MORRILL v. DIXON

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
PANAMA CITY DIVISION
JEFFREY SHARDON MORRILL,
Petitioner,
v. 	Case No. 5:24-cv-269-MW-MJF
RICKY D. DIXON,
Respondent.
/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Jeffrey Morrill has filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus under
28 U.S.C. § 2254. Doc. 1. Respondent (“the State”) answered and provided
relevant portions of the state-court record. Doc. 16. Morrill’s deadline to
file a reply expired on October 6, 2025. Docs. 17, 20. The undersigned
concludes that no evidentiary hearing is required, and that Morrill is not
entitled to habeas relief.
B ACKGROUND
In Holmes County Circuit Court Case No. 2013-CF-309, Morrill was
convicted of trafficking in 200 grams or more of methamphetamine or any
mixture 	containing 	methamphetamine, 	in 	violation 	of 	Fla. 	Stat. 	§
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893.135(1)(f)(1); see also Fla. Stat. § 893.135(6) (defining “mixture”). Doc.
16-9, Ex. I. Morrill was sentenced to 30 years of imprisonment. Id.
The Florida First District Court of Appeal (“First DCA”) affirmed
in a written opinion. Morrill v. State, 184 So. 3d 541 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015)
(copy at Doc. 16-13, Ex. M). The First DCA denied Morrill’s motion for
rehearing on February 15, 2016. Doc. 16-14, Ex. N. Morrill did not seek
further direct review. Doc. 1 at 3.
On May 13, 2016, Morrill filed a pro se motion to correct illegal
sentence under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a). Doc. 16-16,
Ex. P. The state circuit court denied the motion. Doc. 16-17, Ex. Q. The
First DCA per curiam affirmed without opinion. Morrill v. State, 202 So.
3d 411 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016) (Table) (copy at Doc. 16-21, Ex. U). The
mandate issued November 15, 2016. Doc. 16-21, Ex. U.
On October 20, 2016, Morrill filed a pro se motion for postconviction
relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. Doc. 16-23, Ex. W.
Morrill filed a pro se amended motion, followed by a counseled second
amended motion. Doc. 16-25, Ex. Y; Doc. 16-27, Ex. AA. The state circuit
court denied relief. Doc. 16-30, Ex. DD. The First DCA per curiam
affirmed without opinion. Morrill v. State, 396 So. 3d 679 (Fla. 1st DCA
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2024) 	(Table) 	(copy 	at 	Doc. 	16-34, 	Ex. 	HH). 	The 	mandate 	issued
December 3, 2024. Doc. 16-34, Ex. HH.
On December 23, 2016, Morrill filed a pro se petition for writ of
habeas 	corpus 	in 	the 	First 	DCA 	alleging 	ineffective 	assistance 	of
appellate counsel, which he later amended. Doc. 16-35, Ex. II (Pet.); Doc.
16-36, Ex. JJ (Am. Pet.). On February 6, 2018, the First DCA summarily
denied the petition without opinion. Morrill v. State, 240 So. 3d 639 (Fla.
1st DCA 2018) (per curiam) (copy at Doc. 16-38, Ex. LL).
Morrill filed his pro se federal habeas petition on November 22,
2024. Doc. 1. Morrill raises three grounds for relief: (1) “Cruel & unusual
punishment being sentenced to 30 years for having an unusable mixture
containing meth residue”; (2) “Illegal search & s[ei]zure”; and (3) “Not
competent to stand trial”. The State asserts that Morrill’s first and third
claims are procedurally defaulted, and that review of the second claim is
barred by Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976). Doc. 16.
D ISCUSSION
Ground One 	“Cruel 	& 	unusual 	punishment 	being
sentenced to 30 years for having an unusable
mixture containing Meth residue” Doc. 1 at 9.
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Morrill alleges that his sentence violates the Eighth Amendment
because 	it 	is 	disproportionate 	to 	his 	offense. 	Morrill 	alleges 	these
supporting facts:
3 liquids, Coleman camp fuel, were presented to the jury
as Meth. The amount of Meth or fuel was not separately
determined. 	The 	liquid 	was 	Coleman 	camp 	fuel 	& 	only
contained Meth residue. This also proves actual innocence.
Doc. 1 at 9. The State asserts this claim is procedurally defaulted. Doc.
16 at 20–29.
