiff P.M.Q., a minor child, alleges that defendant Marysville Joint Unified School
District (“the District”) violated their rights and caused them emotional harm through a pattern of
verbal abuse.1 Plaintiff now moves to strike certain affirmative defenses in the District’s answer
to the first amended complaint. ECF No. 46. For the reasons stated below, plaintiff’s motion is
granted.
Procedural History
Plaintiff initiated this action in June 2025 against the District and its employee Kelle
Pickell.2 ECF No. 1. In March 2026, upon the District’s and Pickell’s respective motions, the
court dismissed the complaint with leave to amend. ECF No. 30. After plaintiff filed the first
1 The court uses they/them pronouns for plaintiff because the complaint does so.
2 The parties have consented to magistrate judge jurisdiction. ECF No. 20.
Case 2:25-cv-01843-JDP Document 51 Filed 10/14/26 Page 1 of 6

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amended complaint, ECF No. 31, Pickell again moved to dismiss, ECF No. 33. In June 2026, the
court dismissed all claims against Pickell, thereby terminating her from this action. ECF No. 45.
Meanwhile, the District filed an answer to the first amended complaint.3 ECF No. 44.
Plaintiff now moves to dismiss certain affirmative defenses pled by the District. ECF No. 46.
The District has filed an opposition,4 ECF No. 47, and plaintiff has filed a reply, ECF No. 48.
Legal Standard
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f) provides that courts “may strike from a pleading an
insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” Petrie v.
Elec. Game Card, Inc., 761 F.3d 959, 966-67 (9th Cir. 2014) (internal quotations omitted). An
affirmative defense can be deficient either in pleading or as a matter of law. Kohler v. Islands
Rests., LP, 280 F.R.D. 560, 564 (S.D. Cal. 2012). In terms of pleading, “[t]he key to determining
the sufficiency of pleading an affirmative defense is whether it gives [the] plaintiff fair notice of
the defense.” Wyshak v. City Nat’l Bank, 607 F.2d 824, 827 (9th Cir. 1979). An affirmative
defense is deficient as a matter of law only if it can be shown “that there are no questions of fact,
that any questions of law are clear and not in dispute, and that under no set of circumstances
could the defense succeed.” Secs. & Exch. Comm’n v. Sands, 902 F. Supp. 1149, 1165 (C.D. Cal.
1995). Motions to strike affirmative defenses are disfavored challenges because they often
amount to little more than a dilatory tactic. See Cal. Dep’t of Toxic Substances Control v. Alco
Pac., Inc., 217 F. Supp. 2d 1028, 1033 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
3 The answer was untimely. Plaintiff filed the first amended complaint on April 10, 2026,
which made the District’s answer due by April 24, 2026. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(3). After the
District failed to comply with this deadline, the court issued an order to show cause as to why
default should not be entered. ECF No. 38. The court subsequently discharged the order to show
cause, ECF No. 40, and the District filed its answer on June 12, 2026, ECF No. 44.
4 The opposition was untimely. Plaintiff filed their motion on July 3, 2026, which made
any opposition due by July 17, 2026. See E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(c). The District filed its opposition
on July 23, 2026, without any request for an extension of time or acknowledgment of its
untimeliness. The court exercises its discretion to consider the opposition but cautions the
District to comply with all rules moving forward.
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Discussion
Plaintiff moves to strike eight affirmative defenses pled in the District’s answer. ECF No.
46. The District has agreed to withdraw some of the contested defenses but opposes plaintiff’s
motion as to others. ECF No. 47. The court addresses each defense in turn.
I. Waiver and Estoppel
The District’s second affirmative defense is that plaintiff’s claims “are barred by the
doctrine of waiver and estoppel.” ECF No. 44 at 18. In its opposition, the District withdraws this
defense. ECF No. 47 at 5. Accordingly, this defense is stricken with prejudice.
II. Settlement Agreement
The District’s third affirmative defense is that plaintiff’s claims “are barred by the
Settlement Agreement entered into by Plaintiff and the District on or about May 13, 2022.” ECF
No. 44 at 18. In its opposition, the District withdraws this defense because it “appears to have
been included by mistake.” ECF No. 47 at 4. Accordingly, this defense is stricken with
prejudice.
III. Statutes of Limitations
The District’s fourth affirmative defense is that plaintiff’s claims “are barred by the
applicable state and federal statutes of limitations, including, but not limited to, Cal. Gov’t Code
§ 945.6, Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §§ 335 et seq, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1415(b)(6)(B), 1415(f)(3)(C), and 42
U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2).” ECF No. 44 at 18. As plaintiff points out, the District’s citations to
provisions of Title 42 of the United States Code do not exist, and instead it appears that the
District intended to cite Title 20. See ECF No. 46 at 8. Further, plaintiff asserts that “[t]he
defense does not identify which limitations period applies to which claim, or the triggering date
for any of them.” Id. In its opposition, the District acknowledges its citation error as to the
federal statutes, and it supplies some of the requested information as to California Government
Code § 945.6, arguing that the Government Claims Act bars plaintiff’s state law claims. ECF No.
