HALL v. SECRETARY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
PENSACOLA DIVISION
WENDALL HALL,
Petitioner,
v. 	Case No. 3:25-cv-338-LC-MJF
SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT
OF CORRECTIONS,
Respondent.
/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Wendall Hall has filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28
U.S.C. § 2254. Doc. 1. Respondent (“the State”) moves to dismiss the
petition with prejudice because Hall’s claims are procedurally defaulted.
Doc. 14. Hall opposes the motion. Doc. 16. The undersigned concludes
that no evidentiary hearing is required, and that Hall’s petition should
be denied because all of Hall’s claims are procedurally defaulted.
BACKGROUND
In Escambia County Circuit Court Case No. 1994-CF-3077, Hall
was 	convicted 	of 	two 	counts 	of 	sexual 	battery 	and 	one 	count 	of
kidnapping. Doc.14-2. Hall was sentenced on each count to 240 months
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of imprisonment followed by 10 years on probation, to run concurrently.
Id.
While Hall was serving his term of incarceration, he filed so many
frivolous filings that both the Escambia County Circuit Court and the
Florida First District Court of Appeal (“First DCA”) prohibited Hall from
filing pro se pleadings or papers unless the filing was signed by an
attorney licensed to practice law in the State of Florida. The Escambia
County Circuit Court entered its order on June 30, 2005, after giving Hall
notice and an opportunity to be heard. Doc. 14-12. The circuit court’s
order reads, in relevant part:
2. 	The Defendant is hereby PROHIBITED from filing
any future 	pleadings unless reviewed and 	signed by 	an
attorney licensed to practice law in the state of Florida[.]
Doc. 14-12. The First DCA affirmed. Hall v. State, No. 1D05-3823, 914
So. 2d 957 (Fla. 1st DCA Nov. 4, 2005) (Table), 	petition for review
dismissed, 926 So. 2d 1269 (Fla. Mar. 10, 2006) (Table), cert. denied, 127
S. Ct. 104 (2006).
The First DCA issued its ban on pro se filings on May 14, 2014, after
giving Hall notice and an opportunity to be heard. Hall v. Norris, 142 So.
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3d 882 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014) (copy at Doc. 14-17). The First DCA’s order
reads, in relevant part:
[W]e 	prohibit 	Appellant 	from 	filing 	any 	further 	pro 	se
pleadings in this court. Any pleadings or papers filed in this
court regarding Appellant must be reviewed and signed by an
attorney licensed to practice in this state. Accordingly, the
clerk is directed not to accept any further pro se pleadings or
filings from Appellant in any matter. See Perry v. Mascara,
959 So.2d 771 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007).
Hall, 142 So. 3d at 882–83.
Hall completed his prison sentence in late June 2019, and his term
of probation was set to begin on July 1, 2019. Doc. 16 at 2; see also Doc.
16-2, 	Ex. 	F. 	However, 	prior 	to 	being 	released 	from 	the 	Florida
Department of Corrections, the State filed a petition to civilly commit
Hall as a sexually violent predator under the Jimmy Ryce Act, Fla. Stat.
§§ 394.910–394.931. Doc. 16 at 2. Thus, when Hall was released from the
FDC, he immediately was transferred to the Escambia County Jail
pending a trial in the civil commitment case.
On October 18, 2019, Hall was adjudicated a sexually violent
predator and committed to the Florida Department of Children and
Family Services. Doc. 14-1.
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Hall’s federal habeas petition involves a state statute that was
passed while Hall was in prison. In 2014, the Florida Legislature added
this provision to its probation statute, Fla. Stat. § 948.012:
(6) If a defendant who has been sentenced to a split sentence
pursuant to subsection (1) is transferred to the custody of the
Department of Children and Families pursuant to part V of
chapter 394, the period of probation or community control is
tolled until such person is no longer in the custody of the
Department of Children and Families. This subsection applies
to all sentences of probation or community control which
begin on or after October 1, 2014, regardless of the date of the
underlying offense.
