Ryan v. Mansapit-Shimizu et al

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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF GUAM
JOHN RYAN,
Plaintiff,
v.
DAFNE MANSAPIT-SHIMIZU in her
official and individual capacities as the
DIRECTOR OF THE GUAM
DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE AND
TAXATION, MARIE LIZAMA in her
official and individual capacities as the
DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF THE GUAM
DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE AND
TAXATION, and JOHN DOES 1-15,
Defendants.
Case No. 1:23-cv-00015
DECISION AND ORDER
GRANTING IN PART
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR
ATTORNEYS’ FEES
Before the Court is Plaintiff John Ryan’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees Under Rule 37,
CVLR 54(c) and GNLR 2.1 (“Plaintiff’s Motion,” ECF No. 85), and supporting Declarations
(Decl. of Braddock J. Huesman [hereinafter “Huesman Decl.”], ECF No. 85-1; Decl. of Deborah
E. Fisher [hereinafter “Fisher Decl.”], ECF No. 85-2). Therein, Plaintiff moves for attorneys’ fees
and costs, and entry of judgment for the same against current Director of the Guam Department of
Revenue and Taxation Defendant Marie Lizama in her official capacity, in view of the Court’s
granting Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Discovery. (Pl.’s Mot. 2, ECF No. 85.) Defendants Dafne
Mansapit-Shimizu and Marie Lizama timely filed a Response to Motion for Attorneys Fees (ECF
No. 88), in which Defendants seek a substantial reduction in Plaintiff’s claimed fees and costs, to
which Plaintiff filed a Reply (ECF No. 89).
Case 1:23-cv-00015 Document 94 Filed 02/13/26 Page 1 of 17

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Having reviewed the briefs and the record and considered the arguments of counsel and
the applicable law, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Plaintiff’s Motion for
Attorneys’ Fees. Defendant Lizama is liable to Plaintiff in her official capacity in the amount of
$41,485.50 and shall pay Plaintiff the full amount within thirty days of entry of this order.
I. LEGAL STANDARD
“The discovery process in theory should be cooperative and largely unsupervised by the
district court. But when required disclosures aren’t made or cooperation breaks down, Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 37 allows a party to move for an order compelling disclosures or
discovery.” Sali v. Corona Reg’l Med. Ctr., 884 F.3d 1218, 1219 (9th Cir. 2018). Under
Rule 37(a)(5) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a movant who obtains an order compelling
disclosure or discovery may be compensated for the “reasonable expenses for the motion” seeking
disclosure or discovery:
(A) If the Motion Is Granted (or Disclosure or Discovery Is
Provided After Filing). If the motion is granted—or if the disclosure
or requested discovery is provided after the motion was filed—the
court must, after giving an opportunity to be heard, require the party
or deponent whose conduct necessitated the motion, the party or
attorney advising that conduct, or both to pay the movant’s
reasonable expenses incurred in making the motion, including
attorney’s fees. But the court must not order this payment if:
(i) the movant filed the motion before attempting in good faith
to obtain the disclosure or discovery without court action;
(ii) the opposing party’s nondisclosure, response, or objection
was substantially justified; or
(iii) other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.
[. . .]
(C) If the Motion Is Granted in Part and Denied in Part. If the
motion is granted in part and denied in part, the court may issue any
protective order authorized under Rule 26(c) and may, after giving
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an opportunity to be heard, apportion the reasonable expenses for
the motion.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(A), (C). See also Big City Dynasty v. FP Holdings, L.P., 336 F.R.D. 507,
513 (D. Nev. 2020) (explaining that discovery fee-shifting is part of larger design of rules intended
to “deter the abuse implicit in carrying or forcing a discovery dispute to the court when no genuine
dispute exists” (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(4)1 advisory committee’s note to 1970 amendment)).
