Stewart v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd.

1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
Case No. 25-21930-Civ-BECERRA/TORRES
FENYANG AJAMU STEWART,
Plaintiff,
v.
ROYAL CARIBBEAN CRUISES LTD.,
Defendant.
___________________________________________/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON DEFENDANT’S
MOTION TO DISMISS
This cause comes before the Court on Defendant’s (“Royal Caribbean”) Motion
to 	Dismiss 	[D.E. 	28] 	Plaintiff’s 	Amended 	Complaint. 	[D.E. 	20]. 	Plaintiff 	has
responded to the Motion [D.E. 32], to which Royal Caribbean has replied. [D.E. 36].
The Motion, therefore, is ripe for disposition.1 After careful review of the Motion and
relevant authorities, and for the reasons set forth below, we recommend that Royal
Caribbean’s Motion be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
1 On July 29, 2025, the Honorable Jacqueline Becerra referred all pre-trial matters
to the Undersigned Magistrate Judge for disposition. [D.E. 24].
Case 1:25-cv-21930-JB Document 56 Entered on FLSD Docket 01/13/2026 Page 1 of 25

2
I. 	BACKGROUND
This case centers on allegations that Royal Caribbean’s security personnel
battered and assaulted Plaintiff on the gangway of the Navigator of the Seas cruise
ship. This unruly attack, alleges Plaintiff, stemmed from Royal Caribbean’s effort to
force Plaintiff to pay an outstanding invoice.
In light of this, Plaintiff has brought a ten-count complaint (now amended)
against Royal Caribbean, alleging:
• 	Count I: Civil Assault;
• 	Count II: Civil Battery;
• 	Count III: False Imprisonment;
• 	Count IV: Unlawful Search and Seizure;
• 	Count V: Unconstitutional Policy, Custom, or Practice;
• 	Count VI: Failure to Train;
• 	Count VII: Failure to Provide Safe Means of Egress;
• 	Count VIII: Failure to Warn of Dangerous Condition and Custom;
• 	Count IX: Negligent Supervision; and
• 	Count X: Gross Negligence.
In the pending Motion, Royal Caribbean seeks to dismiss all counts except for
Count I and Count II. Further, Royal Caribbean seeks to strike Plaintiff’s demands
for punitive damages, injunctive relief, and declaratory relief.
Case 1:25-cv-21930-JB Document 56 Entered on FLSD Docket 01/13/2026 Page 2 of 25

3
II. 	APPLICABLE LAWS AND PRINCIPLES
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a court may dismiss a claim
for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. “To survive a motion to
dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state
a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). Conclusory
statements, assertions or labels will not survive a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Id. “A
claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Id.; see also Edwards v. Prime, Inc., 602 F.3d 1276, 1291 (11th Cir. 2010)
(setting forth the plausibility standard). “Factual allegations must be enough to raise
a right to relief above the speculative level[.]” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citation
omitted). Additionally:
Although it must accept well-pled facts as true, the court is not required
to accept a plaintiff's legal conclusions. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009) (noting “the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the
allegations 	contained 	in 	a 	complaint 	is 	inapplicable 	to 	legal
conclusions”). In evaluating the sufficiency of a plaintiff's pleadings, we
make reasonable inferences in Plaintiff's favor, “but we are not required
to draw plaintiff’s inference.” Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh Produce, N.A.,
Inc., 416 F.3d 1242, 1248 (11th Cir. 2005). 	Similarly, “unwarranted
deductions of fact” in a complaint are not admitted as true for the
purpose of testing the sufficiency of plaintiff's allegations. Id.; see also
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681 (stating conclusory allegations are “not entitled
to be assumed true”).
Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola, 578 F.3d 1252, 1260 (11th Cir. 2009), abrogated on other
grounds by Mohamad v. Palestinian Auth., 566 U.S. 449, 453 n.2 (2012). The Eleventh
Circuit has endorsed “a ‘two-pronged approach’ in applying these principles: 1)
Case 1:25-cv-21930-JB Document 56 Entered on FLSD Docket 01/13/2026 Page 3 of 25

4
eliminate any allegations in the complaint that are merely legal conclusions; and 2)
where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, ‘assume their veracity and then
determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.’” American
Dental Ass’n v. Cigna Corp., 605 F.3d 1283, 1290 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 679).
III. 	ANALYSIS
We will address in turn each count that Royal Caribbean seeks to dismiss.
A. Count III: False Imprisonment
Plaintiff alleges that he “was unlawfully detained and physically prevented
from exiting the bridgeway by RCCL’s agents,” and “was not free to leave for nearly
30 minutes.” [D.E. 20 at ¶ 53].
“False imprisonment in Florida is defined as ‘the unlawful restraint of a person
against his will, the gist of which action is the unlawful detention of the plaintiff and
the deprivation of his liberty.’” Garcia v. Carnival Corp., 838 F. Supp. 2d 1334, 1338
(S.D. Fla. 2012) (citing Johnson v. Barnes & Noble Booksellers, Inc., 437 F.3d 1112,
1116 (11th Cir. 2006)).
Royal Caribbean argues that Plaintiff fails to allege that he was unlawfully
detained, and thus, Plaintiff fails to plausibly state a claim for false imprisonment.
In support, Royal Caribbean points to its ticket contract with Plaintiff, which
provides: “Carrier may … restrain any Guest at any time when … the Guest’s conduct
or presence … is believed to present a possible danger, security risk or be detrimental
to himself or the health, welfare, comfort or enjoyment of others, or is in violation of
Case 1:25-cv-21930-JB Document 56 Entered on FLSD Docket 01/13/2026 Page 4 of 25

