Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
DILIA YANETH NAVARRETE-
NAVARRETE,
Petitioner,
v.
Warden, Otay Mesa Detention Center, and
U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS
ENFORCEMENT,
Respondents.
Case No.: 26-cv-4984-JES-GC
ORDER GRANTING PETITION
FOR HABEAS CORPUS
[ECF No. 11]
Before the Court is Petitioner Dilia Yaneth Naverrete-Navarrete’s (“Petitioner”)
First Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. ECF No. 11 (“FAP”). On October 6,
2026, Respondents filed their Return to the Petition. ECF No. 13 (“Return”). On October
8, 2026, Petitioner filed a Traverse. ECF No. 14 (“Trav.”). For the reasons set forth below,
this Court GRANTS the Petition.
I. BACKGROUND
Petitioner, a native and citizen of Honduras, entered the United States in 2018 with
her two children. FAP at 2. On October 27, 2022, she was ordered removed in absentia
after her counsel failed to provide her notice of her hearing date. Id. at 2; Return at 2.
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Petitioner was taken into custody on August 12, 2026, after eight ICE agents came
to her house and informed her that she had been ordered removed. FAP at 2–3. Petitioner
was transferred to Otay Mesa Detention Center, where she remains in custody. Id. at 3.
Petitioner filed a motion to reopen her immigration case on August 24, 2026, and
the motion was denied the same day. Id. She then filed an appeal with the Board of
Immigration Appeals (BIA), which remains pending. Id.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
A writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual detained within the United
States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S. Const., Art I, § 9, cl. 2).
“The essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that
custody, and ... the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal custody.”
Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). A court may grant a writ of habeas corpus
to a petitioner who demonstrates to be in custody in violation of the Constitution or federal
law. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). Traditionally, “the writ of habeas corpus has served as a means
of reviewing the legality of Executive detention, and it is in that context that its protections
have been strongest.” I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001). Accordingly, challenges
to immigration-related detention are within the purview of a district court's habeas
jurisdiction. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 687; see also Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 517 (2003).
Noncitizens who are subject to a final order of removal are detained under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1231. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231. Section 1231 creates a 90-day removal period during which
the noncitizen subject to the removal order must be detained. § 1231(a)(1), (2). Section
1231(a)(6) authorizes detention after the 90-day removal period but “does not permit
indefinite detention.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 689. In Zadvydas, the Court limited this post-
removal-period detention to a “period reasonably necessary to bring about removal,”
finding that six months was “presumptively reasonable.” Id. at 689, 701.
After this six-month “grace period,” the noncitizen must provide “good reason to
believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable
future,” whereupon the burden shifts to the Government to “respond with evidence
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sufficient to rebut that showing.” Id. at 701; Pelich v. INS, 329 F.3d 1057, 1059 (9th Cir.
2003). Where removal is not significantly likely in the reasonably foreseeable future, “the
court should hold continued detention unreasonable and no longer authorized by statute”
and grant the writ. Owino v. Napolitano, 575 F.3d 952, 955 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting
Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 699–700).
III. DISCUSSION
Petitioner contends that her continued detention violates Zadvydas and 8 U.S.C. §
1231 because “the six month grace period has ended,” and there is “no significant
likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.” FAP at 3–4. Respondents
disagree, arguing that Petitioner’s detention falls within the six-month grace period and
claiming “there is a significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.”
Return at 2–4 (citing authorities finding detention for less than six months lawful under
Zadvydas).
A. The Six-Month Grace Period Under Zadvydas Has Expired.
The first step in the Zadvydas analysis is determining whether Petitioner’s detention
falls within the six-month grace period that would entitle it to a presumption of
reasonableness. The parties disagree over when the grace period began: Petitioner argues
that it began on October 27, 2022, the date of her final order of removal, while Respondents
implicitly suggest that it began on August 12, 2026, the date Petitioner was re-detained.
See FAP at 5; Return at 2–3. The Court finds that this issue has been addressed by the
undersigned in a recent decision, Osson v. LaRose, No. 3:26-cv-4834-JES-JLB, ECF No.
16 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 9, 2026). Therefore, the Court elects to follow the reasoning it stated in
Osson and incorporates it by reference. Id.
Here, the six-month period in which Petitioner’s detention was presumptively
reasonable began on October 27, 2022, when Petitioner was ordered removed. See Trav. at
3 (conceding that Petitioner’s order of removal became “administratively final” on October
27, 2022). It ended six months later, on April 27, 2023. Petitioner’s present detention
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therefore falls far outside the six-month grace period under Zadvydas and is not entitled to
any presumption of reasonableness.
B. Petitioner Has Carried His Initial Burden Under Zadvydas.
With the six-month period having expired, Petitioner must provide “good reason to
believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable
future.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701. Petitioner has met this burden.
Petitioner testifies that she has a pending appeal with the BIA. ECF No. 11-1 at 3.
She cites reputable statistics that show that the average processing time for a BIA appeal
is over 19 months, and that delay has only been increasing. Trav. at 5–6. Further, BIA’s
clearance rate is presently less than 10 percent—meaning less than one 1 out of every 10
appeals that are pending at the start of a three-month period is decided within that period.
Id. at 6.
Respondents concede that they may not remove Petitioner until the BIA has ruled
on Petitioner’s pending appeal. Return at 4. Because Petitioner has good reason to believe
the BIA will not make a decision on her appeal in the reasonably foreseeable future, she
also has good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the
reasonably foreseeable future. Thus, she has met her burden under Zadvydas.
C. Respondents Fail to Meet Their Burden Under Zadvydas.
The burden having shifted, Respondents must produce “evidence sufficient to rebut”
Petitioner’s showing. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701. They have not done so.
Respondents claim that they will “effectuate [Petitioner’s] removal as soon as
practicable once the BIA has ruled” on Petitioner’s appeal. Return at 4. They have offered
nothing beyond the above assertion to rebut Petitioner’s showing regarding the decision
timeline for BIA appeals or to otherwise support their claim that there is a significant
likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. See generally Return. On this
record, Respondents have failed to carry their burden under Zadvydas. The Petition must,
therefore, be granted.
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IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS the Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus. Respondents are ORDERED to immediately release Petitioner from custody,
subject to any conditions of her prior release that existed at the time she was re-detained.
The Parties are ORDERED to file a Joint Status Report by October 20, 2026, confirming
that Petitioner has been released. The Clerk of Court is ORDERED to CLOSE this case.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: October 13, 2026
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