“[T]he definition of what is a reasonable fee applies uniformly to all federal fee-shifting
statutes[.]” Anderson v. Dir., Off. of Workers Comp. Programs, 91 F.3d 1322, 1325 (9th Cir. 1996)
(citing City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557, 562 (1992)). Calculation of a reasonable award
“usually involves a two-step process”:
First, the court must calculate the “lodestar figure” by taking the
number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation and
multiplying it by a reasonable hourly rate. [Hensley v. Eckerhart,
461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983).] Second, the court must decide whether
to enhance or reduce the lodestar figure based on an evaluation of
the [factors set forth in Kerr v. Screen Extras Guild, Inc., 526 F.2d
67, 70 (9th Cir. 1975),] that are not already subsumed in the initial
lodestar calculation. [Morales v. City of San Rafael, 96 F.3d 359,
363-64 (9th Cir. 1996).]
Fischer v. SJB-P.D. Inc, 214 F.3d 1115, 1119 (9th Cir. 2000) (footnotes omitted); see also Kerr,
526 F.2d at 70 (listing twelve factors for consideration: “(1) the time and labor required, (2) the
novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (3) the skill requisite to perform the legal service
properly, (4) the preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case,
(5) the customary fee, (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent, (7) time limitations imposed by
the client or the circumstances, (8) the amount involved and the results obtained, (9) the
experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys, (10) the ‘undesirability’ of the case, (11) the
1 “The provisions of former Rule 37(a)(4) are now codified in Rule 37(a)(5).” Marrocco v. Hill, 291 F.R.D.
586, 590 n.7 (D. Nev. 2013).
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nature and length of the professional relationship with the client, and (12) awards in similar
cases”); Morales, 96 F.3d at 364 n.4 (explaining that Kerr factors (1), (2), (3), (4), and (5) are
“presumably taken into account in either the reasonable hours component or the reasonable rate
component of the lodestar calculation”). “There is a strong presumption that the lodestar figure
represents a reasonable fee. ‘Only in rare instances should the lodestar figure be adjusted on the
basis of other considerations.’” Morales, 96 F.3d at 363 n.8 (quoting Harris v. Marhoefer, 24 F.3d
16, 18 (9th Cir. 1994)).
In exercising its “great deal of discretion in determining the reasonableness of the fee[,]”
the district court should exclude “hours that are excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary”
and provide a “concise but clear” explanation for how it arrives at an award amount. Gates v.
Deukmejian, 987 F.2d 1392, 1397-98 (9th Cir. 1992); see also Carter v. Caleb Brett LLC, 757 F.3d
866, 868-69 (9th Cir. 2014) (while district court need not engage in detailed calculations, district
court must still provide sufficient, specific explanation such that appellate court may engage in
meaningful review of award, especially where award reflects a substantial departure from the
movant’s request). “The fee applicant bears the burden of documenting the appropriate hours
expended in the litigation and must submit evidence in support of those hours worked[,]” while
“the party opposing the fee application has a burden of rebuttal that requires submission of
evidence to the district court challenging the accuracy and reasonableness of the hours charged or
the facts asserted by the prevailing party in its submitted affidavits.” Gates, 987 F.2d at 1397; see
also Gonzalez v. City of Maywood, 729 F.3d 1196, 1202 (9th Cir. 2013). Likewise, “the burden is
on the fee applicant to produce satisfactory evidence—in addition to the attorney’s own
affidavits—that the requested rates are in line with those prevailing in the community for similar
services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience, and reputation.” Camacho v.
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Bridgeport Fin., Inc., 523 F.3d 973, 980 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886,
895 n.11 (1984)). At bottom, “[t]he burden is not for the court to justify each dollar or hour
deducted from the total submitted by counsel. It remains counsel’s burden to prove and establish
the reasonableness of each dollar, each hour, above zero.” Mares v. Credit Bureau of Raton, 801
F.2d 1197, 1210 (10th Cir. 1986).
