LEWIS v. WINSTROM et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
PENSACOLA DIVISION
PRESTON LEWIS,
Plaintiff,
v. 	Case No. 3:25cv1264-MCR-HTC
ERIC WINSTROM,1
CHIEF OF PENSACOLA
POLICE DEPARTMENT, et al.,
Defendants.
__________________________/
ORDER and
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff Preston Lewis, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed this
action alleging the Defendant Pensacola Police Department (“PPD”) officers
violated his constitutional rights during a July 6, 2025 traffic stop. 	Doc. 6.
Defendants, the Chief of Police and Officer Sidney Massey, have filed a motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim. 	Doc. 17. 	Upon consideration of Defendants’
motion 	(Doc. 	17), 	Lewis’s 	opposition 	(Doc. 	30), 	and 	the 	relevant 	law, 	the
undersigned recommends the motion be GRANTED, and this case be DISMISSED
WITH PREJUDICE as to the Chief of Police and Officer Massey. Additionally, the
1 The amended complaint names Eric Randall, former Chief of the PPD, in his official capacity, as
a defendant. However, the Court had substituted Kristin Brown for Randall as Acting Chief, and
will direct the clerk to substitute Eric Winstrom, current Chief, for Brown. Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d).
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undersigned finds the case should be dismissed without prejudice sua sponte as to
the two John Doe Defendants for failure to state a claim.
I. 	BACKGROUND
Lewis sues the Chief of Police in his official capacity, and PPD Officers
Massey, John Doe 1 K-9 Officer,2 and John Doe 2 in their individual and official
capacities. The amended complaint contains the following allegations.
On July 6, 2025, at approximately 10:30 p.m., Lewis was sitting in his legally
parked, inoperable vehicle near the intersection of B and Belmont Streets in
Pensacola. 	Officer Massey walked to Lewis’s vehicle and “seized him by way of
detention,” saying Lewis’s driver’s license was suspended. 	Lewis handed Massey
his valid driver’s license, insurance, and registration. Massey summoned additional
units and specifically requested a canine unit “to escalate the encounter.” 	Officer
Harris arrived with his canine, and John Doe 2 also arrived. Massey told the other
officers that Lewis was “the one that Mayo tasered last month.”
Lewis complied with Massey’s “unlawful” command to exit his vehicle.
Officer Harris conducted a dog sniff around Lewis’s vehicle, but Lewis asserts the
dog did not alert. 	“Despite the absence of probable cause,” Massey and Harris
conducted a warrantless search of the vehicle without consent or lawful justification.
2 In their motion, the Defendants identify the K-9 Officer as Officer Zachary Harris. Doc. 17 at 4.
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John Doe 2 patted down Lewis and searched his pockets “without consent, probable
cause, or lawful justification.”
The search did not yield any contraband or evidence of criminal activity. The
officers released Lewis without arresting him or issuing a citation. Lewis claims the
officers failed to activate their body-worn cameras during the encounter, violating
PPD Policy N-10.
Based on the foregoing, Lewis alleges seven claims: Counts I & II allege
Officer 	Massey 	violated 	Lewis’s 	Fourth 	and 	Fourteenth Amendment 	rights,
respectively; Counts III & IV allege John Doe 1 (Harris) and John Doe 2 violated
his Fourth Amendment rights by searching his vehicle and person; Count V alleges
a municipal liability claim against the City of Pensacola; Count VI alleges a
conspiracy claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985; and an unnumbered seventh claim alleges
the City violated Lewis’s rights under the Civil Rights Act of 1866. As relief, Lewis
seeks compensatory and punitive damages, as well as declaratory relief, injunctive
relief, and attorneys’ fees.
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). 	“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
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factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” 	Id. 	The Court must liberally
construe Lewis’s pro se allegations, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972),
but conclusory allegations and legal conclusions couched as factual allegations are
not entitled to a presumption of truth. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681; Papasan v. Allain, 478
U.S. 265, 286 (1986).
