EDWARDS v. JONES

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
VALDOSTA DIVISION
JAMES BERNARD EDWARDS, 	:
:
Petitioner, 	:
v. 	: 	Case No. 7:25-cv-84-WLS-ALS
:
Warden DESHAWN JONES, 	:
:
Respondent. 	:
___________________________
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Petitioner James Bernard Edwards, an inmate currently confined at Augusta State
Medical Prison in Grovetown, Georgia, filed a pro se application for habeas relief under
28 U.S.C. § 2254.1 (Doc. 1). Pending before the Court are Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss
the amended habeas petition as untimely (Doc. 17), and Petitioner’s Amended Motion to
dismiss the indictment under which he was convicted. (Docs. 15, 22). For the reasons
stated below, the Court recommends that Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 17) be
granted and that Petitioner’s Amended Motions to dismiss the indictment be denied.
(Docs. 15, 22)
BACKGROUND
On December 16, 2011, a Lowndes County, Georgia, grand jury indicted Petitioner
and a co-defendant in an eleven-count indictment charging burglary (Count 1), armed
robbery (Counts 2 and 4), possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony
(Counts 3, 5, 7, 9, and 11), aggravated assault (Count 6), and kidnapping (Counts 8 and
1 Augusta State Medical Prison, which is in Columbia County, Georgia, is in the Augusta Division of the
United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia. 28 U.S.C. § 90(c)(1). Petitioner’s
convictions occurred in Lowndes County, Georgia, which lies in the Valdosta Division of this Court. Id.
(b)(6). Although Petitioner is outside the jurisdiction of this Court, the Court retains concurrent jurisdiction
over his § 2254 Petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241(d).
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10). (Doc. 18-1). Following a jury trial in January 2013, Petitioner was convicted of
“burglary, two counts of armed robbery, two counts of kidnapping, and four counts of
possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony[.]” (Doc. 17-1, at 1). The state
trial court sentenced Petitioner to four (4) life sentences consecutive to each other, plus
five (5) additional consecutive years. (Doc. 2-10). On March 13, 2017, the Court of Appeals
of Georgia affirmed Petitioner’s convictions. (Doc. 18-2). Petitioner did not file an appeal
with the Supreme Court of Georgia.
On August 7, 2018, Petitioner filed an extraordinary motion for new trial in the
state trial court. (Doc. 18-3). On September 13, 2018, the state trial court denied the
extraordinary motion for new trial. (Doc. 18-4). On April 18, 2019, the Georgia Court of
Appeals dismissed Petitioner’s appeal of the denial of his extraordinary motion for new
trial because Petitioner did not file an application for discretionary review of the denial.
(Doc. 18-5).
On June 24, 2019, Petitioner filed a state habeas petition. (Doc. 18-6). On July 29,
2019, Petitioner filed another state habeas petition, which was subsequently consolidated
into his June 24, 2019 state habeas petition. (Docs. 18-7, 18-8). On June 23, 2020,
Petitioner filed an amendment to his state habeas petition. (Doc. 18-9). Following an
evidentiary hearing, on June 16, 2022, the state habeas court denied Petitioner’s amended
state habeas petition. (Doc. 18-10). On May 31, 2023, the Georgia Supreme Court denied
Petitioner’s application for certificate of probable cause to appeal the denial of his
amended state habeas petition. (Docs. 18-11, 18-12).
On May 20, 2024, Petitioner filed a second state habeas petition. (Docs. 18-1, at 2;
18-13). On October 31, 2024, the second state habeas court dismissed Petitioner’s second
state habeas petition as impermissibly successive. (Doc. 18-14). On July 22, 2025, the
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Georgia Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s application for certificate of probable cause to
appeal the denial of his second state habeas petition. (Docs. 18-15, 18-16).
On July 1, 2025, Petitioner filed this federal habeas Petition asserting claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel and violations of his due process rights. (Doc. 1).
Petitioner subsequently filed an amendment to his Petition on February 3, 2026. (Doc.
14). On February 9, 2026, Respondent moved to dismiss the Amended Petition as
untimely. (Doc. 17). Petitioner filed a response to the Motion to Dismiss. (Doc. 28).
Additionally, Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss the indictment under which he was
convicted, as well as an amendment to that Motion. (Docs. 17, 22). These matters are ripe
for a recommendation.
DISCUSSION
I. 	The Applicable Limitations Period
Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), a petitioner
must file a federal habeas petition challenging his state conviction within one-year of his
conviction becoming final. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). This limitations period begins to run
on “the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the
expiration of the time for seeking such review[.]” Id. § 2244(d)(1)(A). Additionally, the
limitations period is tolled while a petitioner’s “properly filed application” for state habeas
relief is pending. Id. § 2244(d)(2). Thus, to determine whether a petition was timely filed,
the Court “must determine (1) when the collateral motion was filed and (2) when the
judgment of conviction became final.” McCloud v. Hooks, 560 F.3d 1223, 1227 (11th Cir.
