USA v. Chanard Mikeis Robinson

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
CASE NO. 24-20115-CR-DAMIAN/D’ANGELO
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
vs.
CHANARD MIKEIS ROBINSON,
Defendant.
________________________________/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION FINDING
DEFENDANT COMPETENT PRESENTLY TO STAND TRIAL
THIS CAUSE is before the Court following the referral to the undersigned Magistrate
Judge of the Motion to Conduct Competency Evaluation (DE 22, 38). Defendant filed a motion for
a competency evaluation on July 19, 2024 (DE 21), and the Government did not oppose the motion
(DE 24). 	Since then, Defendant has been evaluated by two doctors on multiple occasions, as
detailed below. The Court also held an evidentiary hearing in this matter on September 3, 2025,
at which it received exhibits and expert testimony and heard the arguments of the Parties (DE 118).
Having considered the Parties’ arguments, the relevant authorities, and the pertinent portions of
the record, and being otherwise fully advised in the premises, for the reasons more fully stated
below, it is respectfully recommended that Defendant be found COMPETENT presently to stand
trial in this case.
I. 	BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE
On March 26, 2024, a Grand Jury sitting in the Southern District of Florida returned an
Indictment, charging Defendant with Possession of a Firearm and Ammunition by a Convicted
Felon, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 922(g)(1), in Count One, and
Possession with Intent to Distribute Cocaine, in violation of Title 21, United States Code, Section
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841(a)(1), in Count Two (DE 1). Defendant made his initial appearance on June 6, 2024 (DE 11)
and stipulated to pre-trial detention five days later (DE 16). On July 19, 2024, Defendant filed a
Motion for Medical Exam as to Competence (DE 21), which the Government did not oppose (DE
24). The Court granted the Motion on July 23, 2024 and ordered that Defendant be transported to
a federal medical center for a comprehensive psychological or psychiatric evaluation addressing
his competency to proceed, pursuant to Title 18, United States Code, Sections 4241, 4247(b)-(c)
(DE 25). Dr. Lauren Schumacher evaluated Defendant at the Federal Detention Center in Miami,
Florida and issued a September 12, 2024 report, which was submitted to the Court and the Parties
(DE 29).
On October 8, 2024, Defendant submitted a letter to the Court, stating he was having issues
with his attorney and asked the Court to conduct a Nelson hearing (DE 32).1 	In the letter,
Defendant stated that he believed his attorney was colluding with other individuals against him
and that corrections officers were trying to kill him by putting “harmful materials” in his food (id.).
The Court held an ex parte Nelson hearing on November 14, 2024, at which the Court heard from
Defendant and his prior counsel, Assistant Federal Public Defender Jan Smith, Esq. (DE 42). After
the hearing, Defendant’s prior counsel, Mr. Smith, moved to withdraw from the case (DE 43). The
Court granted the motion and appointed new counsel, Chad Piotrowski, that same day (DE 45).
During a status conference on December 12, 2024, the Court set this matter for an
evidentiary hearing to determine competency on February 13, 2025, at the request of the Parties
(DE 56). 	On February 7, 2025, Defendant requested that the evidentiary hearing be continued,
1 That same day, prior defense counsel Jan Smith submitted a Motion to Cancel Competency
Hearing, stating Defendant did not wish to have a competency hearing and demanded that he not
be transported (DE 34). In response to this Motion, the Court cancelled the competency hearing
set for October 23, 2024 (DE 35).
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and the Government did not oppose the request (DE 63). 	The Court continued the evidentiary
hearing to April 16, 2025 (DE 64, 65). 	At Defendant’s request, Dr. Mark J. Mills evaluated
Defendant at the Federal Detention Center and memorialized his opinions in an April 10, 2025
letter, which was submitted to the Court and the Parties (DE 71). On April 11, 2025, Defendant
again requested a continuance of the evidentiary hearing, without opposition from the Government
(DE 70). The Court held a status conference on April 16, 2025 and reset the evidentiary hearing
for June 10, 2025, at the request of the Parties (DE 79).
The Government requested that a second competency evaluation of Defendant be
performed before the evidentiary hearing, which Defendant did not oppose (DE 81). The Court
granted that request and ordered a second competency evaluation (DE 83). The Parties requested
a continuance of the June 10, 2025 evidentiary hearing to allow for additional evaluations to be
completed by both of their experts (DE 84). Dr. Mills evaluated Defendant a second time at the
Federal Detention Center on June 5, 2025 and memorialized his opinions in a June 8, 2025 letter,
which was submitted to the Court and the Parties (DE 88).
On June 5, 2025, Defendant filed a Motion for Nelson Hearing, requesting that Mr.
Piotrowski be removed from the case and that new counsel be appointed (DE 85). Mr. Piotrowski
also filed a Motion to Withdraw as Attorney on June 10, 2025 (DE 90). The Court held an ex parte
Nelson hearing on June 25, 2025, at which the Court heard from Defendant and Mr. Piotrowski
(DE 94). The Court held a second hearing, part of which was conducted ex parte on July 10, 2025,
at which the Parties requested another continuance of the evidentiary hearing (DE 95). 	The
transcripts from the June 25, 2025 hearing and the ex parte portion of the July 10, 2025 hearing
were sealed by the Court. 	The Court denied Defendant’s request for new counsel and Mr.
Piotrowski’s request to withdraw from the case and scheduled the evidentiary hearing for July 23,
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2025 (DE 95, 98). 	Defendant subsequently filed an unopposed motion to unseal the transcripts
from the June 25, 2025 hearing and the ex parte portion of the July 10, 2025 hearing and provide
them to Dr. Schumacher and Dr. Mills for use in evaluating Defendant’s mental state (DE 99). The
Court permitted a limited unsealing of the transcripts, allowing them to be provided to Dr.
Schumacher and Dr. Mills “solely for the purpose of evaluating Defendant’s competency” (DE
107).2
Dr. Schumacher completed a second evaluation of Defendant and memorialized her
opinions in an August 7, 2025 report, which was submitted to the Court and the Parties (DE 108).
The Parties requested another continuance of the evidentiary hearing, which the Court granted and
rescheduled the evidentiary hearing for August 21, 2025 (DE 105). 	Due to an issue at the jail,
Defendant was not brought to the courthouse on August 21, 2025, and the Court reset the
evidentiary hearing on Defendant’s competency to stand trial for September 3, 2025 (DE 114).
