YASHAYAHU v. RICHARDSON et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TALLAHASSEE DIVISION
ZAKIYAH RUFFIN YASHAYAHU,
Plaintiff,
vs. 	Case No. 4:25cv471-AW-MAF
ASHENAFI N. RICHARDSON,
JENNIFER WINEGARDNER, et al.
Defendants.
_______________________________/
ORDER and REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, initiated this case on November 7, 2025.
However, because her initial in forma pauperis motion, ECF No. 2, and
complaint, ECF No. 1, were insufficient as filed, Plaintiff was afforded an
opportunity to file an amended complaint and a properly completed in
forma pauperis motion. ECF No. 6.
Between November 12 - 14, 2025, Plaintiff submitted 21 documents
for filing. ECF Nos. 7-27. Included among those submissions were two in
forma pauperis motions. ECF Nos. 8, 17. Those motions are not
consistent. In one supporting financial affidavit, Plaintiff said she was
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single, not employed, had zero monthly financial obligations, did not own
an automobile, had no money in the bank, and she reported social security
income of $967.00 per month. ECF No. 17. 	However, in the in forma
pauperis motion filed the day before, Plaintiff reported owning a 2012 Fiat
automobile, had monthly expenses of just over $300.00, 1 and receives
social security income of $967.00 per month. ECF No. 8 at 3-5. Notably,
Plaintiff attached another in forma pauperis motion to that first motion,
listing different persons as Defendants. 	Id. at 6-9. She again listed the
Fiat, included the same social security income of $967.00, but slightly
altered her monthly expenses. 	Id. 	Although not consistent, the financial
affidavits are sufficient to show that Plaintiff is indigent and lacks the
resources to pay the filing fee for this case. 	Her motion, ECF No. 17, is
granted.
Turning to the other submissions, Plaintiff filed a “notice of potential
evidence destruction.” ECF No. 11. Plaintiff requests the Court take
judicial notice of certain events - that certain sealed envelopes were left in
her residence - but following her eviction and seizure of the property,
1 Plaintiff’s handwriting is not fully legible, but it appears she spends $200.00 a
month on utilities, $100.00 a month on food and clothing, and pays just $13.00 a month
for rent. ECF No. 8 at 4. Those amounts are questionable.
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Plaintiff believes the materials may have been removed or destroyed. ECF
No. 11. The Court cannot take judicial notice of what Plaintiff may
“believe.” Pursuant to Rule 201 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, a “court
may judicially notice a fact that is not subject to reasonable dispute
because it: (1) is generally known within the trial court’s territorial
jurisdiction; or (2) can be accurately and readily determined from sources
whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b).
Plaintiff has requested notice be taken of a fact that is subject to dispute;
thus, no further action will be taken as to her notice, ECF No. 11.
Plaintiff has also filed numerous documents titled as an “emergency
notice.” ECF Nos. 12, 14, 15, 18, 24, and 26. In short, Plaintiff has notified
the Court of a November 6, 2025, “Final Judgment of Eviction” and the
ensuing November 12, 2025, execution of a “writ of possession” at her
(former) residence - 1001 Calloway Street, Tallahassee, Florida. ECF No.
12. She requests “immediate judicial review . . . .” 	Id. 	Her second
emergency notice contends the eviction is “void” because there was no trial
or hearing in case number 2025 CC 004565. 2 ECF No. 14. Similarly, her
2 Under Federal Rule of Evidence 201, a court “may judicially notice a fact that is
not subject to reasonable dispute because it ... can be accurately and readily
determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R.
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third such notice argues she is the victim of an unlawful eviction and she
requests the Court “issue an immediate order within 24 hours restoring her
possession and preventing Defendants from altering, selling, transferring,
or disposing of any property.” ECF No. 15. Because a notice is not a
motion, no action will be taken on that document.
Attached to that document is a copy of the Writ of Possession
entered in case number 2025 CC 004565 on November 6, 2025, in the
County Court of the Second Judicial Circuit in and for Leon County, Florida.
ECF No. 15-1 at 4. 3 Plaintiff also presented a copy of a certified letter
dated April 25, 2025, which terminated her lease agreement. 	Id. at 5-6.
Evid. 201(b)(2) (quoted in Kerruish v. Essex Holdings, Inc., 777 F. App’x 285, 293 (11th
Cir. 2019) (citing to Cunningham v. Dist. Att'y’s Office, 592 F.3d 1237, 1255 (11th Cir.
2010) (taking judicial notice of federal and state court records)). The Eleventh Circuit
has explained, “[j]udicial notice of court records is ordinarily confined to determining
what happened in the course of a proceeding—when a plaintiff filed a complaint, what
claims were argued and adjudicated, and so on.” Kerruish, 777 F. App’x at 293. Here,
judicial notice is taken of the docket for Plaintiff’s state court action. The docket reveals
notice was sent on October 24, 2025, of a hearing to be held on November 6, 2025.