5
any provision of this agreement ….” [D.E. 30 at 6]. In light of this provision, Royal
Caribbean that argues that it had a lawful reason to detain Plaintiff.
In response, Plaintiff points to his allegations that Royal Caribbean’s agents
“forcibly blocked, pushed, tackled, and restrained” him, while “employing a dangerous
prone restraint technique.” [D.E. 20 at ¶ 16]. Further, Plaintiff alleges that when he
asked if he was being detained, Royal Caribbean’s agent responded “No.” [D.E. 20 at
¶ 22]. Thus, Plaintiff alleges that there exists a fact dispute as to whether Royal
Caribbean had the right to detain Plaintiff, especially in the manner in which he was
detained.
We agree with Plaintiff that, at this early stage, there exists a prevalent fact
issue as to whether Royal Caribbean lawfully detained Plaintiff. The Court is
cognizant that Defendant’s ticket contract, under certain circumstances, permits its
ability to “restrain any Guest.” [D.E. 30 at 6]. But discovery and more fleshed-out
argument is required to determine whether Royal Caribbean can, as Plaintiff alleges,
surround guests with multiple agents, “tackl[e]” them to the ground, “forcibly pin[ ]”
them “for several minutes,” “appl[y] significant weight to” the “back, legs, and torso,”
and “physically block [their] path” to exit the area. [D.E. 20 at ¶¶ 24, 25, 28].
These allegations, which at this stage we must accept as true, do more than
enough to allege that Royal Caribbean’s detention in this case was unlawful.
Accordingly, the Motion should be denied as to Count III. See Amparo v. Classica
Cruise Operator Ltd., Inc., No. 20-CV-60896-RAR, 2021 WL 4989915, at *6 (S.D. Fla.
Oct. 26, 2021) (finding an issue of fact on the plaintiff’s false imprisonment claim
Case 1:25-cv-21930-JB Document 56 Entered on FLSD Docket 01/13/2026 Page 5 of 25

6
because it was “clearly in dispute whether Classica had the authority to detain
Plaintiffs under the terms of the Cruise Ticket Contract and whether they had the
legal authority to do so” and that “even if the detention was initially warranted, a
reasonable jury could find that the detention became unreasonable or unwarranted
at some point thereafter”); Blumel v. Mylander, 919 F. Supp. 423, 427 (M.D. Fla.
1996) (denying motion to dismiss false imprisonment claim where the plaintiff
alleged a “set of facts” that, “if proven, could easily constitute false imprisonment,”
because they “would clearly support a finding that [the defendant] ‘unlawfully’
detained Blumel under the law of false imprisonment”).
B. Count IV: § 1983 Claim for Fourth Amendment Violation
In Count IV, Plaintiff alleges that Royal Caribbean’s “security personnel,”
while “under color of law,” “detained and forcibly restrained Plaintiff on the ship’s
gangway for several minutes in a prone position,” from which Plaintiff suffered
“physical injury, emotional distress, humiliation, and ongoing psychological trauma.”
[D.E. 20 at ¶¶ 61, 62, 65].
But Royal Caribbean’s security personnel are not state actors. And while
Plaintiff alleges that the security personnel acted under the color of law, “‘the under-
color-of-state-law element of § 1983 excludes from its reach merely private conduct,
no matter how discriminatory or wrongful.’” Focus on the Fam. v. Pinellas Suncoast
Transit Auth., 344 F.3d 1263, 1277 (11th Cir. 2003) (quoting American Mfrs. Mut.
Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 49–50 (1999)). Consequently, Plaintiff must allege—
Case 1:25-cv-21930-JB Document 56 Entered on FLSD Docket 01/13/2026 Page 6 of 25

7
beyond a conclusory statement—that this case is a rare instance in which a private
actor can be held liable under the Fourth Amendment (and § 1983).
In this Circuit, courts employ three distinct tests to determine “whether the
actions of a private entity are properly attributed to the state.” Id. Those tests are
“(1) the public function test; (2) the state compulsion test; and (3) the nexus/joint
action test.” Willis v. Univ. Health Servs., Inc., 993 F.3d 837, 840 (11th Cir. 1993).
The Eleventh Circuit explains those tests as follows:
The public function test limits state action to instances where private
actors are performing functions “traditionally the exclusive prerogative
of the state.” The state compulsion test limits state action to instances
where the government “has coerced or at least significantly encouraged
the action alleged to violate the Constitution.” The nexus/joint action
test applies where “the state has so far insinuated itself into a position
of 	interdependence 	with 	the 	[private 	party] 	that 	it 	was 	a 	joint
participant in the enterprise.” We must determine on a case-by-case
basis whether sufficient state action is present from a non-state actor
(defendant) to sustain a section 1983 claim.
Id.
Here, Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged that any of these three tests are
satisfied. As an initial matter, no allegations in the Complaint meaningfully suggest
that the state coerced or significantly encouraged Royal Caribbean’s detention policy.
The state compulsion test, then, is inapplicable. The same goes for the nexus/joint
action test; Plaintiff does not plausibly allege nor make meaningful argument that
the state was so present in this situation that, effectively, it acted jointly with Royal
Caribbean.
What remains is the public function test. On that front, Plaintiff alleges that
the actors are in “quasi-governmental roles,” and “engaged in conduct that reasonably
Case 1:25-cv-21930-JB Document 56 Entered on FLSD Docket 01/13/2026 Page 7 of 25

