Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
COLUMBUS DIVISION
I.T-S., 	:
:
Petitioner, 	:
:
v. 	: 	Case No. 4:25-cv-239-CDL-AGH
: 	28 U.S.C. § 2241
TERRANCE DICKERSON, et al., 	:
:
Respondents. 	:
_________________________________
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Pending before the Court is Respondents’ motion to dismiss Petitioner’s
application for habeas relief (ECF Nos. 5, 1). 	For the reasons explained below, it is
recommended that Respondents’ motion to dismiss be granted.
BACKGROUND
Petitioner, a native and citizen of Mexico, initially entered the United States
on June 30, 2001, and was processed for expedited removal. 	Knowles Decl. ¶¶ 3-5,
Exs. A-C, ECF Nos. 5-1, 5-2, 5-3, 5-4. He was removed to Mexico that same day. Id.
¶ 6, Ex. F, ECF No. 5-7. Petitioner subsequently reentered the United States at an
unknown time and place. Id. ¶ 7. Petitioner most recently came into United States
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) custody on June 10, 2025.1 Id. ¶ 12.
ICE processed Petitioner for reinstatement of his expedited removal order, but
Petitioner claimed some form of relief that requires interview by United States
1 Petitioner entered custody on June 10, 2025, after receiving a time-served sentence for illegal reentry
under 8 U.S.C. § 1326. He has other criminal convictions out of Cherokee County Georgia.
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Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”). Knowles Decl. ¶ 12. Respondents
state that the only impediment to Petitioner’s removal is an outstanding interview
with USCIS. Id. ¶¶ 12-13; Resp’ts’ Mot. to Dismiss 8-9, ECF No. 5.
On July 21, 2025, Petitioner filed an application for habeas relief. 	Pet. 1.
Respondents moved to dismiss on August 11, 2025. ECF No. 5. Although Petitioner
is represented by counsel, the Court filed an order directing Petitioner to respond to
the motion to dismiss on August 11, 2025. ECF No. 6. Despite this order, Petitioner
failed to respond. Respondents’ motion to dismiss is ripe for review.
DISCUSSION
Respondents 	move 	to 	dismiss 	Petitioner’s 	habeas 	application 	contending
Petitioner’s claim for relief pursuant to Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), is
premature. 	Resp’ts’ Mot. to Dismiss 5-7, ECF No. 5. 	Alternatively, Respondents
contend that if the Petition is not premature, Petitioner fails to establish he is entitled
to release under Zadvydas. 	Id. at 7-11. 	The Court agrees and recommends that
Petitioner’s habeas application be dismissed.
I. 	Petitioner’s habeas application is premature
Because Petitioner has a final order of removal, Petitioner’s detention is
governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a). Under § 1231(a), “when an alien is ordered removed,”
the Attorney General “shall” remove the alien within ninety days. 	8 U.S.C.
§ 1231(a)(1)(A). This removal period begins to run on, as relevant here, “[i]f the alien
is detained or confined (except under an immigration process), the date the alien is
released from detention or confinement.” 	8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(B)(iii). 	Detention
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during the ninety-day removal period is mandatory. 	8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2). 	The
removal period shall be extended “if the alien fails or refuses to make timely
application in good faith for travel or other documents necessary to the alien’s
departure or conspires or acts to prevent the alien’s removal subject to an order of
removal.” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(C). Finally, inadmissible aliens, criminal aliens, and
those who pose a risk to the community or of non-compliance with a removal order
“may be detained beyond the removal period and, if released, shall be subject to the
terms of supervision in [§ 1231(a)(3)].” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6).
Section 1231(a)(6) does not limit the length of post-final order detention. 	In
Zadvydas, however, the United States Supreme Court applied the doctrine of
constitutional avoidance to “read an implicit limitation into the statute.” 533 U.S. at
689. 	The Supreme Court held that § 1231(a)(6) authorizes post-removal-order
detention only for a period “reasonably necessary” to accomplish the alien’s removal
from the United States. 	Id. at 699-700. 	The Court recognized six months as a
presumptively reasonable period of time to allow the government to accomplish such
removal. Id. at 701. The Eleventh Circuit subsequently explained that to be entitled
to release under Zadvydas, an alien must show: “(1) that the six-month period, which
commences at the beginning of the statutory removal period, has expired when the §
2241 petition is filed; and (2) evidence of a good reason to believe that there is no
significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.” 	Gozo v.
Napolitano, 309 F. App’x 344, 346 (11th Cir. 2009) (quotation marks omitted); see also
Akinwale v. Ashcroft, 287 F.3d 1050, 1052 (11th Cir. 2002) (“[I]n order to state a claim
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under Zadvydas the alien . . . must show post-removal order detention in excess of
six months [and] also must provide evidence of a good reason to believe that there is
no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.”).
Respondents contend Petitioner’s habeas application should be dismissed as
premature because he has not shown post-removal detention in excess of six months
as required by Zadvydas. 	Resp’ts’ Mot. to Dismiss 5-7. 	Petitioner’s removal period
began on June 10, 2025, when he was taken into custody following his conviction for
illegal reentry.2 Id. at 6. Consequently, Petitioner’s habeas application—which was
filed on July 21, 2025—was filed during the 90-day removal period, during which
detention is mandatory. 	Thus, Petitioner cannot make the showing required by
Akinwale and Zadvydas, and his petition for habeas relief should be dismissed
without prejudice as premature.
II. 	Petitioner cannot show there is no significant likelihood of removal
in the reasonably foreseeable future
Alternatively, Petitioner cannot show there is no significant likelihood of
removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. 	As explained above, to be entitled to
relief under Zadvydas a petitioner must provide “evidence of a good reason to believe
that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.”
Gozo, 309 F. App’x at 346 (quotation marks omitted). 	Petitioner here provided no
evidence to establish that he cannot be removed to Mexico. Instead, he merely states
in his Petition that he “has neither been deported nor released from custody[.]” Pet.
2 Petitioner failed to respond to the motion to dismiss. Consequently, the Court assumes June 10,
2025, is the appropriate date on which the removal period started under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(B)(iii).
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¶ 4. 	Petitioner thus fails to meet his burden of showing there is no significant
likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. 	Further, despite being
advised of his right to respond to the motion to dismiss, Petitioner failed to respond
or otherwise present evidence in opposition to the motion to dismiss. 	Thus, on the
record before the Court, Petitioner fails to meet his burden of showing there is no
significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it is recommended that Respondent’s motion to
dismiss (ECF No. 5) be granted and Petitioner’s application for habeas relief (ECF
No. 1) be dismissed without prejudice. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the parties
may serve and file written objections to this Recommendation, or seek an extension
of time to file objections, within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy
hereof. The district judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the
Recommendation 	to 	which 	objection 	is 	made. 	All 	other 	portions 	of 	the
Recommendation may be reviewed for clear error.
The parties are hereby notified that, pursuant to Eleventh Circuit Rule 3-1,
“[a] party failing to object to a magistrate judge’s findings or recommendations
contained in a report and recommendation in accordance with the provisions of 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) waives the right to challenge on appeal the district court’s order
based on unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions if the party was informed of the
time period for objecting and the consequences on appeal for failing to object. In the
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absence of a proper objection, however, the court may review on appeal for plain error
if necessary in the interests of justice.”
SO RECOMMENDED, this 5th day of January, 2026.
s/ Amelia G. Helmick
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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