II. 	REPORTS BY THE PARTIES’ MEDICAL EXPERTS
A. The Government’s Expert - Dr. Lauren Schumacher
Dr. Lauren Schumacher, Psy. D., a Forensic Psychologist employed by the Federal Bureau
of Prisons (“BOP”), evaluated Defendant at the Federal Detention Center to determine his
competency to stand trial and memorialized her findings and opinions in a September 12, 2024
2 Defendant later moved to release these transcripts to the Government subject to a protective order
so that they could be used in the evidentiary hearing (DE 111). By its August 18, 2025 Order, the
Court permitted the release of the transcripts to the Government with several restrictions, including
but not limited to: (1) “Defense counsel shall redact all information that does not directly relate to
the 	issues 	being 	addressed 	at 	the August 	21, 	2025 	evidentiary 	hearing 	on 	Defendant’s
competency”; (2) “[T]o the extent there are any inculpatory, or potentially inculpatory statements,
related to this matter or other matters for which Defendant could face criminal liability, statements
about defense strategy, and statements about Defendant’s theory of the case, those statements shall
be redacted from the transcript”; and (3) “[T]he Government may use the transcripts solely for the
purpose of the August 21, 2025 competency hearing in this case. The information in the redacted
transcripts may not be used for any other purpose, absent an Order of the Court” (DE 112).
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report (DE 29; Gov’t Ex. 2). The report summarized Dr. Schumacher’s assessment procedures,
background information provided by Defendant, Dr. Schumacher’s evaluation findings, and her
opinion as to Defendant’s present competence to stand trial (DE 29). 	The report also listed
information reviewed from supplemental sources, including legal documents and reports from this
case and BOP central, medical, and psychological records from June 6, 2024 to August 29, 2024
(id.). 	Dr. Schumacher stated, “[R]esults on psychological testing in various domains reflect
[Defendant’s] level of functioning is higher than what he was attempting to portray” (id. at 12).
Indeed, she opined that Defendant had been malingering, as “[Defendant] endorsed a level of
bizarre symptoms associated with his legal situation” (id. at 11). 	Ultimately, Dr. Schumacher
concluded, “While the true extent of his legal knowledge and abilities was difficult to determine
given his uncandid presentation, there is no evidence of any acute phase of mental illness that
would preclude his understanding of the legal process and a capacity to assist in his own defense,
if motivated to do so” (id. at 12).
Dr. Schumacher evaluated Defendant a second time and memorialized her findings and
opinions in an August 7, 2025 report (DE 108; Gov’t Ex. 2). 	Dr. Schumacher stated that she
reviewed several external materials in additional to materials mentioned during her previous
evaluation, including June 28, 2023 records from New Horizons Community Mental Health
Center, Inc. (“ New Horizons ”), Dr. Mills’s April 10, 2025 letter, BOP central, medical, and
psychological records from June 6, 2024 through July 25, 2025, and monitored telephone calls
placed by Defendant from various dates (DE 108 at 2). 	She also spoke to correctional staff
regarding Defendant’s adjustment to his unit and incarceration in general (id. at 3).
In detailing Defendant’s psychiatric history, Dr. Schumacher discussed the information
contained in the New Horizons medical records. 	Specifically, Defendant was seen for 25
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minutes on June 28, 2023 as part of an outpatient psychiatrist visit with a complaint of
hallucinations (id. at 4). As a result of that visit, Defendant was diagnosed with schizophrenia
and received anti-depressant and anti-psychotic medications (id. at 4-5). Dr. Schumacher also
discussed an intake assessment that was conducted by Dr. Jessica Seaton, Ph.D., Chief
Psychologist, upon Defendant’s initial arrival at the jail (id. at 5). “As a result of this screening,
[Defendant] . . . was opined to be stable, and therefore, did not warrant ongoing mental health
services” (id.). Additionally, on September 12, 2024, Defendant “was provided with a Carel-
MH assignment [,] . . . reflecting [he] did not exhibit mental health concerns warranting
routine intervention from psychology staff at the institution . . . until the onset of the current
evaluation” (id.). “Since the conclusion of the previous evaluation period, no concerns have
been reported regarding [D]efendant’s mental status or behavior to psychology staff by other
departments interacting with [him]” (id.).
After detailing various observations related to Defendant’s behavior, current mental status,
and written and verbal communications, and discussing the results of the psychological testing,
Dr. Schumacher found, “[D]efendant meets criteria for classification under the current system of
diagnostic psychiatric disorders . . . [for a]ntisocial personality disorder and malingering” (id.
at 8-10). Dr. Schumacher further stated, “A psychotic disorder was considered for [Defendant],
as available records reflect he was diagnosed with schizophrenia in June of 2023” (id. at 11).
In any event, “the culmination of objective psychological testing results and behavioral
observations are not consistent with someone who is experiencing a genuine psychotic
disorder” (id.). “[H]is clinical presentation spanning over a year period at the FDC Miami is
inconsistent with experience of an acute phase of mental illness, such as a psychotic disorder
. . .” (id. at 12). Dr. Schumacher also reaffirmed her prior finding of malingering, as “[t]here were
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discrepancies in his reported experience of symptoms and behavioral observations, as well as
previous psychological testing results reflective of intentional exaggeration/fabrication of
symptoms” (id.).
In her August 7, 2025 report, Dr. Schumacher reached the following conclusions: (1)
“[Defendant] has been diagnosed with a personality disorder, although this is not considered a
mental disease or defect” (id. at 13); (2) “[Defendant] has an ability to understand the nature
and consequences of the proceedings against him” (id. at 14); and (3) “[Defendant] presents
with a sufficient ability to assist property [sic] in his defense if motivated to do so” (id. at 15).
In light of these conclusions, Dr. Schumacher stated, “While the true extent of his legal
knowledge and abilities was difficult to determine given his lack of candor during clinical
interviews and on testing administered during the evaluation period, he failed to exhibit
symptoms of a mental disease or defect that would interfere with his factual or rational
understanding of the proceedings or his ability to assist toward his defense” (id.). According
to Dr. Schumacher, Defendant is therefore competent to proceed and “is expected to retain
competency for the foreseeable future” (id. at 15-16).
B. The Defense’s Expert - Dr. Mark J. Mills
At Defendant’s request, Dr. Mark J. Mills, J.D., M.D., evaluated Defendant on February
25, 2025 at the Federal Detention Center to determine his competency to stand trial and
memorialized his findings and opinions in an April 10, 2025 letter (DE 71; Def Ex. 3).3 The letter
summarized Dr. Mills’s evaluation of Defendant, his assessment of Dr. Schumacher’s September
12, 2024 report, and his conclusions as to Defendant’s non-compliance with psychological testing
3 The same April 10, 2025 letter from Dr. Mills appears to have been filed twice on the docket (see
DE 71, 76).