8
conveyed the impressions of acting under police or legal authority.” [D.E. 20 at ¶ 61].
But Plaintiff cites no authority to demonstrate that a private company’s security,
comprised 	of 	private 	actors, 	can 	constitute 	state 	action 	simply 	because 	they
subjectively “convey[ ] the impression of acting under police … authority.” [Id.].
In reality, a company’s security and theft prevention are far from “the exclusive
prerogative of the state.” Willis, 993 F.3d at 840 (emphasis added). Indeed, this
Circuit, relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in Flagg Brothers, Inc. v. Brooks, 436
U.S. 149 (1978), has held exactly that:
Plaintiffs here urge that the defendants performed public functions in
detaining them as suspected shoplifters, in searching their purses, and
in detaining them after the gun was found, even though the defendants
no longer had any reason to believe they were shoplifting. We disagree.
Like the warehouseman in Flagg Brothers, the merchant here did not
perform any function ‘exclusively reserved to the state.’ A merchant's
detention of persons suspected of stealing store property simply is not
an action exclusively associated with the state. Experience teaches that
the prime responsibility for protection of personal property remains with
the individual. A storekeeper's central motivation in detaining a person
whom he believes to be in the act of stealing his property is self-
protection, not altruism. Such action cannot logically be attributed to
the state.
White v. Scrivner Corp., 594 F.2d 140, 142 (5th Cir. 1979).
In light of this binding authority, we are not convinced that Plaintiff has
plausibly alleged that Royal Caribbean’s security acted as state actors. None of
Plaintiff’s allegations distinguish the pending case from one, such as White, where a
private company seeks to (from its perspective) prevent theft or something of the like.
Thus, Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged state action.
As to Count IV, then, Defendant’s Motion should be granted and Count IV
should be dismissed. See Washington v. Veterans of Foreign Wars of U.S., 196 F. App'x
Case 1:25-cv-21930-JB Document 56 Entered on FLSD Docket 01/13/2026 Page 8 of 25

9
777, 779 (11th Cir. 2006) (citing Rayburn ex rel. Rayburn v. Hogue, 241 F.3d 1341,
1347 (11th Cir. 2001)) (“Here, none of the parties were state actors. A private party
will be considered a state actor only where one of the following conditions is met: (1)
the state has coerced or at least significantly encouraged the action alleged to have
violated the Constitution; (2) the private parties performed a public function that was
traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the state; or (3) the state had so far
insinuated itself into a position of interdependence with the private parties that it
was a joint participant in the enterprise. As Washington has failed to allege any of
the foregoing conditions, the district court properly dismissed his constitutional
claim.”); see also Rocha-Jamarillo v. Madrigal, 727 F. Supp. 3d 1370, 1394–95 (M.D.
Ga. 2024) (“Here, … Plaintiff has not alleged facts which are sufficient to establish
that Defendant Paulk was a state actor under any of these tests …. As a result, the
Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently plead that Defendant Paulk was
acting under color of state law for purposes of Section 1983 liability and, therefore,
Plaintiff has failed to state a claim under Section 1983.”); Green v. Abony Bail Bond,
316 F. Supp. 2d 1254, 1262 (M.D. Fla. 2004) (granting motion to dismiss section 1983
claim; “[s]ince bail bondsmen are not state actors, the Plaintiffs have no cause of
action against the Defendants pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983”).
C. Count V: Monell Claim
The same goes for Plaintiff’s Monell claim. There, Plaintiff alleges that his
injuries 	were 	the 	product 	of 	Royal 	Caribbean’s 	customary, 	systemic, 	and
Case 1:25-cv-21930-JB Document 56 Entered on FLSD Docket 01/13/2026 Page 9 of 25

10
unconstitutional policy of permitting security personnel to detain cruisegoers over
payment disputes and to use excessive force.
But an essential prerequisite to a successful Monell claim is an underlying
constitutional violation. See Cunningham v. Cobb Cnty., Georgia, 141 F.4th 1201,
1213 (11th Cir. 2025) (internal citation omitted) (“If a plaintiff cannot establish an
actual constitutional violation by an officer, the plaintiff's Monell claim fails at step
one. … Put differently, when a plaintiff fails to establish an underlying constitutional
violation, we can dismiss the plaintiff's claims against the local government (or local
government entity) as a matter of law.”).
Here, we have found that Plaintiff has failed to plausibly allege that he was
harmed by state actors; hence, we have found that Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged
a constitutional violation. And without a predicate constitutional violation, Plaintiff’s
Monell claim cannot succeed. See City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799
(1986) (“If a person has suffered no constitutional injury …, the fact that the
departmental regulations might have authorized the use of constitutionally excessive
force is quite beside the point.”); Sheets v. Charlotte Cnty., No. 2:24-CV-958-JES-
KCD, 2025 WL 1644084, at *6 (M.D. Fla. June 10, 2025) (“No factual allegations are
made, however, as to which test, if any, establishes Weiser as a State actor. Having
failed 	to 	show 	Weiser 	is 	plausibly 	a 	State 	actor, 	this 	[Monell 	claim] 	merits
dismissal.”).
Royal Caribbean’s Motion should therefore also be granted as to Count V.
Case 1:25-cv-21930-JB Document 56 Entered on FLSD Docket 01/13/2026 Page 10 of 25

