CHAMPA DAHI LLC v. CARLAN et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
MACON DIVISION
CHAMPA DAHI, LLC, 	)
)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
)
v. 	) 	CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:25-CV-360 (MTT)
)
JAMES THOMAS CARLAN, 	)
)
)
Defendant. 	)
)
ORDER
Pro se Defendant James Thomas Carlan filed a Notice of Appeal on October 2,
2025. ECF 10. After his appeal was dismissed (ECF 16), Carlan sought leave to
proceed with his appeal in forma pauperis (“IFP”). ECF 17. The Court denied Carlan’s
motion for leave to appeal IFP as moot (ECF 19), and his appeal was subsequently
reinstated. ECF 20. Carlan has timely filed a second motion for leave to appeal IFP and
requests that the Court consider the financial affidavit filed with his previous motion
(ECF 17). ECF 21.
Applications to appeal IFP are governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and Federal Rule
of Appellate Procedure 24. 28 U.S.C. § 1915 provides:
(a)(1) [A]ny court of the United States may authorize the commencement,
prosecution or defense of any suit, action or proceeding, civil or criminal, or
appeal therein, without prepayment of fees or security therefor, by a person
who submits an affidavit that includes a statement of all assets such
prisoner possesses that the person is unable to pay such fees or give
security therefor. Such affidavit shall state the nature of the action, defense
or appeal and affiant's belief that the person is entitled to redress. . . .
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(3) An appeal may not be taken in forma pauperis if the trial court certifies
in writing that it is not taken in good faith.
Similarly, Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 24 provides:
(1) [A] party to a district-court action who desires to appeal in forma pauperis
must file a motion in the district court. The party must attach an affidavit
that:
(A) shows . . . the party’s inability to pay or to give security for fees
and costs;
(B) claims an entitlement to redress; and
(C) states the issues that the party intends to present on appeal.
(2) If the district court denies the motion, it must state its reasons in writing.
The Court, therefore, must make two determinations when faced with an
application to proceed IFP. First, it must determine whether the plaintiff is financially
able to pay the filing fee required for an appeal. Here, Carlan has submitted a financial
affidavit which demonstrates that he is unable to prepay the appellate filing fee. ECF 17.
Next, the Court must determine if the plaintiff has satisfied the good faith
requirement. “‘[G]ood faith’ . . . must be judged by an objective standard.” Coppedge v.
United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962). The plaintiff demonstrates good faith when he
seeks review of a non-frivolous issue. Id. An issue “is frivolous if it is ‘without arguable
merit either in law or fact.’” Napier v. Preslicka, 314 F.3d 528, 531 (11th Cir. 2002)
(citations omitted), overruled on other grounds by Hoever v. Marks, 993 F.3d 1353,
1363-64 (11th Cir. 2021). “Arguable means capable of being convincingly argued.” Sun
v. Forrester, 939 F.2d 924, 925 (11th Cir. 1991) (quotation marks and citations omitted);
Carroll v. Gross, 984 F.2d 392, 393 (11th Cir. 1993) (“[A] case is frivolous . . . when it
appears the plaintiff ‘has little or no chance of success.’”) (citations omitted). “In
deciding whether an [IFP] appeal is frivolous, a district court determines whether there
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is ‘a factual and legal basis . . . for the asserted wrong, however inartfully pleaded.’”
Sun, 939 F.2d at 925 (citations omitted).
Carlan seeks to appeal the Court’s September 24, 2025, Order (ECF 5)
remanding this action to the Magistrate Court of Houston County. ECF 10. This action
was remanded for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. ECF 5. With certain exceptions1,
“[a]n order remanding a case to the State court from which it was removed is not
reviewable on appeal or otherwise.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d); see also Fla. Polk Cnty. v.
Prison Health Servs., Inc., 170 F.3d 1081, 1083 (11th Cir. 1999) (“Section 1447(d)
forecloses appellate review of a remand order if the order is based on … the absence of
subject matter jurisdiction.”).
Carlan asserts that this case “falls within the exception to the general remand bar
in 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) because the district court’s order exceeded jurisdiction by:” (1)
“Allowing a state magistrate to issue judgment after removal was filed;” (2) “[r]emanding
a case where the amount in controversy exceeded the magistrate’s jurisdictional limit of
$15,000, and the federal record reflected Plaintiff's own claim of more than $21,000;” (3)
“[d]enying Defendant's demanded Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial in a
controversy exceeding $20;” and (4) “[t]reating as valid a void order entered by a court
that lacked jurisdiction after removal.” ECF 10 at 1. None of these are exceptions
provided for in Section 1447(d), and the Court did not remand based on a procedural
defect without waiting for a party’s motion. See Corp. Mgmt. Advisors, Inc. v. Artjen
Complexus, Inc., 561 F.3d 1294, 1296-97 (11th Cir. 2009).
1 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) provides exceptions to cases involving federal officers or agencies and certain civil
rights cases. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1442, 1443.
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Accordingly, Carlan has not identified a non-frivolous issue for appeal and the
Court’s independent review of the record demonstrates that his appeal is frivolous. The
appeal, therefore, is not brought in good faith. Carlan’s application to appeal IFP (ECF
17; 21) is DENIED.
SO ORDERED, this 2nd day of February, 2026.
S/ Marc T. Treadwell_____________
MARC T. TREADWELL, JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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