Samuelson v. Aptiv U.S. Services General Partnership

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Civil Action No. 25-cv-01327-PAB-TPO
IDO M. SAMUELSON,
Plaintiff,
v.
APTIV U.S. SERVICES GENERAL PARTNERSHIP,
Defendant.
______________________________________________________________________________
RECOMMENDATION
______________________________________________________________________________
Timothy P. O’Hara, United States Magistrate Judge.
This cause is before the Court upon the Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. ECF 24. Chief
U.S. District Judge Philip A. Brimmer referred the Motion to this Court. ECF 25. The Motion is
now fully briefed.1 The Court finds that additional oral argument2 will not materially assist this
Court in issuing a Recommendation. Based on the Parties’ arguments and having reviewed the
relevant portions of the record, the Court recommends that the Defendant’s Motion be granted.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On March 1, 2022, Plaintiff began his employment as “Principal Cloud Architect” for
Defendant, 	a 	“global 	technology 	company 	that 	develops 	and 	manufactures 	automotive
components and provides technology solutions for the automotive industry.” ECF 1 at 1-3. While
he was employed with Defendant, Plaintiff was a well-regarded employee “who received positive
1 The briefing in this matter consists of the Motion [ECF 24], Plaintiff’s Response [ECF 26], and
Defendant’s Reply [ECF 28].
2 The Court heard some argument related to the Motion during the Scheduling Conference held
on December 17, 2025. ECF 44.
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feedback for his technical expertise and contributions.” Id. ¶ 11.
During his employment, Plaintiff discovered information that led him to believe that
Defendant had committed violations of federal securities laws. Id. ¶ 14. Plaintiff repeatedly raised
concerns about Defendant’s improper conduct and lack of compliance during various company
meetings. Id. ¶¶ 16, 19, 29-35.
After Plaintiff raised these concerns, according to the Complaint, Defendant engaged in “a
pattern of progressive retaliation.” Id. ¶ 36. Initially, Defendant denied wrongdoing. Id. ¶ 38. Then,
the company excluded him from meetings. Id. ¶¶ 41-42. Defendant also issued him a poor
employment review. Id. ¶ 43. Finally, on March 14, 2023, just over one year after he began
working for the company, Defendant terminated him. Id. ¶ 45.
Following his termination, Plaintiff “has documented evidence of continued adverse
actions that he reasonably believes constitute ongoing retaliation.” Id. ¶ 47. Plaintiff details
multiple events that he believes relate to his employer’s potential retaliation.3 Id. ¶¶ 47-72. Some
of the alleged retaliatory behavior is innocuous. See e.g., id. ¶ 51 (increased LinkedIn views). Some
is odd. See e.g., id. ¶ 53 (Plaintiff alleges intimidation through unwanted objects being left outside
his Texas home, including soap, a toilet, paper, Campbell’s soup can).
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff initiated legal proceedings relating to Defendant’s alleged retaliatory actions
before the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA).4 ECF 24 at 4. OSHA
dismissed his complaint, and Plaintiff appealed the decision to the Office of Administrative Law
Judges (OALJ). Before that agency, Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss, which on January 10,
3 Plaintiff also submits some information as Exhibits. See ECF 2.
4 In ECF 2, Plaintiff attaches a large quantity of documents from that proceeding.
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2025, Administrative Law Judge John M. Herke denied. ECF 26-2 at 11.
On April 28, 2025, while the matter was still pending before the OALJ, Plaintiff filed the
present lawsuit in the District of Colorado. ECF 1. In his Complaint, Plaintiff brings one claim
against Defendant: a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002). Id. at 9. He
alleges that the concerns he raised about Defendant’s behavior constituted “protected activity” by
reporting alleged violations of federal securities laws to company officials. Id.
PARTIES’ POSITIONS
On July 21, 2025, Defendant filed its Motion to Dismiss [ECF 24]. In it, Defendant raises
three principal arguments. First, Defendant argues that the District of Colorado lacks personal
jurisdiction. ECF 24 at 4-8. Second, Defendant argues that venue is not proper in the District of
Colorado. Id. at 9. Finally, Defendant claims that Plaintiff fails to state a plausible claim under the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 because Plaintiff’s allegations do not involve protected activity under
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Id. at 9-15.