Fla. Stat. § 948.012(6) (eff. Oct. 1, 2014). Hall alleges that he learned of
this provision and its applicability to him in 2022. Doc. 1 at 15 in ECF.
On March 28, 2022, Hall filed in the Florida Supreme Court a
“Petition 	for 	Declaratory 	Judgment” 	seeking 	a 	declaration 	that 	§
948.012(6) violated the Due Process Clause, the Equal Protection Clause,
the Ex Post Facto Clause, and the Double Jeopardy Clause. Doc. 14-3.
The Florida Supreme Court treated the filing as a petition for writ of
habeas corpus and transferred it to the Escambia County Circuit Court
for consideration as a motion to correct sentence under Florida Rule of
Criminal Procedure 3.800(a) “or as otherwise considered appropriate by
the trial court to address the claims brought.” Doc. 14-3 at 1. Recognizing
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the circuit court’s 2005 ban on Hall filing pleadings pro se, the Florida
Supreme Court directed:
In light of the petitioner’s status as being barred from
filing pro se pleadings before the transferee court, we direct
the transferee court to accept the petition and appoint counsel
to assist the petitioner with his claim. The transfer of this case
should not be construed as an adjudication or comment on the
merits 	of 	the 	petition, 	nor 	as 	a 	determination 	that 	the
transferee court has jurisdiction or that the petition should be
considered as a motion to correct sentence.
Doc. 14-3.
Hall then filed a pro se “Supplemental Motion to Correct Illegal
Sentence” under Rule 3.800(a) in the state circuit court. Doc. 14-4. Hall
asserted that his sentence was illegal because the sentencing court
departed upward from the sentencing guidelines without filing written
reasons for the departure. Doc. 14-4. As relief, Hall requested that his
sentences of probation be vacated.
The circuit court appointed Joseph O. Reosti, Esq. to represent
Hall. Doc. 14-9. The circuit court ordered Reosti to review Hall’s “Petition
for Declaratory Judgment” and file one of the following: 	(1) verification
that counsel adopted Hall’s petition and would pursue Hall’s claims as
written; (2) a new petition/motion based solely on one or more of the
issues raised in Hall’s petition, “if appropriate, legal, and supported by
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good faith”; or (3) a statement that counsel would not and could not in
good faith pursue any of the issues Hall raised in the “Petition for
Declaratory Judgment.” Id.
Reosti file a response certifying that he could not in good faith
pursue any of the issues Hall raised. Doc. 14-10.
On August 22, 2024, the state circuit court ruled:
In his petition, Defendant alleges that on March 20,
1997, he was sentenced to 20 years in prison to be followed by
10 years of probation in case 94-CF-3077. . . . He alleges he
completed his prison sentence on June 27, 2019, but was
civilly committed in 2019 as a sexually violent predator under
the Jimmy Ryce Act, chapter 394, Florida Statutes. He alleges
his probation in case 94-CF-3077 has been tolled during his
civil commitment. Defendant challenges section 948.012(6)
Florid[a] Statutes (2014), which allows his probation to be
tolled while he is in custody under chapter 394, Florida
Statutes. He seeks declaratory relief, requesting the Court to
declare section 948.012(6) unconstitutional.
Declaratory relief is not a proper means of collateral
review of Defendant’s judgment and sentence and is not
properly brought in his criminal case. See Tedder v. State, 12
So. 	3d 	265 	(Fla. 	5th 	DCA 	2009). 	Because 	Defendant 	is
challenging his sentence and imposition of probation, the
Court will treat the petition as filed under rule 3.800(a).
Defendant’s “Supplemental Motion to Correct Illegal
Sentence and Judicial Notice of Fundamental Error to be
Reviewed Sua Sponte,” which was brought pursuant to rule
3.800(a) and section 90.201, Florida Statutes, was filed in case
94-CF-3077 only. By this pleading, Defendant attempts to
supplement his petition with an additional claim, asserting
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that 	Defendant’s 	prison 	sentence 	followed 	by 	probation
exceeds the sentencing guidelines without a written reason.
