Jackson v. Global Lending Services, LLC

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
CASE NO. 25-CV-62117-DAMIAN/STRAUSS
JAMAL JACKSON,
Plaintiff,
v.
GLOBAL LENDING SERVICES, LLC,
Defendant.
/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
THIS MATTER came before the Court upon Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s
Amended Complaint and Compel Arbitration [DE 18] (the “Motion”), which has been referred to
me to take all necessary and proper action as required by law [DE 29]. I have carefully reviewed
and considered the Motion, the Response [DE 19], the Reply [DE 22], and all other pertinent
portions of the record.1 For the reasons discussed below, I respectfully RECOMMEND that the
Motion 	[DE 18] 	be 	GRANTED 	IN 	PART 	and 	that 	this 	case 	be 	STAYED 	pending
binding arbitration.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed his Amended Complaint on November 12, 2025. 	See
generally [DE 14]. 	In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges claims under various federal
statutes, including the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”), the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
(“FDCPA”), and the Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”). Id. at 3-4. The Amended Complaint also
1 Plaintiff submitted two additional filings related to the Motion. See generally [DE 30]; [DE 31].
Since Plaintiff filed these documents without leave of court, I do not consider them. However,
even after reviewing these documents, I conclude that they do not alter the analysis.
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includes two state-law claims. Id. Defendant moves to dismiss or at least stay the case pursuant
to a binding arbitration agreement. [DE 18] at 1-2.
To finance an automobile purchase, Plaintiff and a co-buyer had entered a Retail
Installment Sales Contract (the “Contract”) with a seller that assigned its contractual interest to
Defendant.2 [DE 14] ¶ 6; [DE 18] at 1; [DE 18-1] at 6. 	The Contract contained the following
provision on arbitration: “Agreement to Arbitrate: By signing below, you agree that, pursuant to
the Arbitration Provision on the reverse side of this contract, you or we may elect to resolve any
dispute by neutral binding arbitration and not by a court action.”3 [DE 18-1] at 6. Plaintiff and
the other buyer signed below. See id. The referred-to arbitration provision on the flipside of the
Contract stated in part:
Any claim or dispute, whether in contract, tort, statute or otherwise (including the
interpretation and scope of this Arbitration Provision, and the arbitrability of the
claim or dispute), between you and us or our employees, agents, successors or
assigns, which arises out of or relates to your credit application, purchase or
condition of this vehicle, this contract or any resulting transaction or relationship
(including any such relationship with third parties who do not sign this contract)
shall, at your or our election, be resolved by neutral, binding arbitration and not by
a court action.
[DE 18-1] at 7. The Contract’s arbitration provision then clarifies that it “shall be governed by the
Federal Arbitration Act . . . .” 	Id. 	Elsewhere, the Contract’s arbitration provision addresses
2 The Contract was attached to the signed declaration of Kelley Bayne, an outsourced legal
recovery manager for Defendant. [DE 18-1] at 2, 5-7. In the declaration, she avers that she has
access to Defendant’s records and knows how they are maintained. Id. at 2-3. She further avers
that the Contract as attached can be found in Defendant’s business records, which are maintained
by Defendant during its regularly conducted business activities. Id.
3 “A motion to compel arbitration is treated as a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), and the Court may consider matters outside the four
corners of the complaint, including the arbitration agreement at issue.” Oxium LLC v. OXO H20
Sols., Inc., No. 22-CV-1068, 2023 WL 3510904, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 16, 2023) (citation
omitted); accord Calcaterra v. Baptist Health S. Fla., Inc., 733 F. Supp. 3d 1349, 1353 (S.D. Fla.
2024).
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termination, indicating that the arbitration provision “shall survive any termination, payoff or
transfer of this contract.” 	Id. 	Regarding waiver, the Contract’s arbitration provision specifies,
“Neither you nor we waive the right to arbitrate by using self-help remedies . . . .” Id.
Plaintiff alleges that, several years after entering the Contract, he fully paid off the
remaining balance and thus satisfied the loan. 	[DE 14] ¶ 7. 	Defendant allegedly accepted and
acknowledged the payment. 	Id. ¶¶ 8-10. 	Despite satisfying the debt, Plaintiff’s Amended
Complaint states that Defendant “continued collection communications and harassing calls . . . .”