Because this Court agrees that Plaintiff has not sufficiently demonstrated that personal
jurisdiction exists over Defendant in the District of Colorado, this Court recommends that
Plaintiff’s claim be dismissed without prejudice. The Court need not address Defendant’s
additional arguments relating to improper venue and Plaintiff’s failure to state a claim under Fed.
R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).5
5 Although there is no mandatory order of operations relating to jurisdictional issues, “[t]he
question of personal jurisdiction, which goes to the court’s power to exercise control over the
parties, is typically decided in advance of venue, which is primarily a matter of choosing a
convenient forum.” Dupray v. Oxford Ins. Co. TN LLC, 645 F. Supp. 3d 1095, 1102 (D. Colo.
2022) (first citing Sinochem Int’l Co. Ltd. v. Malaysia Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 431
(2007); and then quoting Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173, 180 (1979)).
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STANDARDS OF REVIEW
I. 	Treatment of a Pro Se Plaintiff’s Complaint
A pro se plaintiff’s “pleadings are to be construed liberally and held to a less stringent
standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux & Janer,
425 F.3d 836, 840 (10th Cir. 2005) (quoting Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir.
1991)). “Th[e] court, however, will not supply additional factual allegations to round out a
plaintiff’s complaint or construct a legal theory on plaintiff's behalf.” Smith, 561 F.3d at 1096
(quoting Whitney v. New Mexico, 113 F.3d 1170, 1173–74 (10th Cir. 1997)). The Tenth Circuit
interpreted this rule to mean that if a court “can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim
on which the plaintiff could prevail, [it] should do so despite the plaintiff’s failure to cite proper
legal authority, his confusion of various legal theories, his poor syntax and sentence construction,
or his unfamiliarity with pleading requirements.” Diversey v. Schmidly, 738 F.3d 1196, 1199 (10th
Cir. 2013) (quoting Hall, 935 F.2d at 1110).
Nevertheless, it is not “the proper function of the district court to assume the role of
advocate for the pro se litigant.” Garrett, 425 F.3d at 840 (quoting Hall, 935 F.2d at 1110). Nor is
it the Court’s obligation to do litigants’ legal research for them. We Alliance Secured Income Fund,
LLC v. Swan, No. 23-cv-02992-SKC-MEH, 2024 WL 2863805, at *2 (D. Colo. Mar. 25, 2024).
II. 	Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2)—Lack of Personal Jurisdiction
The burden of establishing personal jurisdiction is on the plaintiff. XMission, LC v. Fluent
LLC, 955 F.3d 833, 839 (10th Cir. 2020). “Jurisdiction to resolve cases on the merits requires . . .
authority over the parties (personal jurisdiction), so that the court’s decision will bind them.”
Gadlin v. Sybron Int’l Corp., 222 F.3d 797, 799 (10th Cir. 2000) (quoting Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon
Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 577 (1999)) (quotations omitted).
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To overcome a personal jurisdiction challenge raised in a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff
need only make a prima facie showing, and “the plaintiff’s burden is light.” Wenz v. Memery
Crystal, 55 F.3d 1503, 1505 (10th Cir. 1995) (citing Doe v. National Medical Servs., 974 F.2d 143,
145 (10th Cir. 1992)). A plaintiff does so by demonstrating via an affidavit or other written material
that the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the defendant is proper. Id. (citations omitted); see
also Old Republic Ins. Co. v. Cont’l Motors, Inc., 877 F.3d 895, 900 (10th Cir. 2017). More
specifically, when there is a challenge to personal jurisdiction under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2):
[t]he allegations in the complaint must be taken as true to the extent they are
uncontroverted by the defendant's affidavits. If the parties present conflicting
affidavits, all factual disputes must be resolved in the plaintiff's favor, and the
plaintiff's 	prima 	facie 	showing 	is 	sufficient 	notwithstanding 	the 	contrary
presentation by the moving party. However, only the well pled facts of plaintiff's
complaint, as distinguished from mere conclusory allegations, must be accepted as
true.
Wenz, 55 F.3d at 1505 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Knerr v. Boulder
BJ, LLC, No. 19-cv-00799-JKL-MEH, 2020 WL 5126138, at *2 (D. Colo. Apr. 7, 2020)
(permitting consideration of affidavits and evidence outside the complaint and accepting
allegations as true to the extent they are uncontroverted by the evidence).
