BROWN v. DARINGTON et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
COLUMBUS DIVISION
JESSIE LEE BROWN, 	:
:
Plaintiff, 	:
v. 	: 	Case No. 4:25-cv-253-CDL-AGH
:
Officer DARINGTON, et al., 	:
:
Defendants. 	:
________________________________
ORDER AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff Jessie Lee Brown, a prisoner incarcerated at the Muscogee County
Jail 	in 	Columbus, 	Georgia, 	filed 	a 	pro 	se 	Complaint 	seeking 	relief 	pursuant
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (ECF No. 1), a motion to amend this Complaint, and two motions
for temporary restraining order (“TRO”) (ECF Nos. 4, 6). Plaintiff also seeks leave to
proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) (ECF No. 2), and he filed a motion for an extension
of time to respond to any pending Court orders (ECF No. 5). 	For the following
reasons, 	Plaintiff 	may 	amend 	his 	Complaint 	as 	requested, 	but 	it 	is
RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s motion to proceed IFP be DENIED and that his
pending motions for TRO be DENIED as moot. Plaintiff’s motion for an extension
of time is DENIED as moot because at the time he filed his motion, there were no
pending orders of the Court requiring a response from Plaintiff.
DISCUSSION
Federal law bars a prisoner from bringing a civil action in federal court IFP:
if [he] has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained
in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the United
States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious,
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or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the
prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury.
28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). This is known as the “three strikes provision.” Under § 1915(g),
a prisoner incurs a “strike” any time he has a federal lawsuit or appeal dismissed on
the grounds that it is (1) frivolous, (2) malicious, or (3) fails to state a claim. 	See
Medberry v. Butler, 185 F.3d 1189, 1192 (11th Cir. 1999); see also Daker v. Comm’r,
Ga. Dep’t of Corr., 820 F.3d 1278, 1283-84 (11th Cir. 2016) (confirming that “these
three grounds are the only grounds that can render a dismissal a strike”). 	Once a
prisoner incurs three strikes, his ability to proceed IFP in federal court is greatly
limited: leave to proceed IFP may not be granted unless the prisoner is under
imminent danger of serious physical injury. Medberry, 185 F.3d at 1192.
The Court’s review of Plaintiff’s records1 reveals that Plaintiff has filed dozens
of federal lawsuits and that at least three of his complaints or appeals have been
dismissed as frivolous, or malicious, or for failure to state a claim. 	See, e.g., Order
Dismissing Compl., Brown v. Johnson, ECF No. 5 in Case No. 4:01-cv-00072-HL
(M.D. Ga. June 22, 2001) (adopting recommendation to dismiss for failure to state a
claim and as legally frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)); Order Dismissing
Compl., Brown v. Abbot, ECF No. 22 in Case No. 4:03-cv-00108-BAE (S.D. Ga. June
1, 2004) (dismissing pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)); Order Dismissing Compl.,
Brown v. McLane, ECF No. 4 in Case No. 7:03-cv-00101-HL-RLH (M.D. Ga. Jan. 13,
2004) (dismissing as frivolous); Order on Mot. Recons., Brown v. Nix, ECF No. 12 in
1 These records are available on the Federal Judiciary’s Public Access to Court Electronic Records
(“PACER”) database.
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Case No. 7:03-cv-00098-HL-RLH (M.D. Ga. Jan. 6, 2004) (dismissing as frivolous and
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)); Order Dismissing Compl., Brown v. Nance, ECF No.
6 in Case No. 4:01-cv-00127-HL (M.D. Ga. Oct. 19, 2001) (adopting recommendation
to dismiss for failure to state claim). Plaintiff has also previously had cases dismissed
pursuant to § 1915(g). 	See, e.g., Order Dismissing Compl., Brown v. Ezell, ECF No.
6 in Case No. 4:06-cv-00121-CDL (M.D. Ga. Nov. 2, 2006) (adopting recommendation
to dismiss pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) after identifying at least four cases
determined to be “legally frivolous”). Plaintiff is accordingly barred from prosecuting
this action IFP unless he is in imminent danger of serious physical injury. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(g).