Id. ¶ 10. 	In addition, Defendant allegedly provided false credit information to credit reporting
agencies after the loan balance was paid off. Id. ¶ 11.
Plaintiff then initiated this lawsuit in state court, and Defendant later removed the action to
federal court. See generally [DE 1]. In the course of addressing this dispute, Plaintiff asserts that
Defendant 	has, 	among 	other 	things, 	“defaulted 	in 	state 	court,” 	“engaged 	in 	settlement
communications,” and “requested extensions.” [DE 19] at 4. Defendant has moved to dismiss or
stay the case pending arbitration based on the Contract’s arbitration provision. [DE 18] at 1-2.
LEGAL STANDARD
An arbitration agreement “shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.” 9 U.S.C. § 2. The Federal
Arbitration Act (“FAA”) “creates a ‘presumption of arbitrability’ such that ‘any doubts concerning
the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration.’” Bazemore v. Jefferson
Capital Sys., LLC, 827 F.3d 1325, 1329 (11th Cir. 2016) (quoting Dasher v. RBC Bank (USA),
745 F.3d 1111, 1115-16 (11th Cir. 2014)). “The central or primary purpose of the FAA is to ensure
that private agreements to arbitrate are enforced according to their terms.” Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v.
AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 682 (2010) (citation modified).
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When a motion to compel arbitration is filed, courts generally consider the following: “(1)
whether a valid agreement to arbitrate exists[;] (2) whether an arbitrable issue exists; and (3)
whether the right to arbitrate was waived.” Gomez v. Allied Pros. Ins. Co., 457 F. Supp. 3d 1351,
1356 (S.D. Fla. 2020) (citations omitted); see also Jackson v. Shakespeare Found., Inc., 108 So.
3d 587, 593 (Fla. 2013); Seifert v. U.S. Home Corp., 750 So. 2d 633, 636 (Fla. 1999) (“Under both
federal statutory provisions and Florida’s arbitration code, there are three elements for courts to
consider in ruling on a motion to compel arbitration of a given dispute: (1) whether a valid written
agreement to arbitrate exists; (2) whether an arbitrable issue exists; and (3) whether the right to
arbitration was waived.”).
ANALYSIS
I. 	A VALID WRITTEN AGREEMENT TO ARBITRATE EXISTS
“When deciding whether the parties agreed to arbitrate a certain matter (including
arbitrability), courts generally . . . should apply ordinary state-law principles that govern the
formation of contracts.” 	First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995).
Defendant asserts that Florida law applies to the formation question, [DE 18] at 5-6, and Plaintiff
does not refute that assertion. 	Under Florida law, proving the existence of a contract requires
showing 	the 	following: 	“(1) 	offer; 	(2) 	acceptance; 	(3) 	consideration; 	and 	(4) 	sufficient
specification of the essential terms.” Vega v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 564 F.3d 1256, 1272 (11th Cir.
2009) (citing St. Joe Corp. v. McIver, 875 So. 2d 375, 381 (Fla. 2004)). 	Additionally, when
assessing whether a valid agreement to arbitrate exists, “a district court may conclude as a matter
of law that parties did or did not enter into an arbitration agreement only if ‘there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact’ concerning the formation of such an agreement.” Bazemore, 827
F.3d at 1333 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)).
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Here, no genuine dispute exists regarding whether the parties entered a valid agreement to
arbitrate. Defendant states that Plaintiff signed the Contract with the arbitration provision, thus
agreeing to the arbitration provision’s terms. Notably, Plaintiff does not dispute that he entered
the Contract. 	He instead argues the agreement was later “terminated” or “[e]xtinguished” once
Defendant accepted the payoff. [DE 19] at 3-4. But that argument addresses the enforceability or
scope of the Contract’s arbitration provision rather than its formation, and “courts have
consistently held that arbitration provisions survive the termination of the agreements containing
those provisions.” Dasher, 745 F.3d at 1123; see also Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland
Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 475-76 (1989) (“[I]n applying general state-law principles of
contract interpretation to the interpretation of an arbitration agreement within the scope of the Act,
due regard must be given to the federal policy favoring arbitration, and ambiguities as to the scope
of the arbitration clause itself resolved in favor of arbitration.” (citation omitted)). 	Therefore, I
conclude that a valid written agreement to arbitrate exists.
