Lira-Jarquin V. Noem et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Civil Action No. 26-cv-00588-STV
YELKA DORIBEL LIRA-JARQUIN,
Petitioner,
v.
KRISTI NOEM;
TODD LYONS;
GEORGE VALDEZ;
JUAN BALTAZAR;
PAMELA BONDI;
EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, THE;
UNITED STATES IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT; and
BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS, THE,
Respondents.
______________________________________________________________________
ORDER
______________________________________________________________________
Magistrate Judge Scott T. Varholak
This matter is before the Court on Petitioner Yelka Doribel Lira-Jarquin’s Petition
for Writ of Habeas Corpus (the “Petition”) [#1]. 	The parties have consented to proceed
before a United States Magistrate Judge for all proceedings, including entry of a final
judgment. [#6] In her Petition, Ms. Lira-Jarquin seeks a writ of habeas corpus under 28
U.S.C. § 2241, challenging her detention in Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”)
custody. [#1] Ms. Lira-Jarquin seeks a writ ordering Respondents to immediately release
her on bond. The Court has carefully reviewed the filings to date, and the applicable case
law, and has determined that oral argument would not materially assist the Court in
reaching a disposition. 	For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS the Petition IN
PART.
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I. 	BACKGROUND
The parties do not appear to dispute the material facts of Ms. Lira-Jarquin’s
immigration history. [See ##1; 8]
Ms. Lira-Jarquin is a Nicaraguan citizen who is currently in the custody of the DHS
in Aurora, Colorado. [##1 at 7; see 8 at 2] Ms. Lira-Jarquin entered the United States on
or about May 29, 2024. [#1 at 9] She was not admitted to the United States at that time.
[Id. at 2; #8 at 2] Ms. Lira-Jarquin is an applicant for an I-360 Special Immigration Juvenile
Visa.1 	[#1 at 9] 	Ms. Lira-Jarquin was detained by the DHS on or about September 6,
2025. [Id. at 2] On December 16, 2025, the District Court of Denver County ordered that
Ms. Lira-Jarquin is under the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court because reunification with
her parents is not a viable option due to abuse, abandonment, and neglect. [Id. at 9] The
Court found that it was not in Ms. Lira-Jarquin’s best interest to return to Nicaragua. [Id.]
Neither party has indicated that Ms. Lira-Jarquin has any criminal convictions.
The Petition includes two claims. 	First, Ms. Lira-Jarquin asserts a claim for
violation of her Fifth Amendment Right to Due Process. 	[Id. at 14-15] 	Second, she
asserts a claim for violation of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”). [Id. at 15-16]
On February 13, 2026, Petitioner commenced this action through counsel by filing
an Application for a Writ of Habeas Corpus Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. 	[#1]
Respondents filed a Response opposing all of Ms. Lira-Jarquin's asserted relief. [#8]
They argue that Ms. Lira-Jarquin is subject to mandatory detention under Section 1225(b)
of the INA. [Id. at 2] Ms. Lira-Jarquin replied. [#9]
1 Petitioner provides information about her current immigration application and findings
made in another court. Respondents do not refute or provide further comment on these
alleged facts.
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II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
A. 	Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241
Section 2241 authorizes courts to adjudicate a writ of habeas corpus when a
petitioner is “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United
States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). “The essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person
in custody upon the legality of that custody, and that the traditional function of the writ is
to secure release from illegal custody.” Vizguerra-Ramirez v. Baltazar, No. 25-cv-00881-
NYW, 2025 WL 3653158, at *3 (D. Colo. Dec. 17, 2025). “The writ of habeas corpus is
designed to challenge ‘the fact or duration’ of a person’s confinement.” Ramirez v. Bondi,
No. 25-cv-1002-RMR, 2025 WL 1294919, at *3 (D. Colo. May 5, 2025) (citing Preiser v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973)).
“Habeas corpus proceedings under § 2241 ‘remain available as a forum for
statutory and constitutional challenges to post-removal-period detention’ effectuated
under § 1231(a)(6).” 	Juarez v. Choate, No. 1:24-cv-00419-CNS, 2024 WL 1012912, at
*3 (D. Colo. Mar. 8, 2024) (quoting Singh v. Choate, No. 23-cv-02069-CNS, 2024 WL
309747, at *1 (D. Colo. Jan. 26, 2024)). “[A] noncitizen may bring a habeas petition under
this section if his or her confinement violates the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee of due
process.” Id. (citing Diaz-Ceja v. McAleenan, No. 19-cv-00824-NYW, 2019 WL 2774211,
at *3 (D. Colo. July 2, 2019)).
