Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
CASE NO. 25-62598-CIV-SINGHAL
IRAHETA MORALES, Rafael Antonio,
Petitioner,
v.
KRISTI NOEM, Secretary of the United States
Department of Homeland Security, in her official
capacity, et al.,
Respondents.
_______________________________________/
ORDER
THIS CAUSE is before the Court on Petitioner Rafael Antonio Iraheta Morales’
Expedited Motion for Stay of Removal and/or Injunction Pending Appeal (the “Motion”).
(DE [12]). The Court, having reviewed the Motion, Respondents’ response in opposition
(DE [17]), Petitioner’s reply1 (DE [18]), the record, and otherwise being fully advised,
DENIES the Motion.
Petitioner is an immigrant who has lived in the United States for more than two
decades, is married to a U.S. citizen, has two U.S. citizen children, co-owns a business
in the United States, and maintains a spotless criminal record. See (DE [1] at 39, 53–56,
58–77). 	Nevertheless, the government seeks to remove him from the United States.
Accordingly, the government detains Petitioner pursuant to section 1225(b)(2) pending
conclusion of his removal proceedings. 	In a recent petition for writ of habeas corpus,
1 Because Petitioner demonstrated good cause, Petitioner’s motion for leave to file a reply (DE [18]) is
GRANTED.
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Petitioner argued he is not subject to mandatory detention under section 1225 but instead
entitled to a bond hearing pursuant to section 1226(a). See (DE [1]). 	Petitioner sought
immediate release from detention, a bond hearing, and an injunction prohibiting his
removal from the Southern District of Florida to preserve this Court’s jurisdiction. 	See
generally (DE [1]). He did not otherwise seek an order staying his removal proceedings
or enjoining his removal pursuant to final order of removal. See generally (DE [1]).
While sympathetic to Petitioner’s plight, this Court—constrained by the law and its
oath to uphold same—denied the Petition (the “Order”). See (DE [10]). Having appealed
the Order, Petitioner now moves for the following relief pending appeal: (1) a stay of
removal and/or an injunction prohibiting the government from removing him from the
United States pending appeal, and (2) an order confirming this Court’s prior order
enjoining his removal from the Southern District of Florida remains in effect (the
“Injunction”). 	(DE [12] at 7). 	The government counters that 8 U.S.C. Section 1252(g)
strips this Court of jurisdiction to enter such an order because it would impede the
government’s execution of a final order of removal. 	See generally (DE [17]). Petitioner
replies that section 1252(g) is inapplicable because he does not challenge the legality or
sufficiency of any removal order, but instead seeks only to delay his removal from the
United States to preserve the appellate court’s jurisdiction. 	See (DE [18] at 3). 	For the
reasons below, this Court must deny Petitioner’s Motion.2
Because courts “must address . . . jurisdictional issues . . . [before] reach[ing] the
merits,” the Court first determines whether the Court has jurisdiction to grant the
requested relief. 	See Sweet v. Chief J. of Fla. S. Ct., 2025 WL 915740, at *2 (11th Cir.
2 Denial notwithstanding, the Court commends Petitioner’s counsel for their excellent work in quickly filing
a reply and incorporated motion for leave to file same.
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Mar. 26. 2025) (quoting In re Engle Cases, 767 F.3d 1082, 1108 n.30 (11th Cir. 2014)).
Section 1252(g) provides:
Except as provided in this section and notwithstanding any other provision
of law (statutory or nonstatutory), including . . . any . . . habeas corpus
provision, . . . no court shall have jurisdiction to hear any cause or claim by
or on behalf of any alien arising from the decision or action by the Attorney
General to . . . execute removal orders against any alien under this chapter.
Section 	1252(g) 	must 	be 	read 	“narrow[ly],” 	Reno 	v. 	American-Arab 	Anti-
Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 487 (1999), and “bars only those claims that directly
relate to the ‘. . . specific actions’ it lists,” Camarena v. Director, Immigr. and Customs
Enforcement, 988 F.3d 1268, 1273 (11th Cir. 2021) (quoting Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583
U.S. 281, 294 (2018)). To determine whether a cause or claim directly relates to one of
section 1252(g)’s specific actions, “courts must focus on the action being challenged.”