III. 	DISCUSSION
Although Lewis alleges in the amended complaint that the Defendant Officers
failed to activate their body cameras, this allegation is false because Defendants
submitted video footage from the body cameras worn by Officer Massey (Doc. 17-
1) and Officer Harris (Doc. 17-2) in support of their motion to dismiss. Because the
video footage is central to Lewis’s claims and Lewis does not dispute or challenge
its authenticity, the Court will consider it in resolving Defendants’ motion. 	See
Johnson v. City of Atlanta, 107 F.4th 1292, 1300-1301 (11th Cir. 2024).
As the Eleventh Circuit explained, “if a valid recording completely and clearly
contradicts a party’s testimony, that testimony is not credible, and the court should
disregard it.” 	Brooks v. Miller, 78 F.4th 1267, 1278 (11th Cir. 2023); see also
Morton v. Kirkwood, 707 F.3d 1276, 1284 (11th Cir. 2013) (“[W]here an accurate
video 	recording 	completely 	and 	clearly 	contradicts 	a party’s 	testimony, that
testimony becomes incredible.”).
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Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, this same legal standard applies to a Court’s
obligation to screen a complaint filed by a plaintiff proceeding in forma pauperis
and dismiss the complaint or any part of it that fails to state a claim on which relief
may be granted. 	See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Here, as discussed below, the video
footage blatantly contradicts several of Lewis’s factual allegations, and shows that
Lewis’s constitutional rights were not violated by either the named Defendants or
the Doe Defendants.
A. 	Lewis fails to state a claim under the Fourth or Fourteenth
Amendments against Massey as alleged in Counts I and II.
In Counts I and II, Lewis alleges Massey violated his Fourth Amendment
rights by detaining him and violated his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights
by “fabricating justification for detention and acting in retaliation.” 	However,
Lewis’s allegations and the video footage show no Fourth Amendment violation
occurred.
1. 	Count 1 – Illegal Detention
In Count I, Lewis argues that Massey unlawfully detained him “without
probable cause” when he walked up to Lewis’s vehicle, asked him for his license,
and then asked him to exit the vehicle. As an initial matter, the video shows that it
was not Massey who asked Lewis to exit the vehicle, but rather the K-9 Officer
Harris gave that command. See Doc. 17-2 at 1:09-1:10. Regardless, Massey’s traffic
stop of Lewis did not violate the Fourth Amendment.
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As Lewis acknowledges in his response, even “[a]bsent probable cause to
make an arrest, law enforcement officials may briefly detain a person as part of an
investigatory stop if they have a reasonable articulable suspicion based on objective
facts that the person has engaged in criminal activity.” 	United States v. Blackman,
66 F.3d 1572, 1576 (11th Cir. 1995); see Doc. 30 at 4 (arguing that “officers [had]
no reasonable suspicion that Lewis was committing an ongoing crime”). 	Courts
“examine ‘the totality of the circumstances’ to determine whether the police had ‘a
particularized and objective basis for suspecting legal wrongdoing.’” United States
v. Lindsey, 482 F.3d 1285, 1290 (11th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted).
In addition, because Massey asserts he has qualified immunity, he cannot be
liable for violating Lewis’s rights if he had “arguable” reasonable suspicion to
support the stop. See Jackson v. Sauls, 206 F.3d 1156, 1166 (11th Cir. 2000) (“When
an officer asserts qualified immunity, the issue is not whether reasonable suspicion
existed in fact, but whether the officer had ‘arguable’ reasonable suspicion to support
an investigatory stop.”). 	“[T]o determine whether the officers had arguable
reasonable suspicion,” courts “must take the allegations in the complaint as true and
analyze whether, under the facts as alleged, ‘a reasonable officer could have believed
that the [stop] comported with the Fourth Amendment.’” 	Meshal v. Comm’r, Ga.
Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 117 F.4th 1273, 1288 (11th Cir. 2024) (quoting Brent v. Ashley,
247 F.3d 1294, 1303 (11th Cir. 2001)).
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Here, considering the totality of the circumstances, Massey had arguable
reasonable suspicion to conduct a traffic stop. 	As depicted in the video, Lewis’s
vehicle is parked on the side of a public street, with Lewis seated in the front driver’s
seat, when Massey approaches the vehicle. 	After saying hello to Lewis, Massey
calls dispatch and asks dispatch to run the license plate because he recognized it
from a “prior call.” Doc. 17-1 at 0:19-0:21 (“We should have a prior call with this
[license plate], can you run [a check on the plate] please?”). 	While waiting for
dispatch to return the call, Massey speaks to Lewis through the closed car window.
