Knox v. Kijakazi

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United States District Court
Northern District of California
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
EUREKA DIVISION
JENNIFER KNOX,
Plaintiff,
v.
KILOLO KIJAKAZI,
Defendant.
Case No. 22-cv-03420-RMI
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S
PETITION FOR ATTORNEY’S
FEES UNDER 42 U.S.C. 406(B) AND
1383(D)(2)(B)
Re: Dkt. No. 26
After Plaintiff Jennifer Knox brought this action for review of the Commissioner of Social
Security’s decision to deny benefits, this court remanded the case (dkt. 22), and the Commissioner
issued a favorable decision. Her attorney, John D. Metsker, now seeks $14,647.81 in attorney fees
under section 406(b) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § § 406(b) and 1383(d)(2)(B). (Dkt. 26
at 1, 3, 6.) The Commissioner does not oppose or support the request for attorney fees. For the
following reasons, the court GRANTS the motion for attorney’s fees.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff’s application for disability benefits was denied by the agency’s initial decision.
(Dkt. 28 at ¶ 1.) Plaintiff subsequently brought an action for judicial review, and this court
remanded the case for further proceedings. (Order, Dkt. 24.) The court then granted the parties’
stipulation for attorney fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2412,
and awarded $8,600.00 in attorney’s fees to Plaintiff. (Order, Dkt. 25.)
On remand, the administrative law judge granted Plaintiff’s application and awarded
$58,591.26 in total past due benefits in past-due benefits. (Pl.’s Mot., Dkt. 26, at 2–3.) Under a
contingency fee agreement, Plaintiff agreed to pay counsel up to 25% of any past-due benefits
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resulting from a favorable disability decision. (Id. at ¶ 4–5; see also 26-1, Fee Agreement.) No
formal Notice of Award was ever received by Plaintiff’s counsel in this case. In response to a
request by Plaintiff’s counsel for a copy of the Notice of Award, on January 22, 2026, Plaintiff’s
counsel received from the Social Security Administration’s Auburn, CA Field Office a notice
titled “Supplemental Security Income Important Information” dated November 13, 2024. (See dkt.
26-2, SSI Notice.) This notice indicated to Plaintiff that her past-due benefits are $58,591.26.
LEGAL STANDARD
Attorneys handling social security proceedings may seek fees for their work under both the
EAJA and the Social Security Act. While the government pays an award pursuant to the EAJA, an
award pursuant to Section 406(b) of the Social Security Act is paid out of a successful claimant’s
past-due benefits. See 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A); Russell v. Sullivan, 930 F.2d 1443, 1446 (9th Cir.
1991), abrogated on other grounds by Sorensen v. Mink, 239 F.3d 1140, 1149 (9th Cir. 2001).
Section 406(b)(1) provides that a federal court that “renders a judgment favorable to a claimant . . .
who was represented before the court by an attorney” may grant the attorney “a reasonable fee for
such representation, not in excess of 25 percent of the total of the past-due benefits to which the
claimant is entitled by reason of such judgment.” In passing Section 406, Congress sought to
protect attorneys from the nonpayment of fees, while also shielding clients from unfairly large
fees. Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 805 (2002).
The Supreme Court in Gisbrecht explained that § 406(b) is meant “to control, not to
displace, [contingency] fee agreements between Social Security benefits claimants and their
counsel.” 535 U.S. at 793. Even if a fee request under § 406(b) is within the 25 percent statutory
limit, the attorney bears the burden of showing that the fee sought is reasonable, and the court is
responsible for serving as an “independent check” to ensure the reasonableness of the fee. Id. at
807. Following Gisbrecht, the Ninth Circuit has instructed that a § 406(b) fee request should be
assessed by “looking first to the contingent-fee agreement, then testing it for reasonableness.”
Crawford v. Astrue, 586 F.3d 1142, 1149 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (quoting Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at
808). The court should consider “the character of the representation and the results the
representative achieved,” and determine “whether the amount [of fees specified in the contingency
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fee agreement] need be reduced” for such reasons as “substandard performance, delay, or benefits
that are not in proportion to the time spent on the case.” Id. at 1151. The reasonableness
determination is not governed by the lodestar method, because “[t]he lodestar method
undercompensates attorneys for the risk they assume in representing [Social Security] claimants
and ordinarily produces remarkably smaller fees than would be produced by starting with the
contingent-fee agreement.” Id. at 1150.