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and the need for further assessment (DE 71). Notably, Dr. Mills stated, “Over the course of fifty
years as a psychiatrist, with 2,500 forensic assessments and perhaps 8,000 clinical evaluations, I
have seen many paranoid and frightened people, but . . . Mr. Robinson is among the top three or
four most paranoid, out of more than l0,000” (id. at 2). With respect to the psychological testing
discussed in Dr. Schumacher’s September 12, 2024 report, Dr. Mills found, “I believe that most of
Mr. Robinson’s results could be explained as well, or better if Mr. Robinson rather than
malingering was simply non-compliant; that is, it [sic] he did not try during the testing and/or
answered randomly/carelessly” (id. at 3 (emphasis in original)). Dr. Mills further concluded, “[Mr.
Robinson’s] discussions with me demonstrated extreme paranoia most consistent with an
underlying psychotic disorder. So, I conclude that his paranoia is real and probably reflects such a
disorder” (id. at 4).
Dr. Mills evaluated Defendant a second time at the Federal Detention Center on June 5,
2025 and memorialized his findings and opinions in a June 8, 2025 letter (DE 88; Def Ex. 4). Dr.
Mills stated, “I continue to believe, even after reviewing Dr. Schumacher’s additional testing data,
that Mr. Robinson was more apt to have been disinterested during the psychological testing than
he was attempting to malinger” (DE 88 at 2). Moreover, “Mr. Robinson remains among the most
paranoid individuals I have even [sic] evaluated. Since paranoia is a common manifestation of
schizophrenia, Mr. Robinson’s extreme paranoia could easily fit into such a diagnosis” (id.). Dr.
Mills opined that Mr. Robinson would benefit from “a brief hospitalization to restore his
competence” (id. at 3). 	Lastly, Dr. Mills concluded, “More than I previously realized, Mr.
Robinson’s paranoia is clinically disabling and it clearly prevents him from assisting in his own
defense” (id. (emphasis in original)). 	In reaching this conclusion, Dr. Mills referenced his
observations of Defendant interacting with Mr. Piotrowski at the jail and Defendant’s statements
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to Dr. Mills that Mr. Piotrowski was “colluding with the judge to disenfranchise him of his rights
and to railroad him into prison[,]” despite reassurances from Dr. Mills and Mr. Piotrowski that they
were intending to help him (id.).
III. 	THE SEPTEMBER 3, 2025 EVIDENTIARY HEARING
The Court held a hearing in this matter on September 3, 2025, at which the Parties, through
counsel, and Defendant were present (DE 118). At the hearing, the defense called Dr. Mills to
testify, and the Government called Dr. Schumacher. 	The Parties stipulated that based on their
training and experience, Dr. Mills should be qualified as an expert in the field of Forensic
Psychiatry with Board Certification, and Dr. Schumacher should be qualified as an expert in the
field of Forensic Psychology. The defense offered four exhibits into evidence, including the April
10, 2025 and June 8, 2025 letters from Dr. Mills (Def Exs. 3 and 4) and the redacted transcripts
from the June 25, 2025 and July 10, 2025 hearings (Def Exs. 1 and 2). The Government offered
two exhibits into evidence, including the September 12, 2024 and August 7, 2025 reports from Dr.
Schumacher (Gov’t Exs. 1 and 2).
Dr. Mills began his testimony by recounting his extensive qualifications as a psychiatrist
for nearly 50 years, who has completed several hundred competency evaluations throughout his
career. Dr. Mills testified that he met with Defendant for approximately one hour on each of two
occasions – February 25, 2025 and June 5, 2025.4 During the second visit, Dr. Mills recounted
that he saw Defendant interact with Mr. Piotrowski at the jail and portrayed the interaction as
hostile, with Defendant accusing Mr. Piotrowski of being “compromised” and failing to represent
Defendant. Dr. Mills stated that Defendant is one of the most paranoid people he has ever seen,
4 Dr. Mills’s mistakenly testified at one point that he met Defendant on April 10, 2025, instead of
June 5, 2025.
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describing him as hostile, brittle, and angry. 	Dr. Mills further stated that during his first
assessment, Defendant got up and left when he did not like the questions being asked. During the
second assessment, Dr. Mills stated he made more progress with Defendant until Mr. Piotrowski
arrived. 	Dr. 	Mills 	stated 	that 	Defendant’s 	paranoia 	prevented 	Defendant 	from 	working
meaningfully with Mr. Piotrowski.
According to Dr. Mills, Defendant suffers from persecutory delusions, though he may also
have an antisocial personality. Dr. Mills further testified that he cannot rule out the possibility that
Defendant is malingering, though Dr. Mills believes Defendant is more accurately characterized
as non-compliant, resistant, or reluctant. Nevertheless, Dr. Mills stated that even if Defendant is
malingering, that does not vitiate or diminish his mental illness. Dr. Mills testified that Defendant’s
paranoia is so great that Defendant likely suffers from schizophrenia or a delusional disorder.5 Dr.
Mills also noted Defendant’s prior diagnosis of schizophrenia by New Horizons, though Dr. Mills
had not reviewed those records, and Defendant’s history of substance abuse.
Dr. Mills further testified that he reviewed the transcripts from the June 25, 2025 and July
10, 2025 hearings and concluded that Defendant cannot cooperate with counsel in any meaningful
way, as Defendant thinks everyone is out to harm him. Dr. Mills stated that Defendant’s refusal to
cooperate is a combination of a thought disorder and great paranoia and Defendant’s voluntary
choice not to cooperate. Dr. Mills testified that Defendant’s belief that his attorney is conspiring
against him prevents him from being forthcoming, cooperative, and listening to his attorney. In
5 Dr. Mills affirmed on cross-examination that paranoia without other symptoms is not sufficient
to diagnose an individual with schizophrenia. 	He further clarified that whether Defendant has
schizophrenia or delusional disorder is ultimately academic – either way, in his opinion, Defendant
has a psychotic disorder which prevents him from assisting his counsel in his defense. However,
because Dr. Mills could not obtain enough information from Defendant that he felt was sufficiently
reliable, Dr. Mills stopped short of diagnosing Defendant with a specific psychotic disorder. Dr.