Defendant requests correction of his sentence by vacating the
10 year term of probation. This pleading was not authorized
by the Florida Supreme Court’s order and is filed in violation
of the order of June 30, 2005.
By his response of June 5, 2024, appointed counsel has
advised the Court that after a complete review of Defendant’s
pleading, counsel cannot in good faith pursue any of the
grounds argued by Defendant in the petition.FN2 Because
Defendant’s pro se petition has not been adopted by counsel,
and 	his 	pro 	se 	supplemental 	motion 	is 	unauthorized,
Defendant’s claims as to case 94-CF-3077 may be stricken as
unauthorized under the order of June 30, 2005.
FN2 	The 	Court 	notes 	counsel 	refers 	to 	three
grounds argued by Defendant, while the petition
contains four delineated “Issues.” However, the
Court trusts that counsel made a complete review
of the petition, as stated in counsel’s response.
Doc. 14-11 at 1–3 (footnote 3 omitted).1 The state circuit court’s decretal
stated:
1. 	Defendant’s “Petition for Declaratory Judgment”
is STRICKEN as to case 94-CF-3077 and is DISMISSED as
to case 94-CF-3113.
2. 	Defendant’s 	“Supplemental 	Motion 	to 	Correct
Illegal Sentence and Judicial Notice of Fundamental Error to
be Reviewed Sua Sponte” is STRICKEN.
1 In a letter Reosti later wrote to Hall, Reosti confirmed: “I could not, in
good faith, pursue any of your arguments, either by adopting them
outright, or re-filing them in my own pleading.” Doc. 14-18 at 21 in ECF.
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3. 	Under rule 3.800(a), Defendant has the right to
appeal within 30 days of rendition of this order.
4. 	The Clerk of the Court is DIRECTED to file and
maintain the instant pro se filings in the court record without
further response from the Court as to case 94-CF-3077.
Doc. 14-11 at 3.
On September 4, 2024, Hall moved for appointment of appellate
counsel. Doc. 14-13. The circuit court denied the motion on October 4,
2024, noting that there was no right to appellate counsel in a collateral
review proceeding. Doc. 14-14.
On November 14, 2024, Hall submitted a pro se notice of appeal to
the First DCA. Doc. 14-15. On November 15, 2024, the Clerk of the First
DCA notified Hall that his pleading was not accepted for filing pursuant
to the prior order prohibiting pro se filings:
Pursuant to this Court’s May 14, 2014, opinion in case
1D2013-3634, I am not permitted to submit to the Court any
pro se filings filed by you. Your notice of appeal therefore has
been placed in a correspondence file, unfiled and without
action. If you want to initiate a case in this Court, the notice
of appeal or petition must be filed by a member in good
standing of The Florida Bar.
Doc. 14-16. Hall did not file a notice of appeal through an attorney.
Hall then filed a “Petition for Declaratory Judgment and or Petition
for Writ of Habeas Corpus” in the Florida Supreme Court asserting that
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§ 948.012(6) was unconstitutional as applied to him. Doc. 14-18. Hall
argued: 	“Fl. 	Stat. 	948.012(6) 	tolling 	or 	probation 	provision 	is
unconstitutional, as applied to petitioner’s 1997, 10 year probationary
split sentence, as applied to petitioner’s 1994 sexual battery criminal
charges and or his 1997 convictions and sentence.” Doc. 14-18 at 32 in
ECF.
On 	January 	14, 	2025, 	the 	Florida Supreme Court 	denied the
petition “as procedurally barred.” Doc. 14-19. The court explained: “A
petition for extraordinary relief is not a second appeal and cannot be used
to litigate or relitigate issues that were or could have been raised on
direct appeal or in prior postconviction proceedings.” Doc. 14-19.
Hall filed his pro se federal habeas petition on March 13, 2025. Doc.