ANALYSIS
To demonstrate personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, Plaintiff must show:
(1) an applicable statute authorizes the service of process on defendants; and (2) that the exercise
of statutory jurisdiction does not offend constitutional due process requirements. Dudnikov v.
Chalk & Vermilion Fine Arts, Inc., 514 F.3d 1063, 1070 (10th Cir. 2008) (citing Trujillo v.
Williams, 465 F.3d 1210, 1217 (10th Cir. 2006)). Here, the Colorado long-arm statute, Colo. Rev.
Stat. § 13-1-124(1), governs whether this Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendant. Old
Republic Ins. Co., 877 F.3d at 903. It “confer[s] the maximum jurisdiction permitted by the due
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process clauses of the United States and Colorado constitutions,” and its requirements are
necessarily addressed under the due process standard. Archangel Diamond Corp. v. Lukoil, 123
P.3d 1187, 1193 (Colo. 2005). As a result, the Colorado statute's requirements merge into the
constitutional due process analysis. Dudnikov, 514 F.3d at 1070.
For a court to exercise personal jurisdiction consistent with due process, a defendant must
have “purposefully established minimum contacts with the forum state.” Dental Dynamics, LLC,
v. Jolly Dental Grp., LLC, 946 F.3d 1223, 1228 (10th Cir. 2020). Additionally, the finding of
personal jurisdiction may not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. Id.
(citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985)). The forum contacts must be
of the kind that “the defendant ‘should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.’”
XMission, 955 F.3d at 839 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286,
297 (1980)).
A plaintiff seeking to establish personal jurisdiction may do so by demonstrating either
general (all-purpose) jurisdiction or specific (case-linked) jurisdiction. Ford Motor Co. v. Mont.
Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 592 U.S. 351, 358 (2021) (citation omitted).
General Jurisdiction
“General jurisdiction “extends to ‘any and all claims’ brought against a defendant,” but
“‘[o]nly a select set of affiliations with a forum’ will expose a defendant to such sweeping
jurisdiction.” Id. (citing Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 137 (2014)). The forums that
subject a corporation to general jurisdiction are “its place of incorporation and principal place of
business.”6 Id. (citing Daimler AG, 571 U.S. at 137).
6 While the Supreme Court in Daimler left open the possibility that “in an exceptional case a
corporation might also be ‘at home’ elsewhere,” see Ford, 592 U.S. at 359 (citing Daimler, 571
U.S. at 139 n.19), Plaintiff fails to raise this as a basis for general jurisdiction here.
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Here, although the Parties do not agree on the Defendant’s place of incorporation or its
principal place of business, the Parties do not dispute that Defendant is neither incorporated nor
maintains its principal place of business in Colorado. ECF 1 ¶ 3 (alleging Defendant is organized
under the laws of “Jersey” and with a principal place of business in Massachusetts); ECF 24-1
(alleging Defendant is a Delaware entity with its principal place of business in Michigan). As a
result, Plaintiff has failed to make a prima facie showing that Defendant is subject to general
jurisdiction in Colorado. See Wenz, 55 F.3d at 1505.
Specific Jurisdiction
“Specific jurisdiction is different: It covers defendants less intimately connected with a
State, but only as to a narrower class of claims.” Ford, 592 U.S. at 359. “Courts have been
unwilling to allow states to assert personal jurisdiction over foreign defendants where the
defendant’s presence in the forum arose from the unilateral acts of someone other than the
defendant.” Id. (citing World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 295).
Specific jurisdiction requires that: “(i) the defendant must have ‘purposefully directed its
activities at residents of the forum state,’ and (ii) that ‘the plaintiff's injuries must arise out of [the]
defendant's forum-related activities.’” C5 Med. Werks, LLC v. CeramTec GmbH, 937 F.3d 1319,
1323 (10th Cir. 2019) (quoting Old Republic Ins. Co., 877 F.3d at 903). “The contacts needed for
this kind of jurisdiction often go by the name ‘purposeful availment.’” Ford, 592 U.S. at 359 (citing
Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 475). “Purposeful availment requires actions by the Defendant
which ‘create a substantial connection with the forum state.’” OMI Holdings, Inc. v. Royal Ins. Co.
of Canada, 149 F.3d 1086, 1092 (10th Cir. 1998) (quoting Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Ct.
of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 109 (1987)). Also, Courts should analyze the “quantity and quality of
Defendant[’s] contacts” with the forum state “to determine whether the district court’s assertion
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of personal jurisdiction over Defendant[] comports with due process.” OMI Holdings, 149 F.3d at
1092.
