Rodriguez Alfaro v. Baltazar et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Judge Philip A. Brimmer
Civil Action No. 26-cv-01200-PAB
MARIA TERESA RODRIGUEZ ALFARO,
Petitioner,
v.
JUAN BALTAZAR, in his official capacity as Warden of the Denver Contract Detention
Facility,
GEORGE VALDEZ, 1 in his official capacity as Field Office Director, Denver Field Office
of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement,
TODD LYONS, in his official capacity as Acting Director of U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement,
MARKWAYNE MULLIN, in his official capacity as Secretary of U.S. Department of
Homeland Security, and
TODD BLANCHE, 2 in his official capacity as Acting Attorney General of the United
States,
Respondents.
ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on petitioner Maria Teresa Rodriguez
Alfaro’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus [Docket No. 1]. Respondents filed a
response. Docket No. 7.
1 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d), George Valdez is
automatically substituted as a party in this action.
2 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d), Todd Blanche is
automatically substituted as a party in this action.
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I. BACKGROUND 3
Petitioner is a 42 year old citizen of Mexico. Docket No. 1 at 5, ¶ 21. On or
about April 1, 1992, when she was nine years old, petitioner entered the United States
near Calexico, California, without being admitted or paroled. Id. at 5-6, ¶¶ 21, 25. From
2013 to 2023, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) granted petitioner deferred
action for childhood arrivals (“DACA”), which she lost after making an error in her online
application to renew it. Id. at 6, ¶ 26. Petitioner is a business owner and has no
criminal history. Id., ¶¶ 24, 27.
On July 29, 2025, petitioner was encountered by immigration officials when she
drove her brother to a court hearing related to a traffic violation. Id., ¶ 22. After this
encounter, petitioner was arrested, detained, and put in removal proceedings through
the filing of a Notice to Appear. Id., ¶ 23. On November 8, 2025, an immigration judge
granted petitioner’s application for cancellation of removal, noting the hardship petitioner
and her three children would face if petitioner was removed. Id. at 6, 31-37, ¶ 28. On
December 8, 2025, DHS appealed that decision. Id. at 7, ¶ 29. On January 25, 2026,
the immigration judge granted petitioner bond in the amount of $1,500. Id., ¶ 30. On
January 26, 2026, DHS invoked the automatic stay provision at 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(i).
Id., ¶ 31. On February 22, 2026, the immigration judge amended the bond order to
again grant bond in the amount of $1,500. Id., ¶ 32. On February 23, 2026, DHS filed
an EOIR-43, Notice of ICE Intent to Appeal Custody Redetermination, of the amended
bond order. Id., ¶ 33. Petitioner has remained detained at the Denver Contract
Detention Facility since she was first arrested on July 29, 2025. Id. at 4, ¶ 15.
3 The following facts are taken from petitioner’s habeas petition, Docket No. 1,
and are undisputed unless otherwise noted.
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On March 23, 2026, petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus. Docket
No. 1. She brings a claim under the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), a
substantive due process claim, and a procedural due process claim. Id. at 10-15,
¶¶ 48-84.
II. ANALYSIS
Under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), noncitizens may be detained pending a decision
whether they are to be removed from the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).
Noncitizens detained pursuant to § 1226 have the right to seek release on bond. 8
U.S.C. § 1226(a)(2). DHS may appeal a bond determination to the Board of
Immigration Appeals (“BIA”). 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(f). Moreover, the automatic stay
provision at 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(i)(2) states that:
In any case in which DHS has determined that an alien should not be
released or has set a bond of $10,000 or more, any order of the
immigration judge authorizing release (on bond or otherwise) shall be
stayed upon DHS’s filing of a notice of intent to appeal the custody
redetermination (Form EOIR–43) with the immigration court within one
business day of the order, and, except as otherwise provided in 8 CFR
1003.6(c), shall remain in abeyance pending decision of the appeal by the
Board. The decision whether or not to file Form EOIR–43 is subject to the
discretion of the Secretary.
