Med-Stop, Inc. v. Vandutch, Inc. et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
CASE NO. 23-cv-21875-ALTMAN/Reid
MED-STOP, INC.,
Plaintiff,
v.
VANDUTCH, INC., et al.,
Defendants.
_________________________/
ORDER ADOPTING REPORT & RECCOMENDATION
On January 3, 2025, we dismissed Med-Stop’s claims against the four Defendants that
remained in this case—Vandutch, Inc. (“VDI”), Vandutch USA (“VDUSA”), Jacobus Mast
(collectively, the “Mast Parties”), and Reed Nicol. See Order Granting Motion to Dismiss [ECF No.
154] at 20 (“[W]e hereby ORDER and ADJUDGE that the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss [ECF
No. 115] is GRANTED. The Complaint [ECF No. 1] is DISMISSED with prejudice.”). As
prevailing parties, these four Defendants then moved for attorneys’ fees. See Motion for Attorneys’
Fees by Reed Nicol [ECF No. 161]; see also Motion for Attorneys’ Fees by the Mast Parties [ECF No.
174]. 	We 	referred 	those 	motions 	to 	Magistrate 	Judge 	Lisette 	M. 	Reid 	for 	a 	Report 	and
Recommendation, see Amended Order of Referral [ECF No. 175], and she recommended that we
award Nicol $87,332.30 in attorneys’ fees and costs and the Mast Parties $103,682.69 in attorneys’
fees, see Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) [ECF No. 179]. Med-Stop filed a “limited objection”
to the R&R, claiming that the R&R “did not address the allocation” of the attorneys’-fees award
between the Mast Parties. Objections to R&R (“Objections”) [ECF No. 180] at 2. The Mast Parties
filed a response, asking us to overrule the objection. See Response to Objections [ECF No. 182] at 1
(“[The] Plaintiff’s Objection should be denied/overruled because [the] Plaintiff failed to raise the legal
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arguments asserted in the Objection before the magistrate, [ ] and because neither the facts, nor the
law, support the Objection.”). Alternatively, the Mast Parties request that we award “100% of the
attorney’s fees [ ] to Jacobus Mast” because “[a]ll attorney’s fees paid on behalf of the Mast Defendants
for services rendered herein on or after October 17, 2023 were paid by Jacobus Mast[.]” Id. at 5, 3.
T HE L AW
District courts must review de novo any part of a magistrate judge’s disposition that has been
properly objected to. See FED . R. C IV . P. 72(b)(3). Although Rule 72 itself is silent on the standard of
review, the Supreme Court has acknowledged that Congress’s intent was to require a de novo review
only where objections have been properly filed—and not when neither party objects. See Thomas v.
Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 150 (1985) (“It does not appear that Congress intended to require district court
review of a magistrate [judge]’s factual or legal conclusions, under a de novo or any other standard, when
neither party objects to those findings.”). “If no objection or only [a] partial objection is made to the
magistrate judge’s report, the district judge reviews those unobjected portions for clear error.” Macort
v. Prem, Inc., 208 F. App’x 781, 784 (11th Cir. 2006) (quoting Johnson v. Zema Sys. Corp., 170 F.3d 734,
739 (7th Cir. 1999) (cleaned up)).
When a party timely objects to a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation, the district
judge must make a de novo determination “of those portions of the report or specified proposed
findings or recommendations to which objection is made.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); see also Leonard v.
Polk Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 2019 WL 11641375, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 16, 2019) (Jung, J.). “Parties filing
objections to a magistrate’s report and recommendation must specifically identify those findings
objected to. Frivolous, conclusive, or general objections need not be considered by the district court.”
United States v. Tardon, 493 F. Supp. 3d 1188, 1209 (S.D. Fla. 2020) (Lenard, J.) (quoting Marsden v.