II. 	AN ARBITRABLE ISSUE EXISTS
If unambiguous, arbitration agreements are interpreted according to their plain and
ordinary meaning. See Peery v. City of Miami, 977 F.3d 1061, 1069 (11th Cir. 2020) (“In Florida,
the plain meaning of the language used by the parties controls as the best indication of the parties’
agreement, so contract terms should be interpreted in accordance with their plain and ordinary
meaning.” (citation modified)). 	Moreover, “[i]n analyzing the scope of an arbitration clause,
Florida courts draw a distinction between clauses that require arbitration of claims ‘arising out of’
the subject contract and those that require arbitration of claims ‘arising out of or relating to’ the
contract.” Leidel v. Coinbase, Inc., 729 F. App’x 883, 887 (11th Cir. 2018) (quoting Jackson, 108
So. 3d at 593). “The former are considered to be ‘narrow in scope’ and apply only to ‘those claims
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that have a direct relationship to a contract’s terms and provisions.’” Id. (quoting Jackson, 108
So. 3d at 593). 	“The latter are considered to be broad in scope and apply to claims that are
described as having a significant relationship to the contract—regardless of whether the claim is
founded in tort or contract law.” Id. (citation modified).
An arbitrable issue exists under the Contract here because the arbitration provision’s broad
language covers Plaintiff’s claims in the Amended Complaint.4 To reiterate, Plaintiff’s lawsuit
against Defendant is based on allegations that Defendant continued collection communications
and provided false credit information to credit reporting agencies after Plaintiff paid off his loan
for a vehicle. In Plaintiff’s view, these actions violate several statutes and tort law. Applying the
plain meaning of the arbitration provision, the lawsuit counts as “[a]ny claim or dispute” that is
based “in contract, tort, statute or otherwise.” [DE 18-1] at 7. Moreover, Defendant is an assignee
of the seller under the Contract, so the lawsuit is a claim or dispute that is “between [Plaintiff] and
[the seller] or our . . . assigns[, i.e., Defendant].” Id. The dispute also “arises out of or relates to”
the Contract or, at the very least, to “any resulting transaction or relationship” because the
allegations focus on Defendant’s improper actions regarding the loan that was the subject of the
Contract. Despite Plaintiff’s suggestion otherwise, whether the loan was paid is immaterial. That
is because the addition of the phrase “relates to” significantly broadens the scope of the arbitration
agreement to extend beyond disputes over whether the parties have fulfilled the terms of the
Contract. See Leidel, 729 F. App’x at 887.
4 Even though the Contract’s arbitration provision appears to contain a “delegation clause,”
[DE 18-1] at 7 (delegating “interpretation,” “scope,” and “arbitrability” disputes to arbitrator),
Defendant’s argument centers on whether the merits of Plaintiff’s claims are subject to arbitration,
see [DE 18] at 6-7.
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Still, Plaintiff insists that the Contract cannot apply to “new torts” or “new statutory
violations” that are “independent” of the Contract. [DE 19] at 4. But any reasonable reading of
the language of the arbitration provision indicates that even tortious conduct or statutory violations
relating to the loan (which was the subject of the Contract) are within the arbitration provision.
The supposed violations all stem from the loan under the Contract. Further, the Contract was not
terminated, as Plaintiff suggests, because the Contract expressly stated that its arbitration provision
“shall survive any termination, payoff or transfer of this contract.” [DE 18-1] at 7. Under a plain
reading of the Contract, Plaintiff’s payoff of the loan balance did not extinguish the Contract. And,
as stated earlier, “courts have consistently held that arbitration provisions survive the termination
of the agreements containing those provisions.” Dasher, 745 F.3d at 1123. Therefore, I conclude
an arbitrable issue exists under the Contract.