1. Hall claims that application of the 2014 tolling provision of § 948.012(6)
to his 1997 probationary sentence violates the Ex Post Facto Clause
(Ground 1); the Equal Protection Clause (Ground 2); and the procedural
component of the Due Process Clause (Ground 3). As relief, Hall seeks “to
vacate his 10 year probation sentence and or allow his probation sentence
to run concurrently with his civil commitment confinement and to give
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Petitioner credit for time 	he’s served on 	probation 	during his civil
commitment confinement.” Doc. 1 at 16 in ECF.
The State asserts that Hall’s claims are procedurally defaulted
because the state courts rejected them on independent and adequate
state-law procedural grounds. Doc. 14.
T HE F EDERAL H ABEAS E XHAUSTION REQUIREMENT
“To respect our system of dual sovereignty, the availability of
habeas relief is narrowly circumscribed.” Shinn v. Ramirez, 596 U.S. 366,
375 (2022) (citations omitted). One such constraint is the exhaustion
requirement and corollary principle of procedural default. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(b); Shinn, 596 U.S. at 375-79.
Section 2254 “requires state prisoners to ‘exhaust the remedies
available in the courts of the State’ before seeking federal habeas relief.”
Shinn, 	596 	U.S. 	at 	377 	(alteration 	adopted) 	(quoting 	28 	U.S.C. 	§
2254(b)(1)(A)). State prisoners must “invoke[e] one complete round of the
State’s established appellate review process.” O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526
U.S. 838, 845 (1999). “As long as a State appellate process exists, follows
‘firmly established and regularly followed’ rules, and is not ‘ineffective to
protect the rights’ of the petitioner, the petitioner must navigate the
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State appellate process under the State’s rules.” Carruth v. Comm’r, Ala.
Dep’t of Corr., 93 F.4th 1338, 1354 (11th Cir. 2024) (first quoting Ford v.
Georgia, 	498 	U.S. 	411, 	424 	(1991); 	and 	then 	quoting 	28 	U.S.C. 	§
2254(b)(1)(B)(ii)).
“Not adhering to a State’s procedural rules to present federal claims
deprives the state courts of the opportunity to address those claims.”
Carruth, 93 F.4th at 1354 (citing Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722,
732 (1991)). A procedural default can arise “when the state court correctly
applies a procedural default principle of state law and concludes that the
petitioner’s federal claims are barred.” Carruth, 93 F.4th at 1354.
When the State asserts a procedural-default defense, the federal
court first 	must determine “whether the 	last 	state 	court rendering
judgment clearly and expressly stated that its judgment rested on a
procedural bar . . . .” Bailey v. Nagle, 172 F.3d 1299, 1303 (11th Cir. 1999);
Carruth, 93 F.4th at 1355. Second, the court must determine whether the
state’s 	procedural 	default 	ruling 	rested 	on 	adequate 	state 	grounds
independent of the federal question. Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 263
(1989); Bailey, 172 F.3d at 1303. If the answer is yes, then procedural
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default bars federal habeas review. Caniff v. Moore, 269 F.3d 1245, 1247
(11th Cir. 2001).
Together, exhaustion and procedural default promote
federal-state 	comity. 	Exhaustion 	affords 	States an 	initial
opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged violations of
prisoners’ 	federal 	rights, 	and 	procedural 	default 	protects
against the significant harm to the States that results from
the failure of federal courts to respect state procedural rules.
Ultimately, 	it would be 	unseemly in 	our dual system of
government for a federal district court to upset a state court
conviction without giving an opportunity to the state courts to
correct a constitutional violation, and to do so consistent with
their own procedures.
Shinn, 596 U.S. at 378–79 (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted; alteration adopted).
A 	petitioner 	seeking 	to 	overcome 	a 	procedural 	default 	must
“demonstrate cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result of the
alleged violation of federal law, or demonstrate that failure to consider
the claim[ ] will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Coleman,
501 U.S. at 750; Carruth, 93 F.4th at 1355.
A petitioner establishes “cause” by showing that an objective factor
external to the defense impeded an effort to properly raise the claim in the
state court. Henderson v. Campbell, 353 F.3d 880, 892 (11th Cir. 2003)
(emphasis added). A petitioner establishes “prejudice” by showing at
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least a reasonable probability that the proceeding’s result would have
been different. Id. at 892.