A. 	The Federal Habeas Exhaustion Requirement
“To respect our system of dual sovereignty, the availability of
habeas relief is narrowly circumscribed.” Shinn v. Ramirez, 596 U.S. 366,
375 (2022) (citations omitted). One such constraint is the exhaustion
requirement and corollary principle of procedural default. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(b); Shinn, 596 U.S. at 375-79.
Section 2254 “requires state prisoners to ‘exhaust the remedies
available in the courts of the State’ before seeking federal habeas relief.”
Shinn, 	596 	U.S. 	at 	377 	(alteration 	adopted) 	(quoting 	28 	U.S.C. 	§
2254(b)(1)(A)). “To satisfy the exhaustion requirement, the petitioner
must have fairly presented the substance of his federal claim” to the
state’s highest court, either on direct appeal or on collateral review.
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Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 277-78 (1971); Castille v. Peoples, 489
U.S. 346, 351 (1989).
A petitioner “fairly” presents the substance of his federal claim to
the state courts when he describes the claim “such that the reasonable
reader would understand each claim’s particular legal basis and specific
factual foundation.” Green v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 28 F.4th 1089, 1135
(11th Cir. 2022) (quoting Kelley v. Sec’y Dep’t of Corr., 377 F.3d 1317,
1344–45 (11th Cir. 2004)).
When a petitioner fails to exhaust his federal claim and the state
court 	remedy 	no 	longer 	is 	available, 	that 	failure 	to 	exhaust 	is 	a
procedural default. O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 839–40 (1999);
see also Bailey v. Nagle, 172 F.3d 1299, 1303 (11th Cir. 1999) (when a
petitioner fails to properly exhaust a federal claim in state court, and it
is obvious that the unexhausted claim now would be procedurally barred
under state law, the claim is procedurally defaulted).
Together, exhaustion and procedural default promote
federal-state 	comity. 	Exhaustion 	affords 	States an 	initial
opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged violations of
prisoners’ 	federal 	rights, 	and 	procedural 	default 	protects
against the significant harm to the States that results from
the failure of federal courts to respect state procedural rules.
Ultimately, 	it would be 	unseemly in 	our dual system of
government for a federal district court to upset a state court
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conviction without giving an opportunity to the state courts to
correct a constitutional violation, and to do so consistent with
their own procedures.
Shinn, 596 U.S. at 378–79 (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted, alteration adopted).
A 	petitioner 	seeking 	to 	overcome 	a 	procedural 	default 	must
“demonstrate cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result of the
alleged violation of federal law, or demonstrate that failure to consider
the claim[ ] will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Coleman
v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991); Lucas v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 682
F.3d 1342, 1352–53 (11th Cir. 2012).
A petitioner establishes “cause” by showing that an objective factor
external to the defense impeded an effort to properly raise the claim in
the state court. Henderson v. Campbell, 353 F.3d 880, 892 (11th Cir.
2003). “[A]ttorney error is an objective external factor providing cause for
excusing a procedural default only if that error amounted to a deprivation
of the constitutional right to counsel.” Davila v. Davis, 582 U.S. 521, 528,
(2017). “Attorney error that does not violate the Constitution, however,
is attributed to the prisoner under ‘well-settled principles of agency law.’”
Id. at 528 (quoting Coleman, 501 U.S. at 754).
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A 	petitioner 	establishes 	“prejudice” 	by 	showing 	at 	least 	a
reasonable probability that the proceeding’s result would have been
different. Id. at 892.
To satisfy the miscarriage of justice exception, the petitioner must
show 	that 	“a 	constitutional 	violation 	has 	probably 	resulted 	in 	the
conviction of one who is actually innocent.” Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298,
327 (1995). “To establish the requisite probability, the petitioner must
show that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have
convicted him.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327. The Schlup standard is very
difficult to meet:
a substantial claim that constitutional error has caused the
conviction of an innocent person is extremely rare. To be
credible, such a claim requires [a] petitioner to support his
allegations 	of 	constitutional 	error 	with 	new 	reliable
evidence—whether 	it 	be 	exculpatory 	scientific 	evidence,
trustworthy 	eyewitness 	accounts, 	or 	critical 	physical
evidence—that that was not presented at trial.
Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327.
B. 	Morrill’s Efforts to Exhaust State Remedies
Although Morrill alleges that he raised Ground One in both his
direct appeal and in his Rule 3.850 proceeding, Doc. 1 at 9, the record
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establishes that Morrill did not raise this claim in his direct appeal. See
Doc. 16-11, Ex. K.