III. 	THE RIGHT TO ARBITRATE WAS NOT WAIVED
“A party has waived its right to arbitrate if, under the totality of the circumstances, the
party has acted inconsistently with the arbitration right . . . .” Pinnacle Constructors Grp. LLC v.
SSC Tuscaloosa Apartments LLC, No. 23-13397, 2024 WL 3042536, at *1 (11th Cir. June 18,
2024) (quoting S & H Contractors, Inc. v. A.J. Taft Coal Co., 906 F.2d 1507, 1514 (11th Cir.
1990)); see also Morgan v. Sundance, Inc., 596 U.S. 411, 419 (2022) (abrogating Eleventh
Circuit’s prior caselaw requiring prejudice for waiver). A party acts inconsistent with a right to
arbitrate by substantially participating in litigation “to a point inconsistent with an intent to
arbitrate . . . .” Morewitz v. W. of Eng. Ship Owners Mut. Prot. & Indem. Ass’n (Luxembourg), 62
F.3d 1356, 1366 (11th Cir. 1995) (citing Price v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 791 F.2d 1156,
1158 (5th Cir.1986)). However, when addressing whether waiver occurred, courts are “mindful
of the Supreme Court’s admonition that ‘questions of arbitrability must be addressed with a healthy
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regard for the federal policy favoring arbitration.’” 	Id. at 1365-66 (quoting Moses H. Cone
Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)).
Plaintiff argues that Defendant waived its right to arbitrate because Defendant “defaulted
in state court,” “removed the case to federal court,” “filed motions,” “engaged in settlement
communications,” and “requested extensions.” 	[DE 19] at 4. 	Under the totality of the
circumstances, none of these actions constitute a waiver of Defendant’s right to arbitrate. First, a
default is the opposite of substantial participation in litigation because it results from inaction, not
action. Second, removing an action to federal court and filing a motion for extension of time are
minor procedural actions that are not inconsistent with an intent to arbitrate. 	Moreover, both
substantive motions that Defendant filed have asserted Defendant’s arbitration right. Specifically,
this Motion and Defendant’s initial motion to dismiss both ask the Court to compel arbitration
based on the Contract’s arbitration provision.5 	More generally, the Court cannot conclude that
Defendant has substantially participated in litigation where the case is only at the pleadings stage
and discovery, if any, has been minimal. Cf. Hamlett v. Owners Advantage, LLC, No. 13-80416-
CIV, 2013 WL 4711165, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 30, 2013) (holding that defendants did not waive
right to arbitration where defendants “promptly filed a motion to dismiss” and had “not
participated in the litigation process, such as engaging in pre-trial discovery”).
The result is the same for Plaintiff’s argument regarding Defendant’s alleged settlement
communications; these negotiations do not suggest waiver. See Sw. Indus. Imp. & Exp., Inc. v.
Wilmod Co., 524 F.2d 468, 470 (5th Cir. 1975)6 (“Participation in settlement negotiations and even
5 The first motion to dismiss was denied as moot after Plaintiff amended his initial complaint. See
generally [DE 17].
6 Decisions issued by the Fifth Circuit prior to October 1, 1981, are binding on this Court. Bonner
v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1207 (11th Cir.1981) (en banc).
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alleged contract breach or repudiation have been held not to preclude the right to arbitrate, and
presumably the less extreme self-help steps taken by the seller in this case fall into the same
category” (citations omitted)); cf. Davis v. RealPage, Inc., No. 23-CV-61683, 2024 WL 278293,
at *3 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 10, 2024), report and recommendation adopted, 2024 WL 278191 (S.D. Fla.
Jan. 25, 2024) (concluding defendant did not waive right to arbitrate by making an offer of
judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68). Indeed, settlement suggests an intent to avoid
litigation rather than a substantial participation in it. 	See Davis, No. 23-CV-61683, 2024 WL
278293, at *3. Not to mention, the agreement states that neither party waives the right to arbitrate
by using “self-help” remedies, which arguably includes making a settlement offer to avoid formal
proceedings. [DE 18-1] at 7. Defendant has therefore not waived its right to arbitrate because it
has not acted inconsistently with that right.
