Behdin et al v. Edlow

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
United States District Court
Northern District of California
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
KAYHAN BEHDIN, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
JOSEPH B. EDLOW,
Defendant.
Case No. 26-cv-00566-SVK
ORDER ON (1) DEFENDANT’S
MOTION TO DISMISS AND (2)
PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Re: Dkt. Nos. 49, 55
Plaintiffs are 31 citizens of Iran and 1 citizen of Sudan who, at the time they filed this
action on January 19, 2026, had Form I-765 applications for authorization to work in the United
States pending with the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”). Dkt. 1
¶ 2. In this action, Plaintiffs challenge two Policy Memoranda issued by USCIS in December
2025 and January 2026 that placed a hold on the adjudication of immigration benefit applications
filed by citizens of certain countries, including Iran and Sudan. Dkt. 1. In their complaint,
Plaintiffs sought to compel Defendant Joseph B. Edlow, Director of USCIS, to complete
adjudication of their pending Form I-765 applications. Dkt. 1. All Parties have consented to the
jurisdiction of a magistrate judge. Dkt. 12, 15.
On April 16, 2026, the Court granted Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction and
among other things ordered Defendant to adjudicate every pending Form I-765 application filed
by any Plaintiff within 180 days of the application filing date. Dkt. 41 at 46-47. Defendant
subsequently informed the Court that as of May 21, 2026, USCIS had adjudicated all of the
Plaintiffs’ applications by approving them. Dkt. 49 at 3; Dkt. 49-1; Dkt. 49-2; Dkt. 49-3.
Now before the Court are two motions. Defendant moves to dismiss the complaint,
arguing that the case is moot and the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because USCIS has
Case 5:26-cv-00566-SVK Document 65 Filed 10/16/26 Page 1 of 9

2
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
United States District Court
Northern District of California
already provided the ultimate relief Plaintiffs sought—adjudication of the I-765 applications that
were pending at the time Plaintiffs filed this action. Dkt. 49. Plaintiffs respond by both opposing
the motion to dismiss and bringing a motion for summary judgment “permanently enjoining
Defendant from subjecting any of Plaintiffs’ employment authorization applications to the hold
created by the Policy Memos.” Dkt. 54, 55.
Having reviewed the briefs, the case file, the relevant law, and having had the benefit of a
hearing on Plaintiffs’ earlier motion for preliminary injunction, the Court finds the present
motions suitable for determination without oral argument. Civ. L.R. 7-1(b). For the reasons that
follow, Defendant’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED and Plaintiffs’ motion for summary
judgment is DENIED.
I. LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Defendant’s motion to dismiss
“A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) tests whether
the court has subject matter jurisdiction.” Williams v. Apple, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 3d 892, 900 (N.D.
Cal. 2020). “Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction [and] possess only that power
authorized by Constitution and statute.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375,
377 (1994). “It is to be presumed that a cause lies outside this limited jurisdiction [] and the
burden of establishing the contrary rests upon the party asserting jurisdiction.” Id. (internal
citations omitted).
Federal jurisdiction requires a live case or controversy at every stage of litigation.
See U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S. 693, 704–05 (2013). To
satisfy this requirement, “a litigant must continue to have a personal stake in the outcome of the
suit throughout all stages of federal judicial proceedings.” Abdala v. Immigration &
Naturalization Serv., 488 F.3d 1061, 1063 (9th Cir. 2007). “The various doctrines of ‘standing,’
‘ripeness,’ and ‘mootness’ ... are but several manifestations ... of the [same] primary conception.”
Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 503-04 (1961); see also Bayer v. Neiman Marcus Grp., Inc., 861
F.3d 853, 862 (9th Cir. 2017) (noting that “the doctrine of mootness has been described as the
doctrine of standing set in a time frame”).
Case 5:26-cv-00566-SVK Document 65 Filed 10/16/26 Page 2 of 9

