Perry v. Boor et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
CASE NO. 25-cv-62197-STRAUSS
WILLIE PERRY,
Plaintiff,
v.
JULIANNA BOORS and
TALISA JENKINS,
Defendants.
__________________________________/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION1
THIS MATTER was assigned to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge pursuant
to Administrative Order 2025-11. However, because I find that dismissal of this case is warranted,
and because I do not presently have authority to issue a dispositive order,2 I am issuing a Report
1 This case was directly assigned to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to
Administrative Order 2025-11.
2 It is unclear whether Plaintiff consents to magistrate judge jurisdiction. On October 30, 2025, I
entered an order requiring Plaintiff to file either a notice of consent to magistrate judge jurisdiction
or a motion to have the case re-assigned to a district judge. [DE 5]. Plaintiff did not file either a
notice or a motion before the deadline set out in that order. Plaintiff did, however, file a motion
titled “Motion Disapproval Magistrate Judge on Plaintiff Case,” in which Plaintiff asked for his
case to remain “with a Fort Lauderdale Magistrate Judge.” [DE 7] at 1-2. 	I denied the motion
because it was premised on Plaintiff’s mistaken belief that the undersigned was not stationed in
Fort Lauderdale. [DE 9] at 1-2. In the same order, I again directed Plaintiff to either file a notice
of consent or a motion to re-assign the case to a district judge in order to clarify Plaintiff’s position
on consent. 	Id. at 2. 	Plaintiff then filed a second motion titled “Plaintiff Motion Home
Jurisdiction.” 	[DE 10] at 1. 	In that motion, Plaintiff again appeared to ask for the case to be
assigned to a magistrate judge in Fort Lauderdale. Id. at 2. Plaintiff also appeared to suggest that
I sabotaged his case because the case caption did not properly state one Defendant’s name. 	Id.
Although I had already noted for Plaintiff that the case caption likely was an error, [DE 8] at 1.
n.1, Plaintiff’s second motion also stated that “Mag. Judge, Strauss, should down [sic] from
Plaintiff civil – complaint,” [DE 10] at 2. In other words, it is unclear whether Plaintiff is objecting
to a magistrate judge presiding over his case, objecting to this particular magistrate judge presiding
over his case, or something else. To the extent that Plaintiff’s motion at [DE 10] suggests that I
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and Recommendation. For the following reasons, I respectfully RECOMMEND that this action
be DISMISSED without prejudice and that any pending motions be DENIED as moot.
BACKGROUND
On October 30, 2025, Plaintiff filed a Complaint, which alleged Bivens-type claims under
the Fourteenth Amendment against U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs (“VA”) Director Julianna
Boors and Social Security Administration (“SSA”) Supervisor Talisa Jenkins. 	See generally
[DE 1]. 	The Complaint was premised on the allegedly wrongful reduction of Plaintiff’s VA
pension—supposedly caused by the SSA informing the VA of a raise in Plaintiff’s Social Security
Retirement Insurance (“SSRI”) benefits without Plaintiff’s permission. Id. at 7. The Complaint
averred that this sharing of information was wrongful under the Fourteenth Amendment by
violating Plaintiff’s right to privacy. 	See id. at 3-4. 	The Complaint asked for Plaintiff’s VA
pension to be restored to its prior amount. Id. at 5. Plaintiff also filed a motion to proceed in forma
pauperis, [DE 3], which this Court denied without prejudice, [DE 4], and later a renewed motion
to proceed in forma pauperis, [DE 6], which this Court granted, [DE 8].
Upon screening the Complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), I concluded the Complaint failed
to state a claim and directed Plaintiff to file an amended Complaint by December 11, 2025. [DE
8] at 8-9. Plaintiff filed the Amended Complaint on December 8, 2025. See generally [DE 12].
should recuse from involvement in this case, it presents no basis for recusal because it does not
present any circumstances showing partiality nor circumstances that would cause an objective,
disinterested observer to significantly doubt my impartiality. See 28 U.S.C. § 455; United States
v. Patti, 337 F.3d 1317, 1321 (11th Cir. 2003) (discussing standard for recusal). And regardless
of whether Plaintiff has consented to magistrate judge jurisdiction, Defendants have not appeared
or consented to magistrate judge jurisdiction. 	Therefore, as explained in my contemporaneous
order directing the Clerk to reassign this case to a District Judge of this Court, even assuming
Plaintiff 	has 	consented 	to 	magistrate 	judge 	jurisdiction, 	I 	can 	only 	issue 	a 	report 	and
recommendation rather than a dispositive order dismissal.
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However, as described below, the Amended Complaint contains many of the same flaws as the
Complaint and is thus subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim.
ANALYSIS
Under the screening provisions of § 1915(e), Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint is subject to
dismissal. 	Indeed, Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint failed to address most of the issues that this
Court previously pointed out in its prior order requiring an amended complaint.
First, like the Complaint, the Amended Complaint is a shotgun pleading because it is
“replete with conclusory, vague, and immaterial facts not obviously connected to any particular
cause of action.” 	Weiland v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., 792 F.3d 1313, 1322 (11th Cir.
2015). 	The Amended Complaint alleges that Defendants violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights
(seemingly under a privacy-based theory) without any adequate explanation of how beyond the
possibility that information was shared between government agencies. See [DE 12] at 7. Plaintiff
additionally fails to indicate which Defendants—Boors or Jenkins—are responsible for which
alleged acts. Even if Plaintiff’s position is that both Defendants are responsible for all acts, the
Amended Complaint is simply too vague to enable Defendants to frame a responsive pleading.
See Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1323; Sledge v. Goodyear Dunlop Tires N. Am., Ltd., 275 F.3d 1014,
1018 n.8 (11th Cir. 2001) (“The failure of the plaintiff to identify his claims with sufficient clarity
to enable the defendant to frame a responsible pleading constitutes shotgun pleading.”).
Second, the Amended Complaint fails to state a Bivens claim. Plaintiff checked a box on
the form that he used indicating that he is bringing a Bivens claim.3 [DE 12] at 3. Plaintiff then
3 Plaintiff also checked boxes indicating that he sues Boors and Jenkins in their official capacities.
[DE 12] at 2. But “[a] Bivens claim may be brought against federal officials only in their individual
capacity, not in their official capacity.” Pereira v. USCIS Dist. Dir. Se. Region, No. 20-13298,
2021 WL 3360964, at *2 (11th Cir. Aug. 3, 2021) (emphasis added) (citing Corr. Servs. Corp. v.
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describes the Fourteenth Amendment as the provision of the U.S. Constitution that Defendants
have violated. Id. Yet, as previously stated in the order requiring an amended complaint, the U.S.
Supreme Court has not recognized a Bivens claim under the Fourteenth Amendment. Montalban
v. Samuels, No. 21-11431, 2022 WL 4362800, at *4 (11th Cir. Sept. 21, 2022). 	Additionally,
“courts 	(including 	the 	Eleventh 	Circuit) 	routinely 	decline 	to 	extend 	a 	Bivens 	remedy
to . . . Fourteenth Amendment claims.” 	Williams v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., No. 23-
CV-61124, 2024 WL 2258108, at *3 (S.D. Fla. May 17, 2024) (citations omitted).
Third, even if Plaintiff could bring a Bivens claim under the Fourteenth Amendment, “the
Fourteenth Amendment applies only to states and state actors, not the federal government.” Pinson
v. Rumsfeld, 192 F. App’x 811, 821 (11th Cir. 2006). No allegations suggest that Boors or Jenkins
are actors to which the Fourteenth Amendment would apply.
Fourth, to the extent Plaintiff has brought his case against Boors and Jenkins in their official
capacities, his claims are barred by sovereign immunity. “Absent a waiver, sovereign immunity
shields the Federal Government and its agencies from suit.” F.D.I.C. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475
(1994) (citations omitted). 	“Official capacity suits are, in reality, suits against the official’s
agency/entity.” Nalls v. Bureau of Prisons of U.S., 359 F. App’x 99, 100 (11th Cir. 2009) (citing
Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 105 (1985)). “Additionally, the plaintiff bears the burden of
establishing subject matter jurisdiction [. . .] and, thus, must prove an explicit waiver of immunity.”
Ishler v. Internal Revenue, 237 F. App’x 394, 398 (11th Cir. 2007) (citing Sweet Pea Marine, Ltd.
v. APJ Marine, Inc., 411 F.3d 1242, 1248 n.2 (11th Cir. 2005)). Here, Plaintiff has not alleged a
Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 70-72 (2001)); Ryzhov v. Mayorkas, 634 F. Supp. 3d 1107, 1113 (S.D. Fla.
2022).
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waiver of sovereign immunity by the United States nor pointed to any statute or other avenue
through which this Court could find a waiver of sovereign immunity.
Fifth, even trying to liberally construe Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint as bringing a
constitutional claim that is viable against federal actors, Plaintiff’s allegations do not contain
sufficient factual content to state a claim that is plausible on its face. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it
asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” (citing Bell Atl. Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007))). 	Instead, Plaintiff’s claim is dubious at best. 	No
allegations support Plaintiff’s legal conclusion that sharing information of the type described in
the 	Amended 	Complaint 	between 	governmental 	agencies 	violates 	the 	U.S. 	Constitution.
Therefore, the Amended Complaint fails to state a claim on this basis as well. See id. (“[W]here
the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct,
the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’”
(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). Plaintiff must do more to state a claim.
In sum, the numerous deficiencies in the Amended Complaint favor dismissal without
prejudice. The Court does not need to give Plaintiff leave to amend because he has already been
given one chance to amend. 	See Sifford v. Ford, 701 F. App’x 794, 796 (11th Cir. 2017)
(“Generally, a district court must sua sponte provide a pro se plaintiff at least one opportunity to
amend his complaint, even where the plaintiff did not request leave to amend.”).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, I respectfully RECOMMEND that this action be
DISMISSED without prejudice and that any pending motions be DENIED as moot.
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The parties will have fourteen (14) days from the date of being served with a copy of this
Report and Recommendation within which to file written objections, if any, with this Court.4
Failure to timely file objections shall bar the parties from a de novo determination by a District
Judge of this Court of an issue covered in the Report and shall bar the parties from attacking on
appeal unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions contained in this Report except upon grounds
of plain error if necessary in the interest of justice. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474
U.S. 140, 149 (1985); Henley v. Johnson, 885 F.2d 790, 794 (11th Cir. 1989); 11th Cir. R. 3-1.
DONE AND ORDERED in Fort Lauderdale, Florida, this 22nd day of December 2025.
4 As set forth in Rule 4(b) of the of the Magistrate Judge Rules of this Court’s Local Rules:
Any party may object to a Magistrate Judge’s proposed findings, recommendations
or report under subsections 1(d), (e), and (f) of these rules, supra, within fourteen
(14) days after being served with a copy thereof, or within such other time as may
be allowed by the Magistrate Judge or District Judge. Such party shall file with the
Clerk of the Court, and serve on all parties, written objections which shall
specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or
report to which objection is made, the specific basis for such objections, and
supporting legal authority. . . . A District Judge shall make a de novo determination
of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations
to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part,
the findings or recommendations made by the Magistrate Judge.
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