Plaintiff received that notice because she filed a document entitled, “notice of void trial
court hearing notice,” on October 31, 2025, attempting to prevent that hearing on the
basis that Plaintiff filed an appeal. Docket # 75. The docket reveals that the First
District Court of Appeal entered on Order on November 12, 2025, noting that Plaintiff
Ruffin-Yashayahu had “filed over fifty pro se motions and notices in case numbers 25-
2618, 25-2619, and 25-2798.” That Court found that Plaintiff’s filings were “repetitious”
and “an abuse of the appellate process,” and denied “all pending motions and requests
for relief in said filings.” Docket # 107.
3 Plaintiff separately filed another document which conclusively shows that case
2025 CC 004564 was an action for eviction and damages. See ECF No.26-1 at 72.
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Further, Plaintiff filed another emergency notice, ECF No. 26, in which she
requested the Court undertake “immediate judicial review of the attached
evidence.” ECF No. 26 at 2. The Court has reviewed Plaintiff’s
submissions and makes note of the following documents.
First, Plaintiff has presented a copy of her lease agreement. ECF
No. 26-1 at 45. It was for a 1-year term between September 15, 2024, and
September 15, 2025, and Plaintiff receive a “notice of non-renewal of
lease” on September 2, 2025. ECF No. 26-1 at 56. Those documents
demonstrate that Plaintiff had no legal right to remain in the property after
September 15, 2025. 	Id.
Second, the lease agreement reveals Plaintiff was obligated to pay a
monthly rent of $950.00 per month. 	Id. 	Plaintiff submitted a false financial
affidavit as to the amount of her rent. 	See ECF No. 8 at 4. Considering
her rent was nearly equal the amount of money received each month for
social security income, Plaintiff’s affidavit raises serious concerns as to the
truth of Plaintiff’s income. Moreover, attachments to this notice also
contain statements revealing that Plaintiff is married. ECF No. 26-1 at 97-
98. Plaintiff’s affidavits state that she is single. 	See ECF No. 8, 17.
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In addition to those submissions, Plaintiff filed a first amended
complaint, ECF No. 7, a second amended complaint, ECF No. 9, and a
third amended complaint, ECF No. 16, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Because an amended complaint completely replaces a prior complaint,
only Plaintiff’s third amended complaint has been reviewed. Plaintiff
names two Defendants in the complaint, ECF No. 16 at 1 and 3, one of
which is a state court judge and the other is a private attorney. Although
Plaintiff’s handwriting is not clear, she indicates Defendant Winegardner 4
was seeking to sell property and “frauded [sic] the Court.” 	Id. at 4. The
house was “seized,” presumably as a result of the eviction. 	Id. at 5.
Plaintiff has not presented a legible basis for her claim against Defendant
Richardson. She then makes a conclusory assertion of a Fourteenth
Amendment violation. 	Id. at 6. As relief, Plaintiff seeks issuance of an
emergency temporary restraining order, possession of the property
reinstated, and one million dollars plus fees and costs. 	Id.
4 Plaintiff submitted an attachment which reveals Defendant Winegardner was
counsel for the landlord in the state court eviction proceeding, case number 2025 CC
004565, leading to issuance of a writ of possession. ECF No. 16-1 at 18, 25.
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First, Plaintiff’s complaint does not present a sufficient statement of
facts to support her conclusory allegations. The complaint fails to state a
claim against either Defendant.
Second, as Plaintiff was previously advised, see ECF No. 6, an
attorney in private practice is not a “state actor” and, thus, cannot be sued
under § 1983. To state a claim under § 1983, “a plaintiff must allege facts
showing that the defendant's act or omission, done under color of state
law, deprived [her] of a right, privilege, or immunity protected by the
Constitution or laws of the United States.” Emory v. Peeler, 756 F.2d 1547,
1554 (11th Cir. 1985). Plaintiff must demonstrate “both (1) that the
defendant deprived her of a right secured under the Constitution or federal
law and (2) that such a deprivation occurred under color of state law.”
Arrington v. Cobb County, 139 F.3d 865, 872 (11th Cir. 1998) (quoted in
Bingham v. Thomas, 654 F.3d 1171, 1175 (11th Cir. 2011)). Plaintiff has
not met either requirement. Plaintiff has not shown the deprivation of any
constitutional right. In addition, the fact that the Defendant is an attorney in
private practice who represented a client in state court is insufficient
grounds to label the Defendant as “a state actor.” 	See, e.g., Huls v.
Llabona, 2011 WL 3558194, at *2 (11th Cir. 2011) (finding that “a private
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attorney representing a client in a private civil matter, was not a
government employee and not otherwise acting at the behest of the state.”)