Massey tells Lewis he is familiar with Lewis from an incident a month ago where
Lewis tried to run from law enforcement and was tased (id. at 1:04-1:11) and he is
“pretty sure” Lewis does not have a license.3 Id. at 0:38-0:42. 	Massey also asks
Lewis why he pulled over where he did, and later in the conversation asks Lewis
why he is driving if he does not have a license. 	Id. at 1:40-1:45; 4:05-4:11. About
a minute into the conversation, dispatch calls Massey back and tells him that the tag
inquiry returned “Preston Lewis, ID only,” indicating Lewis did not have a driver’s
license. Id. at 1:50-1:55.
The interaction between Lewis and Massey, as seen in the video, shows
Massey had arguable reasonable suspicion to ask Lewis for his driver’s license.
3 See State v. Lewis, Escambia County Case No. 2025 CF 2100. 	On June 3, 2025, Lewis was
arrested for, among other things, driving while his driving privileges were suspended. 	He was
found guilty of that offense in January 2026.
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Massey was familiar with Lewis, was aware Lewis’s license had been suspended,
and had just seen Lewis driving the vehicle. See United States v. Console, 2022 WL
2093050, at *2 (S.D. Fla. June 10, 2022) (finding officer’s testimony that he had
observed vehicle make two traffic infractions before stopping the vehicle as
sufficient probable cause to make a traffic stop). And, even if he had not just seen
Lewis driving, the fact that Lewis was behind the wheel of the vehicle is sufficient
to give Massey at least arguable reasonable suspicion that Lewis was driving the
vehicle before it was parked. 	See United States v. Francisco, 2008 WL 11340065,
at *13 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 18, 2008) (“Circumstantial evidence that a defendant was
driving can be sufficient to convict for driving on a suspended license, even where
no witness observes the defendant driving a vehicle.”).
After dispatch tells Massey that the tag belongs to “Lewis, ID only,” Massey
tells Lewis this is now a traffic stop because Lewis does not have a license.4 Doc.
17-1 at 2:34. Massey then asks Lewis for his registration and why he is driving if
he does not have a license. Lewis states he does have a license and has just handed
it to Massey. 	Id. at 4:10-4:14. As shown in the video, what Lewis handed Massey
4 Although Lewis does not specifically identify when he believes the “detention” occurred, the
undersigned finds no reasonable person would have believed he could not terminate the encounter
before Massey says, “This is a traffic stop now because you don’t have a license.” Doc. 17-1 at
2:34; see United States v. Ramirez, 476 F.3d 1231, 1238 (11th Cir. 2007) (“An initial detention
becomes a consensual encounter if “a reasonable person would feel free to decline the officers'
requests or otherwise terminate the encounter.”); see also Doc. 30 at 3 (Lewis states in his response,
“A lawful roadside stop begins when a vehicle is pulled over for investigation of a traffic
violation”).
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was a folded-up paper, which he claimed was a valid Ohio driver’s license. See id.
at 4:16-4:36. Massey then walks away and tells the other officers that he needs to
“verify that.” Id. at 5:03-5:04; see United States v. DeJesus, 2009 WL 3488690, at
*1 (M.D. Ala. Oct. 22, 2009) (finding officer had probable cause for initiating a
traffic stop “on the basis that he suspected the paper tag … was not a valid license
tag”). And, as K-9 Officer Harris reminded Massey,5 regardless of whether the Ohio
license was valid, it is Lewis’s driving status in Florida that matters. 	See Fla. Stat.
§ 322.30(1); see Doc. 17-1 at 6:07-6:10.
Thus, Massey had at least arguable reasonable suspicion to detain Lewis and
investigate whether he was driving unlawfully. See, e.g., Kansas v. Glover, 589 U.S.