2009) (alterations adopted) (citation and quotation marks omitted).
II. 	Analysis
Petitioner’s amended application for federal habeas relief is untimely. The Georgia
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Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner’s conviction and sentence on March 13, 2017. (Doc.
18-2). Under Georgia law, Petitioner had twenty days from that date to seek certiorari in
the Supreme Court of Georgia before his convictions became final. See Ga. Sup. Ct. R. 38;
see also Stubbs v. Hall, 308 Ga. 354, 363 (Ga. 2020). Petitioner did not file a certiorari
petition, and his conviction became final on Monday, April 3, 2017. 2 See 28 U.S.C.
§ 2244(d)(1)(A) (explaining that in the context of determining the AEDPA limitations
period, the judgment is final on the date of “the conclusion of direct review or the
expiration of the time for seeking such review”). Accordingly, Petitioner had until April 3,
2018 to either file a federal habeas petition or toll the one-year period of limitations by
properly filing a state collateral attack. Petitioner failed to timely do either.
Instead, Petitioner filed an extraordinary motion for new trial on August 7, 2018.
(Doc. 18-3). The August 7, 2018 extraordinary motion for new trial was filed more than
four (4) months after the AEDPA limitations period expired. As a result, it could not toll
the limitations period. Petitioner then filed a state habeas petition on June 24, 2019,
which was filed nearly fifteen (15) months after the AEDPA limitations period expired.
(Doc. 18-6). Again, a “state-court petition . . . that is filed following the expiration of the
limitations period cannot toll [the AEDPA] period because there is no period remaining
to be tolled.” Webster v. Moore, 199 F.3d 1256, 1259 (11th Cir. 2000). Consequently,
Petitioner’s amended federal habeas petition is untimely under the AEDPA limitations
period, and his Amended Petition should be dismissed unless he can show that he is
entitled to equitable tolling of the limitations period.
2 The twentieth day fell on Sunday, April 2, 2017, so Petitioner had until Monday, April 3, 2017, to file his
certiorari petition with the Georgia Supreme Court. See O.C.G.A. § 1-3-1(d)(3).
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III. 	Equitable Tolling
Petitioner is not entitled to equitable tolling. The one-year AEDPA limitations
period is subject to equitable tolling only in certain situations. Holland v. Fla., 560 U.S.
631, 645 (2010). A petitioner must show “(1) that he has been pursuing his rights
diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way and prevented
timely 	filing.” 	Id. 	at 	649 	(quotation 	marks 	omitted). 	“The 	burden 	of 	proving
circumstances that justify the application of the equitable tolling doctrine rests squarely
on the petitioner.” San Martin v. McNeil, 633 F.3d 1257, 1268 (11th Cir. 2011).
Prior to the Court’s preliminary review of this amended habeas Petition, Petitioner
filed a Motion seeking leave to file an oversized brief, which the Court denied as
premature. (Docs. 2, 7). As a supporting exhibit to that premature Motion, Petitioner
attached 	an 	affidavit 	seeking 	to 	invoke 	equitable 	tolling. 	(Doc. 	2-5). 	Petitioner
subsequently filed an amendment to his Petition, in which he requested the Court to
reconsider his affidavit seeking to invoke equitable tolling. (Doc. 14). The Court granted
that request and will consider Petitioner’s affidavit seeking to invoke equitable tolling.
Having done so, for several reasons, the Court finds that Petitioner is not entitled to
equitable tolling. First, the AEDPA limitations period expired four (4) months before the
date on which Petitioner filed his extraordinary motion for new trial. As a result, the Court
finds that Petitioner has not shown that he was diligently pursuing his rights.
Second, to the extent that Petitioner alleges that his blindness and alleged
undefined mental impairment has impeded him (Doc. 2-5, at 2), any such impairment
has not been an impairment to Petitioner’s ability to pursue his rights in this case.
Further, Petitioner filed cogent – if meritless – motions to appoint counsel (Docs. 10, 20),
motions seeking leave to expand the record to present alleged evidence, and he presented
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his arguments such that the Court could consider them. Petitioner’s brief accompanying
his Motion to expand the record (Doc. 2-1) is articulate, detailed, and thoroughly
organized with an attached table of authorities (Doc. 2-2), and cross referenced among
other of Petitioner’s filings. (See, e.g. Doc. 2-5 (citing Doc. 2-1, at various pages)).