11
D. Count VI: Failure to Train
In this count, Plaintiff alleges that Royal Caribbean has “failed to adequately
train its security personnel and customer-facing staff on the appropriate and lawful
handling of billing disputes, including de-escalation tactics and distinguishing civil
disputes from security threats.” [D.E. 20 at ¶ 81].
In its Motion, Royal Caribbean argues that Plaintiff fails to identify a specific
training program, and also fails to allege how Royal Caribbean failed to implement
that program. In response, Plaintiff argues only that Royal Caribbean has a duty to
train its employees to peacefully resolve customer disputes, and failed to do so by
neglecting to instruct de-escalation tactics.
“Negligent failure to train is a ‘recognized dut[y] under federal maritime law.’”
Mayer v. Carnival Corp., 731 F. Supp. 3d 1316, 1322 (S.D. Fla. 2024) (quoting Diaz
v. Carnival Corp., 555 F. Supp. 3d 1302, 1310 (S.D. Fla. 2021)). “To state a claim of
negligent 	training, 	Plaintiff 	must 	allege 	Defendant 	‘was 	negligent 	in 	the
implementation or operation of the training program and the negligence cause[d]
[his] injury.’” Anders v. Carnival Corp., No. 23-21367-CIV, 2023 WL 4252426, at *4
(S.D. Fla. June 29, 2023) (quoting Diaz, 555 F. Supp. at 1310).
The problem with Plaintiff’s claim is that it does not identify an actual training
program that Royal Caribbean failed to implement. Critically, a failure to train claim
cannot merely allege that a company’s “general policies and operations” were
executed negligently. Quashen v. Carnival Corp., 576 F. Supp. 3d 1275, 1304 (S.D.
Fla. 2021) (“[G]eneral maritime law does not recognize a claim of negligence that is
Case 1:25-cv-21930-JB Document 56 Entered on FLSD Docket 01/13/2026 Page 11 of 25

12
premised upon a company's general policies and operations.”). Rather, a plaintiff
must allege that a “defendant acted negligently in the implementation or operation
of its training programs.” Walsh v. Carnival Corp., No. 20-CV-21454-UU, 2020 WL
10936272, at *5 (S.D. Fla. July 7, 2020).
And here, Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges only that Royal Caribbean should train
its employees to peacefully resolve customer disputes—not that Royal Caribbean has
such a training program but has negligently implemented it. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s
allegations fall short of stating a claim for negligent failure to train. See Mayer, 731
F. Supp. 3d at 1322 (dismissing negligent failure to train claim because the plaintiff
“never actually alleges that Carnival has a training program for its bartenders that
goes beyond the company's general policies and operations,” “much less that the
program trains bartenders on the dangers of making drinks around broken glass,”
and thus “[t]aking the allegations in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, we
cannot say that Mayer has stated a claim for negligent training based on the facts we
have before us”); Watts v. City of Hollywood, Fla., 146 F. Supp. 3d 1254, 1273 (S.D.
Fla. 2015) (granting a motion to dismiss a negligent training claim because, in part,
“[t]he Complaint does not contain any allegations describing a particular training
program, let alone allegations highlighting why such a training program is defective
and how the defect is a widespread problem”); Walsh v. Carnival Corp., No. 20-CV-
21454-UU, 2020 WL 10936272, at *5 (S.D. Fla. July 7, 2020) (“In short, it is not
enough to identify that certain training programs exist and to allege in a conclusory
manner that Defendant was negligent in operating such training programs. Plaintiff
Case 1:25-cv-21930-JB Document 56 Entered on FLSD Docket 01/13/2026 Page 12 of 25