376, 381 (2020) (finding deputy had reasonable suspicion to initiate a traffic stop
where deputy recognized the license plate on the driver’s truck and knew that the
registered owner of the vehicle had a revoked license); see also McKally v. Perez,
87 F. Supp. 3d 1310 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 6, 2015) (finding that police officer’s observation
of plaintiff driving on a suspended license was a factor in favor of arguable probable
cause for arrest). 	Lewis’s Fourth Amendment claim against Massey in Count I
should be dismissed.
5 Harris asks Massey if he has made a traffic stop and he says he has. Then Harris asks whether
Massey wants Harris to walk the dog around the vehicle. Massey tells Harris to wait because the
stop may be over if the Ohio license is valid. After Harris reminds Massey that Lewis’s driving
status in Florida will trump his Ohio license, even if valid, Massey tells Harris to go ahead with
the sniff. Doc. 17-1 at 5:57-6:16.
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2. 	Count II – Lewis fails to state a retaliation or Fourteenth Amendment
claim against Massey.
In Count II, Lewis claims Massey violated the “Fourteenth Amendment right
to due process of law” by “fabricating justification for detention and acting in
retaliation.” Doc. 6 at 12. As discussed above, however, Massey’s conduct was not
unlawful. Thus, Lewis was not denied due process.
Also, to the extent Lewis is attempting to state a claim for retaliation, such a
claim falls under the First rather than Fourteenth Amendment. 	To state a § 1983
First Amendment retaliation claim, a plaintiff generally must show: (1) he engaged
in constitutionally protected speech, such as his right to petition the government for
redress; (2) the defendant’s retaliatory conduct adversely affected that protected
speech; and (3) a causal connection exists between the defendant’s retaliatory
conduct and the adverse effect on the plaintiff’s protected speech. DeMartini v. Town
of Gulf Stream, 942 F.3d 1277, 1289 (11th Cir. 2019).
Here, the only factual allegation Lewis incorporates into Count II is: “Massey
said to the responding officers that’s the one that Mayo tasered last month.’ Doc. 6
at 8, ¶ 25. 	That statement, however, does not show that Lewis engaged in
constitutionally protected speech, that Massey’s conduct adversely affected Lewis’s
speech, or that a causal connection exists between Massey’s conduct and any
protected speech engaged in by Lewis.
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Also, in Lewis’s response, he alleges the retaliation was in response to
complaints Lewis filed against the PPD. 	However, he has failed to allege Massey
was aware of any of those complaints when he stopped Lewis. 	Thus, Lewis has
failed to state a claim for retaliation under the First Amendment. Count II, therefore,
should be dismissed.
B. 	Lewis fails to state a claim against the Chief of Police in his official
capacity.6
In Count V, Lewis seeks to hold the City liable for the officers’ conduct and
contends the City failed to discipline or train them properly. 	In the unnumbered
Count VII, Lewis alleges the City violated the Civil Rights Act of 1866. Both claims
fail as a matter of law.
1. 	Municipal Liability Claim
In Count V, Lewis alleges the City maintained customs, practices, and policies
of deliberate indifference toward constitutional rights. To hold the City liable for the
conduct of its employees under § 1983, “‘a plaintiff must show: (1) that his
constitutional rights were violated; (2) that the [entity] had a custom or policy that
constituted deliberate indifference to that constitutional right; and (3) that the policy
6 A suit against the Chief and the officers in their official capacity is a suit against the City. See
Busby v. City of Orlando, 931 F.2d 764, 776 (11th Cir. 1991) (“[W]hen an officer is sued under
Section 1983 in his or her official capacity, the suit is simply ‘another way of pleading an action
against an entity of which an officer is an agent.’ Such suits against municipal officers are therefore,
in actuality, suits directly against the city that the officer represents.”) (quoting Kentucky v.
Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985)).
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or custom caused the violation.’” Grochowski v. Clayton Cnty., 961 F.3d 1311, 1321
(11th Cir. 2020) (quoting McDowell v. Brown, 392 F.3d 1283, 1289 (11th Cir. 2004)).
