PARNELL v. JESTER et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
__MACON DIVISION
CHRISTOPHER PARNELL, 	:
:
Plaintiff, 	:
:
VS. 	:
: 	NO. 5:25-cv-00105-MTT-CHW
WARDEN T. JESTER, et al., 	:
:
Defendants. 	:
_________________________________
ORDER & RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff Christopher Parnell filed a pro se civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 while he was a prisoner in Central State Prison in Macon, Georgia.1 	ECF No. 1.
Plaintiff also filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). 	ECF No. 10.
Thereafter, Plaintiff’s motion to proceed IFP was granted, and Plaintiff was ordered to
recast his complaint if he wanted to proceed with this action. 	ECF No. 12.
Plaintiff has now filed a recast complaint, which is ripe for preliminary review. 	On
that review, Plaintiff will be permitted to proceed for further factual development on his
deliberate indifference to a serious medical need claims against Warden T. Jester and
Medical Administrator A. Harrison. 	It is RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s claims
against Deputy Warden P. Chambers and WellPath Medical Services be DISMISSED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE for failure to state a claim, as set forth below.
PRELIMINARY REVIEW OF PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT
I. 	Standard of Review
The Prison Litigation Reform Act directs courts to conduct a preliminary screening
1 Plaintiff recently filed a notice of change of address indicating that he has been released
from Central State Prison. 	ECF No. 17.
Case 5:25-cv-00105-MTT-CHW Document 18 Filed 12/09/25 Page 1 of 13

of every complaint filed by a prisoner who seeks redress from a government entity, official,
or employee. 	28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). 	Courts must also screen complaints filed by a
plaintiff proceeding IFP. 	28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). 	Both statutes apply in this case, and the
standard of review is the same. 	“Pro se filings are generally held to a less stringent
standard than those drafted by attorneys and are liberally construed.” 	Carmichael v.
United States, 966 F.3d 1250, 1258 (11th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted). 	Still, the Court
must dismiss a prisoner complaint if it “(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is
immune from such relief.” 	28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e).
A claim is frivolous if it “lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” 	Miller
v. Donald, 541 F.3d 1091, 1100 (11th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted). 	On preliminary
review, the Court may dismiss claims that are based on “indisputably meritless legal”
theories and “claims whose factual contentions are clearly baseless.” 	Id. (citations
omitted). 	A claim can be dismissed as malicious if it is knowingly duplicative or
otherwise amounts to an abuse of the judicial process. 	Daker v. Ward, 999 F.3d 1300,
1308, 1310 (11th Cir. 2021) (affirming dismissal of duplicative complaint “in light of
[prisoner’s] history as a prolific serial filer”).
A complaint fails to state a claim if it does not include “sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” 	Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
“Factual allegations [in a complaint] must be enough to raise a right to relief above the
speculative level . . . .” 	Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted). 	In other words,
the complaint must allege enough facts “to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery
will reveal evidence” supporting a claim. 	Id. at 556. 	“Threadbare recitals of the elements
Case 5:25-cv-00105-MTT-CHW Document 18 Filed 12/09/25 Page 2 of 13

of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” 	Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
To state a claim for relief under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1) an act or
omission deprived him of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or a
statute of the United States; and (2) the act or omission was committed by a person acting
under color of state law. 	Hale v. Tallapoosa Cnty., 50 F.3d 1579, 1582 (11th Cir. 1995).
If a litigant cannot satisfy these requirements or fails to provide factual allegations in
support of his claim or claims, the complaint is subject to dismissal. 	See, e.g., Bingham v.
Thomas, 654 F.3d 1171, 1176-77 (11th Cir. 2011) (affirming dismissal of certain claims at
preliminary screening because prisoner failed to allege sufficient facts to show a violation
of his rights), abrogated on other grounds by Wade v. McDade, 106 F.4th 1251, 1255 (11th
Cir. 2024) (en banc).
II. 	Factual Allegations
In the recast complaint, Plaintiff asserts that he was diagnosed with a lower left
ingrown hernia at Autry State Prison in 2018.2 	ECF No. 14 at 7. 	Plaintiff was supposed
to have surgery at that time, but it was cancelled due to a shortage of transport staff. 	Id.
Apparently, Plaintiff did not receive treatment for his hernia between 2018 and June 2023,
when he was transferred to Central State Prison. 	Id.
When he arrived at Central State Prison, Plaintiff began putting in sick call requests
in relation to his “hernia and the extreme pain” it caused. 	Id. 	Plaintiff lists grievances he
filed and letters he sent beginning on April 5, 2024.3 	In particular, Plaintiff asserts that he
2 In the recast complaint, Plaintiff refers to attachments, which he says will be mailed. 	See
ECF No. 14 at 5. 	No attachments were included with the recast complaint, nor have any
been received by the Court since the complaint was filed.
3 Plaintiff asserts that he put in sick call requests prior to that date, but he does not provide
Case 5:25-cv-00105-MTT-CHW Document 18 Filed 12/09/25 Page 3 of 13