Morrill did raise this claim in his original and first amended Rule
3.850 motions filed pro se. See Doc. 16-23, Ex. W (Mot.); Doc. 16-25, Ex.
Y (Am. Mot.). The state circuit court struck both motions as facially
insufficient but with leave to amend. Doc. 16-24, Ex. X; Doc. 16-26, Ex. Z.
In striking the second motion, the state court warned Morrill: “Any
claims previously raised and not included in the second amended Rule
3.850 motion shall be deemed abandoned and will not be considered by
the Court.” Doc. 16-25, Ex. Z
Morrill’s second amended Rule 3.850 motion—filed by Morrill’s
postconviction counsel—did not raise an Eighth-Amendment challenge to
Morrill’s sentence. Doc. 18-15, Ex. AA. Rather, the second amended
motion raised only claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Id.
Morrill’s Eighth-Amendment challenge to his sentence is not the
same 	as 	a 	Sixth-Amendment 	ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel
claim, even if one or more of the IAC claims is based on counsel’s failure
to raise the Eighth-Amendment claim. The claims are separate and
distinct—legally and factually—for purposes of satisfying the federal
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habeas 	exhaustion 	requirement. 	See 	Green, 	28 	F.4th 	at 	1135–37
(unexhausted Brady claim was not the same claim as an ineffective-
assistance-of-counsel claim based on counsel’s failure to raise the Brady
violation; the two claims were separate and distinct for purposes of the
federal habeas exhaustion requirement); Pietri v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 641
F.3d 1276, 1289 (11th Cir. 2011) (“Pietri’s assertion of a substantive
judicial bias claim in state post-conviction proceedings is not sufficient to
preserve his claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for failing
to raise the substantive claim. These claims are separate and distinct.”);
Lefroy v. Sec’y for Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 421 F.3d 1237, 1260 n. 24 (11th Cir.
2005); Walker v. Jones, 10 F.3d 1569, 1572 (11th Cir. 1994).
Thus, Morrill failed to exhaust his Eighth-Amendment claim in the
state courts. Morrill now is procedurally barred from presenting the
claim to the state courts, so Ground One is procedurally defaulted. See
Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850(b), (c), (h).1
1 The undersigned did not overlook Morrill’s “Motion to Correct Sentence
Pursuant to Rule 3.800(a), Fla. R. Crim. P.” filed on May 13, 2016. Doc.
16-16, Ex. P. That filing, however, was based purely on state law and
interpretation of Florida’s criminal statutes. Morrill did not argue that
his sentence violated the Eighth Amendment.
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Morrill has not responded to the State’s procedural default defense
and has not made any of the requisite showings to excuse his procedural
default. 	Morrill’s 	procedural 	default 	bars 	federal 	habeas 	review 	of
Ground One.
Ground Two 	“Illegal search & seizure” Doc. 1 at 11.
Morrill claims that his conviction was obtained with evidence (a
bottle containing a bi-layered liquid) seized during an “illegal search” of
his property. Doc. 1 at 11. Morrill claims that he exhausted this claim by
raising it in his direct appeal and Rule 3.850 proceeding. Id.
The State asserts that under the Stone v. Powell doctrine, the
District Court is precluded from reviewing the Fourth-Amendment claim
because the State provided Morrill an opportunity for full and fair
litigation of the claim in state court. Doc. 16 at 29–33.
A. 	The Stone v. Powell Doctrine
“[W]here the State has provided an opportunity for full and fair
litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim, a state prisoner may not be
granted federal habeas corpus relief on the ground that evidence obtained
in an unconstitutional search or seizure was introduced at his trial.”
Stone, 428 U.S. at 494 (footnotes omitted). The reason is that, in the
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context 	of 	collateral 	review 	of 	Fourth-Amendment 	claims, 	“the
contribution of the exclusionary rule, if any, to the effectuation of the
Fourth Amendment is minimal, and the substantial societal costs of
application of the rule persist with special force.” Stone, 428 U.S. at 494-
95 (footnote omitted). “For a claim to be fully and fairly considered by the
state courts, where there are facts in dispute, full and fair consideration
requires 	consideration 	by 	the 	fact-finding 	court, 	and 	at 	least 	the
availability of meaningful appellate review by a higher state court.”
Mincey v. Head, 206 F.3d 1106, 1126 (11th Cir. 2000) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted).