DISCUSSION
The court finds that counsel has met his burden to demonstrate that the requested fees are
reasonable. As noted above, Plaintiff entered into a contingency fee agreement providing for a
25% fee, which is consistent with the statutory maximum. In the SSI Notice, Plaintiff was
informed of her right to protest the fee (dkt. 26-2 at 2), and Plaintiff did not submit any objections
to the fee petition by the response deadline. There is no evidence that counsel’s performance was
substandard—indeed, counsel’s representation resulted in Plaintiff receiving $58,591.26 in past
due benefits. Moreover, counsel’s fee request of $14,647.81 is equal to the statutory maximum of
25% of the past-due benefits. See Brenn v. O’Malley, No. 23-CV-05010-DMR, 2025 WL
2419268, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2025) (awarding 25% of the past-due benefits awarded).
Plaintiff’s counsel states that he expended 41.70 hours on this litigation, leading to an
effective hourly rate of approximately $351.27. (Dkt. 26-3 at 2.) While this is well over two and
almost three times the requested rate for EAJA fees, it falls squarely within the range of hourly
rates approved in the Ninth Circuit for social security contingency fee cases and is much lower
than some rates approved by courts in the Ninth Circuit. See Garcia v. O’Malley, No. 1:20-cv-
01366-SKO, 2024 WL 1118782, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 14, 2024) (collecting Ninth Circuit cases
and finding an effective hourly rate of $2,307.69 to be reasonable); Ainsworth v. Berryhill, No. 16-
cv-03933-BLF, 2020 WL 6149710, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 20, 2020) (finding an hourly rate of
$1,325.34 reasonable in social security case under 406(b) and collecting cases); Hearn v.
Barnhart, 262 F. Supp. 2d 1033, 1036–37 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (approving a multiplier of three to the
typical hourly rate for awards under 406(b)). Counsel’s itemized billing sheet includes typical
litigation tasks and hours. (Dkt. 26 at 7–8.) The court is mindful of the Ninth Circuit’s instruction
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that “lawyers are not likely to spend unnecessary time on contingency fee cases in the hope of
inflating their fees” because “[t]he payoff is too uncertain.” Moreno v. City of Sacramento, 534
F.3d 1106, 1112 (9th Cir. 2008). The court finds that the hours provided based on the work
performed are reasonable, as is the effective hourly rate. Further, there is nothing in the record to
suggest that any delay in this case was unreasonable or attributable to Plaintiff’s counsel’s
conduct.
Moreover, the requested fees are reasonable given the risk assumed by counsel in taking
this case on a contingency basis, as the claims had already been denied in an administrative
proceeding. See Crawford v. Astrue, 586 F.3d 1142, 1149 (9th Cir. 2009) (“The lodestar method
under-compensates attorneys for the risk they assume in representing SSDI claimants . . .”);
Ainsworth, 2020 WL 6149710 at *3 (“Here, Counsel assumed a substantial risk of not recovering
attorneys’ fees because the claims had been denied after exhausting administrative remedies.”);
Lewis v. Dudek, No. 22-CV-05180-TSH, 2025 WL 1104770, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 14, 2025) (“the
requested fee is also reasonable because of the substantial risk of loss inherently involved in
representing Social Security disability claimants.”). Based on the findings above that there is a
valid contingency fee agreement, that the amount of fees requested is not disproportionate to the
work performed, that counsel’s work was not substandard or unreasonable, that the requested
effective hourly rate is reasonable, and that counsel assumed substantial risk in taking this case,
the court finds the requested fees are reasonable.
Once the court determines that the fee sought under § 406(b) is reasonable, it must account
for the attorney’s fees paid by the Commissioner under the EAJA. Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 796.
“Congress harmonized fees payable by the Government under EAJA with fees payable under §
406(b) out of the claimant’s past-due Social Security benefits” by requiring the claimant’s attorney
to refund to the claimant the amount of the smaller fee up to the point where the claimant receives
100% of the past-due benefits. Id. Here, the court finds counsel’s § 406(b) request reasonable, and
therefore counsel shall refund to Plaintiff the $8,600 in EAJA fees previously awarded.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the court GRANTS Plaintiff’s counsel’s motion for
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attorney’s fees. The Commissioner is directed to certify fees under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) in the
amount of $14,647.81. The court ORDERS the award of attorney fees pursuant to 406(b) to be
paid out of Plaintiff’s past-due benefits in accordance with agency policy, to the extent that such
past-due benefits are available and not used to pay an attorney fee under 406(a). Counsel is
ORDERED to reimburse Plaintiff the $8,600 in EAJA fees to offset the payment of 406(b) fees.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: February 19, 2026
ROBERT M. ILLMAN
United States Magistrate Judge
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