B. 	The INA
The INA governs all aspects of immigration law. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101 et seq. In
1996, Congress enacted the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act
(“IIRIRA”) which substantially amended the INA. 	Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 423-25
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(2009) (outlining the changes to the statute). Relevant here, IIRIRA added the expedited
removal 	proceedings 	of 	Section 	1225 	as 	an 	alternative 	mechanism 	for 	removing
noncitizens from the United States alongside the existing Section 1226 and Section
1229a proceedings. 	See Aleman Hernandez v. Baltazar, No. 1:25-cv-3688-SKC-SBP,
2025 WL 3718159, at *2 (D. Colo. Dec. 23, 2025).
1. 	Removal Proceedings
“The usual removal process—commonly referred to as Section 240—involves an
evidentiary hearing before an immigration judge, where a noncitizen may attempt to show
that he or she should not be removed.” Id. (quotations omitted). “These are adversarial
proceedings where noncitizens have the right to hire counsel, examine the evidence
against them, present their own evidence, and cross-examine witnesses.” Id. (citing 8
U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(A)-(B)). 	“These proceedings are recorded, often take months to
resolve, and upon a decision by an immigration judge, are appealable to” the Board of
Immigration Appeals (“BIA”). Id. (citing 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.1, 1240.15). “The BIA order is,
in turn, appealable to a U.S. Court of Appeals.” Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1252).
“The second process provides for expedited removal [pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §
1225(b)(1)]. Under this provision, noncitizens who satisfy two criteria may be subject to
expedited removal.” 	Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)). 	“Under the first criterion, the
noncitizens are ‘inadmissible’ to the United States because they either lack proper entry
documents or they engaged in fraud or willfully misrepresented a material fact on their
application for admission.” Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i)). 	“The second criteria
provides that the noncitizens fall into at least one of two categories: (1) they are ‘arriving
in the United States,’ 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i) (‘Arriving [Noncitizen] Provision’); and or
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(2) they ‘have not been admitted’ or paroled into the United States and have ‘not
affirmatively shown’ to an immigration officer's satisfaction that they have been ‘physically
present in the United States continuously for [a] 2-year period immediately prior to the
date of the determination of inadmissibility[,]’ id. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii)(II) (‘Designation
Provision’).” Id. “In contrast to the usual removal process, ‘the expedited removal order
is usually issued within a few days, if not hours.’” Id. (quoting Make the Rd. New York v.
Noem, No. 25-cv-190 (JMC), 2025 WL 2494908, at *3 (D.D.C. Aug. 29, 2025)). “In these
proceedings, noncitizens typically have no opportunity to review the evidence against
them or prepare a defense.” 	Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV); 8 C.F.R. §
235.3(b)(2)(iii)). 	“And there is almost no opportunity for judicial review.” 	Id. (citing 8
U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(A)).
2. 	Detention Pending Removal
The 	INA 	provides 	two 	options 	for 	detaining 	noncitizens 	pending 	removal
proceedings: Section 1225 and Section 1226. 	Id. 	Section 1225 authorizes the
government to inspect, detain, and, if appropriate, remove applicants for admission. Id.
(citing 8 U.S.C. § 1225). An “applicant for admission” is a noncitizen “present in the United
States who has not been admitted or who arrives in the United States.” 	8 U.S.C. §
1225(a)(1). 	“Section 1225(b) requires the detention of two groups of ‘applicants for
admission.’” Aleman Hernandez, 2025 WL 3718159, at *2 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1),
(2)).
“To the first grouping, [Section] 1225(b)(1) . . . applies to noncitizens who (1) are
inadmissible because they lack proper documentation or because they engaged in fraud
or 	willful 	misrepresentations 	in 	their 	applications, 	and 	(2) 	fall 	within 	the 	‘Arriving
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[Noncitizen] Provision’ or the ‘Designation Provision.’” 	Id. at *2 (citing 8 U.S.C. §
1225(b)(1)(A)(i), (iii)(II)). 	“To the second grouping, [Section] 1225(b)(2) applies ‘in the
case of 	[a noncitizen] 	who is an applicant 	for admission, 	[where] 	the examining
immigration officer determines that [the noncitizen] seeking admission is not clearly and
beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted.’” Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A)) (emphasis
added). “Noncitizens detained under § 1225, no matter which grouping, are not entitled
to bond hearings.” Id. (citing Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 297 (2018)).