Moore, 847 F.2d 1536, 1548 (11th Cir. 1988)). The “[f]ailure to object to the magistrate [judge]’s factual
findings after notice precludes a later attack on these findings.” Lewis v. Smith, 855 F.2d 736, 738 (11th
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Cir. 1988) (citation omitted).
A NALYSIS
For four reasons, we overrule Med-Stop’s objection. First, Med-Stop concedes that Magistrate
Judge Reid didn’t err by failing to allocate the attorneys’ fees between the Mast Parties—it merely
argues that “judicial economy” would be best served by such an allocation. See Objections at 4 (“While
this Court could elect simply to issue a joint fee award to all three Mast Defendants, Plaintiff submits
that judicial economy could be best served by this Court either by allocating the entire fee award to
VDI or, alternatively, by identifying the portion, if any, allocable to VDI.”). That’s not a good enough
reason to overrule a magistrate judge.
Second, Med-Stop doesn’t cite any authority for the proposition that we must allocate an
attorneys’-fee award between prevailing parties who are represented by the same counsel. The only
case Med-Stop cites on this issue is Oxford Asset Management, Ltd. v. Jaharis, 297 F.3d 1182, 1197 (11th
Cir. 2002). See Objections at 4 (“As a general proposition, ‘the district court has wide latitude in
determining how to apportion [an attorneys’ fee] award, but it must explain its decision such that it is
capable of meaningful review.’” (quoting Oxford, 297 F.3d at 1197)). But this case is inapposite. Med-
Stop’s quoted language involved the district court’s determination of a reasonable fee, not the allocation
of that fee between prevailing parties. As to fee allocation, the Eleventh Circuit has held that “fees
must not always, or even usually, be apportioned.” Council for Periodical Distributors Assc’n. v. Evans, 827
F.2d 1483 (11th Cir. 1987).
Third, even if we thought it necessary to allocate the fee award between the Mast Parties (we
don’t), Med-Stop hasn’t given us any evidence with which we might determine how the award should
be allocated. The Mast Parties, on the other hand, tell us that Jacobus Mast incurred the relevant
attorneys’ fees—not VDI or VDUSA. See Response to Objections at 3 (“All attorney’s fees paid on
behalf of the Mast Defendants for services rendered herein on or after October 17, 2023 were paid
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by Jacobus Mast through other entities owned by him that are neither defendants, nor judgment
debtors”). We think it’s clear that the Mast Parties—not this Court—are best positioned to determine
how to allocate their attorneys’-fees.
Finally, as the Mast Parties correctly observe, Med-Stop didn’t raise the allocation issue in its
underlying briefing. See generally Response to Motion for Attorneys’ Fees by the Mast Parties [ECF No.
176]. In its Response, Med-Stop only asked that, if the Magistrate Judge were inclined to award fees,
those fees should be reduced. See id. at 19 (“While Med-Stop continues to maintain that Defendants
should not be entitled to any fees, this Court may disagree. If so, Med-Stop maintains that any fee
award should at least be reduced.”). Med-Stop’s failure to raise this issue before the Magistrate Judge
is reason alone to overrule its objection. See Williams v. McNeil, 557 F.3d 1287, 1292 (11th Cir. 2009)
(“[A] district court has discretion to decline to consider a party’s argument when that argument was
not first presented to the magistrate judge.”).
The Magistrate Judge Reid thus didn’t err by failing to allocate the attorneys’-fee award
between the Mast Parties. We’ve reviewed the rest of Magistrate Judge Reid’s R&R for clear error—
and, finding none, concur in her well-reasoned judgment.
C ONCLUSION
Accordingly, we hereby ORDER and ADJUDGE that Med-Stop’s Objections [ECF No.
180] are OVERRULED. We ADOPT Magistrate Judge Reid’s Report and Recommendation [ECF
No. 179] in full. The case shall remain CLOSED.
DONE AND ORDERED in the Southern District of Florida on February 6, 2026.
__________________________________
ROY K. ALTMAN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
cc: counsel of record
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