3
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
United States District Court
Northern District of California
A court lacks jurisdiction to hear moot claims. Pitts v. Terrible Herbst, Inc., 653 F.3d
1081, 1086–87 (9th Cir. 2011); see also Am. Rivers v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 126 F.3d
1118, 1123 (9th Cir. 1997) (“A federal court does not have jurisdiction to give opinions upon
moot questions or abstract propositions, or to declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect
the matter in issue in the case before it”). Consequently, “[i]f an event occurs that prevents the
court from granting effective relief, the claim is moot and must be dismissed.” Am. Rivers, 126
F.3d at 1123; see also Pitts, 653 F.3d at 1087 (“if events subsequent to the filing of the case
resolve the parties’ dispute, we must dismiss the case as moot”). “A case becomes moot when it
no longer satisfies the case-or-controversy requirement of Article III, Section 2 of the
Constitution, which demands that “the plaintiff ‘must have suffered, or be threatened with, an
actual injury traceable to the defendant and likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial
decision.’” United States v. Ilkhani, 516 F. App'x 661, 662 (9th Cir. 2013); see also Tianshu
Cheng v. United States Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., No. 20-CV-01962-JSW, 2020 WL 7342730,
at *3 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 14, 2020) (“A case is moot when the issues presented are no longer ‘live’ or
the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome”) (citing Powell v. McCormack, 395
U.S. 486, 496 (1969)).
“[S]tanding and mootness both pertain to a federal court's subject-matter jurisdiction under
Article III, [so] they are properly raised in a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(1).” White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1242 (9th Cir. 2000). “A Rule 12(b)(1)
jurisdictional attack may be facial or factual.” Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035,
1039 (9th Cir. 2004). “In a facial attack, the challenger asserts that the allegations contained in a
complaint are insufficient on their face to invoke federal jurisdiction.” Id. In a factual attack, the
motion “disputes the truth of the allegations that, by themselves, would otherwise invoke federal
jurisdiction.” Id. Accordingly, “when considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1)
the district court is not restricted to the face of the pleadings, but may review any evidence, such
as affidavits and testimony, to resolve factual disputes concerning the existence of jurisdiction.”
McCarthy v. United States, 850 F.2d 558, 560 (9th Cir. 1988).
Case 5:26-cv-00566-SVK Document 65 Filed 10/16/26 Page 3 of 9

4
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
United States District Court
Northern District of California
B. Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment
A party may move for summary judgment as to any claim, any defense, or any part of a
claim or defense. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Summary judgment is appropriate if the moving party
shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the party is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law. Id. A fact is material if it may affect the outcome of the case. Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1985). A genuine dispute of material fact exists if there is
sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id.
The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of informing the court of
the basis for the motion and identifying portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, admissions, or affidavits that demonstrate the absence of a triable issue of material
fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).
Where the party moving for summary judgment has the burden of persuasion at trial, such
as where the moving party seeks summary judgment on its own claims or defenses, the moving
party must establish “beyond controversy every essential element of its [claim].” So. Cal.
Gas Co. v. City of Santa Ana, 336 F.3d 885, 888 (9th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). Where the
moving party seeks summary judgment on a claim or defense on which the opposing party bears
the burden of persuasion at trial, “the moving party must either produce evidence negating an
essential element of the nonmoving party’s claim or defense or show that the nonmoving party
does not have enough evidence of an essential element to carry its ultimate burden of persuasion at
trial.” Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co., Ltd. v. Fritz Cos., Inc., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir.
2000). If the moving party meets its initial burden, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to
produce evidence supporting its claims or defenses. Id. at 1103. If the nonmoving party does not
produce evidence to show a genuine issue of material fact, the moving party is entitled to
summary judgment. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.
“The court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant and draw
all reasonable inferences in the nonmovant’s favor.” City of Pomona v. SQM N. Am. Corp., 750
F.3d 1036, 1049 (9th Cir. 2014). However, the party opposing summary judgment must direct the
court’s attention to “specific, triable facts.” So. Cal. Gas, 336 F.3d at 889. “[T]he mere existence
Case 5:26-cv-00566-SVK Document 65 Filed 10/16/26 Page 4 of 9