Camerena, 988 F.3d at 1272 (quoting Canal A Media Holding, LLC v. U.S. Citizenship &
Immigr. Servs., 964 F.3d 1250, 1257–58 (11th Cir. 2020)). 	When “that action is the
government's execution of . . . removal orders,” the cause “fall[s] squarely within §
1252(g)’s jurisdictional bar.” 	Camarena, 988 F.3d at 1272. 	Notwithstanding section
1252(g), an appellate court may stay a removal order pending review of the removal
order itself. 	See Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418 (2009)3; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5)
(“[A] petition for review filed with an appropriate court of appeals in accordance with this
section shall be the sole and exclusive means for judicial review of an order of removal
. . . .”).
3 Petitioner cites Nken for the freestanding proposition that courts may stay removal orders pending
appellate review. 	Not so. 	In Nken, the Supreme Court stayed a removal order pending review of the
removal order itself, not a collateral order entered during removal proceedings. See Nken, 566 U.S. at
422–23. Nken provides little support for the proposition that a district court can preemptively stay a yet-to-
exist removal order—the merits of which it cannot even begin to assess—pending appeal to determine
whether the immigrant was entitled to bond during the pendency of his removal proceedings.
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Petitioner seeks to avoid section 1252(g)’s application by arguing that he does not
(1) “challeng[e] the Government’s authority to remove him; (2) challeng[e] any existing or
future removal order, or (3) ask[] this Court to adjudicate the merits of his removal
proceedings.” 	See (DE [18] at 3). 	Instead, he seeks only to “delay[] execution” of a
removal order, should one be entered against him. 	Id. 	But that is precisely the kind of
relief section 1252(g) prohibits this Court from dispensing. 	See § 1252(g) (“[N]o court
shall have jurisdiction to hear any cause or claim . . . arising from the decision or action
by the Attorney General to . . . execute removal orders against any alien under this
chapter.”); see also Camarena, 988 F.3d at 1272 (holding section 1252(g) stripped district
court’s 	jurisdiction 	to 	stay 	removal 	order 	pending 	processing 	of 	aliens’ 	collateral
proceedings). It is of no consequence that the government has not yet entered a removal
order against Petitioner. As this Court would be powerless to enjoin a decision or action
to execute an existing removal order, it also cannot prospectively enjoin same in
anticipation of its future existence. 	Constrained by section 1252(g), this Court is
powerless to grant the requested relief.
Finally, the Court clarifies that the Injunction (DE [9]) dissolved when this Court
denied the Petition (DE [10]) and declines to revive same. 	The Court entered the
Injunction on Petitioner’s representation that it was necessary to preserve this Court’s
jurisdiction and the government’s apparent agreement and acquiescence to same during
the January 15 hearing. 	But nothing in the Injunction suggested that it continued in
perpetuity or was intended to preserve the appellate court’s jurisdiction, which had not
then been invoked. In fact, the Injunction strongly suggests the opposite. 	See (DE [9]
(the Injunction was “entered to preserve this Court’s jurisdiction over the pending habeas
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corpus proceedings” and would terminate upon “further order of this Court”) (emphasis
added)). 	The order denying the Petition rendered the Injunction purposeless and thus
constituted a “further order of this Court” that terminated same.
Moreover, for the reasons explained above, the Court would exceed its jurisdiction
if it enjoined the Attorney General from deciding or acting to execute a final removal order
against Petitioner. 	See § 1252(g). 	Accordingly, the Court is powerless to revive the
Injunction to achieve that end. 	Furthermore, subsequent research revealed that an
injunction prohibiting Petitioner’s transfer outside the Southern District or the Eleventh
Circuit (but still within the United States) would not destroy habeas jurisdiction. 	See
Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 440–41 (2004) (“[W]hen the Government moves a
habeas petitioner after she properly files a petition naming her immediate custodian, the
District Court retains jurisdiction and may direct the writ to any respondent within its
jurisdiction who has legal authority to effectuate the prisoner's release.” (citing Ex parte
Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944))). 	Thus, not only does this Court lack jurisdiction to stay or
enjoin Petitioner’s removal, but also Petitioner has proffered no compelling reason to
otherwise enjoin his transfer within the United States. Accordingly, it is hereby
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Petitioner’s motion for leave to file a reply in
support of the Motion is GRANTED; the Motion is otherwise DENIED in all respects and,
for the avoidance of doubt, the Injunction (DE [9]) is DISSOLVED.
DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers, Fort Lauderdale, Florida, this 17th day of
February 2026.
Copies furnished counsel via CM/ECF
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