Jennis v. Dept. of Corrections

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
CASE NO. 02-14191-CIV-COHN/MAYNARD
CARLOS JENNIS,
Petitioner,
v.
SECRETARY FOR THE
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
Respondent.
___________________________________/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON
AMENDED MOTION TO REOPEN HABEAS PROCEEDING [DE 34]
This cause is before me on Petitioner Carlos Jennis’s Amended Motion to Reopen Habeas
Proceeding Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6) (“Motion”). DE 33. Presiding
United States District Judge James I. Cohn referred the matter to me. 	DE 26. 	Respondent
Secretary for the Department of Corrections responded and filed an appendix. 	DE 37, DE 38.
Petitioner replied. 	DE 39. 	The matter is now ripe for review. 	For the reasons stated below, I
respectfully recommend that the Motion be DENIED.
BACKGROUND
Petitioner is a state prisoner at Everglades Correctional Facility in Miami, Florida. 	On
February 22, 2000, after a jury in a Florida state court convicted Petitioner of first-degree murder,
attempted first-degree murder, attempted voluntary manslaughter, and shooting at a vehicle, the
state court sentenced Petitioner to life in prison without the possibility of parole in addition to
consecutive lesser terms of incarceration. DE 17 at 2–3. Petitioner unsuccessfully sought relief
through a direct appeal and a postconviction motion. Id. at 3.
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On July 1, 2002, Petitioner initiated this proceeding by filing a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus under United States Code Title 28, Section 2254. 	DE 1, DE 2. 	Petitioner raised the
following grounds for habeas relief: improper admission of prejudicial and irrelevant evidence;
prosecutorial misconduct; and ineffective assistance of counsel based on (1) failure to call an
exculpatory witness, (2) failure to request a jury instruction, (3) failure to challenge a biased juror,
and (4) counsel’s conflict with Petitioner. DE 2 at 5–21. On August 25, 2003, this Court denied
the Petition. DE 17, DE 20. Both this Court and the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals declined
to issue a certificate of appealability. DE 23, DE 24.
After over 20 years of inactivity in this federal case, Petitioner moved to reopen it on
October 17, 2025. 	DE 25. 	As grounds, Petitioner cites Rule 60(b)(6) and “extraordinary
circumstances that undermined the integrity of the original [f]ederal habeas proceedings.” DE 34
at 1. Petitioner contends that extraordinary circumstances exist because on December 3, 2024, he
requested records from the State Attorney’s Office, and in response he received a previously
undisclosed written plea offer with a sentence of 38.5 years. 	Id. at 2. 	Petitioner says the State
delivered this offer to Petitioner’s counsel during the trial court proceedings, but none of
Petitioner’s three court-appointed attorneys informed Petitioner. Petitioner claims he did not know
about the State’s plea offer of 38.5 years until after he made the 2024 records request. 	Id. 	He
therefore contends that the integrity of his federal habeas proceedings was undermined because
the proceedings were “based on an incomplete and misleading record” and the federal court “was
unaware of a material constitutional violation[.]” DE 34 at 4 (emphasis in original).
Respondent counters that Petitioner’s Motion is a veiled attempt to file a successive habeas
petition with a new ground for relief. DE 37 at 6–7. Respondent says the Motion does not meet
the requirements for reopening a case under Rule 60(b) or filing a successive petition. Id. at 7–8.
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In his reply, Petitioner reiterates that he has met the “extraordinary circumstances”
requirement of Rule 60(b)(6), because the previously “concealed” plea offer rendered the prior
habeas proceedings fundamentally incomplete. DE 39 at 2. Thus, he argues, his Motion is not a
successive petition, but a proper motion to reopen based on an incomplete record. Id. at 4.
DISCUSSION
The Motion is, in substance, an unauthorized successive habeas petition. 	As explained
below, it is therefore barred by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(“AEDPA”).
Under the AEDPA, federal courts have a strictly circumscribed power to grant a writ of
habeas corpus setting aside a state prisoner’s conviction because it was obtained in violation of the
United States Constitution. 	Crawford v. Head, 311 F.3d 1288, 1295 (11th Cir. 2002) (citation
omitted). 	The AEDPA does not permit second or successive habeas petitions presenting new
claims unless the petitioner shows (A) reliance on a new, retroactive rule of constitutional law, or
(B) that a previously undiscoverable factual predicate would show by clear and convincing
evidence that no reasonable factfinder would have found the petitioner guilty but for a
constitutional error. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60 governs relief from a judgment or order. Under Rule
60(b), a party may obtain relief from a final judgment, order, or proceeding under one of several
specified circumstances or for “any other reason that justifies relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). 	A
Rule 60(b) movant must show “extraordinary circumstances” for a court to reopen a final
judgment. Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 535 (2005) (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted).