Accordingly, the Court finds that Petitioner has not shown that his blindness and alleged
mental impairments are extraordinary circumstances that warrant equitable tolling.
IV. 	Schlup Actual Innocence Gateway
Petitioner also seeks to invoke the “actual innocence” gateway under Schlup v.
Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995), to evade the AEDPA limitations period. (Doc. 2, at 1). Under
Schlup, a claim of actual innocence is “‘not itself a constitutional claim, but instead a
gateway through which a habeas petitioner must pass to have his otherwise barred
constitutional claim considered on the merits.’” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 315 (citation omitted).
The Supreme Court of the United States subsequently extended the actual innocence
gateway to federal habeas petitions barred by the AEDPA statute of limitations.
McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U.S. 383, 386 (2013). In doing so, the Court cautioned “that
tenable actual-innocence gateway pleas are rare: ‘[A] petitioner does not meet the
threshold requirement unless he persuades the district court that, in light of the new
evidence, no juror, acting reasonably, would have voted to find him guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt.’” Id. (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 329) (alteration in original).
In considering an actual innocence plea to evade the statute of limitations, the Court may
consider the timing of the federal habeas petition. Id. at 386-87.
Here, Petitioner asserts that he has “provided the new evidence required for an
actual innocence claim[.]” Id. (citing Doc. 2-1, at 8). However, the “new evidence” upon
which Petitioner relies is nothing more than an argument that the evidence was
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insufficient to convict him. (Doc. 2-1, at 8). That argument has already been presented,
considered, and rejected by the Georgia Court of Appeals. (Doc. 18-2, at 10) (“In sum, the
evidence was clearly sufficient on all charges for which [Petitioner] was convicted[.]”).
Further, Petitioner’s apparent citation to Shinn v. Ramirez, 596 U.S. 366 (2022),
(see Doc. 2-1, at 8), does not assist his efforts to show actual innocence. The Shinn case
involved ineffective assistance of state habeas counsel and whether a federal habeas court
could hold a hearing to develop the record that state habeas counsel negligently failed to
develop – a question which the Supreme Court of the United States answered in the
negative. Shinn, 596 U.S. at 371. Here, Petitioner was not represented by state habeas
counsel. And more fundamentally and important, Shinn has no application to the
question whether Petitioner has shown actual innocence. Accordingly, the Court finds
that Petitioner has not presented any credible evidence to suggest that he is entitled to
the actual innocence gateway. Therefore, the Court recommends that Respondent’s
Motion to Dismiss be granted and Petitioner’s amended federal habeas application be
dismissed as untimely.
Because 	the 	Court 	recommends 	that 	Petitioner’s 	amended 	federal 	habeas
application be dismissed as untimely, the Court also recommends that Petitioner’s
Amended Motions seeking to dismiss the indictment under which he was convicted (Docs.
15, 22) be denied as moot.
V. 	Certificate of Appealability
Rule 11(a) of Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District
Courts provides that the “district court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability
when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” A certificate of appealability may
issue only if the applicant makes “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional
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right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). When a court denies a habeas petition on procedural
grounds without reaching the merits of the petitioner’s application for habeas relief, this
standard requires a petitioner to demonstrate that “jurists of reason would find it
debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right,
and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in
its procedural ruling.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 478 (2000). Petitioner cannot
meet this standard and a certificate of appealability in this case should be denied.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent’s Motion to
Dismiss (Doc. 17) be GRANTED, Petitioner’s Amended Motions seeking to dismiss the
indictment under which he was convicted (Docs. 15, 22) be DENIED as moot, and
Petitioner’s 	amended 	application 	for 	a 	writ 	of 	habeas 	corpus 	(Docs. 	1, 	14) 	be
DISMISSED as untimely. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the parties may serve and
file written objections to this Recommendation, or seek an extension of time to file
objections, within FOURTEEN (14) DAYS after being served with a copy hereof. Any
objection should be no longer than TWENTY (20) PAGES in length. See M.D. Ga. L.R.
7.4. The district judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the
Recommendation to which objection is made. All other portions of the Recommendation
may be reviewed for clear error.
The parties are notified that, pursuant to Eleventh Circuit Rule 3-1, “[a] party
failing to object to a magistrate judge’s findings or recommendations contained in a report
and recommendation in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) waives
the right to challenge on appeal the district court’s order based on unobjected-to factual
and legal conclusions if the party was informed of the time period for objecting and the
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consequences on appeal for failing to object. In the absence of a proper objection,
however, the court may review on appeal for plain error if necessary in the interests of
justice.”
SO RECOMMENDED, this 21st day of August, 2026.
s/ ALFREDA L. SHEPPARD
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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