sent letters to Health Administrator A. Harrison on April 7, 2024; April 18, 2024; and April
23, 2024. 	Id. 	Plaintiff also alleges that he filed grievances on April 5, 2024; April 7,
2024; and April 8, 2024; and that he sent letters to Warden T. Jester on April 23, 2024;
May 4, 2024; and May 25, 2024. 	Id.
In the meantime, Plaintiff was seen in medical on April 11, 2024, about his hernia.
Id. at 8. 	At that time, Plaintiff was given a hernia belt and Motrin and was scheduled to
be seen by Dr. Green. 	Id. 	Plaintiff was told that a prescription would be put in for him,
but it was not put into the system, and Plaintiff did not receive any pain medication other
than the Motrin on that one occasion. 	Id.
On April 19, 2024, Plaintiff spoke to Warden Jester about a burn wound and his
hernia. 	Id. 	Plaintiff was sent to the hospital for treatment for the burn, but nothing was
done about the hernia. 	Id. 	On April 22, 2024, Plaintiff’s dressing for his wound was
changed, and he asked about his hernia. 	Id. 	Physician’s Assistant Megran spoke to Dr.
Green, who said that Plaintiff would not be treated for the hernia until the burn was
completely healed. 	Id. 	Plaintiff spoke to Megran again on April 26, 2024, when he was
again denied treatment. 	Id. 	Plaintiff states that on April 30, 2024, Harrison told him that
nothing would be done at that time. 	Id.
On May 8, 2024, Plaintiff discussed his hernia with Warden Jester, who told him
that she could not give orders to medical. 	Id. 	He also spoke to her on May 29, 2024, but
he does not say what she told him at that time. 	Id.
On May 30, 2024, Plaintiff was seen by a nurse at sick call. 	Id. 	Plaintiff then was
put on a video chat with Nurse Practitioner Parrish from WellPath Medical Services. 	Id.
any specific information about his requests for help before April 2024.
Case 5:25-cv-00105-MTT-CHW Document 18 Filed 12/09/25 Page 4 of 13

Parrish looked at Plaintiff’s hernia on video and told the sick call nurse to put in new orders
for a CT scan, ultrasound, and surgery consult. 	Id. 	On June 12, 2024, Plaintiff spoke to
Physician’s Assistant Monday, who said that Plaintiff needed to have surgery and
scheduled an appointment. 	Id. 	Plaintiff was told on June 21, 2024, that he would be
getting everything that he had asked for. 	Id. 	Plaintiff filed this complaint against Warden
T. Jester, Deputy Warden of Care and Treatment P. Chambers, Medical Administrator A.
Harrison, and WellPath Medical Services.
III. 	Plaintiff’s Claims
Plaintiff’s allegations in the complaint suggest that he is attempting to raise claims
against these defendants for deliberate indifference to a serious medical need. 	To state a
claim for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs, a plaintiff must allege facts
showing “(1) a serious medical need; (2) the defendants’ deliberate indifference to that
need; and (3) causation between that indifference and the plaintiff’s injury.” 	Mann v.
Taser Int’l, Inc., 588 F.3d 1291, 1306-07 (11th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). 	The first
prong is objective, and
a serious medical need is considered one that has been diagnosed by a
physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay
person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention. . . . 	In
either of these situations, the medical need must be one that, if left
unattended, pos[es] a substantial risk of serious harm.
Farrow v. West, 320 F.3d 1235, 1243 (11th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted).
For the second element—deliberate indifference—a plaintiff must plausibly allege
that the defendant: (1) “was subjectively aware that the inmate was at risk of serious harm”;
(2) “disregarded that risk”; and (3) “acted with ‘subjective recklessness as used in the
criminal law.’” 	Wade v. McDade, 106 F.4th 1251, 1255 (11th Cir. 2024) (quoting Farmer
Case 5:25-cv-00105-MTT-CHW Document 18 Filed 12/09/25 Page 5 of 13