Mills also repeatedly testified that he was struck by the severe degree of Defendant’s paranoia.
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other words, Defendant is so profoundly paranoid that he cannot meaningfully engage with his
counsel. According to Dr. Mills, the record is clear that Defendant is not competent to proceed
and hospitalization with anti-psychotic medication may restore him to competency.6
Next, 	Dr. 	Schumacher 	testified 	about 	her 	educational 	background 	and 	significant
experience conducting competency evaluations as a Forensic Psychologist with BOP. 	Dr.
Schumacher testified that she evaluated Defendant on two occasions and memorialized her
findings in two reports – a September 12, 2024 report and an August 7, 2025 report. In terms of
her contact with Defendant, Dr. Schumacher stated that she spent between eight and nine hours of
evaluation time, observed Defendant in his housing unit at the jail on numerous occasions over the
course of approximately a year, listened to at least four hours of recorded telephone calls with
Defendant, and spoke to correctional officers who work in Defendant’s housing unit. Defendant
was also interviewed by three other psychologists at the jail, with whom Dr. Schumacher
consulted, as well as medical team staff and unit team staff.
Dr. Schumacher then testified about her conclusions that Defendant was competent to stand
trial in this matter, that Defendant did not suffer from any mental disease or defect, though Dr.
Schumacher did diagnose Defendant with antisocial personality disorder, and that Defendant was
malingering.7 	In concluding that Defendant was malingering, Dr. Schumacher stated that she
considered Defendant’s test results, which suggested overt feigning or malingering of symptoms,
telephones calls, reports of Defendant’s interactions in his housing unit, and Defendant’s self-
reporting compared to behavioral observations. She discussed, for example, how on multiple tests,
6 Dr. Mills testified that Defendant refused to take medication at the jail.
7 Dr. Schumacher testified that while personality disorders are listed in the Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual 5 (“DSM-5”), which clinicians use to categorize various clinical presentations,
these disorders are not considered mental diseases or defects and are not psychotic disorders.
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Defendant’s responses produced a score that fell significantly below chance levels, which
suggested that he was purposefully selecting the wrong answers and imploring a deliberate
approach to present himself as more impaired.8
Dr. Schumacher then testified that she does not believe there is evidence that suggests
Defendant is currently exhibiting psychosis. In reaching that conclusion, Dr. Schumacher stated
that she questioned the New Horizons diagnosis of schizophrenia, because it was based on a single
contact of about 25 minutes, no records demonstrated Defendant exhibited a continuous phase of
symptoms to support the diagnosis, and the presence of symptoms was based solely on Defendant’s
self-report.9 According to Dr. Schumacher, when you break down Defendant’s statements and
behavior, it is more appropriately characterized as cynicism and mistrust of the legal system and
his attorney, which is exacerbated by the symptoms of his antisocial personality disorder. In other
words, Dr. Schumacher stated that she does not believe that Defendant’s distrust of the legal system
and his attorney are grounded in any non-reality-based belief or overt delusion. Dr. Schumacher
ultimately concluded that Defendant is presently competent to stand trial.
IV. 	LEGAL STANDARD
The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits
the Government from prosecuting defendants who are incompetent. See U.S. Const. Amend. V;
Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171 (1975) (“It has long been accepted that a person whose
mental condition is such that he lacks the capacity to understand the nature and object of the
8 Dr. Schumacher explained that if someone were just guessing answers for the test, that person’s
score would fall within chance levels. 	Defendant’s scores were also lower than the range of
defendants who were truly incompetent.
9 Dr. Schumacher testified that a diagnosis of schizophrenia should be based on at least a six-month
period of documented symptoms. 	Further, schizophrenia does not typically onset when an
individual is in his mid-30s, like Defendant. Dr. Schumacher testified that clinicians usually expect
schizophrenia to onset in an individual’s early to mid-20s.
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proceedings against him, to consult with counsel, and to assist in preparing his defense may not be
subjected to a trial.”). 	“For a defendant to be competent to stand trial, he must have ‘sufficient
present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding . . .
and have a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.’” United States
v. Rahim, 431 F.3d 753, 759 (11th Cir. 2005) (quoting Medina v. Singletary, 59 F.3d 1095, 1106
(11th Cir. 1995)); Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960) (same).
Title 18, United States Code, Section 4241 sets forth the procedures for determining a
defendant’s competency to stand trial:
If, after the hearing, the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the
defendant is presently suffering from a mental disease or defect rendering him
mentally incompetent to the extent that he is unable to understand the nature and
consequences of the proceedings against him or to assist properly in his defense,
the court shall commit the defendant to the custody of the Attorney General.
18 U.S.C. § 4241(d); see also 18 U.S.C. § 4241(a) (providing the court shall grant a motion for a
competency hearing, or shall order such a hearing sua sponte, where “there is reasonable cause to
believe that the defendant may presently be suffering from a mental disease or defect rendering
him mentally incompetent to the extent that he is unable to understand the nature and consequences
of the proceedings against him or to assist properly in his defense.”); United States v. Alhindi, 97
F.4th 814, 817 (11th Cir. 2024) (“[Section] 4241 allows any participant in the case to raise the
issue of the defendant’s competency. This feature . . . underlines the importance of protecting both
a defendant’s right not to be tried if he is not mentally competent and the system’s legitimacy by
trying only mentally competent defendants.”). 	The standard for determining competency or
incompetency is a preponderance of the evidence.10 See United States v. Marks, 156 F.4th 1169,
10 Whether the burden of proof is on Defendant to demonstrate his incompetency by a
preponderance of the evidence or the Government to show Defendant’s competency by a
preponderance of the evidence, it would not alter the Court’s findings and conclusions in this case,
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1175, 1178 (11th Cir. 2025) (finding the court was not required to determine, as a general matter,
whether the burden of proof in competency proceedings rests with the Government, Defendant, or
the moving party where the evidence is not in equipoise).
V. 	DISCUSSION
In this case, we start with the points on which the Parties agree. First, the Parties agree that
Defendant has expressed extreme distrust for two court-appointed attorneys, including his first
attorney from the Federal Public Defender’s Office, Mr. Smith, and his CJA attorney, Mr.
Piotrowski. Defendant views both attorneys as “compromised,” though for different reasons, as
Dr. Schumacher pointed out. Defendant has also expressed hostility toward the Court, Dr. Mills,
and Dr. Schumacher. 	Indeed, the Court observed first-hand during legal proceedings Defendant’s
uncooperative demeanor, which is consistent with the testimony provided by Dr. Mills and Dr.