Because Plaintiff has not shown that Defendant Winegardner took action
under color of state law, the complaint is insufficient and fails to state a
claim as a matter of law.
Third, the complaint fails to state a claim as to Defendant Richardson
either. No legible facts reveal a basis for a claim against that Defendant.
More importantly, Defendant Richardson is a state court judge who
presided over Plaintiff’s landlord-tenant eviction proceeding. When a judge
acts within her judicial capacity, the judge is entitled to absolute immunity
from liability for damages under § 1983 unless the judge’s actions were in
the “clear absence of all jurisdiction.” Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349,
355-357, 98 S. Ct. 1099, 1104-05, 55 L. Ed. 2d 331 (1978). In Stump, the
Supreme Court set "forth a two-part test for determining when a judge is
entitled to immunity from money damages liability when sued under
Section 1983." Simmons v. Conger, 86 F.3d 1080, 1084 (11th Cir. 1996)
(citing Stump). Part one of the test asks whether the judge dealt with
Plaintiff “in a judicial capacity" and part two of the test looks at “whether the
judge acted in the ‘clear absence of all jurisdiction.’” Simmons, 86 F.3d at
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1084-15 (quoting Stump, 435 U.S. at 362, 98 S. Ct. at 1107). Plaintiff's
allegations make clear that Defendant Richardson was acting in her judicial
capacity in handling case number 2025 CC 004565, and she had
subject-matter jurisdiction to hear a landlord - tenant case. 	See FLA. STAT .
§ 34.011. Thus, Defendant Richardson dealt with Plaintiff purely in her
capacity as a judicial officer as Plaintiff did not present any factual
allegations which reveal she dealt with Plaintiff in a private capacity.
Therefore, Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant Richardson is barred by
absolute judicial immunity.
There is another reason that Plaintiff’s complaint is insufficient to
proceed - the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. “The Rooker–Feldman doctrine
places limits on the subject matter jurisdiction of federal district courts and
courts of appeal over certain matters related to previous state court
litigation.” Christophe v. Morris, 198 F. App’x 818, 824 (11th Cir. 2006)
(quoting Goodman ex rel. Goodman v. Sipos, 259 F.3d 1327, 1332 (11th
Cir. 2001)). That is because only the United States Supreme Court has
“authority to review the final judgments of state courts.” Christophe, 198 F.
App’x at 825. Thus, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars federal district
courts from reviewing final decisions of a state court. Rooker v. Fidelity
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Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 44 S. Ct. 149, 68 L. Ed. 362 (1923); District of
Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 103 S. Ct. 1303, 75
L. Ed. 2d 206 (1983). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine is jurisdictional,
precluding a loser in state court from challenging a judgement entered in
state court, “based on the losing party’s claim that the state judgment itself
violates the loser's federal rights.” Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997,
1005-06, 114 S. Ct. 2647, 2654, 129 L. Ed. 2d 775 (1994) (quoted in
Brown v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 611 F.3d 1324, 1330 (11th Cir.
2010)).
Here, Plaintiff initiated this case on November 7, 2025. ECF No. 1.
A “Final Judgment of Eviction” had already been entered in her state court
case (case number 2025 CC 004565) on November 6, 2025, and Plaintiff
attached a copy of the Judgment to her initial complaint. ECF No. 1-4 at 5-
6. A Writ of Possession was simultaneously entered, and the Sheriff was
ordered to remove Plaintiff (the Defendant in the state court case) from the
premises. 	Id. at 5. Review of the docket for the state court case reveals
the case was closed on November 6, 2025. Plaintiff’s claim in this case is
based on that eviction proceeding, which she contends violated her
Fourteenth Amendment rights. Therefore, the complaint is barred by
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Rooker-Feldman as Plaintiff cannot use this case as a means to invalidate
the final order and judgment entered in state court. Indeed, Plaintiff has
attempted to file an “emergency motion to stay eviction,” ECF No. 22, and
an emergency motion which requests she be restored to “possession of her
home located at 1001 Calloway St.” ECF No. 15 at 1. This Court lacks
jurisdiction to overturn the Final Judgment of Eviction. Having lost in state
court, Plaintiff’s avenue of relief is to pursue appeals through the state
court system and then to the United States Supreme Court. This Court
does not, however, have jurisdiction to sit as an appellate court and review
the orders entered by state court judge Nina Ashenafi Richardson.
Notably, Plaintiff has argued that she is not asking this Court to
overturn a final state court judgment in violation of the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine. ECF No. 19 at 1. She contends her request is for prospective
relief - restoring her “access to her residence . . . .” 	Id. at 3. However, that
is precisely what Plaintiff seeks as relief in this case. 	See ECF No. 16 at 6.
To allow Plaintiff to repossess the subject property would necessarily
require this Court to vacate the Final Order of Eviction.