II. ANALYSIS
Plaintiff seeks $46,095.00 in reasonable expenses, to be reduced to judgment and made
payable within fourteen days, reflecting a lodestar amount of $46,445.00 less a one-hour reduction
of $350.00. (Pl.’s Mot. 6-11; Pl.’s Reply 1-2, 13, ECF No. 89.) Plaintiff bases his request on a
reasonable hourly rate of $350.00 for each of his two attorneys, with Mr. Huesman expending 87.5
hours and Ms. Fisher expending 45.3 hours. (Pl.’s Mot. 8-10; Huesman Decl. ¶ 25, ECF No. 85-1;
Fisher Decl. ¶ 10, ECF No. 85-2; Huesman Decl., Ex. A (billing entries); see also Pl.’s Reply 13
(withdrawing one-hour billing entry dated February 2, 2025, because the entry “is ambiguous”).)
Plaintiff expected to supplement his request with the bills and work to draft the fee application
(Pl.’s Mot. 9 n.6) and ultimately seeks fees for twenty hours of work related to preparing his instant
application for fees in his Reply (Pl.’s Reply 13 n.6.).
In response, Defendants first indicate that they do not object to the “lodestar rate” of
$350.00 for both of Plaintiff’s attorneys. (Defs.’ Resp. 2, ECF No. 88.) Defendants, however,
contend that Plaintiff’s award should be reduced because (1) Plaintiff is not a prevailing party
because there is no enforceable judgment against Defendants (id. at 2); (2) the Court did not
compel Defendants to respond to all of Plaintiff’s discovery requests, thus establishing that
Defendants’ “nondisclosures were substantially justified” (id. at 2-5); (3) as to the requests to
which the Court ordered responses, awarding Plaintiff’s full fee request would be “unjust” in view
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of Defendants’ having responded prior to the hearings and decision on Plaintiff’s Motion to
Compel (id.); and (4) Plaintiff’s claimed hours are unreasonable as they include time spent on
matters “unrelated to the Motion to Compel” and reflect duplicative billing (id. at 5-6). Defendants
accordingly propose a reduction of Plaintiff’s claimed award by at least 50 percent. (Id. at 7.)
In reply, Plaintiff contends that (1) Defendants ignore that Plaintiff is entitled to an award
under Rule 37(a)(5)(C) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Pl.’s Reply 4); (2) Plaintiff is
entitled to an overwhelming majority of his claimed fees in view of his prevailing on the
overwhelming majority of his identified discovery requests (id. at 5-10); and (3) Defendants’
challenges to the reasonableness of Plaintiff’s requested hours are unsupported by any specific
objections to Plaintiff’s attorneys’ billing entries, belied by Defendants’ own conduct that drove
up the cost of litigation, and contradicted by the terms of the Court’s order granting in part
Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel (id. at 10-13).
Before turning to the calculation of the award amount, the Court first addresses Defendants’
challenges to Plaintiff’s eligibility to recover expenses. The Court then concludes by setting forth
the terms of the award and addressing Plaintiff’s requests concerning the form and parties subject
to the award.
A. Plaintiff’s Eligibility for Award
The Court rejects Defendants’ challenges to Plaintiff’s eligibility for an award because
Defendants’ challenges are not supported by law or fact.
First, as to Defendants’ assertion that Plaintiff is not a prevailing party because he has not
obtained an enforceable judgment against Defendants, Defendants’ assertion ignores the plain
language of the applicable rule authorizing an award of expenses to a party who prevails, in whole
or in part, on a motion for an order compelling discovery. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(A), (C). In
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other words, Plaintiff need not obtain a judgment to be eligible for an interlocutory award arising
from an interlocutory order resolving an interlocutory discovery dispute in his favor; once the
discovery order in his favor issued, he is eligible for an award of expenses. Defendants’ reliance
on Rule 54(d)(2)(B)(ii) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and related cases discussing post-
judgment fee awards is wholly misplaced and borders on frivolity, cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(2),
especially in view of the Court’s previous citation to the exact governing rule provision (see Mem.