IV. 	THE COURT SHOULD STAY RATHER THAN DISMISS THE ACTION
After a district court determines that an issue should be arbitrated, the FAA states that the
court “shall on application of one of the parties stay the trial of the action until such arbitration has
been had in accordance with the terms of the agreement, providing the applicant for the stay is not
in default in proceeding with such arbitration.” 9 U.S.C. § 3.
Regardless of the mandatory language in § 3, prior courts in this district had dismissed
rather than stayed cases “where all claims were subject to arbitration.” E.g., Perera v. H & R Block
E. Enters., Inc., 914 F. Supp. 2d 1284, 1290 (S.D. Fla. 2012). Yet the U.S. Supreme Court recently
clarified, “When a federal court finds that a dispute is subject to arbitration, and a party has
requested a stay of the court proceeding pending arbitration, the court does not have discretion to
dismiss the suit on the basis that all the claims are subject to arbitration.” Smith v. Spizzirri, 601
U.S. 472, 475-76 (2024).
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Spizzirri does not address what happens when a stay is not requested. 	See Wallrich v.
Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 106 F.4th 609, 617 (7th Cir. 2024) (“Spizzirri merely held that a district
court must issue a stay (rather than dismiss a case) when a party requests a stay under § 3.”);
Emergency Recovery Inc. v. Conifer Revenue Cycle Sols., LLC, No. 24-CV-22426, 2025 WL
71974, at *8 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 10, 2025) (“[T]he Spizzirri Court expressly foreclosed dismissal as an
option . . . so long as one of the parties has requested the Court to stay the case pending
arbitration.”); Mod. Perfection, LLC v. Bank of Am., N.A., 126 F.4th 235, 244 (4th Cir. 2025)
(“[Spizzirri] says nothing about what happens when the appealing party never requests a stay.”).
However, the Eleventh Circuit has expressed a preference for cases to be stayed rather than
dismissed when a claim is subject to arbitration under the FAA. See Bender v. A.G. Edwards &
Sons, Inc., 971 F.2d 698, 699 (11th Cir. 1992) (“Upon finding that a claim is subject to an
arbitration agreement, the court should order that the action be stayed pending arbitration.” (citing
9 U.S.C. § 3); see also Caley v. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp., 428 F.3d 1359, 1368 (11th Cir. 2005)
(“[T]he FAA’s enforcement sections require a court to stay a proceeding where the issue in the
proceeding ‘is referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing for such arbitration’ . . . .”
(emphasis removed) (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 3)).
Here, Defendant argues that, because all issues in the case are arbitrable, the Court should
exercise its discretion and dismiss the case. [DE 18] at 9-10. I disagree because of the Eleventh
Circuit’s preference for a stay. Moreover, I am cognizant of the fact that Plaintiff is proceeding
pro se, so dismissing the case would potentially prejudice Plaintiff’s ability to seek redress if
arbitration does not end the dispute. As explained in Spizzirri, § 3 of the FAA “ensures that the
parties can return to federal court if arbitration breaks down or fails to resolve the dispute.” 601
U.S. at 477. Importantly, “[t]hat return ticket is not available if the court dismisses the suit rather
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than staying it.” Id. I therefore conclude that a stay is more appropriate than dismissal. The Court
should stay the action pending the result of the arbitration
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully RECOMMEND that the Motion [DE 18] be
GRANTED IN PART and that this action be STAYED pending binding arbitration.
The parties will have fourteen (14) days from the date of being served with a copy of this
Report and Recommendation within which to file written objections, if any, with the Honorable
Melissa Damian, United States District Judge. Failure to timely file objections shall bar the parties
from a de novo determination by the District Judge of an issue covered in the Report and shall bar
the parties from attacking on appeal unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions contained in this
Report except upon grounds of plain error if necessary in the interest of justice. 	See 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149 (1985); Henley v. Johnson, 885 F.2d 790, 794 (11th
Cir. 1989); 11th Cir. R. 3-1.
DONE AND SUBMITTED in Fort Lauderdale, Florida, this 17th day of February 2026.
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