As an initial matter, for the reasons discussed above and below, Lewis has not
established his rights were violated during the July 2025 encounter. Thus, there is
no underlying constitutional violation for which the City could be held liable. 	See
Knight ex rel. Kerr v. Miami-Dade Cnty., 856 F.3d 795, 821 (11th Cir. 2017) (“There
can be no policy-based liability or supervisory liability when there is no underlying
constitutional violation.”).
Regardless, Lewis cannot establish a custom or policy because he has failed
to identify a single incident, much less a series of incidents, involving constitutional
violations by the PPD or its officers. 	He has failed to identify any meritorious
complaint made against Harris, Massey, or another PPD officer, for committing the
violations Lewis contends occurred here. See Gold v. City of Miami, 151 F.3d 1346,
1351 (11th Cir.1998) (finding no § 1983 municipal liability where plaintiff failed to
present evidence of a single prior incident of false arrest for protected speech or
excessive force in handcuffing); Mercado v. City of Orlando, 407 F.3d 1152, 1162
(11th Cir.2005) (finding no § 1983 municipal liability where, during discovery,
plaintiff was given list of all cases involving excessive force, but could not show any
of them involved a factual situation substantially similar to the case at hand).
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Instead, what he offers are four incidents in which he 	claims 	he was
unlawfully detained. The fact that Lewis believes he was unlawfully detained does
not make it so. 	See Hesed-El v. McCord, 829 F. App’x 469, 472 (11th Cir. 2020)
(affirming 	dismissal 	of 	claims 	when 	plaintiff 	alleged 	“he 	was 	arrested 	and
prosecuted ‘without probable cause,’ but offered no plausible or non-conclusory
facts to show why probable cause was lacking”). There has been no determination
in any of the instances Lewis referenced that the officers violated his constitutional
rights. Although Lewis filed a § 1983 action regarding the March 2024 incident,
that matter remains pending. 	See Lewis v. Reeves, N.D. Fla. Case No. 3:25cv947-
MCR-HTC (awaiting response to motion to dismiss). 	Thus, there has not been a
determination that Lewis’s rights were violated in March 2024. Similarly, Lewis’s
rights could not have been violated during the June 2024 encounter because Lewis
admits he “exercised his right to terminate the conversation after a brief exchange,”
indicating the encounter was consensual. See Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434-
35 (1991) (“[E]ven 	when officers have no basis for suspecting a particular
individual, they may generally ask questions of that individual, ask to examine the
individual’s identification, and request consent to search his or her luggage—as long
as the police do not convey a message that compliance with their requests is
required.”) (internal citations omitted).
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Furthermore, four incidents occurring over a roughly 28-month period would
not be sufficient to establish a custom or policy. 	See Depew v. City of St. Marys,
Ga., 787 F.2d 1496, 1499 (11th Cir. 1986) (noting that “random acts or isolated
incidents are insufficient to establish a custom or policy”) (citation omitted); Prieto
v. Metro. Dade Cnty., 718 F. Supp. 934, 938-39 (S.D. Fla. 1989) (“[T]hese four
isolated incidents involving only Prieto fall well short of proving a persistent and
widespread practice sufficient to establish a policy or custom.”).7 Thus, Lewis’s
municipal liability claim in Count V should be dismissed.
2. 	The Civil Rights Act of 1866.
In the unnumbered seventh count, Lewis alleges the City deprived him of
“property rights” in violation of the “Civil Rights Act of 1866.” 	Doc. 6 at 16.
Section 1 of that statute has been codified in 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) and states “[a]ll
persons … shall have the same right … to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be
parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings
for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be
7 See also Ott v. City of Mobile, 169 F. Supp. 2d 1301, 1310–12 (S.D. Ala. Mar. 28, 2001) (holding
that evidence of four substantiated complaints in the five years preceding the incident was
insufficient to establish a question of fact regarding municipal liability under either a custom or
policy or failure to train theory); Mindler v. Clayton County, 831 F. Supp. 856, 862 (N.D. Ga. July
22, 1993) (finding that three prior incidents over a six-year period was insufficient as a matter of
law to create a question of fact as to municipal policy) (collecting cases); Gomez v. Metro Dade
County, 801 F. Supp. 674, 679–80 (S.D. Fla. July 24, 1992) (“This Court finds as a matter of law
that the allegations [of four previous incidents] offered by Gomez as support for her theory that a
de facto custom existed are nothing more than isolated incidents that clearly cannot be said to
establish or create a ‘custom’ or ‘widespread practice.’”).