Decision Den. Defs.’ Mot. for Jud. Disqualification & Granting in Part Pl.’s Mot. to Compel 31
[hereinafter “11/06/25 D&O”], ECF No. 82), the straightforward language of the rule, and the
countless decisions—if not hornbook civil procedure—applying the rule to award expenses
without any need for a judgment.
Second, as to Defendants’ challenge based on the Court’s denying some of Plaintiff’s
identified discovery requests, Defendants are correct that the Court only compelled Defendants to
respond to six of twelve identified interrogatories and seventeen of twenty identified requests for
production of documents. (See 11/06/25 D&O 21-31.) But Defendants offer no substantive
arguments as to why Plaintiff’s success on the majority of his identified requests warrants an
outright denial of an award. Cf. also Fischer, 214 F.3d at 1119 (“The Supreme Court . . . has made
clear that the ‘prevailing party inquiry does not turn on the magnitude of the relief obtained.’”
(quoting Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 114 (1992))). Insofar as Plaintiff’s claimed award amount
should be reduced, the Court addresses the reduction infra in the next sections concerning the
Court’s calculation of the award.
Third, as to Defendants’ assertion that an award would be unjust in view of Defendants’
responding to certain of Plaintiff’s identified requests prior to the hearing and decision on
Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel, Defendants’ assertion contradicts the plain language of the rule. See
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Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(A) (payment of reasonable expenses available where “the disclosure or
requested discovery is provided after the motion was filed” (emphasis added)); RG Abrams Ins. v.
Law Offs. of C.R. Abrams, No. 2:21-cv-00194-FLA-MAAx, 2021 WL 8895081, at *8 (C.D. Cal.
Dec. 15, 2021) (collecting cases noting that only difference between Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(A)
and (C) is that award is discretionary under latter provision, but analysis for award is the same
across both provisions); see also Harkless v. Pac. Power & Light, No. 2:18-CV-2903-TLN-DMC,
2020 WL 1139499, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 9, 2020) (“Under the spirit of [Rule 37(a)(5)], the moving
party is entitled to recover its expenses where it is forced to file a discovery motion in order to
obtain discovery.”). In addition, as Plaintiff correctly notes, Defendants’ belated disclosures are
not excused by the pendency of Defendants’ interlocutory appeal on the issue of qualified
immunity because Plaintiff’s discovery requests were otherwise related to “aspects of the case that
[were] not the subject of the appeal,” United States v. Pitner, 307 F.3d 1178, 1183 n.5 (9th Cir.
2002),2 and Defendants never obtained a stay on discovery (or proceedings more generally), see
Infazon v. Allstate Ins. Co., 335 F.R.D. 305, 312 (C.D. Cal. 2020) (Federal Rules do not provide
for blanket or automatic stays of discovery when potentially dispositive motions are pending);
Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 433 (2009) (“A stay is not a matter of right, even if irreparable injury
might otherwise result.” (quoting Virginian Ry. Co. v. United States, 272 U.S. 658, 672 (1926))).
Furthermore, Defendants’ assertion ignores fundamental principles underlying the conduct of
discovery and judicial resolution of discovery disputes generally. See Big City Dynasty, 336 F.R.D.
at 513 (discovery rules provide for fee-shifting to deter meritless discovery disputes); Infazon, 335
F.R.D. at 312 (even if dispositive motion is ultimately granted and potentially moots certain
2 See also Cousins v. Lockyer, 568 F.3d 1063, 1072 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[Q]ualified immunity is a doctrine of
federal common law and, as such, has no application to [plaintiff’s] state claims, which are subject only to
state statutory immunities.”).
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discovery requests, thus “mitigat[ing] the overriding prejudice” to the proponent of the discovery
requests, “it does not erase the stain of the discovery abuse in the first place”); Cunningham v.
Hamilton Cnty., 527 U.S. 198, 209 (1999) (“Rule 37(a) . . . was designed to protect courts and
opposing parties from delaying or harassing tactics during the discovery process.”); G-K Props. v.