Schumacher and reflected in the June 25, 2025 and July 10, 2025 hearing transcripts. The first
main point of divergence between Dr. Mills and Dr. Schumacher, however, is whether Defendant’s
distrust and hostility towards virtually all actors in these proceedings is rooted in extreme paranoia
that is the byproduct of a psychotic disorder, such as schizophrenia or delusional disorder, or
whether Defendant’s conduct is volitional, not born out of any delusion, but exacerbated by his
antisocial personality disorder. Dr. Mills and Dr. Schumacher next disagree on whether Defendant
has the ability to assist in his defense and whether Defendant is presently competent to stand trial.
For the reasons explained below, the preponderance of the evidence establishes that Defendant is
competent to proceed.
A. Defendant is Not Presently Suffering from a Mental Disease or Defect.
“Incompetency to stand trial is not defined in terms of mental illness. As such, a defendant
can be competent to stand trial despite being mentally ill and similarly a defendant can be found
discussed supra, as the evidence is not “in equipoise; that is, where the evidence that a defendant
is competent is just as strong as the evidence that he is incompetent.” Marks, 156 F.4th at 1178.
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incompetent to stand trial without being mentally ill.” United States v. Williams, No. 06-CR-36,
2007 WL 1655371, at *5 (M.D. Fla. June 7, 2007) (citations omitted). In fact, incompetency to
stand trial is not demonstrated solely by the existence of a mental defect, intellectual disability, or
low intellect. See United States v. Greene, 767 F. App’x 793, 797 (11th Cir. 2019) (“In the absence
of evidence that the defendant was incapable of understanding the proceedings sufficiently to assist
counsel, low intelligence, mental deficiency, or signs of mental illness are insufficient to show
incompetence.”) (quotations omitted). 	“The competency inquiry, then, is a functional one. It
focuses on the criminal defendant’s capacity to contribute sufficiently to his own defense to allow
a fair trial and, ultimately, serves to protect both the defendant and society against erroneous
convictions.” 	Watts v. Singletary, 87 F.3d 1282, 1286 (11th Cir. 1996). 	“The determination of
whether a defendant is mentally competent to stand trial is a question left to the sound discretion
of the district court, with the advice of psychiatrists [or other mental health professionals]. The
medical opinion of experts as to the competency of a defendant to stand trial is not binding on the
court . . . .” United States v. Abernathy, No. 08-CR-20103, 2009 WL 982794, at *3 (E.D. Mich.
Apr. 13, 2009) (citation omitted).
Courts are required to probe a defendant’s competency whenever there is a “bona fide
doubt” as to the defendant’s competence. 	Rahim, 431 F.3d at 759. 	In making a competency
determination, the Court may consider a number of factors, including the defendant’s behavior in
the courtroom, evidence of irrational behavior, and any prior medical opinions as to competence.
Drope, 420 U.S. at 180. 	Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit has permitted courts to consider a
defendant’s behavior and statements in open court, letters drafted by the defendant, and previous
psychological evaluations. See Rahim, 431 F.3d at 759. While it may consider expert testimony
in determining competency, the Court is free to assign whatever weight it determines is due to such
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testimony. See Battle v. United States, 419 F.3d 1292, 1299 (11th Cir. 2005) (affirming the district
court’s decision finding the defendant competent because the Government’s experts were found to
be more persuasive).
Here, Dr. Mills and Dr. Schumacher offer competing opinions about whether Defendant
suffers from a psychotic disorder that results in extreme paranoia and delusions. Dr. Mills testified
that although he did not have enough reliable information to make a specific diagnosis, in Dr.
Mills’s expert opinion, Defendant has a psychotic disorder that prevents him from cooperating
with counsel. Dr. Mills reiterated throughout his written findings and his testimony that he was
struck by Defendant’s degree of profound paranoia, which indicated to him that Defendant’s
hostile and uncooperative conduct was not volitional but rather, the result of a serious underlying
mental disorder.11 	Dr. Mills explained that for purposes of the competency inquiry, whether
Defendant suffers from delusional disorder, schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, or some other
diagnosis, is ultimately irrelevant, because Defendant has some psychotic disorder with such
extreme paranoia that he cannot assist his counsel in his defense.
In support of this opinion, Dr. Mills discussed his two evaluations of Defendant that lasted
approximately one hour each and particularly, the second evaluation where he observed Defendant
interact with Mr. Piotrowski at the jail. 	Dr. Mills also relied on the June 25, 2025 and July 10,
2025 hearing transcripts, which suggested that Defendant cannot cooperate with counsel in any
meaningful way, and he reviewed Dr. Schumacher’s reports. Dr. Mills discussed speaking with
Defendant’s mother for approximately 30 minutes in total on two occasions regarding Defendant’s
11 Dr. Mills also clarified that Defendant could be suffering from a psychotic disorder and antisocial
personality disorder, and those two diagnoses are not exclusive of one another. Besides that, Dr.
Mills stated it is also possible that Defendant was malingering or non-compliant in the
administration of psychiatric testing. 	In sum, none of Dr. Schumacher’s diagnoses mean that
Defendant does not have a psychotic level illness.
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medical and mental health history, including the New Horizons diagnosis of schizophrenia, for
which New Horizons prescribed anti-psychotic medication. Furthermore, Dr. Mills noted that even
though he believes Defendant is suffering from a psychotic disorder, Defendant does not lack all
volition and can contain his symptoms in certain isolated settings, which explains his ability to
appear normal on the jail calls with his family. Overall, Dr. Mills opined that Defendant would
benefit from medical treatment to dispel his paranoia and likely restore him to competency.
In contrast, Dr. Schumacher opined that Defendant suffers from antisocial personality
disorder and malingering, but not a psychotic disorder. She described personality disorders as a
way for clinicians to characterize dysfunctional, pervasive ways an individual interacts with his
environment, which may cause distress but does not involve an impaired understanding of reality.
In other words, Dr. Schumacher stated that the resulting behaviors from a personality disorder are
volitional, though they may be maladaptive.12 Dr. Schumacher further stated that throughout her
interaction with Defendant, she did not observe any indication that Defendant was responding to
internal stimuli, such as hallucinations, and he did not exhibit any bizarre, non-reality-based
beliefs. Additionally, no such observations were made by individuals at the jail who interacted
with Defendant on his housing unit.
