Marquez-Rodriguez v. Hagan et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Judge Nina Y. Wang
Case No. 26-cv-01067-NYW
RAFAEL MARQUEZ-RODRIGUEZ,
Petitioner,
v.
GEORGE VALDEZ, in his official capacity,
MARKWAYNE MULLIN, in his official capacity,
TODD BLANCHE, in his official capacity, and
JUAN BALTASAR, in his official capacity,1
Respondents.
______________________________________________________________________
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
______________________________________________________________________
This matter is before the Court on the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (the
“Petition”). [Doc. 1]. Respondents have responded to the Petition. [Doc. 7]. Petitioner
did not file a reply brief, and the time to do so has lapsed. 	See [Doc. 4 at 3]. 	For the
following reasons, the Petition is GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
Petitioner Rafael Marquez-Rodriguez (“Petitioner” or “Mr. Marquez-Rodriguez”) is
a citizen of Mexico who has been present in the United States for over 20 years. [Doc. 1
at ¶¶ 22, 30]. 	He was detained by ICE officers on January 21, 2026, and is currently
detained in the GEO Detention Center in Aurora, Colorado. 	[Id. at ¶¶ 14, 22]. 	He was
denied bond on February 10, 2026 on the basis that the immigration judge “ha[d] no
1 Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d), George Valdez, Markwayne Mullin, and Todd Blanche
are automatically substituted in as Respondents as current office holders.
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jurisdiction to set a bond.” [Doc. 1-3].
Mr. Marquez-Rodriguez argues that he is detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a),
which—as explained below—would entitle him to a bond hearing. See [Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 33,
35]. 	Respondents counter that Petitioner is not detained under § 1226(a), but under
§ 1225(b)(2), which renders his detention mandatory. [Doc. 7 at 3].
The Petition was filed on March 16, 2026 and asserts one claim for relief under the
Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”). [Doc. 1 at 6]. Petitioner asks the Court to “[i]ssue
a writ of habeas corpus similar to that issued in” Garcia Abanil v. Baltazar, --- F. Supp. 3d
----, 2026 WL 100587 (D. Colo. Jan. 14, 2026), and Martinez-Orellana v. Hagan, Case
No. 26-cv-00355-WJM, ECF 14 (D. Colo. Feb. 13, 2026), and to “[i]ssue a writ of habeas
corpus requiring that within one day, Respondents release Petitioner,” [Doc. 1 at 7].
Elsewhere in his Petition, he states that “[t]here is an alternative path” of relief, “such as
this Court ordering [that Petitioner] be provided a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)
within seven days.” [Id. at ¶ 12].
This matter is fully briefed and ripe for disposition. 	No Party has requested an
evidentiary hearing or oral argument, and the Court finds that no hearing is necessary.
Garcia Cortes v. Noem, No. 25-cv-02677-CNS, 2025 WL 2652880, at *1 (D. Colo. Sept.
16, 2025) (declining to hold a hearing where the petitioner’s habeas challenge was
“fundamentally legal in nature”).
LEGAL STANDARD
Section 2241 of Title 28 authorizes a court to issue a writ of habeas corpus when
a person is “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United
States.” 	28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). 	“[T]he essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a
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person in custody upon the legality of that custody, and . . . the traditional function of the
writ is to secure release from illegal custody.” 	Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484
(1973). 	“Challenges to immigration detention are properly brought directly through
habeas.” Soberanes v. Comfort, 388 F.3d 1305, 1310 (10th Cir. 2004) (citing Zadvydas
v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687–88 (2001)).
ANALYSIS
Petitioner’s claim turns on whether he is detained under § 1226(a), as he asserts,
[Doc. 1], or under § 1225(b)(2), as Respondents argue, [Doc. 7]. The Court summarizes
the applicable statutory framework before turning to Petitioner’s claims.
I. 	Statutory Framework
Sections 1225 and 1226 govern detention of noncitizens prior to a final order of
removal. See Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 287 (2018). Section 1226 “sets forth
‘the default rule’ for detaining noncitizens ‘already present in the United States.’” Quispe-
Ardiles v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-01382-MSN-WEF, 2025 WL 2783800, at *5 (E.D. Va. Sept.
30, 2025) (quoting Jennings, 583 U.S. at 303). This section permits, but does not require,
the Attorney General to detain noncitizens pending removal proceedings, subject to
certain exceptions not applicable here. Jennings, 583 U.S. at 303; 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(1)–
(2) (the Attorney General “may continue to detain” or “may release” the noncitizen
(emphasis added)). 	Section 1226(a) thus establishes a discretionary framework for the
detention of noncitizens pending removal proceedings.
Section 1225(b) “supplement[s] § 1226’s detention scheme.” 	Rodriguez v.
Bostock, 779 F. Supp. 3d 1239, 1246 (W.D. Wash. 2025) (quoting Rodriguez Diaz v.
Garland, 53 F.4th 1189, 1196 (9th Cir. 2022)). 	Section 1225(b) “applies primarily to
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[noncitizens] seeking entry into the United States,” i.e., “applicants for admission.”
