Alvarez Cantun v. Miami-Dade Public Housing and Community Development et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
Case No.: 25-cv-21849-JB
ROSARIO ALVAREZ CANTUN,
Plaintiff,
v.
MIAMI-DADE PUBLIC HOUSING AND
COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT and
ROYAL AMERICAN MANAGEMENT,
INC.
Defendants.
____________________________________________/
ORDER DENYING EMRGENCY MOTION FOR TEMPORARY
RESTRAINING ORDER AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
THIS CAUSE comes before the Court on the pro se Plaintiff’s Emergency
Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction (the “Motion”).
ECF No. [36]. 	In her Motion, Plaintiff urges the Court to enter a temporary
restraining order and preliminary injunction preventing Defendants from pursuing
eviction proceedings against her during the pendency of this action. 	Id. 	In their
Response, Defendants assert that the Court is prohibited from granting the relief
Plaintiff seeks and further argues that Plaintiff cannot satisfy the requirements for
the issuance of a preliminary injunction. ECF No. [42]. 	On March 23, 2026, Plaintiff
filed her Reply. 	ECF No. [47]. 	Upon due consideration of the parties’ submissions,
the record, and the relevant legal authorities, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED
that the Motion, ECF No. [36], is DENIED.
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I. 	BACKGROUND
On April 23, 2025, Plaintiff filed a complaint for damages and injunctive relief,
in which she asserts claims under the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”), 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et
seq., and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794. ECF No. [1] ¶¶39−55.
Plaintiff alleges that on February 10, 2026, eviction proceedings against her were
filed in the County Court of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit. ECF No. [36] at 4. Plaintiff
now proceeding pro se, filed the instant Motion seeking a temporary restraining order
and preliminary injunction preventing Defendants from terminating her tenancy
during the pendency of this action. 	ECF No. [36]. 	Plaintiff, in highlighting the
expedited nature of her request, also requested that the Motion be addressed by the
Court without a hearing. Id. at 7.
In response, Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s request to enjoin the state court
eviction proceedings is explicitly prohibited by the Anti-Injunction Act. ECF No. [42].
Furthermore, 	Defendants 	posit 	that 	Plaintiff 	cannot 	satisfy 	the 	stringent
requirements for injunctive relief given that she cannot show: 1) likelihood of success
on the merits of this action, 2) irreparable harm, 3) that the balance of equities weighs
in her favor, 4) and that the granting of her requested relief would be beneficial to
the public interest. Id.
In reply, Plaintiff argues that not only are Defendants’ arguments insufficient,
but also that they support her claims of disparate treatment. 	ECF No. [47].
Furthermore, she reiterates that the temporary restraining order and preliminary
injunction factors fall in her favor. Id. at 6−7. Additionally, Plaintiff argues, for the
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first time, that an injunction is permitted under the second exception to the Anti-
Injunction Act. Id. at 5.
II. 	ANALYSIS
The Anti-Injunction Act states that “[a] court of the United States may not
grant 	an 	injunction to 	stay 	proceedings 	in 	a 	State 	court 	except 	as 	expressly
authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to
protect or effectuate its judgments." 28 U.S.C. § 2283. 	Unless the injunction falls
within 	one 	of 	the 	three 	specifically 	defined 	exceptions 	mentioned 	above, 	the
prohibition against enjoining state court proceedings is absolute. See Burr & Forman
v. Blair, 470 F.3d 1019, 1028 (11th Cir.2006) (“[I]n assessing the propriety of an
injunction entered to stop a state court proceeding, the sole relevant inquiry is
whether the injunction qualifies for one of the exceptions to the Anti–Injunction
Act.”). “The Anti-Injunction Act cannot be avoided by framing the injunction as
directed 	against 	a 	state 	court 	litigant 	instead 	of 	against 	the 	state 	court.”
Kantsepolsky v. River Shores Ass'n, Inc., No. 25-61725-CIV, 2025 WL 3140268 at *4
(S.D. Fla. Nov. 10, 2025) (citing Atl. Coast Line R. Co. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng'rs,
398 U.S. 281, 287 (1970)).
It is well-settled that the Anti-Injunction Act prohibits a federal court from
enjoining a state court action for eviction or foreclosure. See, e.g., Mercer v. Sechan
Realty, Inc., 569 F. App'x 652, 655-56 (11th Cir. 2014) (holding that Anti-Injunction
Act prohibited a federal district court from enjoining pending state court eviction
proceedings in a FHA case); see also Kelly v. Day PVC, No. 8:26-CV-220-MSS-NHA,
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2026 WL 362794 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 10, 2026) (same); Hamilton v. Carrington Mortg.
Serv., LLC, No. 1:25-CV-02827-SEG, 2025 WL 2888937 (N.D. Ga. June 10, 2025)
(same); Estate of Bamberg v. Regions Bank, No. 1:14-cv-01960-JEC, 2014 WL
2957815 (N.D. Ga. June 30, 2014) (same); cf. Gomez v. Wash. Mut. Bank, No. 17-cv-
60960-WPD, 2017 WL 6949244, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 13, 2017) (holding that "[n]one
of [the Anti-Injunction Act’s] three exceptions apply to requests of federal courts for
a preliminary injunction to enjoin the execution of a state court judgment that
authorizes an eviction."); Chester v. Bank of Am., No. 1:14-CV-00027-JEC-GGB, 2014
WL 12323683, at *3 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 17, 2014) (“The federal courts in this circuit and
elsewhere that have addressed this issue have uniformly held that the Anti-
Injunction Act bars a request for a preliminary injunction to enjoin the execution of
a state court judgment that authorizes an eviction.”).