5
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
United States District Court
Northern District of California
of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff’s position” is insufficient to defeat a motion for
summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. “Where the record taken as a whole could not
lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue for trial.”
City of Pomona, 750 F.3d at 1049-50 (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)).
A “district court need not examine the entire file for evidence establishing a genuine issue
of fact, where the evidence is not set forth in the opposing papers with adequate references so that
it could conveniently be found.” Carmen v. S.F. Unified Sch. Dist., 237 F.3d 1026, 1031 (9th Cir.
2001). In other words, “whatever establishes a genuine issue of fact must both be in the district
court file and set forth in the response.” Id. at 1029; see Keenan v. Allan, 91 F.3d 1275, 1279
(9th Cir. 1996) (“[I]t is not our task, or that of the district court, to scour the record in search of a
genuine issue of triable fact. We rely on the nonmoving party to identify with reasonable
particularity the evidence that precludes summary judgment.”).
II. DISCUSSION
Defendant argues that Plaintiffs’ claims are moot and the Court therefore lacks subject
matter jurisdiction because USCIS has now adjudicated all of the I-765 applications that were the
subject of the complaint in this action. Dkt. 49 at 3. According to Defendant, “USCIS’s approvals
of Plaintiffs’ 1-765 applications moot any dispute between the parties, regardless of whether this
lawsuit is characterized as a challenge to (1) USCIS’s alleged unreasonable delay in adjudicating
their I-765 applications or (2) the adjudicative hold imposed on their pending I-765 applications
by USCIS’s two policy memorandums” because “[e]ither way, USCIS’s approval of Plaintiffs’
I-765 applications deprives Plaintiffs of ‘a personal stake in the outcome of the suit[.]’” Dkt. 49 at
6 (quoting Abdala, 488 F.3d at 1063).
Plaintiffs’ opposition to Defendant’s motion to dismiss, which also includes Plaintiffs’
motion for summary judgment, offers several arguments why the Court should not dismiss the
case. First, Plaintiffs argue that despite USCIS granting all of Plaintiffs’ pending Form I-765
applications, at least one Plaintiff (Iman Ataee Langroudy) had not received his EAD. Dkt. 54 at
5. However, Defendant responded with a declaration indicating that an EAD had been delivered
Case 5:26-cv-00566-SVK Document 65 Filed 10/16/26 Page 5 of 9

6
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
United States District Court
Northern District of California
to Mr. Langroudy. Dkt. 57-1 at ¶¶ 5-6 and Exs. D and E see also Dkt. 57 at 3, 4. In their
summary judgment reply brief, Plaintiffs concede that Mr. Langroudy received his EAD card
issued in connection with the Form I-765 application that was the subject of the complaint and this
Court’s preliminary injunction order. Dkt. 62 at 4. Thus, this argument by Plaintiffs does not
provide a basis for the Court to deny Defendant’s motion to dismiss.
Second, Plaintiffs argue that the case is not mooted by the grant of their Form I-765
applications because six Plaintiffs paid premium processing fees but only two had been refunded
at the time Plaintiffs filed their opposition to the motion to dismiss. Dkt. 54 at 3, 5. Defendant
responded by arguing that Plaintiffs’ complaint did not seek a refund of these fees. Dkt. 54 and 4-
5. Plaintiffs argued in their summary judgment reply brief that a refund of the premium
processing fees is encompassed in the relief claimed in the complaint. Dkt. 62 at 4-5. After
reviewing these arguments, the Court ordered the Parties to provide a joint report regarding the
status of the refunds. Dkt. 63. The Parties’ joint status report confirms that all premium
processing fees paid by Plaintiffs have now been refunded. Dkt. 64.
Third, Plaintiffs argue that some Plaintiffs are eligible and have already filed for new
employment authorizations, and they contend that these new applications are or could be subject
to the adjudication hold under the challenged Policy Memoranda. Dkt. 54 at 8; see also Dkt. 64 at
6. Plaintiffs argue that the Court can still grant relief in the form of a summary judgment
“permanently enjoining Defendant from subjecting any of Plaintiffs’ employment authorization
applications to the hold created by the Policy Memos.” Dkt. 54 at 4. In support of this argument,
Plaintiffs cite language in this Court’s preliminary injunction order stating that Defendant is
“ENJOINED from applying the adjudication hold of the December 2, 2025 USCIS Policy
Memorandum (PM-602-0192) and/or January 1, 2026 USCIS Policy Memorandum (PM-602-
0194) to any Form I-765 (Application for Employment Authorization) application filed by any of
the Plaintiffs.” Dkt. 54 at 6 (quoting Dkt. 41 at 46)).
Defendant makes two main arguments in response. First, Defendant argues that Plaintiffs’
new applications for employment authorization will not be subject to an adjudication hold under
the challenged Policy Memoranda because USCIS presently treats the Policy Memoranda “as if
they are not in effect” as a result of a decision and judgment by the United States District Court for
Case 5:26-cv-00566-SVK Document 65 Filed 10/16/26 Page 6 of 9