By contrast, Section 1226 authorizes the arrest and detention of noncitizens
“already in the country pending the outcome of removal proceedings.” Id. at *3 (quoting
Jennings, 583 U.S. at 289) (emphasis in original). Unlike Section 1225(b), Section 1226
generally provides for individualized custody determinations, including the possibility of
release on bond (except where mandatory detention under Section 1226(c) applies).2 A
person “cannot be subject to both mandatory detention under § 1225 and discretionary
detention under § 1226.” 	Lopez Benitez v. Francis, 795 F.Supp.3d 475, 485 (S.D.N.Y.
2025).
After the enactment of the IIRIRA, the Executive Office for Immigration Review
(“EOIR”) promulgated regulations clarifying that individuals who entered the United States
2 Section 1226(c) “carves out a statutory category of [noncitizens] who may not be
released under § 1226(a).” 	Aleman Hernandez, 2025 WL 3718159, at *5 (quoting
Jennings, 583 U.S. at 289) (emphasis omitted). “Under this subcategory, noncitizens who
fall ‘into one of several enumerated categories involving criminal offenses and terrorist
activities’ are not eligible for release and must be detained without bond.” 	Id. (quoting
Jennings, 583 U.S. at 289). 	“Importantly, the plain text of section 1226(c) requires
detention for certain noncitizens who are ‘deportable’ (meaning they were previously
admitted to the United States) as well as certain noncitizens deemed ‘inadmissible’
(meaning they have not been admitted to the United States).” Id. (quoting Rodriguez v.
Bostock, No. 3:25-cv-05240-TMC, 2025 WL 2782499, at *17 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 30,
2025)) (emphasis omitted).
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without inspection generally were not considered detained under Section 1225, but
instead were subject to detention under Section 1226(a). See Inspection and Expedited
Removal of Aliens; Detention and Removal of Aliens; Conduct of Removal Proceedings;
Asylum Procedures, 62 Fed. Reg. 10312, 10323 (Mar. 6, 1997) (“Despite being applicants
for admission, aliens who are present without having been admitted or paroled (formerly
referred to as aliens who entered without inspection) will be eligible for bond and bond
redetermination.”). 	Consistent with this view, the United States Supreme Court has
explained 	that 	Section 1226(a) 	“sets out the default 	rule” 	governing detention of
noncitizens already present in the country pending removal proceedings. Jennings, 583
U.S. at 288-89; see also Aleman Hernandez, 2025 WL 3718159, at *6 (“[T]he default
discretionary bond procedures in § 1226(a) apply to noncitizens who are (1) present in
the United States without having been admitted or paroled, and (2) have not been
implicated in any of the enumerated crimes set forth in § 1226(c).” (citing Rodriguez v.
Bostock, No. 3:25-cv-05240-TMC, 2025 WL 2782499, at *17 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 30,
2025))); 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (The Attorney General may release a noncitizen on bond
“[e]xcept as provided in subsection (c).”).
III. 	ANALYSIS
The issue before the Court is whether Respondents are lawfully detaining Ms. Lira-
Jarquin under Section 1225(b)(2)(A)’s mandatory detention requirement or whether
Section 1226(a) applies and therefore Ms. Lira-Jarquin is entitled to a bond hearing. As
Respondents note, this issue has been addressed by this Court and several other courts
in this District. See, e.g., Inestroza Paguada v. Choate, No. 25-cv-03970-STV, 2026 WL
621282 (D. Colo. Mar. 5, 2026); Hernandez-Redondo v. Bondi, No. 25-cv-03993-PAB,
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2026 WL 290989 (D. Colo. Feb. 4, 2026); Martinez Escobar v. Baltazar, No. 26-cv-00296-
NYW, 2026 WL 503313 (D. Colo. Feb. 24, 2026); Chavez Armenta v. Noem, No. 26-cv-
00236-PAB, 2026 WL 274634 (D. Colo. Feb. 3, 2026); Tumax Caniz v. Warden, No. 25-
cv-03969-NRN, 2026 WL 820813 (D. Colo. Mar. 25, 2026); Aleman Hernandez, 2025 WL
3718159. 	In each case, this District has determined that the respondents’ detention of
the petitioner, in analogous fact patterns to those at issue in this case, was not authorized
under Section 1225(b)(2)(A).
These courts reason that Section 1225(b)(2)(A) is applicable to noncitizens who
are “applicant[s] for admission” where an examining officer finds that the noncitizen
“seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a reasonable doubt entitled to be admitted.”