The miscarriage of justice exception requires the petitioner to show
that “a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of
one who is actually innocent.” Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995).
“To establish the requisite probability, the petitioner must show that it
is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted
him.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327. The Schlup standard is very difficult to
meet:
[A] substantial claim that constitutional error has caused the
conviction of an innocent person is extremely rare. To be
credible, such a claim requires [a] petitioner to support his
allegations 	of 	constitutional 	error 	with 	new 	reliable
evidence—whether 	it 	be 	exculpatory 	scientific 	evidence,
trustworthy 	eyewitness 	accounts, 	or 	critical 	physical
evidence—that that was not presented at trial.
Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327.
D ISCUSSION
A. 	The Parties’ Exhaustion Arguments
The State asserts that Hall’s claims are procedurally defaulted
because the state circuit court and the First DCA rejected Hall’s claims
on an independent and adequate state-law procedural ground, namely,
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“the fact that Hall had relinquished his right to file pro se pleadings by
abusing the process and being limited to litigation run by an attorney.”
Doc. 14 at 12. In addition, the Florida Supreme Court dismissed the
claims 	in 	Hall’s 	subsequent 	habeas 	petition 	because 	they 	were
procedurally barred. Id. at 6.
Hall asserts that he satisfied the exhaustion requirement because
he gave the state courts an opportunity to address his constitutional
claims but the courts improperly refused to consider them. Doc. 1 at 3–4;
Doc. 16 at 3, 6, 13. Hall argues that the state circuit court’s imposition of
a 	procedural 	bar 	was 	inadequate 	to 	support 	its 	striking 	of 	Hall’s
petition/Rule 3.800 motion, because the Florida Supreme Court required
the circuit court to accept the pleading and consider Hall’s claims on the
merits. Doc. 16 at 3–5, 7–9, 12–13.
In addition, Hall asserts that the First DCA’s imposition of a
procedural bar was inadequate, and that “state appeal court remedies
were 	unavailable 	to 	Hall 	or 	were 	ineffective 	to 	protect 	Hall’s
constitutional 	rights, 	since 	the 	FIRST 	DISTRICT 	COURT 	OF
APPEAL (1st DCA) would not accept Hall’s pro se appeal.” Id. at 5, 6–
13.
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The undersigned will address Hall’s “unavailable” and “ineffective”
argument first.
B. 	The State Courts’ Prohibition on Pro Se Filings Did Not
Render 	the 	State 	Corrective 	Process 	Unavailable 	or
Ineffective to Protect Hall’s Rights
Hall argues that state corrective process was unavailable to him or
was ineffective to protect his constitutional rights because of the state
circuit court’s and the First DCA’s bans on Hall filing documents pro se.
Doc. 16 at 5–7, 12.
A state prisoner may avoid the exhaustion requirement if “there is
an absence of available State corrective process; or circumstances exist
that render such process ineffective to protect the rights of the applicant.”
28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(B)(i)–(ii). “An exception is made only if there is no
opportunity to obtain redress in state court or if the corrective process is
so 	clearly 	deficient 	as 	to 	render 	futile 	any 	effort 	to 	obtain 	relief.”
Duckworth v. Serrano, 454 U.S. 1, 3 (1981) (emphasis added).
Hall does not contend that Florida’s postconviction procedures are
inadequate 	or 	ineffective 	to 	address 	a 	defendant’s 	constitutional
challenges to the application of § 948.012(6). Hall, in fact, concedes that
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a state corrective procedure existed for review of constitutional claims
like his. Doc. 16.
Instead, Hall argues that the state courts’ prohibition of Hall filing
pro se 	pleadings brings him under § 2254(b)(1)(B)’s exception. Hall,
however, has not shown that the pro se filing bans rendered the state
corrective process unavailable or ineffective to protect his rights.