Next, Dr. Schumacher discussed some of Defendant’s filings in this case requesting a new
attorney. 	With respect to Mr. Smith, Defendant’s first attorney, Dr. Schumacher noted that
Defendant raised concerns about Mr. Smith’s location in Fort Lauderdale when Defendant was
housed in Miami, and other reality-based concerns, such as his success rate in criminal cases, in
addition to his general distrust of the criminal justice system given his involvement since the age
12 For antisocial personality disorder specifically, Dr. Schumacher testified that a clinician would
typically see antisocial behavior, such as breaking the law, and the individual is typically deceitful,
manipulative, impulsive, and has a hostile way of interacting with others.
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of nine. 	With respect to Mr. Piotrowski, Dr. Schumacher noted that Defendant raised concerns
about his legal representation being funded by the Government when he is also being prosecuted
by the Government and Mr. Piotrowski’s failure to consult Defendant and file motions that
Defendant wants. According to Dr. Schumacher, while these concerns may not be valid, they are
not based in overt delusions; they are based in reality. 	Defendant’s concerns and outbursts are
grounded in his perception that his defense attorney does not consult him or represent him
appropriately, that the Court does not handle a matter the way he wishes, or that he is targeted by
the criminal justice system, all of which are exacerbated by his antisocial personality traits.
To support this interpretation of Defendant’s behavior, Dr. Schumacher stated that aside
from Defendant’s self-reporting and the single contact with New Horizons, no records show
Defendant exhibited a continuous phase of symptoms to support a schizophrenia diagnosis.
Furthermore, Dr. Schumacher stated that if Defendant experienced a circumscribed delusion
related to the legal system, she would expect it to be more pervasive than interactions related to
the competency evaluation and court proceedings. Still, there is no evidence of delusional thinking
by Defendant in hours of jail calls with people Defendant trusts, in observations of jail staff, and
in Defendant’s contacts with four psychiatrists and psychologists at the jail over the course of more
than a year.13 She noted that when given a forum to express his concerns in the courtroom, instead
of doing so, Defendant repeatedly referred to his writings, which is inconsistent with her
experience involving individuals who suffer from genuine delusions. 	Dr. Schumacher testified
that she considered whether Defendant suffered from a psychotic disorder but ruled that conclusion
13 To illustrate this point, Dr. Schumacher anecdotally contrasted Defendant with another
individual, who experienced delusional thinking related to possessing nuclear codes. She testified
that the individual used any means available, including telephone calls, court appearances, and
talking to any staff on his unit who would listen, to bring attention to the injustices he believed
that he was experiencing due to his delusions.
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out, because given all the data points, Defendant’s behavior was most consistent with his
personality traits, marked by hostility towards authority and mistrust of individuals involved with
his legal case. According to Dr. Schumacher, Defendant’s behavior is exaggerated or fabricated
to some extent when Defendant is seeking a specific motive, such as obtaining new counsel.
Faced with opposing interpretations of the evidence, the Court finds that Dr. Schumacher’s
opinion is more persuasive. See Marks, 2025 WL 2935320, at *9 (“[W]hen a trial [court’s] finding
is based on his decision to credit the testimony of one of two or more witnesses, each of whom has
told a coherent and facially plausible story that is not contradicted by extrinsic evidence, that
finding, if not internally inconsistent, can virtually never be clear error.” (citation omitted)); Battle
v. United States, 419 F.3d 1292, 1299 (11th Cir. 2005) (“[F]aced with ‘diametrically opposite
expert testimony,’ a district court does not clearly err simply by crediting one opinion over another
where other record evidence exists to support the conclusion.” (citation omitted)). 	First, it is
uncontroverted that Dr. Schumacher spent more time evaluating Defendant – between eight and
nine hours compared to two hours by Dr. Mills – over a longer period – more than a year compared
to less than six months by Dr. Mills. 	See Battle, 419 F.3d at 1299 (finding “the government’s
witnesses – who had evaluated [the defendant] over a longer and more consistent period of time –
more persuasive”). 	Dr. Schumacher also considered a greater breadth of evidence, such as
Defendant’s jail calls, the New Horizons and jail records, and observations of correctional staff
that routinely interacted with Defendant at the jail. In addition, Dr. Schumacher administered, or
attempted to administer, a litany of psychological tests to Defendant.
Even more, Dr. Schumacher considered contacts and observations of Defendant that were
not directly related to the competency evaluation or courtroom proceedings and noted there was
no evidence of delusions or paranoia from those contacts. Considering the absence of delusions
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when Defendant’s criminal case is not implicated, in conjunction with the test results described by
Dr. Schumacher that suggest Defendant is malingering, the weight of the evidence reveals that
Defendant’s antisocial personality traits, such as his hostility, uncooperativeness, and aggression,
are rooted in his profound mistrust of the criminal justice system and may be exaggerated by efforts
to manipulate court processes to achieve a desired goal, rather than non-reality-based beliefs.14
Dr. Schumacher convincingly asserted that all available evidence suggests Defendant’s behavior
in every circumstance examined appears to reflect his interpretation, or often misinterpretation, of
reality-based events colored by his pervasive distrust of his attorney, the Government, the Court,
and even the experts tasked with evaluating him. 	Lastly, although Dr. Mills firmly concluded
Defendant suffered from a psychotic disorder, he was unable to specify the disorder from which
Defendant suffers based on the available evidence. Dr. Schumacher, on the other hand, diagnosed
Defendant with antisocial personality disorder and malingering, based on a multitude of tests that
she administered, among other evidence, and definitively ruled out a psychotic disorder. 	The
credible evidence, therefore, casts sufficient doubt on the conclusion that Defendant is presently
suffering from a psychotic disorder.
B. Defendant Can Understand the Proceedings and Assist in his Defense.
Notwithstanding Dr. Schumacher’s opinion, even if Dr. Mills’s conclusion that Defendant
is presently suffering from a psychotic disorder is correct, the Court must still assess whether
Defendant is competent within the meaning of Section 4241. See Medina v. Singletary, 59 F.3d
1095, 1107 (11th Cir. 1995) (“[N]either low intelligence, mental deficiency, nor bizarre, volatile,
and irrational behavior can be equated with mental incompetence to stand trial.”); United States v.
14 The Court does not, and need not, make a specific finding as to whether Defendant was
malingering or simply uncooperative during the test-taking process, as Dr. Mills opined.