v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 839 (1994)). 	Subjective awareness requires that the defendant
“must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial
risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” 	Rodriguez v. Sec’y for
Dep’t of Corr., 508 F.3d 611, 617 (11th Cir. 2007) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837). 	To
show that a particular “defendant acted with ‘subjective recklessness as used in the criminal
law,’” the plaintiff must allege facts showing “that the defendant was subjectively aware
that his own conduct put the plaintiff at substantial risk of serious harm.” 	Wade, 106 F.4th
at 1255. 	Whether the defendant was subjectively aware of a serious risk of harm “is a
question of fact subject to demonstration in the usual ways, including inference from
circumstantial evidence, and a factfinder may conclude that a prison official knew of a
substantial risk from the very fact that the risk was obvious.” 	Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842.
Liability cannot be based on simple negligence or medical malpractice, but rather
on some sort of conscious disregard for a serious and imminent risk. 	Id. at 834; Harris v.
Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495, 1505 (11th Cir. 1991) (explaining that mere allegations of
negligence or malpractice do not amount to deliberate indifference). 	A prison official
might act with deliberate indifference by denying or delaying medical care or by providing
“medical care which is so cursory as to amount to no treatment at all.” 	Dang v. Sheriff,
Seminole Cnty. Fla., 871 F.3d 1272, 1280 (11th Cir. 2017) (citations omitted). 	But
“[s]ome delay in rendering medical treatment may be tolerable depending on the nature of
the medical need and the reason for the delay.” 	Adams v. Poag, 61 F.3d 1537, 1544 (11th
Cir. 1995).
The final prong simply requires “that a defendant have a causal connection to the
constitutional harm.” 	Goebert v. Lee Cnty., 510 F.3d 1312, 1326 (11th Cir. 2007)
Case 5:25-cv-00105-MTT-CHW Document 18 Filed 12/09/25 Page 6 of 13

(citation omitted) (explaining that “as with any tort claim, [plaintiff] must show that the
injury was caused by the defendant's wrongful conduct”).
As to whether he had a serious medical need, Plaintiff asserts that he was diagnosed
with a hernia in 2018. 	Plaintiff contends that he was initially scheduled for surgery but
that the surgery did not take place. 	Plaintiff alleges that he sent in numerous sick call
requests seeking treatment because the hernia caused him pain. 	At some point after June
21, 2024, Plaintiff apparently underwent surgery to treat the hernia.
At this point, it is not clear that Plaintiff’s condition constituted a serious medical
need, as he went years without treatment before the named defendants became involved,
and Plaintiff does not allege specific facts showing that he suffered serious harm in that
time. 	Nevertheless, Plaintiff does allege that the condition was very painful. 	Moreover,
he asserts that, once he was seen by the Nurse Practitioner in May 2024, he was ultimately
referred for surgery. 	Accepting these allegations as true and construing them in his favor,
Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that his hernia constituted a serious medical need sufficient
for the purposes of this preliminary review. 	Therefore, the question is whether Plaintiff
has alleged facts to show that any of the named defendants was deliberately indifferent to
his need.
A. 	Warden T. Jester
Plaintiff does not set forth any facts regarding Warden Jester before April 19, 2024,
when he spoke to her about a burn wound and his hernia. 	At that point, Plaintiff had been
seen in medical about his hernia, had been given a hernia belt, and was scheduled to be
seen by Dr. Green. 	Plaintiff also sent letters to Warden Jester on April 23, 2024; May 4,
2024; and May 25, 2024. 	He spoke to Warden Jester on May 8, 2024, when she told him
Case 5:25-cv-00105-MTT-CHW Document 18 Filed 12/09/25 Page 7 of 13