Redevelopment Agency, 577 F.2d 645, 647 (9th Cir. 1978) (“Litigants who are willful in halting
the discovery process act in opposition to the authority of the court and cause impermissible
prejudice to their opponents. It is even more important to note, in this era of crowded dockets, that
they also deprive other litigants of an opportunity to use the courts as a serious dispute-settlement
mechanism.”).
Fourth, as to Defendants’ arguments about the reasonableness of Plaintiff’s claimed hours,
such arguments bear only on the possibility of reducing Plaintiff’s award and not on Plaintiff’s
eligibility for an award. As with Defendants’ challenge based on Plaintiff’s partial success, the
Court addresses the reduction in the next sections concerning the Court’s calculation of the award.
B. Calculation of Award3
The Court first calculates the reasonable hourly rate for Plaintiff’s counsel before
calculating the reasonable number of hours expended on Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel and
addressing Defendants’ arguments in favor of a reduction. The Court then addresses whether
further adjustments to the lodestar figure are appropriate.
//
//
3 The Court denies without prejudice Plaintiff’s request for “fees-on-fees” because Plaintiff’s claim of
twenty hours spent on preparing his Motion for Attorneys’ Fees is not supported by any evidentiary
materials. See also Camacho, 523 F.3d at 981 (explaining that “fees-on-fees” is generally available because
“it would be inconsistent to dilute a fees award by refusing to compensate attorneys for the time they
reasonably spent in establishing their rightful claim to the fee” (quoting In re Nucorp Energy, Inc., 764 F.2d
655, 659-60 (9th Cir. 1985))).
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1. Reasonable Hourly Rate
The Parties do not dispute Plaintiff’s claimed reasonable hourly rate of $350.00 for his two
attorneys. The Court is also satisfied that $350.00 per hour is “in line with those [rates] prevailing
in the community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience and
reputation.” Camacho, 523 F.3d at 980 (quoting Blum, 465 U.S. at 895 n.11). (See Huesman Decl.
¶¶ 2-7 (describing experience and selection of hourly rate); Fisher Decl. ¶¶ 2-5 (same); Pl.’s Mot.
7-8 (citing Paeste v. Guam, No. 11-00008-CBM, 2013 WL 6254669 (D. Guam Dec. 3, 2013)
(reasonable hourly rate of $350.00 for similarly experienced attorneys), and RSA-Tumon, LLC v.
Pitt Cnty. Mem’l Hosp., No. 20-00025, 2021 WL 2828713 (D. Guam. July 7, 2021) (reasonable
hourly rates of $195, $200, and $300 fell within prior decisions finding that $250 and $350 rates
were reasonable)).)
2. Reasonable Hours
Plaintiff claims 86.5 hours for Mr. Huesman and 45.3 hours for Ms. Fisher, in addition to
twenty hours for preparing Plaintiff’s instant Motion for Attorneys’ Fees. (Pl.’s Mot. 8-10;
Huesman Decl. ¶ 25; Fisher Decl. ¶ 10; Huesman Decl., Ex. A; Pl.’s Reply 13.) Defendants object
to hours billed for work “unrelated” to Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel, namely, briefing opposing
Defendants’ Motion for Judicial Disqualification and in response to the Court’s call for
supplemental briefing. (Defs.’ Resp. 5.) Defendants further assert that Ms. Fisher’s billing is
duplicative because“[t]he fact that Plaintiff has two attorneys does not mean that there is a need
for two attorneys to bill on a single motion to compel or that it is reasonable to pay twice for that
same motion.” (Id. at 6.) In addition, Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s award should be reduced
to reflect Plaintiff’s limited success. (Id. at 2-5.)
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As a starting matter, the Court agrees with Defendants in principle that Plaintiff is not
eligible to recover expenses for work relating to Defendants’ Motion for Judicial Disqualification.