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Rule 60(b) applies in habeas proceedings only to the extent it does not conflict with 28
U.S.C. § 2244(b). 	Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 529 (citations omitted). 	A Rule 60(b) motion is
essentially a veiled habeas corpus petition subject to the restrictions of Section 2244(b) when the
motion contains a “claim,” defined as “an asserted federal basis for relief from a state court’s
judgment of conviction.” Franqui v. Fla., 638 F.3d 1368, 1371 (11th Cir. 2011) (citing Gonzalez,
545 U.S. at 530) (internal quotation marks omitted); Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 531. 	A petitioner
cannot evade the restrictions of § 2244(b) by characterizing a successive petition as a motion to
reopen the habeas proceedings under Rule 60(b). Franqui v. Fla., 638 F.3d 1368, 1371 (11th Cir.
2011) (citing Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 531–32). 	Where, as here, a federal court has previously
resolved the petitioner’s habeas claims on their merits, I must view a Rule 60(b) motion
“challenging that decision with particular skepticism.” Franqui, 638 F.3d at 1371.
Here, the Motion is akin to a successive petition. Though Petitioner alleges the absence of
the plea offer from the federal record was a fundamental defect in the proceedings, DE 34 at 4,
Petitioner cites no authority that required Respondent to include the offer in its appendix. Indeed,
the Court’s order to show cause in the original habeas proceeding only required the appendix to
contain the trial transcript and filings relating to direct appeals and state-court postconviction
motions. DE 8 at 1.
At the root of the Motion is Petitioner’s attempt to present a claim that trial counsel’s failure
to present the plea offer to Petitioner during the state proceedings may have affected Petitioner’s
conviction or sentence. DE 34 at 4. Like in Franqui, though the Motion “is careful to characterize
its attack as targeting the omission” of the written plea offer from the habeas proceeding, the
Motion actually “advances an additional claim for habeas relief.” 	638 F.3d at 1372. 	I cannot
ignore that the Motion’s goal is to obtain a second chance at federal relief from Petitioner’s life
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sentence based on a more favorable plea offer he asserts he never received. The Motion is therefore
effectively a second habeas corpus petition. See Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 531 (“A habeas petitioner’s
filing that seeks vindication of such a claim is, if not in substance a ‘habeas corpus application,’ at
least similar enough that failing to subject it to the same requirements would be ‘inconsistent with’
the statute.”) (citations omitted).
Having determined that the Motion is an petition for habeas relief, I must apply the
restrictions on successive petitions found in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b). A petitioner seeking to present
a successive petition must first move for an order from the appropriate court of appeals authorizing
a district court to consider the successive petition. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A). Without such an
order of authority, a district court lacks jurisdiction to consider a successive habeas petition. Hill
v. Hopper, 112 F.3d 1088, 1089 (11th Cir. 1997). There is no evidence that Petitioner obtained
(or even sought) an order from the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals allowing this Court to
adjudicate a successive petition. Therefore, this Court lacks jurisdiction and must deny the Motion.
Young v. FCI Miami Warden, 805 F. App’x 829, 832 (11th Cir. 2020) (citing Franqui, 638 F.3d
at 1375); Hidalgo v. U.S., 2014 WL 12768167, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 19, 2014) (citing Hill, 112
F.3d at 1089).
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, I respectfully recommend that the Amended Motion to Reopen
Habeas Proceeding, DE 34, be DENIED, and that this case be CLOSED.
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO OBJECT
The parties shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of being served with a copy of this
Report and Recommendation within which to file written objections, if any, with U.S. District
Judge James I. Cohn. 	Failure to file objections timely shall bar the parties from a de novo
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determination by the District Judge of an issue covered in the Report and Recommendation and
shall bar the parties from attacking on appeal unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions contained
in this Report and Recommendation. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140,
149 (1985); Henley v. Johnson, 885 F.2d 790, 794 (11th Cir. 1989); 11th Cir. R. 3-1 (2016).
Conversely, if a party does not intend to object to this Report and Recommendation, then
that party shall file a Notice of such within five (5) days of the date of this Report and
Recommendation.
DONE AND RECOMMENDED in Chambers at Fort Pierce, Florida, this 1st day of May,
2026.
_______________________________
SHANIEK MILLS MAYNARD
U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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