13
must 	allege 	sufficient 	factual 	allegations 	to 	establish 	that 	Defendant 	acted
negligently in the implementation or operation of its training programs. And Plaintiff
has failed to do so.”); Donaldson v. Carnival Corp., No. 20-23258-CIV, 2020 WL
6801883, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 19, 2020) (quoting Christie v. Royal Caribbean Cruises,
Ltd., No. 20-22439-Civ, 2020 WL 6158815, at *6 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 21, 2020)) (“As this
Court recently stated, where a Plaintiff's pleading could be ‘interchangeably alleged
against any cruise line defendant’ the Plaintiff has failed to adequately state a claim.
The Plaintiff offers no specific facts as to the Defendant's crewmembers showing any
alleged negligence in support of Counts I and II. Such threadbare allegations fail to
satisfy federal pleading standards.”); cf. Spotts v. Carnival Corp., 711 F. Supp. 3d
1360, 1368 (S.D. Fla. 2024) (denying motion to dismiss negligent training claim where
the plaintiff’s allegations included that “Carnival ‘trains its crew members to inspect
and maintain the deck areas in a clean and dry condition. CARNIVAL's trainings and
procedures instruct crew members that its floors are slippery when wet which can
cause passengers to slip and fall and get injured. CARNIVAL also trains and created
procedures which require crew members to place wet floor signs on walkways that
become repetitively wet and/or are known to be wet.’”).
Accordingly, 	because 	Plaintiff’s 	complaint 	vaguely 	alleges 	that 	Royal
Caribbean negligently trained its employees, rather than identifying a specific
training program that Royal Caribbean negligently implemented or operated, Count
VI should be dismissed without prejudice.
Case 1:25-cv-21930-JB Document 56 Entered on FLSD Docket 01/13/2026 Page 13 of 25

14
E. Count VII: Failure to Provide Safe Means of Egress
Here, Plaintiff alleges that Royal Caribbean breached its maritime duty to
Plaintiff to provide safe egress, and “breached this duty by: Stationing security
officers in a manner that physically blocked and obstructed Plaintiff’s exit on the
disembarkation gangway; Creating a threatening and hostile environment that
rendered the exit route psychologically and physically unsafe; and Deviating from
normal disembarkation procedures to target Plaintiff under the pretext of an
unresolved billing dispute.” [D.E. 20 at ¶ 92].
But these allegations, as Royal Caribbean points out, essentially re-allege the
intentional torts. Effectively, Plaintiff alleges that the officers blocked his exit,
created a hostile environment, then targeted him and physically beat him. Plainly,
the intentionally-tortious conduct is the underpinning of the claim. Such intentional
conduct (which also serves as the basis for Plaintiff’s assault, battery, and false
imprisonment claims) cannot serve as the basis for this negligence claim. See Garcia
v. Carnival Corp., 838 F. Supp. 2d 1334, 1337 (S.D. Fla. 2012) (“Defendant cannot be
found negligently liable for the commission of the same intentional tort for which
Defendant is strictly liable. To hold otherwise in this instance would eviscerate any
distinction between tort liability premised on negligence and tort liability premised
on intentional tortious activity. Thus, Count I is improper to the extent that Count I
attempts to state a negligence cause of action against Defendant for the commission
of intentional torts, and is therefore dismissed with prejudice.”); Doe v. Carnival
Corp., No. 24-CV-22749-RAR, 2024 WL 4723115, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 8, 2024) (noting
Case 1:25-cv-21930-JB Document 56 Entered on FLSD Docket 01/13/2026 Page 14 of 25

15
that, while in theory, claims for strict liability for intentional torts and strict liability
negligence claims can be pleaded together, “a plaintiff cannot allege that a defendant
negligently committed the same intentional tort through the same conduct for which
the defendant is strictly liable”).
Accordingly, the Motion should be granted as to Count VII.
F. Count VIII: Failure to Warn of Dangerous Conditions
On this front, Plaintiff alleges that Royal Caribbean “failed to warn Plaintiff
that: Security personnel would be stationed to intercept him on the gangway; He was
considered ‘detained’ or subject to a forum of involuntary delay; [and] Any attempt to
disembark might result in the use of physical force or a call to law enforcement.” [D.E.
20 at ¶ 100].
Royal Caribbean argues that Plaintiff fails to state a claim. Specifically,
Plaintiff fails to allege that Royal Caribbean had knowledge that the security
personnel stationed on the gangway posed a danger. In support, Royal Caribbean
avers that there are “no facts demonstrating that any of the security personnel
involved in the alleged incident had ever injured a passenger before, or … that any
passenger was injured by security personnel attempting to prevent them from
disembarking in the past.” [D.E. 28 at 13].
Plaintiff, meanwhile, stands on his allegations that Royal Caribbean had a
duty to warn him that the security personnel may intercept him and use force.
But Plaintiff has not alleged that Royal Caribbean had any knowledge that the
security personnel would commit intentional torts upon a passenger. He does allege
Case 1:25-cv-21930-JB Document 56 Entered on FLSD Docket 01/13/2026 Page 15 of 25

16
that Royal Caribbean “knew or should have known that” their practice of detaining
guests with security personnel “posed serious risks to passenger safety.” [D.E. 20 at
¶ 19]. But this allegation is conclusory: there are no factual underpinnings to support
this allegation, and there is no obvious reason why Royal Caribbean should have
known the security personnel posed a risk to Plaintiff. And short of plausible
allegations that Royal Caribbean was on notice of this apparent danger, Plaintiff fails
to state a claim. See Spall v. NCL (Bahamas) Ltd., 275 F. Supp. 3d 1345, 1349 (S.D.
Fla. 2016) (granting motion to dismiss failure to warn claim because, in part,
“Plaintiffs failed to provide any facts relating to how Defendant knew or should have
known of such dangers and/or hazards, which is necessary in order to state a plausible
claim on a failure to warn theory”); Aronson v. Celebrity Cruises, Inc., 30 F. Supp. 3d
1379, 1394 (S.D. Fla. 2014) (granting motion to dismiss duty to warn claim because,
in part, “the Complaint contains no factual allegations to support the inference that
Celebrity was on actual or constructive notice of any specific hazards”); Gayou v.
Celebrity Cruises, Inc., No. 11-23359-CIV, 2012 WL 2049431, at *5 (S.D. Fla. June 5,
2012) (“Gayou's negligence count, premised on Celebrity's failure to warn, fails to
state a claim because he has not alleged any facts from which it may be inferred that
Celebrity either knew or should have known of any dangerous or unsafe condition”)
(emphasis in original).
Consequently, we recommend that Count VIII be dismissed.
Case 1:25-cv-21930-JB Document 56 Entered on FLSD Docket 01/13/2026 Page 16 of 25