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McKnight, No. 23-CR-20439, 2025 WL 1490135, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 21, 2025), report and
recommendation adopted, No. 23-CR-20439, 2025 WL 1488741 (S.D. Fla. May 23, 2025)
(“[I]ncompetency to stand trial is not defined or established by the existence of a mental defect,
intellectual disability, or low intellect.”). 	“To be competent, a defendant must have ‘sufficient
present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding . . .
[and] ha[ve] a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.’” United
States v. Utsick, 45 F.4th 1325, 1338 (11th Cir. 2022) (citation omitted). “The competency inquiry
is a functional analysis that ‘focuses on the criminal defendant’s capacity to contribute sufficiently
to his own defense to allow a fair trial’ and that requires a case-by-case assessment.” McKnight,
2025 WL 1490135, at *3 (citation omitted).
In the August 7, 2025 report, Dr. Schumacher summarized her previous findings from
September 12, 2024 that when Defendant was administered the Georgia Court Competency Test
(“GCCT-MSH”), Defendant’s “performance was below the range that would be expected of a truly
incompetent defendant. Further, [he] . . . endorsed a level of bizarre symptoms associated with his
legal situation, which is associated with malingering of trial incompetency” (DE 108 at 7).
Similarly, when administered the Inventory of Legal Knowledge (“ILK”), Defendant’s “total score
was lower than scores typically obtained amongst persons with genuine mental illness” (id.). As
part of her second evaluation, Dr. Schumacher attempted to administer an objective measure of
legal knowledge and abilities related to trial competency (“ECST-R”) on July 2, 2025 (id. at 12-
13). She reported the following results:
[Defendant] evidenced an uncooperative test taking approach, resulting in the
premature termination of this measure. While he answered questions relevant to
his perception of his attorney . . . and a few questions related to his factual
understanding of the legal system . . ., he would not abide by subsequent test
instructions. For example, [Defendant] was asked about the role of a defense
attorney. He proceeded to explain his perception of his appointed counsel,
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repeatedly asserting a negative perception in [sic] this individual. The defendant
was reminded that he was provided with the opportunity to discuss this
information and was redirected to the question at hand. [Defendant] then
asserted a perception that I was forcing him to answer ‘how [I] wanted [him]
to.’ He was educated regarding the structured nature of the questions on this
measure, although he continued to voice a perception that he was being coerced
into 	answering 	questions. 	As 	a 	result, 	this 	measure 	was 	discontinued.
Subsequent 	attempts 	were 	made 	to 	resume 	this 	measure; 	however, 	he
consistently refused to meet with me for all remaining evaluation contacts.
(Id. at 13). Later in the report, Dr. Schumacher found that after repeated prompting, Defendant
correctly identified the role of the Judge and the defense attorney (id. at 14). She stated, “While
the defendant was largely uncooperative with attempts to complete formal interviewing and/or
assessments related to his competency, the information available suggests insight into the
allegations against him” (id.). She further observed that in Defendant’s writings, “he alludes
to the evidence against him and an awareness of case specific information” (id.). 	Dr.
Schumacher concluded,
While the extent of his legal knowledge is unclear, given his uncooperative
approach to evaluation procedures, he does not evidence deficits that would
preclude his ability to understand his current legal situation, the charges against
him and facts relevant to his case, and possible outcomes. The culmination of
his verbalizations and writings reflect an understanding of legal procedures,
defense strategies, and possible pleas. [Defendant] evidences his ability to
disclose pertinent facts relevant to his case.
(Id.). With respect to Defendant’s ability to assist in his defense, Dr. Schumacher observed that
while Defendant has a strained opinion of his attorney, he “requested to speak with his attorney
at the beginning of the evaluation period to discuss his participation and made continued
requests to speak with counsel. Unit Team staff also confirmed his communication with his
defense attorney” (id. at 15). She noted that Defendant “submitted numerous writings to the
Court reflective of self-advocacy and participation in his defense” (id.). 	Dr. Schumacher
concluded, “[Defendant] appeared to be actively engaged in his defense, discussed potential
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defense strategies, and provided writings reflected understanding of various dynamics
relevant to his legal strategy” (id.).
In support of these findings, Dr. Schumacher testified that during her last contact with
Defendant in the jail, she told Defendant it was the last opportunity to meet with her before the
evaluation period concluded; Defendant responded that he did not want to speak with her, because
he had not yet had the chance to consult with his attorney about any additional contacts. 	Dr.
Schumacher further testified that Defendant requested to become an orderly in his housing unit.15
The unit staff at the jail were very familiar with Defendant, as they initially offered the orderly
position to Defendant, but he did not report to his counselor’s office to accept it. Dr. Schumacher
stated that when she spoke to unit staff there were no reported symptoms associated with a mental
illness. 	Moreover, Dr. Schumacher pointed out that Defendant has been housed in the same
housing unit for over a year and has been able to comport his behavior appropriately. She stated
that there was only one incident report in that time, where Defendant claimed he was disrespectful
to jail staff because they were disrespectful to him first. According to Dr. Schumacher, Defendant
routinely followed institutional procedures, understood instructions from unit staff, and there were
no concerns whatsoever about Defendant’s functioning and behavior. 	Dr. Schumacher testified
that in her opinion, Defendant’s behavior, as reflected in the court transcripts, appeared to be an
“abnormality,” indicating volitional conduct and potentially manipulation.
On the other hand, Dr. Mills opined that Defendant did not understand the court
proceedings and would not be able to meaningfully assist in his defense. In his June 8, 2025 letter,
Dr. Mills explains that after seeing Defendant interact with Mr. Piotrowski at the jail, and hearing
15 According to Dr. Schumacher, becoming an orderly is a prized role among inmates, because it
comes with additional privileges, such as more out-of-cell time.
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Defendant express his belief that Mr. Piotrowski and the Court were trying to “railroad him into
prison,” Dr. Mills found Defendant’s paranoia to be “clinically disabling and it clearly prevents
him from assisting in his own defense” (DE 88 at 3 (emphasis in original)). Dr. Mills also testified
that based on his observations, Defendant’s paranoia did, in fact, prevent him from meaningfully
engaging with Mr. Piotrowski. Dr. Mills further testified that Defendant has no insight and thinks
everybody is out to harm him. Dr. Mills acknowledged that Defendant’s conduct may be volitional
to a degree; however, his uncooperative approach exacerbates his underlying great paranoia, or
makes his choices worse. 	Dr. Mills also acknowledged that Defendant showed some level of
understanding the role and responsibilities of an attorney and some level of understanding court
proceedings, though Dr. Mills believed Defendant’s understanding is “skewed” and “limited.” Dr.