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subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every
kind, and to no other.”
While Lewis claims he was deprived of the “equal benefit of all laws” due to
the 	Defendants’ 	deliberate 	indifference 	“to 	known 	systemic 	failures 	that
disproportionately impact minority communities,” these conclusory allegations are
insufficient to state a claim. In addition, as explained below, Lewis has not alleged
any facts suggesting he was subject to racial discrimination.
C. 	Counts III and IV – the illegal search claims against the John Doe
officers should be dismissed sua sponte under § 1915(e).
Although the John Doe officers have not been served because Lewis did not
identify them, as stated above, because Lewis is proceeding in forma pauperis, the
Court has an independent obligation to screen the complaint under § 1915(e). 	In
doing so, the undersigned finds that Lewis’s claims against these officers should be
dismissed for the same reason as the claims against Massey – the video footage
contradicts Lewis’s factual allegations and shows the officers had probable cause
and consent to search Lewis’s vehicle and his person, respectively.
1. 	Canine sniff search and search of Lewis’s vehicle by the K-9 Officer
(Harris)
In Count III, Lewis takes issue with being asked to exit his vehicle and
contends the K-9 Officer, Harris, conducted an unlawful “canine sniff” and search
of the vehicle. The undersigned disagrees.
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First, “[o]nce a vehicle is lawfully stopped, an officer may order the occupants
to exit the vehicle.” 	See United States v. Bishop, 940 F.3d 1242, 1248 (11th Cir.
2019). Thus, because Massey’s detention of Lewis was lawful, Harris had the right
to ask Lewis to exit the vehicle. See State v. Creller, 386 So. 3d 487, 495 (Fla. 2024)
(“We hold that binding Fourth Amendment precedent permits a K-9 officer arriving
midway through a lawful traffic stop to command the driver to exit the vehicle for
officer safety before conducting a lawful vehicle sweep.”).
Second, although Lewis alleges otherwise, the video evidence shows that
during the sniff, the canine provided an alert next to the driver’s side door of Lewis’s
vehicle. Doc. 17-2 at 2:35. That alert provided the officers with probable cause to
conduct a warrantless search of Lewis’s vehicle. See United States v. Nelson, 309 F.
App’x 373, 375 (11th Cir. 2009) (“In the case of dog sniffs, probable cause arises
when a drug-trained canine alerts to drugs.”) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
Accordingly, neither the order to exit the vehicle, nor the search of the vehicle,
violated the Fourth Amendment, and the unlawful search claims in Count III should
be dismissed.
2. 	Officer Doe 2’s search of Lewis’s pocket
In Count IV, Lewis claims John Doe 2 violated the Fourth Amendment by
patting him down and searching his pockets. However, “law enforcement officers
may search an individual without a warrant” as long as they obtain the individual’s
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consent. 	United States v. Blake, 888 F.2d 795, 798 (11th Cir. 1989) (quoting
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219-22 (1973)). 	When officers obtain
voluntary consent, they need neither reasonable suspicion nor probable cause to
conduct a search. Id.
While Lewis alleges he did not consent to a search of his person (Doc. 6 at
13), the body camera footage, once again, shows otherwise. After Lewis steps out
of his vehicle, Harris asks Lewis, “Hey Preston is it okay if this officer searches you
to make sure there’s nothing on you, Preston?” Doc. 17-2 at 1:29-1:32. Lewis can
be heard on video saying, “Yeah.” Id. at 1:33. Because Lewis consented to the pat-
down search, it did not violate the Fourth Amendment. 	See Schneckloth, 412 U.S.
at 219 (stating it is “well settled that one of the specifically established exceptions
to the requirements of both a warrant and probable cause is a search that is conducted
pursuant to consent”). 	Therefore, Count IV against Officer John Doe 2 should be
dismissed.