17
G. Count IX: Negligent Supervision
In Count IX, Plaintiff alleges that Royal Caribbean “owed Plaintiff a duty to
supervise its security agents and employees to ensure that they acted within lawful
bounds and did not violate passenger rights” and failed to do so. [D.E. 20 at ¶ 107].
Plaintiff further alleges that the Guest Services Manager, Kwame, “failed to prevent
the detention or use of force” and “did not direct security to stand down despite
knowing there was no lawful authority to detain Plaintiff.” [Id. at ¶ 110].
In its Motion, Royal Caribbean argues that Plaintiff fails to allege Royal
Caribbean had notice that any of the crewmembers or security personnel were unfit
for the position.
“Negligent supervision ‘occurs when, during the course of employment, the
employer becomes aware or should have become aware of problems with an employee
that indicated his unfitness, and the employer fails to take further actions such as
investigating, discharge, or reassignment.’” Doe v. NCL (Bahamas) Ltd., No. 1:16-CV-
23733-UU, 2016 WL 6330587, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 27, 2016) (quoting Cruz v. Advance
Stores Co., 842 F. Supp. 2d 1356, 1359 (S.D. Fla. 2012)). Thus, a plaintiff “must allege
that 	(1) 	the 	employer 	received 	actual 	or 	constructive 	notice 	of 	an 	employee's
unfitness, and (2) the employer did not investigate or take corrective action such as
discharge or reassignment.” Cruz, 842 F. Supp. 2d at 1359.
Here, Royal Caribbean’s point is well taken: Plaintiff offers no allegations that
Kwame or Royal Caribbean had notice that any of the security personnel would (as
alleged) violently detain and attack Plaintiff. Plaintiff’s allegations, therefore, fail to
Case 1:25-cv-21930-JB Document 56 Entered on FLSD Docket 01/13/2026 Page 17 of 25

18
state a claim for negligent supervision. See Doe, 2016 WL 6330587, at *4 (granting
motion to dismiss because “Plaintiff fails to state a claim for negligent supervision
because she fails to allege that Defendant: (1) had actual or constructive notice of the
bartender's or any other crewmember's unfitness; and (2) failed to take corrective
action in light of its knowledge”); Doe v. NCL (Bahamas) Ltd., No. 18-20060-CIV,
2018 WL 3848421, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 13, 2018) (granting motion to dismiss because
“[t]he Plaintiffs fail to allege any facts that NCL had actual or constructive notice of
Selvam’s unfitness before the alleged sexual assault and battery, and that NCL failed
to investigate or take corrective action”); Doe v. Carnival Corp., 472 F. Supp. 3d 1187,
1194 (S.D. Fla. 2020) (“Plaintiff fails to state a claim for negligent monitoring or
supervision because she fails to allege that Dufry: (1) had actual or constructive notice
of Ganesh Joshi's or “Segain's” unfitness;1 and (2) failed to take corrective action in
light of its knowledge.”).
H. Count X: Gross Negligence
Here, 	Plaintiff 	alleges 	that 	Royal 	Caribbean’s 	agents 	“forcibly 	pushed,
grabbed, 	tackled 	and 	restrained 	Plaintiff 	on 	the 	narrow 	bridgeway,” 	and
by subjecting Plaintiff to violent force in this precarious setting … acted with
conscious disregard for the foreseeable risk of death or catastrophic injury.” [D.E. 20
at ¶¶ 117–18].
But, as Royal Caribbean points out, this claim simply recasts Plaintiff’s
intentional tort claims (assault, battery, and false imprisonment) into a negligence
claim. Put otherwise, Plaintiff cannot plausibly and properly plead the negligent
Case 1:25-cv-21930-JB Document 56 Entered on FLSD Docket 01/13/2026 Page 18 of 25