To qualify for this exception, a prisoner must allege specific facts that describe
an “ongoing serious physical injury,” or “a pattern of misconduct evidencing the
likelihood of imminent serious physical injury.” Daker v. Ward, 999 F.3d 1300, 1311
(11th Cir. 2021) (quoting Brown v. Johnson, 387 F.3d 1344, 1350 (11th Cir. 2004)).
Complaints of past injuries are not sufficient. See Medberry, 185 F.3d at 1193. Vague
and unsupported claims of possible dangers likewise do not suffice. See White v. State
of Colo., 157 F.3d 1226, 1231-32 (10th Cir. 1998); see also Daker, 999 F.3d at 1311
(noting 	that 	“[g]eneral 	assertions” 	are 	insufficient 	to 	establish 	entitlement 	to
imminent danger exception). 	The exception to § 1915(g) is to be applied only in
“genuine emergencies,” when (1) “time is pressing,” (2) the “threat or prison condition
is real and proximate,” and (3) the “potential consequence is ‘serious physical injury.’”
Lewis v. Sullivan, 279 F.3d 526, 531 (7th Cir. 2002).
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Plaintiff’s claims arise from an incident that occurred at the Muscogee County
Jail in the late evening and early morning hours between May 30, 2025, and June 1,
2025. 	Compl. 6, ECF No. 1. 	According to the Complaint, Plaintiff was talking to
another inmate when he “felt a punch to [his] back” and realized someone had hit
him. Id. Plaintiff reported this to the control room officer, Defendant Darington, and
requested to speak with the lieutenant. 	Id. 	Defendant Darington left to call the
lieutenant, but he did not return. Id. Plaintiff therefore “beated on the door again,
and a big black officer,” whom Plaintiff later identifies as Defendant Martin,
responded. Id.2 Plaintiff contends Defendant Martin approached him as if he wanted
to fight Plaintiff, and he told Plaintiff “that if [Plaintiff] didn’t chill that the inmates
was going to beat [Plaintiff] up.” Id. at 6-7. Plaintiff reports that Defendant Martin
“then stated to the inmates you all beat his ass and he walked out the dorm.” Id. at 7.
Plaintiff “started to kick and beat on the table charger box,” and the inmates around
him said, “we will beat your ol ass.” 	Id. 	Plaintiff prepared to fight, but Defendant
Martin came back to the dorm, handcuffed Plaintiff, and took him out of the dorm
when he realized Plaintiff “was going to fight back and it wasn’t going to be easy.”
Id. The lieutenant later reviewed camera footage and relocated Plaintiff. Id.
Plaintiff contends he fears for his safety every time Defendant Martin is
around him because of this incident. Compl. 9. He states that the “[w]hole jail knows
of the incident and the statement [Defendant Martin] made,” and he thus believes
2 Plaintiff moved to amend his original Complaint to identify the “big black officer” as Defendant
Martin. ECF No. 4 at 1. Plaintiff may amend his Complaint in this manner.
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that other inmates at the jail will “think it[’s] ok to beat [him] up when [Defendant
Martin] is working because of the incident.” 	Id. 	In his motion to amend, Plaintiff
also contends Defendant Martin is still “allowed to work around the Plaintiff after
instructing inmates to beat Plaintiff up,” and he still “feels threatened by this.”
Amend. Compl. 1-2, ECF No. 4.
In his second motion for a TRO, Plaintiff recounts an incident that occurred on
October 24, 2025, that he believes makes “clear that [Defendant Martin] is trying to
cause [him] harm and trying to use inmates to do it even more since this action was
filed.” 	2d Mot. TRO 1-2, ECF No. 6. 	Plaintiff contends that an inmate trustee was
serving breakfast alongside Defendant Martin. 	Id. 	Plaintiff states that when the
trustee realized Plaintiff was next in line to pick up his food tray, he pulled one tray
out of the flap and replaced it with another. 	Id. 	Plaintiff states he “could tell by
[Defendant Martin’s] reaction that he had the trustee to make sure that he gave
[Plaintiff] that tray, and the trustee tr[i]ed to make sure that [Plaintiff] got it.” 	Id.
at 2. Plaintiff thus believes Defendant Martin tampered with that food tray. See id.