While the substance and timing of Defendants’ Motion for Judicial Disqualification appear to have
been triggered, in part, by Defendants’ own delays in conducting and producing discovery (see
11/06/25 D&O 11 n.11 (discussing timeliness of Defendants’ Motion for Judicial
Disqualification)), the work on Defendants’ Motion for Judicial Disqualification, properly
understood, falls outside of Plaintiff’s “reasonable expenses incurred in making” his Motion to
Compel, Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(A), because Defendants’ Motion concerned issues separate and
distinct from the discovery disputes identified in Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel. A careful review
of Plaintiff’s attorneys’ billing entries, however, reveals that Plaintiff’s attorneys did not include
entries for preparation of Plaintiff’s filings concerning Defendants’ Motion for Judicial
Disqualification. Instead, the only mention of Defendants’ Motion for Judicial Disqualification is
in the entries reflecting the time Plaintiff’s attorneys spent in appearing before the Court to present
oral argument on all motions pending before the Court—i.e., Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel and
Defendants’ Notice of Potential Judicial Conflict and Motion for Judicial Disqualification. (See
Huesman Decl., Ex. A, at 8 (Mr. Huesman’s entries dated September 28, 2025, and October 20,
2025); id. at 11 (Ms. Fisher’s entries dated September 28, 2025, and October 20, 2025).) As
Plaintiff’s attorneys would have had to appear before the Court for those hearings regardless of
whether Defendants had filed their Motion for Judicial Disqualification, and Plaintiff’s claimed
hours for appearing at the hearings are reasonable, the Court declines to strike or otherwise modify4
4 As the hearings addressed Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel alongside Defendants’ Motion for Judicial
Disqualification, portions of the hearing would concern only Defendants’ Motion. (Alternatively, had
Defendants not filed their Motion, the recoverable hours potentially would have been less as the hearings
may not have run as long.) The Court, however, declines to further parse Plaintiff’s attorneys’ entries for
the hours expended at the hearings to isolate the time specifically spent on arguments concerning Plaintiff’s
Motion to Compel. “The essential goal in shifting fees (to either party) is to do rough justice, not to achieve
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the entries for the hours expended in attending the hearings. (See also 11/06/25 D&O 31-32
(finding Plaintiff was entitled to fees and costs for preparing and appearing for, inter alia, the
September and October 2025 hearings).)
As to Defendants’ challenge to Plaintiff’s recovering expenses related to the Court’s call
for supplemental briefing, the Court rejects Defendants’ challenge. The Court’s call for
supplemental briefing was triggered by Defendants’ assertion that the Ninth Circuit’s decision on
interlocutory appeal foreclosed Plaintiff from seeking discovery—including prevailing on his
Motion to Compel. (See id. at 6.) As such, Plaintiff’s attorneys’ supplemental briefing work is
fairly understood as being a part of the recoverable time and expense in preparing, arguing, and
defending Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(A) (recoverable expenses
consist of “reasonable expenses incurred in making the motion”); Marrocco v. Hill, 291 F.R.D.
586, 589-90 (D. Nev. 2013) (explaining that Rule 37(a)’s fee-shifting provision encompasses not
only “the original motion to compel,” but also subsequent motions practice concerning objections
to an order granting the original motion to compel). The Court declines to exclude entries for the
hours expended in preparing filings in response to the Court’s call for supplemental briefing.
As to Defendants’ assertion that Ms. Fisher’s billing is duplicative, Defendants fail to set
forth any substantive discussion on why Ms. Fisher’s work qualifies as non-recoverable
overstaffing or is otherwise unreasonable. See Moreno v. City of Sacramento, 534 F.3d 1106, 1116
(9th Cir. 2008) (party opposing fee award must “come up with specific reasons for reducing the
fee request”); Gates, 987 F.2d at 1397-98 (“burden of rebuttal . . . requires submission of
evidence”); see also United States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 1990) (“”[I]ssues adverted
to in a perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by some effort at developed argumentation, are
auditing perfection. So trial courts . . . may use estimates in calculating and allocating an attorney’s time.”
Fox v. Vice, 563 U.S. 826, 838 (2011).