B. 	Application of 	the 	Stone 	v. 	Powell 	Doctrine 	to 	Morrill’s
Fourth-Amendment Claim
Morrill does not assert that he was not given a full and fair hearing
on the merits of his Fourth-Amendment claim in state court, Doc. 1, nor
can he truthfully make such a claim. The record establishes that Morrill
raised this Fourth-Amendment claim in a pre-trial motion to suppress.
Doc. 16-4, Ex. D. The trial judge conducted an evidentiary hearing during
which he heard testimony, considered documentary evidence (including
photographs), and considered the parties’ arguments. Doc. 16-5, Ex. E.
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At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court denied Morrill’s
motion, making explicit findings on matters essential to the Fourth
Amendment issue. Id. Morrill obtained further review of the issue on
direct appeal. Doc. 16-11, Ex. K at 14–18 (Initial Br.); Doc. 16-12, Ex. L
(State’s Answer Br.). The First DCA affirmed. Doc. 16-13, Ex. M.
Because Morrill had a full and fair opportunity to litigate his
Fourth-Amendment claim in the state courts, Stone v. Powell bars federal
habeas review of the claim. Thus, Ground Two must be denied.
Ground Three 	“Not competent to stand trial” Doc. 1 at 13.
Morrill claims he was “[n]ot competent to stand trial” because he
“had attempted suicide the day before trial. [R]ight arm was bandaged at
trial.” Doc. 1 at 13. The undersigned construes this claim as a substantive
competency claim alleging that Morrill’s due process rights were violated
because he was incompetent when he stood trial. See James v. Singletary,
957 F.2d 1562, 1569–72 (11th Cir. 1992) (distinguishing procedural
competency claims from substantive competency claims).
The State asserts this claim is procedurally defaulted. Doc. 16 at
33–41.
A. 	Morrill’s 	Substantive 	Competency 	Claim 	Is 	Not
Procedurally Defaulted
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Morrill asserts that he presented this claim to the state courts in
both his direct appeal and in his Rule 3.850 proceeding, Doc. 1 at 13. The
record establishes, however, that Morrill did not raise this claim in his
direct appeal or in his counseled second amended Rule 3.850 motion. See
Doc. 16-11, Ex. K; Doc. 18-15, Ex. AA.
Nevertheless, 	the 	Eleventh 	Circuit 	has 	held 	that 	substantive
competency claims cannot be procedurally defaulted. Raheem v. GDCP
Warden, 995 F.3d 895, 928, 929 (11th Cir. 2021) (although procedural
competency 	claims 	can 	be 	procedurally 	defaulted, 	“a 	substantive
incompetency claim . . . cannot be procedurally defaulted”); Lawrence v.
Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 700 F.3d 464, 481 (11th Cir. 2012) (adhering to
“both pre–and post-AEDPA precedent . . . holding that substantive
competency claims generally cannot be procedurally defaulted”); Wright
v. Sec'y, Dep’t of Corr., 278 F.3d 1245, 1258-59 (11th Cir. 2002) (“The
district 	court’s 	ruling 	that 	Wright 	had 	procedurally 	defaulted 	his
substantive due process mental competency claim is contrary to the law
of this circuit that such claims generally cannot be defaulted.”).
B. 	Morrill Is Not Entitled to Habeas Relief
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No state court directly ruled on Morrill’s substantive competency
claim.2 Thus, the claim is reviewed de novo.
1. 	The Federal Due Process Competency Standard
A defendant is incompetent to stand trial if he lacks “sufficient
present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of
rational understanding and a rational as well as factual understanding
of the proceedings against him.” Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 396
(1993) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Dusky v. United States,
362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960)). “Not every manifestation of mental illness
demonstrates incompetence to stand trial; rather, the evidence must
indicate a present inability to assist counsel or understand the charges.”
Medina v. Singletary, 59 F.3d 1095, 1107 (11th Cir. 1995) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted, alteration adopted).
2 	The state court in Morrill’s Rule 3.850 proceeding did observe, in
denying Morrill’s ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim based on
counsel’s alleged failure to investigate Morrill’s competence to stand
trial, 	that 	Morrill’s 	suicide 	attempts 	before 	and 	after 	trial 	did not
“indicate he would be incompetent to proceed under Dusky.” Doc. 16-30,
Ex. DD.
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“[A] 	petitioner 	raising 	a 	substantive 	claim 	of 	incompetency 	is
entitled to no presumption of incompetency and must demonstrate his or
her incompetency by a preponderance of the evidence.” Id. at 1106.