Finally, Plaintiff contends there has been a “retaliatory use of
judicial power and court processes” which include having declared Plaintiff
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a “vexatious litigant” and “blocking her access to the courts.” ECF No. 19
at 1, 3. Plaintiff attached a copy of an Order entered in case number 2025
CC 004565 which deemed her to be “a vexatious litigant pursuant to
Section § 68.093, Florida Statutes.” ECF No. 1-4 at 1-4; see also ECF No.
16-1 at 16. To the degree Plaintiff could also be deemed to raise a
challenge that the state court order prohibited her from filing pro se
matters, see ECF No. 1-4 at 4, Plaintiff is advised that prohibiting a
vexatious litigant from filing documents pro se does not violate the Equal
Protection Clause. Smith v. Bondi, No. 4:14cv606-RH/CAS, 2015 WL
3843860, at *3 (N.D. Fla. June 22, 2015), aff’d sub nom. Smith v. Attorney
Gen., 637 F. App’x 574 (11th Cir. 2016) (finding “[t]here is a rational basis
for the imposition of additional burdens on vexatious litigants who often
impose burdens on both courts and defendants”). The Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeal “repeatedly has held that federal courts have the power to
manage their dockets and curb vexations litigation.” Woodroffe v. Attorney
Gen., No. 8:08-CV-1838- T-30EAJ, 2009 WL 320863, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Feb.
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9, 2009) (quoting May v. Maass, 2005 WL 2298296, *3 (11th Cir. Sept. 22,
2005)). 5
Likewise, a vexatious litigant order does not violate the First
Amendment either; that is because a “vexatious litigant does not have a
First Amendment right to abuse official processes with baseless filings in
order to harass someone to the point of distraction or capitulation.” Riccard
v. Prudential Ins. Co., 307 F.3d 1277, 1298 (11th Cir. 2002) (affirming
injunction which prohibited the filing of any action without first obtaining
leave of court did not violate the First Amendment).
“As noted by the United States Supreme Court, ‘[e]very paper
filed with the Clerk of this Court, no matter how repetitious or
frivolous, requires some portion of the institution's limited
resources. A part of the Court's responsibility is to see that
these resources are allocated in a way that promotes the
interests of justice.’” In re McDonald, 489 U.S. 180, 184, 109 S.
Ct. 993, 103 L. Ed. 2d 158 (1989) (quoted in May, 934 So.2d at
1187)). There is a compelling interest in providing justice to
litigants and enabling courts to work efficiently without the
burden on judicial resources of processing frivolous or
repetitious filings.
5 It appears that the proper citation for that case should be United States v.
Maass, No. 05-11632, 2005 WL 2298296, at *3 (11th Cir. Sept. 22, 2005) (holding that
district court’s “have the power to manage their dockets and curb vexatious litigation:
and dismissal under Rule 41 in exercising that power “was not an abuse of discretion”).
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Smith, 2015 WL 3843860, at *2. Thus, Plaintiff is advised that a court may
impose requirements upon litigants as deemed appropriate to prevent
abuse of the judicial process. Doing so is not, per se, unconstitutional.
Accordingly, despite the fact that this Court lacks authority to review
Plaintiff’s state court proceedings, a challenge to an order which requires a
litigant to be represented by counsel and prohibits continued pro se filings
would lack merit.
Because this Court lacks jurisdiction to review state court
proceedings, this case should be summarily dismissed and all pending
motions should be denied.
Accordingly, it is
ORDERED:
1. Plaintiff’s motion requesting leave to proceed in forma pauperis,
ECF No. 17, is GRANTED.
2. Plaintiff is not required to pay the filing fee for this action.
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RECOMMENDATION
In light of the foregoing, it is respectfully RECOMMENDED that this
case be DISMISSED for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine and that all pending motions be DENIED.
IN CHAMBERS at Tallahassee, Florida, on November 18, 2025.
S/ 	Martin A. Fitzpatrick
MARTIN A. FITZPATRICK
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
NOTICE TO THE PARTIES
Within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy of this
Report and Recommendation, a party may serve and file specific written
objections to these proposed findings and recommendations. 	Fed. R.
Civ. P. 72(b)(2). A copy of the objections shall be served upon all other
parties. 	A party may respond to another party’s objections within
fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Fed. R. Civ.
P. 72(b)(2). 	Any different deadline that may appear on the electronic
docket is for the Court’s internal use only and does not control. 	If a
party 	fails 	to 	object 	to 	the 	Magistrate 	Judge’s 	findings 	or
recommendations as to any particular claim or issue contained in this
Report and Recommendation, that party waives the right to challenge on
appeal the District Court’s order based on the unobjected-to factual and
legal conclusions. 	See 11th Cir. Rule 3-1; 28 U.S.C. § 636.
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