For starters, the ban on pro se filings was a circumstance created
by Hall’s own abuse of the judicial process. See Claudio v. Sec’y, DOC,
2015 WL 5996932, at *6 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 14, 2015) (petitioner’s abusive
tactics in the state-court system, and the state courts’ ban on pro se
filings, did not “negate or excuse the requirement that he exhaust his
state court remedies prior to filing a federal petition”).
Second, the ban did not prevent Hall from pursuing Florida’s
corrective process at all, it only prevented him from doing so as a pro se
litigant. Hall still had the opportunity to fully exhaust his claims by filing
documents through a lawyer in good standing with The Florida Bar. See
Maggard v. State, 790 So. 2d 506, 508 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001) (a Spencer
order does not completely bar a defendant from the court that imposed it;
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rather, “[s]uch defendants simply need to have a valid legal claim, as
recognized by a responsible, licensed Florida attorney”).
The state circuit court even appointed counsel to review Hall’s
pleading. On appeal, the First DCA explicitly informed Hall that the
appellate process still was available to him: “If you want to initiate a case
in this Court, the notice of appeal or petition must be filed by a member
in good standing of The Florida Bar.” Doc. 14-16.
In short, Hall’s abusive tactics in the state-court system—and the
state courts’ ultimate decision to reject further pro se filings from Hall—
does not bring Hall under § 2254(b)(1)(B)’s exception to the exhaustion
requirement. Hall was required to properly exhaust his federal claims in
the state courts.
C. 	Hall’s Claims Are Procedurally Defaulted
Each state court clearly and expressly stated that its judgment
rested on a state-law procedural bar. The procedural bars were wholly
independent of Hall’s federal constitutional challenges to the probation
statute.
Thus, the only question is whether the state courts’ procedural bars
were an “adequate” state ground for concluding that Hall’s federal claims
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were barred. See Judd v. Haley, 250 F.3d 1308, 1313 (11th Cir. 2001). A
state procedural rule constitutes an adequate state ground when it is
“firmly 	established 	and 	regularly 	followed” 	and 	not 	“applied 	in 	an
arbitrary or unprecedented fashion.” Siebert v. Allen, 455 F.3d 1269, 1271
(11th Cir. 2006); Judd, 250 F.3d at 1313.
1. 	The State Circuit Court’s Imposition of a Procedural
Bar Was Adequate to Support Its Judgment
Hall argues that the state circuit court’s application of the pro se
filing ban to arrive at the conclusion that Hall’s federal claims were
barred was improper because the Florida Supreme Court ordered the
circuit court to accept Hall’s pro se petition/motion. Doc. 16 at 4–5. This
argument is a non-starter. The record establishes that the state circuit
court fully complied with the Florida Supreme Court’s order.
The circuit court accepted Hall’s pleading for filing and appointed
counsel to review the validity of Hall’s proposed claims. Doc. 14-9. After
counsel certified that he could not in good faith pursue any of the claims
Hall 	raised, 	the 	circuit 	court 	concluded 	that 	Hall’s 	claims 	were
procedurally barred by the pro se ban and struck Hall’s claims, but
allowed Hall’s pro se petition/motion to remain part of the state-court
record. Doc. 14-10; Doc. 14-11.
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The Florida Supreme Court did not require the circuit court to
address Hall’s claims on the merits. The Florida Supreme Court explicitly
stated: “The transferee court should not interpret the transfer of this case
as an indication that it must or should reach the merits of the petition.”
Doc. 14-3.
The procedural bar imposed by the circuit court was adequate to
support its judgment. Prohibitions on abusive litigants’ pro se filings are
a firmly established and regularly followed procedural practice in the
Florida state courts. See State v. Spencer, 751 So. 2d 47, 48 (Fla. 1999) (a
court 	may 	prohibit 	an 	abusive 	litigant 	from 	filing 	further 	pro 	se
challenges to his conviction and sentence as long as the litigant is
provided notice and an opportunity to be heard); Hastings v. State, 79 So.