47 at 5-6.
However, as plaintiff points out in their reply, the District’s fourteenth affirmative
defense—which is not challenged by plaintiff—asserts that plaintiff’s claims are “barred by
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Plaintiff’s failure to comply with the California Government Claims Act, Government Code
§§ 905, et seq., claims presentation requirements in that Plaintiff failed to timely present a claim
asserting all causes of action and/or all factual and legal bases for liability asserted in the
Complaint, and/or failed to timely file suit following the denial of said claim.” ECF No. 44 at 20.
Accordingly, this defense is stricken with leave to amend. Any amended answer should
correctly identify the relevant federal statutes and provide at least some detail regarding the
applicable limitations periods, including the triggering date. To the extent that the District sees a
distinction between this defense’s citation to California Governmentt Code § 945.6 and the
District’s fourteenth affirmative defense, the District may replead such citation with an
explanation as to how it is not duplicative.
IV. Exhaustion
The District’s fifth affirmative defense is that plaintiff “has failed to exhaust [their]
administrative and/or judicial remedies.” ECF No. 44 at 18. As plaintiff points out, this defense
“does not identify the administrative remedy the District contends Plaintiff was required to
exhaust, the claim to which the defense applies, or the relief said to require exhaustion.” See ECF
No. 46 at 9. In its opposition, the District has provided some of the requested information. ECF
No. 47 at 6. Accordingly, this defense is stricken with leave to amend.
V. Qualified Immunity
The District’s seventh affirmative defense is that Pickell is “entitled to federal qualified
immunity.” ECF No. 44 at 18. In its opposition, the District withdraws this defense. ECF No.
47 at 3. Accordingly, this defense is stricken with prejudice.
VI. Attorney’s Fees
The District’s twelfth affirmative defense is that “it is entitled to attorneys’ fees under the
federal statues Plaintiff sues under and pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure section
1038 because Plaintiff’s action is frivolous, unreasonable and without foundation.” ECF No. 44
at 19. In its opposition, the District concedes that this allegation is not an affirmative defense but
rather a prayer for relief. Accordingly, this defense is stricken with prejudice to being replead as
an affirmative defense; the District may, however, plead it as part of its prayer for relief.
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VII. Immunity
The District’s thirteenth affirmative defense is that plaintiff’s claims “are barred in whole
or in part because all actions and conduct by the District and its agents or employees were
justified and subject to governmental immunities, including but not limited to the immunities
arising under the United States Constitution and federal law, immunities arising under the
California Constitution and California law, immunities arising under Government Code sections
810, et seq. including, but not limited to, Sections 815, 815.2, 818, 818.2, 818.8, 820.2, 820.4,
820.6, 820.8, 821.2, 821.6, and 822.2.” ECF No. 44 at 20. As plaintiff points out, “[t]welve
separate immunity provisions are listed without any indication of which immunity is asserted
against which claim or the facts said to support it.” See ECF No. 46 at 9-10. In its opposition, the
District supplies the requested information. ECF No. 47 at 7-9. Accordingly, this defense is
stricken with leave to amend.
VIII. Right to Assert Additional Affirmative Defenses
The District’s fifteenth and final affirmative defense is that it retains “the right to assert
additional affirmative defense, if any and to the extent that such affirmative defenses are
applicable.” ECF No. 44 at 20. Plaintiff argues that “[a] reservation of the right to assert
defenses not yet pleaded is not itself an affirmative defense.” ECF No. 46 at 7. The court agrees.
Courts in this Circuit have held that “[a] ‘reservation of affirmative defenses’ is not an affirmative
defense.” E.E.O.C. v. Timeless Invs., Inc., 734 F. Supp. 2d 1035, 1055 (E.D. Cal. 2010); see also
United States v. Glob. Mortg. Funding, Inc., No. 07-cv-1275-DOC-PJW, 2008 WL 5264986, at
*5 (C.D. Cal. May 15, 2008) (“[The defendant] is either entitled to raise additional defenses at a
later time or he is not; his attempt to reserve his rights to do so is a legal nullity.”). Accordingly,
this defense is stricken with prejudice.
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Conclusion
Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that:
1. Plaintiff’s motion to strike the District’s answer, ECF No. 46, is GRANTED.
Specifically, the second, third, seventh, twelfth, and fifteenth affirmative defenses are
STRICKEN with prejudice. The fourth, fifth, and thirteenth affirmative defenses are STRICKEN
with leave to amend.
2. The District may file an amended answer within fourteen days of this order.
Failure to do so will result in this action proceeding on the District’s answer, ECF No. 44.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: October 13, 2026
JEREMY D. PETERSON
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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