Plaintiff, however, “returned the tray before leav[i]ng the food tray flap and requested
another tray.” Id.
Plaintiff’s allegations are not sufficient to establish that he is in imminent
danger of serious physical injury. 	While the Court does not condone Defendant
Martin’s alleged actions, he apparently only attempted to instigate a fight between
Plaintiff and other inmates on one past occasion—and this attempt was unsuccessful.
Plaintiff does not allege that Defendant Martin has continued to make similar
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comments or threatened him in any other way. 	Moreover, Plaintiff acknowledges
that he was moved after the incident (Compl. 7), and he provides no factual support
for his speculative conclusion that the entire jail knows about this isolated incident
(Compl. 9). 	He does not allege that he has had any physical altercations with any
other inmates at the jail or that any other inmates have ever referenced this incident.
Plaintiff’s 	allegations 	regarding 	his 	food 	tray 	are 	similarly 	speculative.
Although Plaintiff states he “know[s Defendant Martin] did something to [the tray],”
he acknowledges that he “can’t prove it.” 	2d Mot. TRO 2. 	Indeed, even taking
Plaintiff’s allegations as true, it is just as plausible that Defendant Martin wanted
Plaintiff to take the “special food tray” for a nefarious but ultimately harmless reason:
the tray could have contained less food, for example, or the food could have been less
appetizing. Id. at 1. Perhaps more importantly, Plaintiff was able to obtain another
food tray without incident, despite Defendant Martin’s continued presence in the food
tray line. Id. at 2.
In the absence of any specific facts that could show that Plaintiff is currently
in 	danger 	from 	Defendant 	Martin 	or 	other 	inmates, 	his 	subjective 	fear 	of 	a
hypothetical future incident is not enough to invoke the imminent danger exception.
See, e.g., Daker, 999 F.3d at 1311; Gross v. Holder, 714 F. Supp. 2d 133, 135 (D.D.C.
June 1, 2010) (“Plaintiff's subjective fear for his safety, absent allegations of an
actual, concrete or ongoing threat, does not demonstrate an imminent danger.”)
(citing Mitchell v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 587 F.3d 415, 420–21 (D.C. Cir. 2009));
Husband v. Knapp, No. 3:14-CV-00177, 2015 WL 1641146, at *8 (M.D. Penn. Apr. 6,
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2015) (finding that inmate’s “subjective sense of threat from being housed with
others, standing alone and unaccompanied by any actual alleged injury, simply
cannot be considered an imminent threat of serious physical injury for purposes of
§ 1915(g).”).
For these reasons, Plaintiff should not be permitted to proceed IFP pursuant
to § 1915(g), and his Complaint should be dismissed without prejudice to his right to
refile with pre-payment of the full $405.00 filing fee. See Dupree v. Palmer, 284 F.3d
1234, 1236 (11th Cir. 2002) (“[T]he proper procedure is for the district court to dismiss
the complaint without prejudice when it denies the prisoner leave to proceed in forma
pauperis pursuant to the three strikes provision of § 1915(g).”).
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff will be allowed to amend his Complaint, but
it is RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s motion to proceed IFP (ECF No. 2) be
DENIED and that his pending motions for TRO (ECF Nos. 4, 6) be DENIED as
moot. Plaintiff’s motion for an extension of time (ECF No. 5) is DENIED as moot.
OBJECTIONS
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the parties may serve and file written
objections to these recommendations with the Honorable Clay D. Land, United States
District Judge, WITHIN FOURTEEN (14) DAYS after being served with a copy of
this Recommendation. Any objection is limited in length to TWENTY (20) PAGES.
See M.D. Ga. L.R. 7.4. 	The parties may seek an extension of time in which to file
written objections, provided a request for an extension is filed prior to the deadline
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for filing written objections. 	Failure to object in accordance with the provisions of
§ 636(b)(1) waives the right to challenge on appeal the district judge’s order based on
factual and legal conclusions to which no objection was timely made. 	See 11th Cir.
R. 3-1.
SO ORDERED AND RECOMMENDED, this 3rd day of November, 2025.
s/ Amelia G. Helmick
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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