Mills explained that in multiple court proceedings, Defendant repeatedly referenced that Mr.
Piotrowski is “compromised” without explaining the basis for his belief, and Defendant expressed
similar feelings about his prior attorney, Mr. Smith. In Dr. Mills’s view, Defendant’s paranoia is
so great, his resulting viewpoint that each attorney is “compromised” stems from his underlying
mental disorder, not a volitional choice to be uncooperative. 	In sum, according to Dr. Mills,
Defendant is so paranoid that it distracts him from being able to meaningfully listen to or work
with counsel.
Once again, the Court is faced with contrasting opinions on whether Defendant can
understand the proceedings against him and contribute to his own defense. Dr. Mills relies heavily
on the extreme paranoia that he observed in his contacts with Defendant and that is also reflected
throughout the June 25, 2025 and July 10, 2025 hearing transcripts. Yet, as Dr. Schumacher points
out, Defendant’s extreme paranoia is noticeably absent from communications with his family
members and friends in jail calls, reports from jail staff in his housing unit, and evaluations from
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psychiatrists and psychologists at the jail who are unaffiliated with his competency evaluation.
Indeed, Dr. Schumacher stated that it would be consistent with Defendant’s personality disorder
and general mistrust of the legal system for Defendant to manipulate circumstances or make
accusations to obtain his desired goal, like securing a different attorney to represent him. 	The
Court gives greater weight to Dr. Schumacher’s opinion due to the multitude and variety of
evidence – including evidence of Defendant’s behavior outside of court proceedings and related
contacts – she considered, the longer period of time over which she interacted with Defendant, and
the more comprehensive psychological testing she administered and analyzed. See United States
v. Saingerard, 621 F.3d 1341, 1343 (11th Cir. 2010) (“The district court did not commit clear error
in considering the conflicting expert testimony and crediting one view over the other. ‘Where there
are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder’s choice between them cannot be clearly
erroneous.’” (citations omitted)).
There is no dispute among the Parties that currently, Defendant refuses to work with Mr.
Piotrowski and will not communicate or cooperate with him in preparing a defense. But, the Court
is tasked with assessing whether Defendant has the ability to reasonably assist in his defense. See
United States v. Cometa, 966 F.3d 1285, 1293 (11th Cir. 2020) (“Refusing to work with defense
counsel is not necessarily proof of incompetency because what matters is the ability to work with
counsel.”); United States v. Merriweather, 921 F. Supp. 2d 1265, 1304 (N.D. Ala. 2013) (“It is
worth emphasizing that the Dusky standard refers to the ability of a defendant to communicate
with his attorneys, not his willingness to communicate with his attorney.”). 	In this case, Dr.
Schumacher compellingly opined that Defendant has the ability to understand the proceedings and
assist defense counsel, notwithstanding his antisocial personality disorder, his hostility towards
authority, and his mistrust of the legal system, which may be exaggerated or fabricated in
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furtherance of a specific motive. She further opined that Defendant may be feigning mental illness
or exhibiting malingering of symptoms based on the test results and all the evidence she
considered.
Defendant’s ability is evidenced by his requests for legal phone calls and consultations with
his attorney before answering Dr. Schumacher’s questions, his writings and motions discussing his
perceived defense strategy, and his complaints that his attorney does not communicate with him
regularly. The June 25, 2025 and July 10, 2025 hearing transcripts demonstrate that Defendant
understands his attorney should file motions – such as suppression motions – and requests on his
behalf with the Court, regularly communicate and confer with him, and keep their communications
confidential.16 The transcripts further show Defendant’s understanding of the role of the Court in
ruling on issues and the role of the Government in prosecuting the case. 	Moreover, Dr.
Schumacher highlighted that although competency is fluid, in the past roughly 16 years of contact
with the criminal justice system, there is no evidence Defendant was previously found
incompetent. 	Based on the entire record, the preponderance of the evidence indicates that
Defendant exhibits an unwillingness to cooperate with his defense attorney, the Court, Dr.
Schumacher, Dr. Mills, and anyone else he associates with his criminal case, particularly when
things are not going the way he wants, rather than a deficit in ability. Such hostility and lack of
cooperation with counsel does not render Defendant incompetent to proceed. See Merriweather,
921 F. Supp. 2d at 1304 (“Being able but unwilling to communicate with one’s attorney does not
make a defendant incompetent to stand trial.”); Williams, 2007 WL 1655371, at *5 (“[W]hile the
Defendant may engage in conduct that is adversarial with his lawyer, nonetheless, the Court
16 The June 25, 2025 hearing transcript also demonstrates that Defendant understands criminal
defendants can request that the Court allow them to represent themselves, or proceed pro se.
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concludes that the Defendant has the capacity to interact with his lawyer, if the Defendant so
chooses.”); Battle, 419 F.3d at 1299 (“That Battle at times exhibited an antagonistic relationship
with his lawyers over their representation of him is no indicator of incompetency. . . . Neither do
Battle’s courtroom outbursts, odd behavior, and history of mental illness mandate a finding of
incompetency.”).
Accordingly, the preponderance of the evidence establishes Defendant is competent to
stand trial in this case. The greater weight of the evidence does not demonstrate that Defendant
has an unspecified psychotic disorder. However, even if Defendant is presently suffering from a
psychotic disorder, the greater weight of the evidence shows he is able to rationally and factually
understand the nature and consequences of the criminal proceedings against him. Defendant also
has the present ability to consult with his attorney with a reasonable degree of rational
understanding such that he is able to assist with his defense, even though he declines to do so.
VI. 	CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, it is respectfully recommended that Defendant be found
COMPETENT presently to stand trial in this case.
VII. 	OBJECTIONS
The Parties will have fourteen (14) days from the date of this Report and Recommendation
to file written objections, if any, with the Honorable Melissa Damian, United States District Judge.
Failure to file objections timely shall bar the parties from a de novo determination by the District
Judge of an issue covered in this Report and shall bar the Parties from attacking on appeal
unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions contained in this Report, except upon grounds of plain
error, if necessary, in the interest of justice. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (2009); Thomas v. Arn, 474
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U.S. 140, 149 (1985); Henley v. Johnson, 885 F.2d 790, 794 (11th Cir. 1989); 11th Cir. R. 3-1
(2016).
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED in Chambers in Miami, Florida on this 21st day of
November, 2025.
____________________________________
ELLEN F. D’ANGELO
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
cc: 	All Counsel of Record
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