8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A).3 	Accordingly, Section 1225(b)(2)(A) applies only when a
noncitizen can be categorized as “seeking admission.” “Admission” is defined by the INA
as “lawful entry of the [noncitizen] into the United States after inspection and authorization
by an immigration officer.” 	8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A). 	“Entry,” when given its ordinary,
common meaning, means “[t]o come or go in [to a country].” J.G.O. v. Francis, No. 25-
CV-7233 (AS), 2025 WL 3040142, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 28, 2025) (quoting Entry, O XFORD
ENGLISH D ICTIONARY 	(2d 	ed. 	1989)). 	Therefore, 	“‘seeking 	admission’ 	requires 	[a
noncitizen] to continue to want to go into a country.” Id. (emphasis omitted).
3 Respondents argue all “applicants for admission” are subject to detention under either
8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1) or § 1225(b)(2) as interpreted by Jennings. 	[#8 at 2 (citing
Jennings, 583 U.S. at 287)] This interpretation eliminates the portion of the statute which
requires that an applicant be “seeking admission.” 	To conserve Court resources, the
Court does not rehash its disagreement with Respondents’ interpretation of Jennings
here. Instead, the Court incorporates the rationale elucidated in Inestroza Paguada, 2026
WL 621282.
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This definition cannot apply to Ms. Lira-Jarquin, as she had already entered the
United States and had been living in the country for over a year prior to being detained.
[See #1 at 2] 	One cannot seek to go into the place where they already are. 	With
appreciated candor, Respondents acknowledge that the facts and legal issues present in
Inestroza Paguada are not materially different from those in this case. [#8 at 3] Although
Respondents note that they disagree with the Court’s previous conclusions, they
recognize that the Supreme Court and the Tenth Circuit have not yet offered guidance on
these legal questions. [Id.]
Respondents also cite the Fifth Circuit’s recent order in Buenrostro-Mendez v.
Bondi, 166 F.4th 494, 502-508 (5th Cir. 2026), wherein the Fifth Circuit agreed with
Respondents’ interpretation of the relevant statutes. 	[#8 at 3] 	This Court respectfully
disagrees with the Fifth Circuit’s opinion and instead adopts District Judge Charlotte N.
Sweeney’s analysis in Singh v. Baltazar, No. 1:26-cv-00336-CNS, 2026 WL 352870, at
*3-6 (D. Colo. Feb. 9, 2026).
Under the plain language of the statute, the Court finds that Ms. Lira-Jarquin’s
detention is governed by Section 1226(a). 	Because Section 1226 applies, Ms. Lira-
Jarquin is entitled to the custody procedures provided by that statute.
The appropriate relief for the Court to direct at this stage is for a bond hearing to
be conducted pursuant to Section 1226(a) before an Immigration Judge. [See ##8 at 4;
9 at 8 (agreeing that the appropriate relief is for the Court to direct is a bond hearing)]
“[Section] 1226(a) does not require release of those noncitizens arrested on a warrant but
instead provides the [DHS] with the discretion to grant a noncitizen release on bond.”
Guevara Garcia v. Baltasar, No. 1:26-cv-01012-SKC, 2026 WL 835766, at *3 (D. Colo.
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Mar. 26, 2026) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)). Where courts rule that a petitioner’s detention
is governed by Section 1226, they find that the petitioner’s immediate release is not an
appropriate remedy given that Section 1226 authorizes detention. See, e.g., De La Cruz
v. Baltazar, No. 26-cv-00360-PAB, 2026 WL 439217, at *3 (D. Colo. Feb. 17, 2026). In
such cases, the appropriate form of relief is a court order requiring that a bond hearing
be conducted. 	Id. 	Accordingly, the appropriate form of relief here is an order requiring
that a bond hearing be conducted in the next seven days.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it is ORDERED:
(1) that the Application for a Writ of Habeas Corpus Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241
[#1] is GRANTED to the extent it seeks a bond hearing;4
(2) Respondents shall provide Petitioner with a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. §
1226(a) within SEVEN DAYS of the date of this Court's Order;
(3) Respondents shall file a status report within TEN DAYS of the date of this
Court's order to certify compliance. The status report shall include if and when
the bond hearing occurred, if bond was granted or denied, and if bond was
denied, the reasons for the denial.
DATED: March 30, 2026 	BY THE COURT:
s/Scott T. Varholak
United States Magistrate Judge
4 To the extent Petitioner's Counsel seeks an award of attorney's fees, he must file a
separate motion for fees that complies with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the
Local Rules of Practice for this District.
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