In this case, Defendant presents a sworn affidavit from Ms. Ellen Weir, Vice President and
Chief Employment and Litigation Counsel. ECF 24-1. In it, Ms. Weir first states that Plaintiff’s
employment for Defendant was entirely in the state of Texas. Id. ¶ 8. Furthermore, Ms. Weir states
that Defendant does not:
a) 	conduct business in Colorado,
b) 	have any customers in Colorado,
c) 	advertise or solicit customers in Colorado,
d) 	have any offices in Colorado, or
e) 	own real estate in Colorado.
Id. ¶¶ 3-6. Defendant has four employees that work remotely from Colorado, id. ¶ 9, making up
approximately 0.14% of its workforce.
In his Complaint, Plaintiff makes no effort to demonstrate any contacts by Defendant to
Colorado. See generally ECF 1. In his Response, Plaintiff fares no better. See generally ECF 26.
He does not challenge any of Ms. Weir’s sworn statements detailing Defendant’s lack of contacts
in the District of Colorado, and he appears to concede a lack of purposefully directed activity by
Defendant here. See ECF 26 at 6 (“While Plaintiff cannot establish direct targeting . . .”). Instead,
Plaintiff argues that since he relocated to Colorado in February of 2024, ECF 26 at 6, Defendant
has been harassing him here. Plaintiff does not allege direct harassment by employees of
Defendant, though. Id. (“While Plaintiff does not allege that Defendant’s employees personally
carried out each act of harassment . . .). Rather he alleges that Defendant may be using unknown
third parties to carry out the harassment. Id. (“Corporations can and often do use third parties—
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such as investigators, contractors, or other intermediaries—to conduct retaliatory acts while
maintaining plausible deniability.”). He lists a series of events that he believes are indirect evidence
of ongoing harassment. Id. at 7-8. The ongoing harassment, “coupled with the timing and nature
of the incidents, make it plausible that the retaliation originated with or was directed by Defendant,
satisfying the standard to proceed beyond a motion to dismiss.” Id. at 7.
Even construing Plaintiff’s well pled allegations to be true and in a light most favorable to
him, he has not demonstrated specific jurisdiction. Plaintiff presents no real evidence to show that
Defendant has purposefully availed itself of this district. Other than the recent actions alleged by
Plaintiff to be associated with Defendant, it is undisputed that Defendant has virtually no contacts
with the state of Colorado.7
And for at least two reasons, Plaintiff’s allegations of “ongoing harassment,” conducted by
third parties that might possibly be affiliated with Defendant, fail to meet even the low burden of
what is required by Plaintiff to demonstrate purposeful availment. First, the information alleged
about Defendant is entirely speculative and unreliable, which is information the Court need not
consider in making this determination. See Dudnikov, 514 F.3d at 1070 (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007)) (court need only consider “plausible, non-conclusory, and non-
speculative” facts). Second, the unilateral activity of third parties “who claim some relationship
with a nonresident defendant cannot satisfy the requirement of contact with the forum State.”
7 Defendant does acknowledge a small number of employees residing in Colorado who work
remotely. ECF 24-1 at 3. However, allowing employees to work remotely from the forum state
does not constitute purposeful availment. See Martinez v. N. Ariz. Univ., 553 F. Supp. 3d 908, 918-
19 (D.N.M. 2021) (noting that remote study and work situations, even when they involve the
plaintiff and relate specifically to the lawsuit, do not typically demonstrate purposeful availment)
(emphasis added) (collecting cases).
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World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 298. Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate any real connection
between the alleged harassing actors and Defendant.