8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(i)(2). Petitioner argues that detention is not authorized by § 1226(a)
after an immigration judge grants bond, even DHS appeals the bond determination.
Docket No. 1 at 10, ¶ 48. Respondents, on the other hand, argue that the bond ruling
has no effect once the automatic stay provision has been invoked, thus permitting
continued detention under § 1226(a). Docket No. 7 at 5-6. The Court need not decide
this issue because it finds that petitioner’s detention violates her procedural due process
rights under the Fifth Amendment. See M.P.L. v. Arteta, 2025 WL 3288354, at *12
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(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 25, 2025) (refusing to determine whether invoking the automatic stay
provision violated the INA because the petitioner’s detention violated due process).
Petitioner argues that the correct method for determining whether her due
process rights have been violated is by applying the three-factor test set out in Mathews
v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). Docket No. 1 at 14, ¶ 73. Conversely,
respondents argue that the “notice and opportunity to be heard” test should be utilized.
Docket No. 7 at 8. Respondents derive this test from a recent Supreme Court case
analyzing the constitutionality of removal under the Alien Enemies Act, 50 U.S.C. § 21,
not the constitutionality of continued detention, in which the Court stated that “detainees
are entitled to notice and opportunity to be heard appropriate to the nature of the case.”
Trump v. J.G.G., 604 U.S. 670, 673 (2025) (citation and internal quotations omitted).
Respondents argue that the appeals process regarding her bond constitutes sufficient
due process in this case, and provides her with both notice and the opportunity to be
heard. Docket No. 7 at 7-8.
Respondents assert that “[t]he Supreme Court has never used the framework set
forth in Eldridge to evaluate due process for noncitizens.” Id. at 8. Respondents cite
Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 34 (1982), for the proposition that the procedural due
process analysis regarding noncitizens is deferential to the government. Id. Yet, in
Landon, the Supreme Court applied the Mathews factors to evaluate whether a
noncitizen received appropriate due process—the very thing respondents claim the
Supreme Court has never done. Landon, 459 U.S. at 34. Respondents also cite
Miranda v. Garland, 34 F.4th 338, 362, 364 (4th Cir. 2022), for the proposition that
petitioner is receiving sufficient notice through the regulatory process for evaluating her
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bond. Docket No. 7 at 8. In Miranda, however, the Fourth Circuit utilized the Mathews
test to evaluate a due process challenge to a noncitizen detained under § 1226(a). See
Miranda, 34 F.4th at 358-59 (“Both [petitioner] and the government agree that the
Mathews test governs. Furthermore, the First and Ninth Circuits have employed the
Mathews balancing test to evaluate due process challenges to the procedures used by
the government under § 1226(a). . . . Therefore, we will apply it to [petitioner’s] due
process claims.”).
Petitioner accurately notes that this case mirrors Merchan-Pacheo v. Noem, No.
25-cv-03860-SBP, 2026 WL 88526 (D. Colo. Jan. 12, 2026), a case in this district
analyzing whether the use of the automatic stay provision violated the petitioner’s due
process rights. Docket No. 1 at 3, ¶¶ 9-10. In Merchan-Pacheo, 2026 WL 88526, at *8,
the court noted “the plethora of cases applying the Mathews factors in substantively
similar or identical contexts and evaluate[d] whether Petitioner’s continued detention
[was] justified pursuant to those factors.” The Court will follow the weight of authority
and analyze petitioner’s procedural due process claim under the test set out in
Mathews.
Under Mathews, courts weigh the following three factors in evaluating due
process claims: (1) “the private interest that will be affected by the official action”; (2)
“the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and
the probative value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards”; and (3)
“the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would
entail.” Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
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Petitioner argues that she has a significant private interest at stake, namely, her
interest in physical freedom. The interest in being free from physical detention “is the
most elemental of liberty interests.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529 (2004); see
also Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001) (noting that freedom from physical
restraint “lies at the heart of the liberty that [the Due Process] Clause protects.”). Yet,
petitioner has been in physical detention for over eight months, despite not having been
accused of any crime. Respondents argue that petitioner’s interest is not significant
because her continued detention might not be prolonged. Docket No. 7 at 9.