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deemed waived. It is not enough merely to mention a possible argument in the most skeletal way,
leaving the court to do counsel’s work, create the ossature for the argument, and put flesh on its
bones.” (citations omitted)). Furthermore, the Court finds that Ms. Fisher’s entries are recoverable
and reasonable in view of the protracted nature and considerable scope of the discovery dispute,
Defendants’ own largely unjustified conduct in resisting discovery, and the complex nature of the
task of ascertaining what portions of the case—and, consequently, what portions of Plaintiff’s
November 2024 discovery requests—survived the Ninth Circuit’s decision on interlocutory
appeal. See Moreno, 534 F.3d at 1112 (noting that some level of necessary duplication of legal
work is “inherent part of the process” of “litigating over time” as legal work product grows stale
over the course of extended litigation); Kerr, 526 F.2d at 70 (listing “novelty and difficulty of the
questions involved” and “the amount [of fees] involved and the results obtained” among factors
for consideration in awarding fees).
As to Defendants’ arguments for a reduction based on Plaintiff’s limited success, the Court
agrees that a reduction is appropriate, see Kerr, 526 F.2d at 70 (listing “results obtained” as factor
for consideration); Hensley, 461 U.S. at 436 (“That the plaintiff is a ‘prevailing party’ . . . may say
little about whether the expenditure of counsel’s time was reasonable in relation to the success
achieved.”), but rejects Defendants’ proposed reduction of at least 50 percent.5 As the Parties note,
Plaintiff succeeded in obtaining relief as to twenty-three of the thirty-two discovery requests—72
percent—identified in Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel. (See 11/06/25 D&O 21-31.) Case law
5 Although the Parties essentially suggest that any reduction based on Plaintiff’s partial success should be
assessed after calculating the lodestar figure, the Ninth Circuit has explained that “[s]ince consideration of
limited success is presumably ‘subsumed within the initial calculation of hours reasonably expended at a
reasonably hourly rate,’ district courts should not ordinarily make a separate adjustment for limited
success.” Corder v. Gates, 947 F.2d 374, 378 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting Cabrales v. Cnty. of Los Angeles,
864 F.2d 1454, 1464 (9th Cir. 1988)). As such, the Parties’ suggested method “is disfavored.” Id. The
Court will instead account for Plaintiff’s partial success by reducing Plaintiff’s claimed hours before
calculating the lodestar figure. See also Gates, 987 F.2d at 1404; Morales, 96 F.3d at 363 n.8.
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suggests two general methods for accounting for partial success: (1) reducing the number of hours
“mechanically on the basis of [Plaintiff’s] success or failure on particular issues,” Hensley, 461
U.S. at 438 (footnote omitted); see, e.g., Bartech Sys. Int’l, Inc. v. Mobile Simple Sols., Inc., No.
2:15-cv-2422-MMD-NJK, 2018 WL 1170925, at *2 (D. Nev. Apr. 30, 2018) (twelve discovery
disputes; award reduced by 25 percent to reflect movant’s total success on eight disputes and partial
success on two disputes); or (2) reducing the number of hours based upon a qualitative assessment
of “the relationship between the extent of success and the amount of the fee award,” Hensley, 461
U.S. at 438; see, e.g., Aevoe Corp. v. AE Tech Co., Ltd., No. 2:12-cv-00053-GMN-NJK, 2013 WL
5324787, at *3 (D. Nev. Sept. 20, 2013) (“As the motion was granted in significant part, the Court
in its discretion will reduce the fees awarded by 10%.”).