that she could not give orders to medical, and again on May 29, 2024. 	Plaintiff learned
on June 21, 2024, that he would receive the treatment he had been seeking.
As with the question of whether he had a serious medical need, it is not clear at this
time that Plaintiff will be able to demonstrate that Warden Jester was actually aware of
Plaintiff’s serious medical need and deliberately disregarded a risk of harm to Plaintiff.
Accepting Plaintiff’s allegations as true and construing them in his favor, it appears
possible that he may have a claim for relief against Warden Jester. 	In particular, Plaintiff
asserts that Warden Jester knew for two months that Plaintiff was suffering from his hernia,
but she did not help him get treatment. 	Therefore, Plaintiff will be permitted to proceed
for further factual development on his deliberate indifference claim against Warden Jester.
B. 	Medical Administrator A. Harrison
Similarly, Plaintiff asserts that he wrote multiple letters to Medical Administrator
Harrison and that he spoke to her in person about his condition, but she also did not help
him get treatment. 	Thus, Plaintiff will be permitted to proceed for further factual
development on his deliberate indifference claim against Harrison.
C. 	Deputy Warden P. Chambers
Plaintiff names Deputy Warden of Care and Treatment P. Chambers as a defendant
to this action, but he does not include any allegations as to Chambers in his statement of
the facts. 	Presumably, Plaintiff included Chambers based on her position as deputy
warden of care and treatment. 	A § 1983 claim, however, requires a plaintiff to
demonstrate “an affirmative causal connection between the actions taken by a particular
person under color of state law and the constitutional deprivation.” 	LaMarca v. Turner,
995 F.2d 1526, 1538 (11th Cir. 1993) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 	As
Plaintiff has made no allegations connecting Deputy Warden Chambers to his claim, it is
Case 5:25-cv-00105-MTT-CHW Document 18 Filed 12/09/25 Page 8 of 13

RECOMMENDED 	that 	his 	claim 	against 	her 	be 	DISMISSED 	WITHOUT
PREJUDICE for failure to state a claim.
D. 	WellPath Medical Services
Finally, Plaintiff also does not include any allegations as to WellPath’s involvement
with his situation other than that he saw a nurse practitioner from WellPath. 	To state a
claim against a prison’s medical services contractor, a prisoner must allege that the
contractor had a custom or policy that caused the constitutional violation at issue. 	Massey
v. Montgomery Cty. Detention Facility, 646 F. App’x 777, 780 (11th Cir. 2016) (per
curiam) (citing Monell v Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978)). 	As Plaintiff’s
allegations do not show any connection between WellPath’s policies and any delay in his
treatment, it is also RECOMMENDED that this claim be DISMISSED WITHOUT
PREJUDICE.
IV. 	Conclusion
Therefore, as set forth above, Plaintiff will be permitted to proceed for further
factual development on his deliberate indifference to a serious medical need claims against
Defendants 	Warden 	T. 	Jester 	and 	Medical 	Administrator 	A. 	Harrison. 	It 	is
RECOMMENDED that his claims against Deputy Warden P. Chambers and WellPath
Medical Services be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for failure to state a claim.
OBJECTIONS
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the parties may serve and file written objections
to these recommendations with Marc T. Treadwell, United States District Judge, WITHIN
FOURTEEN (14) DAYS after being served with a copy of this Recommendation. 	The
parties may seek an extension of time in which to file written objections, provided a request
for an extension is filed prior to the deadline for filing written objections. 	Objections to
Case 5:25-cv-00105-MTT-CHW Document 18 Filed 12/09/25 Page 9 of 13

the Recommendation are limited in length to twenty (20) pages. 	A party seeking
permission to exceed these limitations shall do so by filing a written motion no later than
five (5) days in advance of the deadline for filing objections and by specifying the number
of pages requested. 	Failure to object in accordance with the provisions of § 636(b)(1)
waives the right to challenge on appeal the district judge’s order based on factual and legal
conclusions to which no objection was timely made. 	See 11th Cir. R. 3-1.
ORDER FOR SERVICE
Having found that Plaintiff has made colorable constitutional violation claims
against Defendants Warden T. Jester and Medical Administrator A. Harrison, it is
accordingly ORDERED that service be made on Defendants and that they file an Answer,
or such other response as may be appropriate under Rule 12, 28 U.S.C. § 1915, and the
Prison Litigation Reform Act. 	Defendants are reminded of the duty to avoid unnecessary
service expenses, and of the possible imposition of expenses for failure to waive service
pursuant to Rule 4(d).
DUTY TO ADVISE OF ADDRESS CHANGE
During the pendency of this action, all parties shall keep the Clerk of this Court and
all opposing attorneys and/or parties advised of their current address. 	Failure to promptly
advise the Clerk of a change of address may result in the dismissal of a party’s pleadings.
DUTY TO PROSECUTE ACTION
Plaintiff is also advised that he must diligently prosecute his Complaint or face the
possibility that it will be dismissed under Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure for failure to prosecute. 	Defendants are similarly advised that they are expected
to diligently defend all allegations made against them and to file timely dispositive motions
as hereinafter directed. 	This matter will be set down for trial when the Court determines
Case 5:25-cv-00105-MTT-CHW Document 18 Filed 12/09/25 Page 10 of 13