3d 739, 742 (Fla. 2011) (imposing ban on pro se filings); Johnson v.
Rundle, 59 So. 3d 1080, 1081 (Fla. 2011) (same); Campbell v. State, 296
So. 3d 893, 894 (Fla. 2020) (same); Butler v. State, 55 So. 3d 598, 599–600
(Fla. 1st DCA 2010) (affirming trial court’s decision to strike motion to
correct illegal sentence in accordance with previous order barring further
pro se filings); Mobley v. State, 976 So. 2d 1146, 1147 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008)
(same); see also Wells v. Miller, 652 F. App’x 874, 875 (11th Cir. 2016).
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The state circuit court’s rejection of Hall’s claims on an independent
and adequate state procedural ground renders Hall’s claims procedurally
defaulted 	from 	habeas 	review. 	Bailey, 	172 	F.3d 	at 	1302 	(citing
Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87 (1977)).
2. 	The First DCA’s Imposition of a Procedural Bar Was
Adequate to Support Its Judgment
Even if the District Court were to conclude that the state circuit
court’s imposition of a procedural bar was inadequate to support its
judgment, Hall still faces another obstacle. Hall failed to invoke one
complete round of the state’s appellate review process, because his pro se
appeal was rejected on state-law procedural grounds, and Hall did not
cure the deficiency. See Boerckel, 526 U.S. at 845.
Florida’s established postconviction process required Hall to appeal
the circuit court’s order. Fla. R. App. P. 9.030(b)(1)(A); Fla. R. App. P.
9.110(a)–(b); Fla. R. App. P. 9.141(b); see also Doc. 14-11 at 3 (notifying
Hall of his right to appeal). Hall’s pro se appeal was rejected by the First
DCA on the state-law procedural ground that Hall was prohibited from
filing pleadings pro se and failed to have an attorney file the notice of
appeal. Doc. 14-16.
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As discussed above, a ban on an abusive litigant’s pro se filings is a
firmly established and regularly followed procedural practice in the
Florida state courts. See discussion supra Section C.1.
Hall was notified that his pro se notice of appeal had been rejected
and that he had to file a notice of appeal through counsel. Doc. 14-16.
Hall, however, failed to file a notice of appeal through an attorney. Thus,
Hall’s claims are procedurally defaulted. See, e.g., Hinson v. Sec’y, Dep’t
of Corr., 2018 WL 5794171, at *4–5 (N.D. Fla. Oct. 17, 2018).
3. 	The 	Florida 	Supreme 	Court’s 	Imposition 	of 	a
Procedural Bar Was Adequate to Support Its Judgment
Hall’s subsequent attempt at exhaustion also failed. On January
14, 2025, the Florida Supreme Court denied Hall’s second state habeas
petition “as procedurally barred” because Hall was attempting “to litigate
or relitigate issues that were or could have been raised . . . in prior
postconviction proceedings.” Doc. 14-19. In other words, Hall’s as-applied
challenge to the constitutionality of § 748.012(6) was or could have been
raised in his first petition that was transferred to the state circuit court.
The procedural bar imposed by the Florida Supreme Court is firmly
established and regularly followed in the Florida state courts. Hildwin v.
Dugger, 654 So.2d 107, 111 (Fla. 1995); Johnston v. State, 63 So. 3d 730,
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747 (Fla. 2011); Zuluaga v. State, Dep’t of Corr., 32 So. 3d 674, 676–77
(Fla. 1st DCA 2010).
In short, the Florida Supreme Court’s conclusion that Hall’s federal
claims were barred rested on an adequate state-law procedural bar.
Thus, Hall’s federal claims are procedurally defaulted.
D. 	Hall Fails to Overcome His Procedural Default
Hall fails to establish “cause” to overcome his procedural default.
Hall first argues that the state courts’ barring him from filing pro se
pleadings constitutes “cause” to overcome his procedural default. Doc. 16.