Here, 	Plaintiff 	requests 	that 	the 	Court 	enjoin 	the 	state 	court 	eviction
proceedings against her. The Court has no authority to do so. Plaintiff argues that
the relief she requests is not barred by the Anti-Injunction Act because her claim falls
squarely within the Act’s “expressly authorized” exception. 	ECF No. [36] at 6.
Specifically, Plaintiff asserts that the relief she requests falls under the FHA, which
authorizes 	federal 	courts 	to 	grant 	appropriate 	injunctive 	relief 	to 	remedy
discrimination and retaliation in housing. 	Id. 	Plaintiff makes no argument in
relation to her claim under the Rehabilitation Act. 	See generally, ECF No. [36].
Plaintiff’s argument is unpersuasive.
In Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972), the Supreme Court prescribed a
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two-part analysis for determining whether a federal statute comes within the Anti–
Injunction Act's “expressly authorized” exception: (1) the statute “must have created
a specific and uniquely federal right or remedy, enforceable in a federal court of
equity,” and (2) the federal right or remedy must be such that it can be “given its
intended scope only by the stay of a state court proceeding.” Id. at 237–38 (emphasis
added). 	As the Eleventh Circuit recognized in Mercer, the FHA “is expressly
enforceable in both state and federal courts.” 	Mercer v. Sechan Realty, Inc., 569 F.
App'x 652, 655 (11th Cir. 2014). The Mercer court held that the plaintiff’s FHA claim
did not fall under the first exception to the Anti-Injunction Act and therefore an
injunction could not issue on that basis. Id. In so holding, the Mercer court also noted
that the plaintiff retained an avenue to challenge her eviction in state court through
the appellate process. 	Id. 	Similarly, here, Plaintiff raises a FHA claim and can
challenge an eviction in the state court proceedings, including though the appellate
process. 	Given that the FHA does not fall within the first exception to the Anti-
Injunction Act, and that Plaintiff highlights no other exception that applies,1
1 In her Reply, Plaintiff raises a new argument, namely that the Anti-Injunction Act’s
second exception applies. 	ECF No. [47]. 	However, it is well-settled that a party
cannot raise an argument for the first time in their reply brief. 	See S.D. Fla. L. R.
7.1(c)(1) (requiring that a reply memorandum “be strictly limited to rebuttal of
matters raised in the memorandum in opposition.”); Herring v. Secretary, Dep't of
Corrections, 	397 	F.3d 	1338, 	1342 	(11th 	Cir. 	2005) 	(“As 	we 	repeatedly 	have
admonished, arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief are not properly
before a reviewing court.”) (citation omitted); Baltzer v. Midland Credit Mgmt., Inc.,
No. 14-20140-CIV, 2014 WL 3845449, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 5, 2014) (citations omitted)
(“A reply memorandum may not raise new arguments or evidence, particularly where
the evidence was available when the underlying motion was filed and the movant was
aware (or should have been aware) of the necessity of the evidence.”). 	As such, the
Court will not consider Plaintiff’s new argument. 	See Foley v. Wells Fargo Bank,
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Plaintiff’s request is barred by the Anti-Injunction Act. 	Mitchum, 407 U.S. at 237–
38; see also Mercer, 569 F. App'x at 655; Kantsepolsky, 2025 WL 3140268 at *5.
Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Plaintiff’s
Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction, ECF No. [36],
is DENIED.
DONE AND ORDERED in Miami, Florida this 27th day of March, 2026.
______________________________________
JACQUELINE BECERRA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
N.A., 849 F. Supp. 2d 1345, 1349 (S.D. Fla. 2012) (“Because it is improper for
Defendant to raise this new argument in its Reply brief, the argument will not be
considered.”).
Even if the Court were to consider Plaintiff’s argument, the second exception to the
Anti-Injunction Act is similarly inapplicable here. The Eleventh Circuit made clear
that “federal courts may enjoin state court proceedings based on the ‘necessary in aid
of its jurisdiction’ exception in only two situations, where: “(1) the district court has
exclusive jurisdiction over the action because it had been removed from state court;
or, (2) the state court entertains an in rem action involving a res over which the
district court has been exercising jurisdiction in an in rem action.” Mercer, 569 F.
App’x at 655–56 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). Neither of those situations exist
here. 	Further, the Court notes that it is not necessary to enjoin the state court
eviction proceedings “in aid of [this Court’s] jurisdiction” because the state court
eviction would not moot this action given that Plaintiff seeks, inter alia, declaratory
and monetary relief in both her Complaint and proposed amended complaint. 	See
ECF Nos. [1] at 9–10, [38] at 19; Philippeaux v. Apartment Inv. & Mngmt. Co., 598 F.
App’x 640, 643 (11th Cir. 2015) (“That [plaintiff] vacated the apartment does not moot
any claim for damages he may have suffered in the past as a result of [defendant’s]
alleged violations of the FHA and FFHA.”).
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