7
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
United States District Court
Northern District of California
the District of Rhode Island in Dorcas Int’l Inst. of Rhode Island v. United States Citizenship and
Immig. Servs., D.R.I. Case No. 26-cv-132-JJM-PAS. Dkt. 57 at 2-3. According to Defendant, the
ruling in Dorcas vacating the Policy Memoranda as unlawful has eliminated any current or
imminent need for injunctive relief as to Plaintiffs’ new applications in this case. Dkt. 57 at 2-3,
5-6. However, the Government is appealing Dorcas. See Dkt. 62 at 3; 62-1. Several courts in
this District have rejected the Government’s argument that the vacatur of the Policy Memoranda in
Dorcas and USCIS’s subsequent conduct with respect to the challenged policies obviates or moots
claims for injunctive relief in other cases challenging the Policy Memoranda. See, e.g., Red Eagle
Law, L.C. v. Edlow, No. 26-cv-04850-CRB, 2026 WL 2476424, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2026);
Vajari v. Edlow, No. 26-cv-05596-EMC, 2026 WL 2211782, at *3 (N.D. Cal. July 31, 2026);
but see Khadem v. Edlow, No. 26-cv-05227-PCP, 2026 WL 2350112, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 12,
2026).
Second, Defendant argues that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to enjoin a
potential future adjudicative hold under the USCIS Policy Memoranda as to applications Plaintiffs
may file in the future because there is no present case or controversy before the Court on such
applications. Dkt. 49 at 8. Defendants assert that all the Form I-765 applications at issue in this
lawsuit were adjudicated and any new Form I-765 applications are not at issue in this lawsuit.
Dkt. 57 at 5.
Defendant has the better argument on the issue of whether the Court has jurisdiction due to
Plaintiffs’ actual or potential filing of new Form I-765 applications after this lawsuit was filed and
the potential application of the challenged Policy Memoranda to such new applications. Plaintiffs’
complaint was premised on Plaintiffs’ then-pending I-765 applications, noting that “[a]ll Plaintiffs
have pending I-765 applications with USCIS” and asserting that “Plaintiffs are entitled to
decisions on their pending applications.” Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 2, 4. In the complaint, Plaintiffs requested
issuance of a writ of mandamus or order directing Defendant to complete all steps necessary to
adjudicate “Plaintiffs’ Form I-765 applications” and for other relief regarding those applications.
Id. at pp. 31-32 (Prayer for Relief) ¶¶ A-D, G. Read in context, these and other references to
Plaintiff’s “applications” in the complaint refer to their applications at the time this suit was filed.
Although Plaintiffs also requested relief such as an order “enjoining Defendant from
Case 5:26-cv-00566-SVK Document 65 Filed 10/16/26 Page 7 of 9