19
commission of an intentional tort. And because Plaintiff’s gross negligence claim does
just that, it is insufficient. See Lizarazo v. Miami-Dade Cnty., No. 1:16-CV-20558-UU,
2016 WL 11589781, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 26, 2016) (dismissing gross negligence claim
in light of a pending intentional tort claim because “[e]ven viewing the direct and
inferential allegations in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court cannot
reconcile the logically inconsistent claims. Other than the conclusory allegation that
each officer ‘failed to prevent his fellow officers from assaulting [Plaintiff],’ the gross
negligence 	counts 	do 	not 	contain 	any 	factual 	content 	showing 	the 	Officers
nonfeasance or mere misfeasance in witnessing the use of excessive force but failing
to 	come 	to 	Plaintiff's 	aid. 	Rather, 	by 	Plaintiff's 	account, 	each 	officer 	actively
participated in the alleged beating by striking Plaintiff, which quite clearly, supports
a claim for battery.”); see also Doe v. Norwegian Cruise Lines, Ltd., No. 23-CV-24236,
2024 WL 3916800, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 22, 2024) (“Doe raises her negligence claim
based on Norwegian's failure to prevent an intentional tort for which she claims it is
strictly liable. Counts 1 and 2 are premised on the same intentional tort — Roe's
assault. The Court is persuaded Count 1 fails to state a claim for this reason.”).
Accordingly, the Motion should be granted on this score, and Count X should
be dismissed.
I. 	Punitive Damages
Royal 	Caribbean 	next 	moves 	to 	dismiss 	Plaintiff’s 	demand 	for 	punitive
damages. In support, Royal Caribbean argues that Plaintiff fails to allege Royal
Caribbean’s knowledge of the wrongful conduct.
Case 1:25-cv-21930-JB Document 56 Entered on FLSD Docket 01/13/2026 Page 19 of 25

20
Plaintiff, meanwhile, argues that punitive damages are in order because the
force used on Plaintiff “was neither necessary nor proportionate, especially given the
elevated and dangerous condition of the gangway, creating a substantial risk of
catastrophic harm.” [D.E. 32 at 16]. Further, Plaintiff argues, the “conduct exceeded
mere negligence and reflected a conscious disregard for Plaintiff’s safety.” [Id.].
In admiralty, a plaintiff “may recover punitive damages” for an intentional tort
“upon a showing of ‘intentional or wanton and reckless conduct’ on the part of
defendants amounting to ‘a conscious disregard of the rights of others.’” In re Amtrak
Sunset Ltd. Train Crash in Bayou Canot, Ala. on Sept. 22, 1993, 121 F.3d 1421, 1428
(11th Cir. 1997) (quoting CEH, Inc. v. F/V Seafarer, 70 F.3d 694, 699 (1st Cir. 1995)).
And “[u]nder general principles of tort law, punitive damages cannot be recovered
from a principal for actions of its agent, unless the principal authorized the actions,
approved the actions, was somehow reckless in allowing them to happen, or the agent
was acting within the scope of his employment.” Jones v. Compagnie Generale Mar.,
882 F. Supp. 1079, 1085 (S.D. Ga. 1995).
Here, Plaintiff has, of course, alleged that the actors in this case were acting
within the scope of their employment when they allegedly committed the intentional
torts (otherwise, strict liability would not attach). These are not allegations of mere
negligence; they are allegations that Royal Caribbean’s agents intentionally harmed
Plaintiff, or at the very least did so with reckless disregard. Consequently, taken in
the light most favorable to Plaintiff at this early juncture, we find that Plaintiff has
plausibly pleaded intentional misconduct. See Atl. Sounding Co. v. Townsend, 557
Case 1:25-cv-21930-JB Document 56 Entered on FLSD Docket 01/13/2026 Page 20 of 25

21
U.S. 404, 409, 414 (2009) (“Punitive damages have long been an available remedy at
common law for wanton, willful, or outrageous conduct”) (“[P]unitive damages have
long been available at common law[,] [and] . . . the common-law tradition of punitive
damages extends to maritime claims.”); Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471,
510-11 (2008) (recognizing availability of punitive damages under maritime law when
a defendant engaged in “reckless action,” that was “worse than negligent but less
than malicious”); see, e.g., Noon v. Carnival Corp., No. 18-23181-CIV, 2019 WL
3886517, at *13 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 12, 2019) (“Defendant takes issue with Plaintiff's
position because punitive damages are purportedly not recoverable under general
maritime law where only simple negligence is alleged. But, Plaintiff's allegations, in
the light most favorable to Plaintiff, include gross recklessness tantamount to
intentional misconduct because the crewmembers not only refused to assist Mrs.
Noon, but they even prevented her family members from contacting emergency
service providers in a timely basis after Mrs. Noon's oxygen had been cut off.”);
Colarte v. Carnival Corp., No. 1:24-CV-22203, 2024 WL 4124295, at *10 (S.D. Fla.
Aug. 23, 2024), report and recommendation adopted, 2024 WL 4122238 (S.D. Fla.
Sept. 9, 2024) (finding that punitive damages were adequately pleaded where the
defendant’s employees were alleged to have engaged in intentional misconduct); Doe
v. Carnival Corp., 470 F. Supp. 3d 1317, 1326 (S.D. Fla. 2020) (“At this stage, viewing
the allegations in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, Plaintiff has adequately
alleged entitlement to punitive damages ‘to the extent’ that Carnival was ‘more than
simply negligent.’”).
Case 1:25-cv-21930-JB Document 56 Entered on FLSD Docket 01/13/2026 Page 21 of 25