that discovery has been completed and that all motions have been disposed of or the time
for filing dispositive motions has passed.
FILING AND SERVICE OF MOTIONS,
PLEADINGS, AND CORRESPONDENCE
It is the responsibility of each party to file original motions, pleadings, and
correspondence with the Clerk of Court. 	A party need not serve the opposing party by
mail if the opposing party is represented by counsel. 	In such cases, any motions,
pleadings, or correspondence shall be served electronically at the time of filing with the
Court. 	If any party is not represented by counsel, however, it is the responsibility of each
opposing party to serve copies of all motions, pleadings, and correspondence upon the
unrepresented party and to attach to said original motions, pleadings, and correspondence
filed with the Clerk of Court a certificate of service indicating who has been served and
where (i.e., at what address), when service was made, and how service was accomplished.
DISCOVERY
Plaintiff shall not commence discovery until an answer or dispositive motion has
been filed on behalf of the Defendant from whom discovery is sought by the Plaintiff. 	The
Defendants shall not commence discovery until such time as an answer or dispositive
motion has been filed. 	Once an answer or dispositive motion has been filed, the parties
are authorized to seek discovery from one another as provided in the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. 	The deposition of the Plaintiff, a state/county prisoner, may be taken at any
time during the time period hereinafter set out provided prior arrangements are made with
his custodian. 	Plaintiff is hereby advised that failure to submit to a deposition may
result in the dismissal of his lawsuit under Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.
Case 5:25-cv-00105-MTT-CHW Document 18 Filed 12/09/25 Page 11 of 13

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that discovery (including depositions and the service
of written discovery requests) shall be completed within 90 days of the date of filing of an
answer or dispositive motion by the Defendant (whichever comes first) unless an extension
is otherwise granted by the court upon a showing of good cause therefor or a protective
order is sought by the defendant and granted by the court. 	This 90-day period shall run
separately as to Plaintiff and Defendant beginning on the date of filing of Defendant’s
answer or dispositive motion (whichever comes first). The scheduling of a trial may be
advanced upon notification from the parties that no further discovery is contemplated or
that discovery has been completed prior to the deadline.
Discovery materials shall not be filed with the Clerk of Court. 	No party shall be
required to respond to any discovery not directed to him/her or served upon him/her by the
opposing counsel/party. 	The undersigned incorporates herein those parts of the Local
Rules imposing the following limitations on discovery: 	except with written permission
of the court first obtained, interrogatories may not exceed TWENTY-FIVE (25) to each
party, requests for production of documents and things under Rule 34 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure may not exceed TEN (10) requests to each party, and requests
for admissions under Rule 36 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure may not exceed
FIFTEEN (15) requests to each party. 	No party shall be required to respond to any such
requests which exceed these limitations.
IT 	IS 	FURTHER 	ORDERED 	that 	Defendants 	comply 	with 	the 	attached
“Required Disclosure of the Existence of Video or Photographic Evidence When Plaintiff
Files Suit Against One or More Georgia Department of Corrections Employees Relating
to Events That Occurred During Plaintiff’s Incarceration within the Georgia Department
of Corrections.”
Case 5:25-cv-00105-MTT-CHW Document 18 Filed 12/09/25 Page 12 of 13

REQUESTS FOR DISMISSAL AND/OR JUDGMENT
The Court shall not consider requests for dismissal of or judgment in this action,
absent the filing of a motion therefor accompanied by a brief/memorandum of law citing
supporting authorities. 	Dispositive motions should be filed at the earliest time possible,
but in any event no later than one hundred twenty (120) days from when the discovery
period begins unless otherwise directed by the Court.
SO ORDERED and RECOMMENDED, this 9th day of December, 2025.
s/ Charles H. Weigle
Charles H. Weigle
United States Magistrate Judge
Case 5:25-cv-00105-MTT-CHW Document 18 Filed 12/09/25 Page 13 of 13