2. 	Morrill Fails to Demonstrate He Was Incompetent
Morrill’s sole basis for claiming incompetency is that he attempted
suicide the day before trial. Doc. 1 at 13. This unadorned allegation falls
far short of showing that Morrill lacked the capacity to understand the
proceedings and to assist counsel. See Dusky, 362 U.S. 402; see also, e.g.,
United States v. Collins, 834 F. App’x 537, 541 (11th Cir. 2020) (“[A]
defendant is not incompetent based solely on suicidal ideations or mental
illness or disability. Because at their core, competency determinations
have ‘a modest aim: they seek to ensure that the defendant has the
capacity to understand the proceedings and to assist counsel.’” (quoting
Godinez, 509 U.S. at 402) (first alteration added, subsequent alterations
adopted)).
The undersigned has reviewed the record of Morrill’s trial and
sentencing. 	Morrill 	testified 	at 	both 	proceedings. 	Nothing 	during
Morrill’s trial testimony or statements during sentencing indicates that
Morrill lacked the ability to assist counsel or understand the charges and
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proceedings against him. See Doc. 16-6, Ex. F (Trial Tr.); Doc. 16-8, Ex.
H (Sentencing Tr.); see also Doc. 16-30, Ex. DD at 5–6 	(state court’s
detailed description of Morrill’s statements at trial and sentencing that
indicate Morrill was competent to stand trial).
Because Morrill fails to show that he was incompetent to stand
trial, he is not entitled to habeas relief on his substantive competency
claim.
A CERTIFICATE OF A PPEALABILITY I S N OT WARRANTED
Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United
States District Courts provides: “[t]he district court must issue or deny a
certificate of appealability when it enters a final order adverse to the
applicant.” If a certificate is issued, “the court must state the specific
issue 	or 	issues 	that 	satisfy 	the 	showing 	required 	by 	28 	U.S.C. 	§
2253(c)(2).” 	28 U.S.C. § 2254 Rule 11(a). A timely notice of appeal must
still be filed, even if the court issues a certificate of appealability. See 28
U.S.C. § 2254 Rule 11(b).
“[Section] 2253(c) permits the issuance of a COA only where a
petitioner 	has 	made 	a 	‘substantial 	showing 	of 	the 	denial 	of 	a
constitutional right.’” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003)
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(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)). “At the COA stage, the only question is
whether the applicant has shown that jurists of reason could disagree
with the district court’s resolution of his constitutional claims or that
jurists could conclude the issues presented are adequate to deserve
encouragement to proceed further.” Buck v. Davis, 580 U.S. 100, 115
(2017). “When the district court denies a habeas petition on procedural
grounds without reaching the prisoner’s underlying constitutional claim,
a COA should issue when the prisoner shows, at least, that jurists of
reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim
of the denial of a constitutional right and that jurists of reason would find
it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural
ruling.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000) (emphasis added).
Here, Petitioner has not made the requisite demonstration. Accordingly,
the court should deny a certificate of appealability in its final order.
“Before entering the final order, the court may direct the parties to
submit arguments on whether a certificate should issue.” 	28 U.S.C. §
2254 Rule 11(a). If there is an objection to this recommendation, the
relevant party shall file such an objection with the District Court.
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CONCLUSION
For 	the 	reasons 	set 	forth 	above, 	the 	undersigned 	respectfully
RECOMMENDS that the District Court:
1. 	DENY the petition for writ of habeas corpus, Doc. 1.
2. 	DENY a certificate of appealability.
3. 	DIRECT the clerk of court to close this case file.
At Panama City, Florida, this 30th day of October 2025.
/s/ Michael J. Frank
Michael J. Frank
United States Magistrate Judge
NOTICE TO THE PARTIES
The District Court referred this case to a magistrate
judge to make recommendations regarding dispositive
matters. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), (C). Objections to
these proposed findings and recommendations must be
filed within fourteen days of the date of the report and
recommendation. 	Any 	different 	deadline 	that 	may
appear 	on 	the 	electronic 	docket 	is 	for 	the 	court’s
internal use only. A party must serve a copy of any
objections on all other parties. A party who fails to
object to this report and recommendation waives the
right to challenge on appeal the District Court’s order
based on unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions.
See 11th Cir. R. 3-1; 28 U.S.C. § 636.
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