D. 	Lewis fails to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985 against the
Officers.
In Count VI, Lewis brings a conspiracy claim against all the officers under 42
U.S.C. § 1985. “A claim for conspiracy to interfere with civil rights under § 1985(3)
requires factual allegations showing: (1) the existence of a conspiracy; (2) for the
purpose of depriving a person of equal protection under the law; (3) an act in
furtherance of the conspiracy; and (4) a resultant injury or deprivation of a
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constitutional right.” 	Tobin v. Moody, 2025 WL 1213866, at *3 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 14,
2025) (collecting cases). 	The second element “requires proof that a conspirator’s
action was motivated by a ‘class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus.’” 	Id.
(quoting Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971)).
Here, Lewis alleges the Defendants “conspired to deprive [him], a African
American male, of the equal protection of the laws and of equal privileges and
immunities 	under 	the 	law 	by 	engaging 	in 	a 	coordinated, 	pretextual, 	and
discriminatory seizure and search, thereby violating 42 U.S.C. § 1985 and interfering
with [his] right to travel and engage in commerce.” Doc. 6 at 15-16.
This allegation of a conspiracy is entirely conclusory and insufficient to
support a claim under § 1985. See Guillaume v. United States, 2025 WL 2610053,
at *3 (11th Cir. Sept. 10, 2025) (holding plaintiff failed to state a § 1985 claim
because 	his 	allegations 	consisted 	of 	“conclusory 	statements 	that 	assume 	the
defendants had conspired with each other without providing facts that plausibly state
such a claim”). Furthermore, nothing in the amended complaint or the video footage
indicates the Defendants discriminated against Lewis based on his membership in a
protected class. 	See Griffin, 403 U.S. at 102 (explaining a § 1985 claim requires
“some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus
behind 	the 	conspirators’ 	action”). 	To 	the 	contrary, 	Lewis 	suggests 	Massey
“harassed” him due to his prior encounters with the PPD. But even if true, that does
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Case No. 3:25cv1264-MCR-HTC
not demonstrate the class-based discrimination needed to support a § 1985(3) claim.
See Fla. Carry, Inc. v. City of Miami Beach, 564 F. Supp. 3d 1213, 1237 (S.D. Fla.
Sept. 30, 2021) (awarding summary judgment to defendants because plaintiffs failed
show defendants’ conduct “was motivated by Defendants’ animus towards [them],
as opposed to a legitimate purpose like public safety”). 	Therefore, the § 1985(3)
conspiracy claim in Count VI should be dismissed.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Defendants’ motion to dismiss should be granted and
this action dismissed as to all defendants. Also, because Lewis has already had an
opportunity to amend his complaint, no further amendments should be allowed.
Accordingly, it is ORDERED:
1. 	The clerk shall substitute Eric Winstrom, Chief of Police, for Kristin
Brown, Acting Chief of Police, and shall also substitute Zachary Harris, for John
Doe K-9 Officer.
And it is further RECOMMENDED that:
1. 	Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 17) be GRANTED and Lewis’s
claims against the Chief of Police and Massey be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
2. 	Lewis’s 	claims 	against 	Harris 	and 	John 	Doe 	2 	be 	DISMISSED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE sua sponte under § 1915(e)(2)(B) for failure to state a
claim.
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Case No. 3:25cv1264-MCR-HTC
3. 	The clerk close the file.
At Pensacola, Florida, this 12 th day of March, 2026.
/s/ Hope Thai Cannon
HOPE THAI CANNON
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
NOTICE TO THE PARTIES
Objections to these proposed findings and recommendations must be filed within
fourteen (14) days of the date of the Report and Recommendation. Any different
deadline that may appear on the electronic docket is for the court’s internal use only
and does not control. An objecting party must serve a copy of its objections upon all
other parties. A party who fails to object to the magistrate judge’s findings or
recommendations contained in a report and recommendation waives the right to
challenge on appeal the district court’s order based on the unobjected-to factual and
legal conclusions. See 11th Cir. Rule 3-1; 28 U.S.C. § 636.
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