22
Accordingly, on this score, Royal Caribbean’s Motion should be denied. At best,
the question of punitive damages can be revisited at summary judgment based on a
review of the complete record developed in the case.
J. Declaratory and Injunctive Relief
Lastly, Royal Caribbean seeks to dismiss Plaintiff’s request for injunctive and
declaratory relief.
1. 	Injunctive Relief
As to injunctive relief, Plaintiff alleges that he is set to embark on another
Royal Caribbean cruise in February of 2026. Consequently, Plaintiff requests certain
mandatory actions be compelled in advance of his cruise, to ensure that this incident
will not repeat itself.
Recently, the Court, in its Order denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary
Injunction, denied this request for relief. [D.E. 55]. The Court sees no reason to stray
from that reasoning here. And when the Court removes as the basis for Plaintiff’s
injunctive relief his fear that he will be detained on his upcoming cruise, there exist
no plausible allegations of future harm.
Accordingly, for the reasons set forth in that Order and because Plaintiff fails
to plausibly allege the threat of future injury, the Court should grant Defendant’s
Motion to strike Plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief. See Zononi v. CHW Grp., Inc.,
No. 22-CV-14358, 2023 WL 2667941, at *5 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 7, 2023) (“After reviewing
the FAC, the Court finds no allegations to suggest a threat of future injury, other
than the mere fact of past injuries. Without more, past injuries alone do not suffice.”);
Case 1:25-cv-21930-JB Document 56 Entered on FLSD Docket 01/13/2026 Page 22 of 25

23
Schaevitz v. Braman Hyundai, Inc., 437 F. Supp. 3d 1237, 1249 (S.D. Fla. 2019)
(dismissing prayer for declaratory and injunctive release based upon failure to allege
facts showing threat of imminent future harm).
2. 	Declaratory Relief
Plaintiff further requests the Court to declare that Royal Caribbean is liable
under every count of the Amended Complaint. Royal Caribbean, meanwhile, moves
to strike these requests for relief, on grounds that there exists no live controversy.
In cases where “only … past conduct violated [the plaintiff’s] rights …
declaratory relief would have no force or effect.” Rager v. Augustine, 760 F. App'x 947,
954 (11th Cir. 2019) (citing Emory v. Peeler, 756 F.2d 1547, 1551-52 (11th Cir. 1985)).
Here, supra, we recommend the dismissal of Plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief,
and also the dismissal of Counts IV–X. All that remains in Plaintiff’s Complaint in
terms of declaratory relief, then, is requests to declare past harm. Those requests,
because they relate solely to past harms, are inappropriate. See AA Suncoast
Chiropractic Clinic, P.A. v. Progressive Am. Ins. Co., 938 F.3d 1170, 1180 (11th Cir.
2019) (dismissing claims for declaratory relief because the plaintiff did not satisfy
“the requirement that the plaintiff seeks relief for a future harm”) Michele F. Libman
MD PA v. First Health Grp. Corp., No. 24-14119-CIV, 2024 WL 4564804, at *3 (S.D.
Fla. 	Aug. 	12, 	2024) 	(internal 	citations 	omitted) 	(“Applying 	this 	framework 	to
Plaintiff's claims for declaratory judgment, the Court discerns that much of what
Plaintiff seeks in its prayer for relief are declarations concerning the propriety of
Defendants’ past conduct. … These claims, although cast in the form of declaratory
Case 1:25-cv-21930-JB Document 56 Entered on FLSD Docket 01/13/2026 Page 23 of 25

24
relief, really speak in legal remedies (i.e., breach of contract) and related damages
rather than Plaintiff's uncertainty as to its legal rights in a continuing, live
controversy. … Declaratory judgment is therefore improper ….”).
Thus, Plaintiff’s request for declaratory relief should be stricken.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Defendant’s Motion [D.E. 28] should be
GRANTED in part and DENIED in part:
A. Counts IV and V should be dismissed from Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint
with prejudice;
B. Counts VI, VII, VIII, IX, and X should be dismissed from Plaintiff’s
Amended Complaint with leave to amend on a proper showing and motion;
C. Plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief should be stricken from the Amended
Complaint;
D. Plaintiff’s 	request 	for 	declaratory 	relief 	should 	be 	stricken 	from 	the
Amended Complaint; and
E. The remainder of Defendant’s Motion should be denied.
Pursuant to Local Magistrate Rule 4(b) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 73, the parties have
fourteen (14) days from service of this Report and Recommendation within which to
file written objections, if any, to the District Judge. Failure to timely file objections
shall bar the parties from de novo determination by the District Judge of any factual
or legal issue covered in the Report and shall bar the parties from challenging on
appeal the District Judge’s Order based on any unobjected-to factual or legal
Case 1:25-cv-21930-JB Document 56 Entered on FLSD Docket 01/13/2026 Page 24 of 25

25
conclusions included in the Report. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); 11th Cir. Rule 3-1; see, e.g.,
Patton v. Rowell, 2017 WL 443634 (11th Cir. Feb. 2, 2017); Cooley v. Commissioner
of Social Security, 2016 WL 7321208 (11th Cir. Dec. 16, 2016).
DONE and SUBMITTED in Chambers at Miami, Florida this 13th day of
January, 2026.
/s/ Edwin G. Torres
EDWIN G. TORRES
United States Magistrate Judge
Case 1:25-cv-21930-JB Document 56 Entered on FLSD Docket 01/13/2026 Page 25 of 25