Specifically, respondents note that the automatic stay provision expires after 90 days if
the BIA has not yet ruled. Id. However, there are several possibilities for the detention
being extended after the 90-day period lapses, including the stay being extended due to
custody proceedings. Rivas v. Baltazar, No. 26-cv-00442-SKC, 2026 WL 444732, at *1
n.2 (D. Colo. Feb. 17, 2026); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.6(c)(5)-(d). Thus, petitioner’s
detention may continue for longer than 90 days. Moreover, even if petitioner would only
be detained for an additional 90 days, the Court finds that freedom from 90 days of
physical detention still constitutes a significant private interest, particularly in light of the
fact that petitioner has already been detained for over eight months. Thus, the first
Mathews factor weighs in favor in petitioner. See Merchan-Pacheo, 2026 WL 88526, at
*14 (finding that the first Mathews factor weighed in favor of petitioner after the
invocation of the automatic stay provision); Rivas, 2026 WL 444732, at *3 (same).
Second, there is a high risk of erroneous deprivation of petitioner’s liberty
interest. “The risk of deprivation is high because the only individuals subject to the
automatic stay are those who, by definition, prevailed at their bond hearing.” Merchan-
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Pacheo, 2026 WL 88526, at *15 (citation and internal quotations omitted). Here, an
immigration judge has twice determined that petitioner is not a significant flight risk or
danger to the community, and has granted bond in the amount of $1,500. Docket No. 1
at 7, ¶¶ 30, 32. However, the automatic stay provision allows DHS to unilaterally stay
the bond determination, despite not requiring “DHS to consider or demonstrate any
individualized facts or show a likelihood of success on the merits.” Merchan-Pacheo,
2026 WL 88526, at *15 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(i)(2)). Accordingly, the second
Mathews factor weighs in favor of petitioner.
Finally, respondents argue that the government has a legitimate interest in
maintaining custody over petitioner because “release could render the review process
illusory.” Docket No. 7 at 10. Specifically, respondents argue that many noncitizens
who are released from custody do not show up to scheduled removal hearings after
their release. Id. While the government has an interest in preventing flight risks, an
immigration judge has already determined that a $1,500 bond would effectively
ameliorate that risk. As one court in this district noted, “this interest rings hollow given
that . . . this automatic stay is being applied only to those individuals ‘who an
Immigration Judge has determined [do] not pose a public safety threat or a risk of flight
sufficient to warrant continued confinement.’” Rivas, 2026 WL 444732, at *4 (quoting
Merchan-Pacheo, 2026 WL 88526, at *16). Thus, the third Mathews factor weighs in
favor of petitioner. Accordingly, each Mathews factor weighs in favor of petitioner, and
the Court finds that petitioner’s continued custody violates her procedural due process
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rights. 4 Notably, this finding follows the weight of authority, since “[a]t least 50 district
court decisions across the United States . . . have found that DHS’s application of the
automatic stay pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(i)(2) violates a non-citizen’s due process
under the Fifth Amendment.” M.P.L., 2025 WL 3288354, at *7 (collecting cases).
III. CONCLUSION
Therefore, it is
ORDERED that petitioner Maria Teresa Rodriguez Alfaro’s Petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus is GRANTED. It is further
ORDERED that, upon petitioner posting the $1,500 bond set by the immigration
judge, respondents shall immediately release petitioner from custody. It is further
ORDERED that, on or before April 13, 2026, the parties shall file a status report
informing the Court whether bond was posted and whether petitioner remains in
custody.
DATED April 7, 2026.
BY THE COURT:
___________________________
PHILIP A. BRIMMER
United States District Judge
4 Because the Court will grant habeas relief on the procedural due process claim,
it need not address petitioner’s substantive due process claim. See Merchan-Pacheo,
2026 WL 88526, at *16 (“Petitioner also asserts that the automatic stay violates his
substantive due process rights. Because the court has already awarded Petitioner the
relief he requests, the court need not reach this issue.”).
______	________________ ______	_ ____	_ __________	__	___________________
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