Jennings, 583 U.S. at 297. This section provides, in relevant part, that “in the case of an
alien who is an applicant for admission, if the examining immigration officer determines
that an alien seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted,
the alien shall be detained” pending removal proceedings. 	8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A)
(emphasis added).2 Under § 1225(a)(1), an “applicant for admission” is
An alien present in the United States who has not been admitted or who
arrives in the United States (whether or not at a designated port of arrival
and including an alien who is brought to the United States after having been
interdicted in international or United States waters).
Absent an exception for urgent humanitarian reasons not implicated in this case,
“detention under § 1225(b)(2) is considered mandatory,” and “[i]ndividuals detained under
§ 1225 are not entitled to a bond hearing.” 	Lopez Benitez v. Francis, 795 F. Supp. 3d
475, 484 (S.D.N.Y. 2025) (citing Jennings, 583 U.S. at 297).
II. 	Application to Petitioner’s Claim
Petitioner argues that he is detained under § 1226(a) and is eligible for a bond
hearing. 	[Doc. 1 at ¶ 33]. 	Respondents disagree, arguing that Petitioner is “subject to
mandatory detention under § 1225(b)” because he entered the United States “without
having been admitted” and is thus an “applicant for admission” under the statute. [Doc.
2 Under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1), “certain applicants for admission who are deemed
inadmissible are subject to expedited removal, unless they express a fear of persecution
or an intent to apply for asylum.” Guerrero Orellana v. Moniz, 802 F. Supp. 3d 297, 304
(D. Mass. Oct. 3, 2025), appeal docketed, No. 25-2152 (1st Cir. Dec. 3, 2025); see also
8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i) (directing an immigration officer to “order [a person deemed
inadmissible] removed from the United States without further hearing or review unless
[the person] indicates either an intention to apply for asylum . . . or a fear of persecution”).
Respondents do not argue that Petitioner is detained pursuant to § 1225(b)(1), see [Doc.
8 at 3], so the Court does not substantively address detention under this subsection.
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7 at 2]. But Respondents concede that the issue presented in this case “is not materially
different from [the] issue this Court has resolved” in prior rulings and acknowledge that
“this Court’s prior ruling on this issue would lead the Court to reach the same result here
if the Court adheres to that decision.” [Id. at 2–3].
Indeed, this Court has already rejected Respondents’ position. See Loa Caballero
v. Baltazar, No. 25-cv-03120-NYW, 2025 WL 2977650, at *5 (D. Colo. Oct. 22, 2025)
(“[F]ederal courts have overwhelmingly rejected Respondents’ ‘broad interpretation of
section 1225(b)(2).’” (collecting cases)).3 In Loa Caballero, this Court reviewed a similar
habeas petition filed by a noncitizen who had resided in the United States for nearly 20
years before he was detained by ICE. See id. at *1. Like Petitioner here, the Government
asserted that the petitioner was not entitled to a bond hearing because § 1225 mandated
his detention. 	See id. 	The Court disagreed, emphasizing that § 1225(b)(2)(A) only
provides for mandatory detention of noncitizens “seeking admission” to the country. 	Id.
at *6. 	“The plain meaning of the phrase ‘seeking admission’ requires that the applicant
must be presently and actively seeking lawful entry into the United States.” 	Id. 	Thus,
3 In addition to this Court’s ruling in Loa Caballero, a majority of other judges in this District
have concluded that § 1225(b)(2)(A) does not apply to noncitizens similarly situated to
Petitioner, who have been present in the country for some time and are not actively
“seeking admission.” 	See, e.g., Mendoza Gutierrez v. Baltasar, No. 25-cv-02720-RMR,
2025 WL 2962908 (D. Colo. Oct. 17, 2024) (Rodriguez, J.), appeal docketed, No. 25-
1460 (10th Cir. Dec. 16, 2025); Moya Pineda v. Baltasar, No. 25-cv-02955-GPG, 2025
WL 3516291 (D. Colo. Oct. 20, 2025) (Gallagher, J.); Nava Hernandez v. Baltazar, No.
25-cv-03094-CNS, 2025 WL 2996643 (D. Colo. Oct. 24, 2025) (Sweeney, J.); Arredondo
v. Baltazar, No. 25-cv-03040-RBJ, 2025 WL 4083607 (D. Colo. Oct. 31, 2025); Florez
Marin v. Baltazar, No. 25-cv-03697-PAB, 2025 WL 3677019 (D. Colo. Dec. 18, 2025)
(Brimmer, J.); Aleman Hernandez v. Baltazar, No. 25-cv-03688-SKC-SBP, 2025 WL
3718159 (D. Colo. Dec. 23, 2025) (Crews, J.); Garcia Abanil v. Baltazar, --- F. Supp.
3d ----, 2026 WL 100587 (D. Colo. Jan. 14, 2026) (Martínez, J.).
