CHARLESTON v. DIXON

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
PANAMA CITY DIVISION
DERRICK CHARLESTON,
Plaintiff,
v. 	Case No. 5:25-cv-332-TKW-MJF
RICKY D. DIXON,
Defendant.
/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff 	Derrick 	Charleston, 	a 	prisoner 	proceeding 	pro 	se,
commenced 	this 	civil 	action 	against 	the 	Secretary 	of 	the 	Florida
Department of Corrections by filing a complaint on the form approved for
use by prisoners in actions under “28 U.S.C. § 1331 or § 1346 or 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983.” Doc. 1. Because Charleston fails to state a plausible claim for
relief under section 1983, the District Court should dismiss this civil
action.
BACKGROUND
In 	Gadsden 	County 	case 	number 	2000-128-CFA, 	the 	State 	of
Florida charged Charleston with sexual battery of a child under the age
of twelve. See Charleston v. McDonough, No. 4:07-cv-260 (N.D. Fla. of
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October 8, 2009) (Report and Recommendation, ECF Doc. 45 at 1–2). A
jury found Charleston guilty, and the trial court sentenced Charleston
imprisonment for life. Id. The court also adjudicated Charleston a sexual
predator. Id.; see Doc. 1 at 5.
Although 	Charleston 	utilized 	the 	form 	approved 	for 	use 	by
prisoners in civil rights actions brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
Charleston 	attacks 	his 	conviction 	and 	his 	designation 	as 	a 	sexual
predator. Doc. 1 at 5.
D ISCUSSION
A. 	Charleston Does Not State a Claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
The 	District 	Court 	is required to 	review Plaintiff’s 	complaint,
identify cognizable claims and dismiss the complaint, or any portion
thereof, if the complaint “(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from
a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a)–(b).
“An inmate convicted and sentenced under state law may seek
federal relief under two primary avenues: ‘a petition for habeas corpus,
28 U.S.C. § 2254, and a complaint under” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Hutcherson
v. Riley, 468 F.3d 750, 754 (11th Cir. 2006) (quoting Hill v. McDonough,
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547 U.S. 573, 579 (2006)). A challenge to the “validity of any confinement
or to the particulars affecting its duration are the province of habeas
corpus.” Hill, 547 U.S. at 579.
Although he utilized the court-approved form for civil actions under
42 U.S.C. § 1983, Charleston seeks to challenge his conviction—and
sentence—in Gadsden County case number 2000-128-CFA. Specifically,
Charleston asserts that he was “14 at the time” of the battery, and,
therefore, could not be charged with a sexual battery. Doc. 1 at 5. Because
Charleston seeks to challenge the conviction and sentence—and not the
conditions of his confinement—his exclusive remedy is a habeas corpus
petition. Charleston, therefore, fails to state a claim under § 1983, and
the District Court should dismiss this civil action.
B. 	The District Court Should Deny Leave to Amend
Although a district court must liberally construe pro se filings and
“freely give leave to amend when justice so requires, it may deny leave
sua sponte . . . if amendment would be futile.” 	L.S. ex rel. Hernandez v.
Peterson, 982 F.3d 1323, 1332 (11th Cir. 2020). “Leave to amend would
be futile if an amended complaint would still fail at the motion-to-dismiss
or summary-judgment stage.” Id.
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Allowing Charleston to amend his complaint so that it can be
brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 would be futile insofar as the district
court would be required to dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction.
“Before a second or successive [habeas corpus] application . . . is
filed in the district court, the applicant shall move in the appropriate
court of appeals for an order authorizing the district court to consider the
application.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A); see also Rule 9, Rules Governing
Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts (2018) (“Before
presenting a second or successive petition, the petitioner must obtain an
order from the appropriate court of appeals authorizing the district court
to consider the petition as required by 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3) and (4).”).
A district court lacks jurisdiction to consider a “second or successive”
habeas 	corpus 	petition 	that 	was 	not 	previously 	authorized 	by 	an
appellate court. Burton v. Stewart, 549 U.S. 147, 152, 157 (2007) (district
court lacked jurisdiction to entertain petitioner’s second habeas corpus
petition because petitioner failed to obtain order from court of appeals
authorizing it); Fugate v. Dep’t of Corr., 301 F.3d 1287, 1288 (11th Cir.
2002) (same).
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The undersigned takes judicial notice that Charleston has filed in
the Northern District of Florida several habeas corpus petitions pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. These include Case No. 4:07-cv-260-SPM, in which
Charleston challenged his 2000 conviction and sentence. Specifically, in
Case No. 4:07-cv-260-SPM, Charleston challenged the conviction in 2000-
128-CFA, and the district court denied the petition with prejudice.
Charleston 	v. 	McDonough, 	No. 	4:07-cv-260 (N.D. 	Fla. 	Oct. 	8, 	2009)
(Order, ECF Doc. 48). In light of this dismissal, Charleston’s current
complaint—if it were construed as a § 2254 petition—would constitute a
“second or successive” habeas corpus application. 	See Candelario v.
Warden, 592 F. App'x 784, 785 n.1 (11th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (“[A]
second petition is successive if the first was denied or dismissed with
prejudice”) (internal citations omitted); Jordan v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr.,
485 F.3d 1351, 1353 (11th Cir. 2007).
Charleston does not allege or show that he obtained the Eleventh
Circuit’s authorization to file a second or successive petition. Charleston’s
failure to receive the requisite authorization before filing the instant civil
action operates as a jurisdictional bar that requires dismissal of this case.
See Burton, 549 U.S. at 152, 157; Fugate, 301 F.3d at 1288. 	Thus, it
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would 	be 	futile 	to 	afford 	Charleston 	an 	opportunity 	to 	amend 	his
complaint to file an action under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
C ONCLUSION
For 	the 	reasons 	set 	forth 	above, 	the 	undersigned 	respectfully
RECOMMENDS that the District Court:
1. 	DISMISS this civil action under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) for
failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted.
2. 	DIRECT the clerk of the court to close the case.
At Pensacola, Florida on December 1, 2025
/s/ Michael J. Frank
Michael J. Frank
United States Magistrate Judge
NOTICE TO THE PARTIES
The District Court referred this case to a magistrate
judge 	to 	address 	preliminary 	matters 	and to 	make
recommendations regarding dispositive matters. See
N.D. Fla. Loc. R. 72.2; see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b); Fed R.
Civ. P. 72(b). Objections to these proposed findings and
recommendations must be filed within fourteen days of
the 	date 	of 	the 	report 	and 	recommendation. 	Any
different deadline that may appear on the electronic
docket is for the court’s internal use only and does not
control. An objecting party must serve a copy of its
objections upon all other parties. A party who fails to
object 	to 	the 	magistrate 	judge’s 	findings 	or
recommendations 	contained 	in 	a 	report 	and
recommendation 	waives 	the 	right 	to 	challenge 	on
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appeal the District Court’s order based on unobjected-
to factual and legal conclusions. See 11th Cir. Rule 3-1;
28 U.S.C. § 636. The parties also are advised that if they
dispute the accuracy of any facts taken from judicially-
noticed documents, or if they otherwise wish to be
heard on the propriety of the court taking judicial
notice of those facts, they must raise this issue in an
objection to this report and recommendation.
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