Even if Plaintiff were able to demonstrate that Defendant purposefully availed itself to
personal jurisdiction in Colorado, Plaintiff’s argument would fail on the second prong of the
specific jurisdiction analysis, one that requires that Plaintiff’s injuries arose out of the Defendant’s
forum-related activities. Here, Plaintiff brings an employment-related retaliation action. Plaintiff’s
employment with Defendant ended with his termination in March of 2023. ECF 1 at 6. Plaintiff
alleges that Defendant’s harassment in Colorado did not start until after he moved to Colorado in
February of 2024, nearly a year after his termination. As a result, the timing of Plaintiff’s
allegations is not consistent with finding his injuries relating to this lawsuit arise out of forum-
related activities. Plaintiff’s allegations of harassment are more consistent with a completely
separate cause of action.
The Court finds Defendant’s citation to Vora v. Dionne to be persuasive. No. 22-cv-00572-
CNS-MDB, 2023 WL 1784227 (D. Colo. Feb. 6, 2023). In that employment contract case, just as
here, the plaintiff failed to allege any real connection between Defendant and Colorado. Id. at *4.
The plaintiff argued that after he was terminated, his relocation to Colorado and the subsequent
interaction between he and the employer established the minimum contacts necessary for the court
to exercise personal jurisdiction. Id. In denying personal jurisdiction, the court noted “a
defendant’s 	relationship 	with 	the 	plaintiff, 	‘standing 	alone, 	is 	an 	insufficient 	basis 	for
jurisdiction.’” Id. (citing Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 286 (2014)).
As a result, this Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to meet his burden to demonstrate that
either general or specific jurisdiction exists. Based on this Court’s findings, it need not discuss
whether exercising personal jurisdiction would offend “traditional notions of fair play and
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substantial justice.”8 Asahi, 480 U.S. at 113. Similarly, the Court need not address Defendant’s
other arguments relating to improper venue and the merits of Plaintiff’s claims under Fed. R. Civ.
P. 12(b)(6).
CONCLUSION
Here, Plaintiff does not demonstrate that this Court has personal jurisdiction over
Defendant. Accordingly, the Court respectfully recommends9 that Defendant’s Motions to Dismiss
[ECF 24] be granted and Plaintiff’s claim be dismissed without prejudice. See Brereton v.
8 “When a plaintiff satisfies the minimum-contacts requirement, the burden shifts to the defendant
to demonstrate that exercising personal jurisdiction would ‘offend traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice.’” Kaiser v. Kunam, 2026 WL 412767, at *3 (D.N.M. Feb. 13, 2026)
(quoting Dudnikov, 514 F.3d at 1070). The court is to consider: “(1) the burden on the defendant,
2) the forum state’s interest in resolving the dispute, 3) the plaintiff’s interest in receiving
convenient and effective relief, 4) the interstate judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most
efficient resolution of controversies, and (5) the shared interest of the several states in furthering
fundamental substantive social policies.” OMI Holdings, 149 F.3d at 1095 (citing Asahi, 480 U.S.
at 113). This Court notes, without making any findings, that multiple factors in this analysis appear
to weigh heavily in favor of Defendants, including the burden on the Defendant to litigate a matter
in a jurisdiction where it has almost no presence, Colorado’s limited interest in resolving a dispute
that occurred in Texas, and the judicial system’s interest in efficient resolution which would be
offended by hearing a case where the large majority of witnesses and the employer at issue is
located in a different state.
9 Be advised that all parties shall have fourteen (14) days after service hereof to serve and file any
written objections in order to obtain reconsideration by the District Judge to whom this case is
assigned. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. The party filing objections must specifically identify those findings
or recommendations to which the objections are being made. The District Court need not consider
frivolous, conclusive or general objections. A party’s failure to file such written objections to
proposed findings and recommendations contained in this report may bar the party from a de novo
determination by the District Judge of the proposed findings and recommendations. United States
v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 676-83 (1980); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Additionally, the failure to file
written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations within fourteen (14) days after
being served with a copy may bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings and legal
conclusions of the Magistrate Judge that are accepted or adopted by the District Court. Duffield v.
Jackson, 545 F.3d 1234, 1237 (10th Cir. 2008) (quoting Moore v. United States, 950 F.2d 656,
659 (10th Cir. 1991)).
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Bountiful City Corp., 434 F.3d 1213, 1218 (10th Cir. 2016) (dismissals for lack of jurisdiction
must be without prejudice).
DATED at Denver, Colorado, this 23rd day of February, 2026.
BY THE COURT:
Timothy P. O’Hara
United States Magistrate Judge
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