This argument fails, because the reason Hall was barred from filing pro
se pleadings is due to his own conduct, namely, repeatedly filing frivolous
pleadings and abusing the judicial process. See Lynn v. United States,
365 F.3d 1225, 1235 (11th Cir. 2004).
Hall also argues that his procedural default is excused because
appointed postconviction counsel was ineffective for failing to pursue
Hall’s claims. Doc. 16 at 9–12 (citing Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012)).
Hall, however, had no constitutional right to postconviction counsel
to litigate his challenges to the probation statute. See Coleman, 501 U.S.
at 753–55. Also, the Martinez exception does not apply, because Hall’s
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procedurally 	defaulted 	claims 	are 	not 	ineffective-assistance-of-trial-
counsel claims. See Martinez, 566 U.S. at 17; Rigg v. Blackwater River
Corr. Facility, 685 F. App’x 812, 816 (11th Cir. 2017); Gore v. Crews, 720
F.3d 811, 816 (11th Cir. 2013).
Because Hall fails to establish “cause” to excuse his procedural
default, and Hall has not presented evidence of his factual innocence of
his crimes to satisfy the miscarriage of justice exception, his petition
must be denied.
A CERTIFICATE OF A PPEALABILITY I S N OT WARRANTED
Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United
States District Courts provides: “[t]he district court must issue or deny a
certificate of appealability when it enters a final order adverse to the
applicant.” If a certificate is issued, “the court must state the specific
issue 	or 	issues 	that 	satisfy 	the 	showing 	required 	by 	28 	U.S.C. 	§
2253(c)(2).” 	28 U.S.C. § 2254 Rule 11(a). A timely notice of appeal must
still be filed, even if the court issues a certificate of appealability. See 28
U.S.C. § 2254 Rule 11(b).
“[Section] 2253(c) permits the issuance of a COA only where a
petitioner 	has 	made 	a 	‘substantial 	showing 	of 	the 	denial 	of 	a
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constitutional right.’” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003)
(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)). “At the COA stage, the only question is
whether the applicant has shown that jurists of reason could disagree
with the district court’s resolution of his constitutional claims or that
jurists could conclude the issues presented are adequate to deserve
encouragement to proceed further.” Buck v. Davis, 580 U.S. 100, 115
(2017). “When the district court denies a habeas petition on procedural
grounds without reaching the prisoner’s underlying constitutional claim,
a COA should issue when the prisoner shows, at least, that jurists of
reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim
of the denial of a constitutional right and that jurists of reason would find
it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural
ruling.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000) (emphasis added).
Here, Petitioner has not made the requisite demonstration. Accordingly,
the court should deny a certificate of appealability in its final order.
“Before entering the final order, the court may direct the parties to
submit arguments on whether a certificate should issue.” 	28 U.S.C. §
2254 Rule 11(a). If there is an objection to this recommendation, the
relevant party shall file such an objection with the District Court.
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CONCLUSION
For 	the 	reasons 	set 	forth 	above, 	the 	undersigned 	respectfully
RECOMMENDS that the District Court:
1. 	GRANT Respondent’s motion to dismiss, Doc. 14.
2. 	DENY Hall’s petition for writ of habeas corpus, Doc. 1.
3. 	DENY a certificate of appealability.
4. 	DIRECT the clerk of court to close this case file.
At Panama City, Florida, this 21st day of November, 2025.
/s/ Michael J. Frank
Michael J. Frank
United States Magistrate Judge
NOTICE TO THE PARTIES
The District Court referred this case to a magistrate
judge to make recommendations regarding dispositive
matters. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), (C). Objections to
these proposed findings and recommendations must be
filed within fourteen days of the date of the report and
recommendation. 	Any 	different 	deadline 	that 	may
appear 	on 	the 	electronic 	docket 	is 	for 	the 	court’s
internal use only. A party must serve a copy of any
objections on all other parties. A party who fails to
object to this report and recommendation waives the
right to challenge on appeal the District Court’s order
based on unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions.
See 11th Cir. R. 3-1; 28 U.S.C. § 636.
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