8
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
United States District Court
Northern District of California
discriminating against Plaintiffs based on their nationality” and an order enjoining the challenged
Policy Memoranda as they applied to Plaintiffs (id. ¶¶ E, F), read as a whole the complaint focuses
on adjudication of the then-pending I-765 applications. The Court issued a preliminary injunction
requiring Defendant to adjudicate those applications, and USCIS did so. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’
claims in this case were mooted by Defendant’s subsequent granting of their I-765 applications.
The reference to “any” of Plaintiffs’ Form I-765 applications in one paragraph of the preliminary
injunction (see Dkt. 64 at 46 ¶1) was also in the context of the applications that were the subject of
the complaint, i.e., the applications pending when this case was filed (see id. ¶¶ 2-4). That
reference was not intended as an open-ended injunction that would apply to any and all future
Form I-765 applications Plaintiffs may file.
Contrary to Plaintiffs’ arguments on the present motions, neither the “voluntary cessation”
nor the “capable of repetition” exceptions to the mootness doctrine apply. “It is well-
established ... that voluntary cessation of allegedly illegal conduct does not deprive the tribunal of
power to hear and determine the case unless (1) it can be said with assurance that there is no
reasonable expectation that the alleged violation will recur and (2) interim relief or events have
completely and irrevocably eradicated the effects of the alleged violation.” Am. Fed'n of Gov't
Emps., AFL-CIO v. United States Off. of Pers. Mgmt., No. C 25-01780 WHA, 2025 WL 770360,
at *3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 2025). Defendant disputes that it voluntarily ceased the challenged
conduct, arguing that it adjudicated Plaintiff’s I-765 applications only because the Court’s
preliminary injunction forced it to do so. See Dkt. 49 at 7. However, the subtext of the argument,
as well as other evidence in the record, demonstrates that USCIS is fighting the decision in Dorcas
that vacated the Policy Memoranda and that the agency will reinstate those policies if permitted to
do so. Even so, this does not bring this case within the scope of the voluntary cessation exception
to mootness. Plaintiffs’ claims in this case are moot because they have already obtained the relief
they sought in this action: adjudication of their then-pending I-765 applications. This relief has
addressed the alleged violation as to the Form I-765 applications at the time the complaint was
filed, and there is no reasonable expectation that the alleged violation can or will recur as to those
particular applications.
Similarly, the exception to mootness for actions that are capable of repetition but evading
Case 5:26-cv-00566-SVK Document 65 Filed 10/16/26 Page 8 of 9

9
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
United States District Court
Northern District of California
review does not apply here. Defendant might institute the challenged adjudication hold policies
again in the future if permitted to do so and in theory could avoid review of those policies by
adjudicating the applications of particular plaintiffs before their future challenges to the policies
could be decided. However, the capable of repetition exception “is limited to extraordinary cases
where ‘(1) the duration of the challenged action is too short to be fully litigated before it ceases,
and (2) there is a reasonable expectation that the plaintiffs will be subjected to the same action
again.’” Jacob v. Biden, 542 F. Supp. 3d 938, 954 (N.D. Cal. 2021) (quoting Doe v. Madison Sch.
Dist. No. 321, 177 F.3d 789, 798 (9th Cir. 1999)). As discussed above, reinstitution of the
adjudication hold policies would not affect Plaintiffs’ Form I-765 applications that are the subject
of this litigation, i.e., those that were pending at the time this litigation was filed, because those
applications have already been adjudicated. Any new applications that have been filed or may be
filed by Plaintiffs after the complaint in this case are not a part of this case.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED and Plaintiffs’
motion for summary judgment is DENIED. The Clerk of Court shall close the file in this matter.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: October 16, 2026
SUSAN VAN KEULEN
United States Magistrate Judge
Case 5:26-cv-00566-SVK Document 65 Filed 10/16/26 Page 9 of 9