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noncitizens who are merely “present”—and have been for “years upon years” without
obtaining legal status—are not “seeking admission” under § 1225(b)(2)(A). 	Id. (quoting
Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft, 797 F. Supp. 3d 771, 781 (E.D. Mich. 2025)). 	Interpreting
§ 1225(b)(2)(A) to mandate detention for all “applicants for admission” would render the
“seeking admission” language superfluous. Id. at *7. The Court concluded that both the
plain text of § 1225 and applicable canons of statutory interpretation demonstrated that
the petitioner in Loa Caballero was detained under § 1226, not § 1225. See id. at *5–8.
The Court has since reaffirmed its ruling in Loa Caballero in several other similar habeas
cases. See, e.g., Briales-Zuniga v. Baltazar, No. 25-cv-03439-NYW, 2026 WL 35227, at
*4 (D. Colo. Jan. 6, 2026); Bautista v. Noem, No. 26-cv-00272-NYW, 2026 WL 532427,
at *4 (D. Colo. Feb. 26, 2026).
Accordingly, consistent with the Court’s prior rulings and the weight of authority in
this District and across the country, the Court concludes that § 1225(b)(2) does not
authorize 	Mr. 	Marquez-Rodriguez’s 	detention. 	The 	“default 	rule” 	of 	discretionary
detention under § 1226(a) therefore applies. 	See, e.g., Quispe-Ardiles, 2025 WL
2783800, at *5, *7. Mr. Marquez-Rodriguez’s continued detention without a bond hearing
violates the INA.4 The Court will grant the Petition.
4 Although the Petition states that “Petitioner was denied bond by” an immigration judge
upon 	the 	immigration 	judge’s 	conclusion 	that 	Petitioner 	was 	detained 	under
§ 1225(b)(2)(A), [Doc. 1 at ¶ 22], the Court observes that nothing in the record suggests
that Petitioner was actually provided a bond hearing as contemplated under § 1226(a).
Rather, the immigration judge denied bond upon concluding that there was “no jurisdiction
to set a bond.” [Doc. 1-3 at 1]. Moreover, Respondents do not argue that the immigration
judge’s determination amounted to a bond hearing under § 1226(a) or that Petitioner has
already been afforded the requisite bond hearing. 	See [Doc. 7]. Accordingly, the Court
finds that, based on the current record, Petitioner has not been provided the bond hearing
that § 1226(a) requires. See Hernandez De La Cruz v. Baltazar, No. 26-cv-00390-CYC,
2026 WL 496647, at *1–2 (D. Colo. Feb. 23, 2026) (ordering a bond hearing where the
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III. 	Appropriate Remedy
Mr. Marquez-Rodriguez asks the Court to “[i]ssue a writ of habeas corpus requiring
that within one day, Respondents release [him].” [Doc. 1 at 7]. But he also asks the Court
to “[i]ssue a writ of habeas corpus similar to that issued in” Garcia Abanil, and in Garcia
Abanil, the Honorable William J. Martínez ordered the respondents to provide the
petitioner with a bond hearing under § 1226(a) within seven days, see 2026 WL 100587,
at *9. Petitioner acknowledges that “[t]here is an alternative path [for relief], such as this
Court ordering [that Petitioner] be provided a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)
within seven days.” [Doc. 1 at ¶ 12].
Because § 1226(a) “does not require release—it provides DHS the discretion to
grant” release on bond, Nava Hernandez v. Baltazar, No. 25-cv-03094-CNS, 2025 WL
2996643, at *8 (D. Colo. Oct. 24, 2025), this Court finds it appropriate to order
Respondents to provide Petitioner with the statutorily required bond hearing. Accordingly,
Respondents are ORDERED to provide Mr. Marquez-Rodriguez a bond hearing no later
than April 16, 2026. 	If Respondents to not do not provide Petitioner with a bond
hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) as required herein, Petitioner must be immediately
released from detention. On or before April 23, 2026, the Parties shall file a joint status
report concerning (1) the results of any bond hearing that was conducted or, if no hearing
was held, advise the Court of the date Petitioner was released from custody; and
(2) whether any additional proceedings in this matter are required.
“petitioner’s request for a bond hearing was denied solely because the Immigration Judge
did not believe she had jurisdiction . . . and, as a result, she did not consider 8 U.S.C.
§ 1226”).
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, IT IS ORDERED that:
(1) 	The Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus [Doc. 1] is GRANTED;
(2) 	Respondents shall provide Petitioner a bond hearing no later than April 16,
2026. 	If Respondents to not do not provide Petitioner with a bond
hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) as required herein, Petitioner must be
immediately released from detention; and
(3) 	On or before April 23, 2026, the Parties shall file a joint status report
concerning (1) the results of any bond hearing that was conducted or, if no
hearing was held, advise the Court of the date Petitioner was released from
custody; and (2) whether any additional proceedings in this matter are
required.
DATED: April 9, 2026 	BY THE COURT:
_________________________
Nina Y. Wang
United States District Judge
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