Here, the Court elects to follow the latter approach and reduce Plaintiff’s claimed hours by
10 percent to reflect Plaintiff’s partial success. The Court finds that such a reduction and resulting
118.53 hours (90 percent of 131.7 hours, the sum of Mr. Huesman’s 86.4 hours6 and Ms. Fisher’s
45.3 hours) are reasonable because (1) the discovery requests on which Plaintiff prevailed reflect
plainly relevant and permissible requests concerning virtually all claims and core issues raised in
this litigation (see, e.g., 11/06/25 D&O 22-23, 29 (all communications relating to Plaintiff’s
Whistleblower Act claims); id. at 25-26 (any basis in fact or law in support of Defendants’ position
opposing Whistleblower Act award in Carson Guam action); id. at 28-29 (all materials in support
of Defendants’ affirmative defenses); (2) the Court’s basis for denying Plaintiff relief as to the nine
other discovery requests—namely, that Plaintiff is raising legal disputes not resolvable in
6 It appears that Plaintiff’s claimed figure of 86.5 hours—instead of 86.4 hours, derived from summing all
of Mr. Huesman’s billing entries and deducting the February 2, 2025 entry of one hour—is a typographical
error. Plaintiff’s final claimed lodestar figure, however, is $46,095.00, which figure appears to reflect the
correct figure of 86.4 hours for Mr. Huesman.
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discovery (see id. at 24, 27, 30)—does not detract from Plaintiff’s qualitatively significant success
in compelling Defendants to discharge their discovery obligations as to the overwhelming majority
of the subject matter of this litigation (see also id. at 31); and (3) Defendants’ own conduct
triggered much of the work claimed by Plaintiff’s attorneys since Plaintiff first served Defendants
with the discovery requests in November 2024.
Therefore, the lodestar figure is 118.53 hours multiplied by the hourly rate of $350.00, or
$41,485.50.
3. Further Adjustments
The Court finds that no further adjustments to the lodestar figure are necessary because all
relevant Kerr factors7 are subsumed in the above analysis, Fischer, 214 F.3d at 1119; Morales, 96
F.3d at 364 n.4, and the Court discerns no “other considerations” warranting further adjustment,
Morales, 96 F.3d at 363 n.8. See also Moreno, 534 F.3d at 1116 (“If opposing counsel cannot come
up with specific reasons for reducing the fee request that the district court finds persuasive, it
should normally grant the award in full, or with no more than a haircut.”).
C. Form and Terms of Award
Plaintiff requests that the award be reduced to judgment, entered against Defendant Lizama
in her official capacity and Defendant’s counsel personally, and made payable within fourteen days
of entry of judgment. (Pl.’s Mot. 2 & n.1.) Defendants do not specifically address Plaintiff’s
requests.
First, the Court declines to reduce the award to judgment. An order imposing monetary
sanctions under Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “is immediately enforceable, and
7 Namely, factors (1) (time and labor), (2) (novelty and difficulty of questions), (3) (skill), (5) (customary
fee), (8) (amount involved and results obtained), and (9) (experience, reputation, ability of attorneys). Kerr,
526 F.2d at 70. The other Kerr factors largely concern post-judgment considerations in the civil rights
litigation context that are not implicated by the award of fees after the grant of a motion to compel discovery.
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a litigant may be held in contempt for failure to timely pay.” Hosp. Mgmt., Inc. v. Preferred
Contractors Ins. Co., No. 3:18-cv-00452-YY, 2020 WL 8373395, at *1 (D. Or. Aug. 11, 2020)
(citing Sali, 884 F.3d at 1221); see also Cunningham, 527 U.S. at 199 (explaining that to permit
delay in the immediate enforceability of Rule 37(a) orders would contradict Rule 37(a)’s purposes
and “undermine trial judges’ discretion to structure a sanction in the most effective manner”).
Thus, no judgment is necessary to create the enforceable obligation to pay the monetary award set
forth herein. Furthermore, determining whether to reduce a sanctions award to judgment requires
consideration of the circumstances surrounding collection of the award—i.e., an additional
procedural step toward collecting on the award that is separate and distinct from levying sanctions
in an amount certain. See Hoggatt v. Allstate Ins., 502 F. Supp. 3d 1110, 1114 (N.D. Miss. 2020)
(“Relevant here, ‘a sanctions award may be reduced to judgment if the sanctioned party has failed
to pay the sanctions despite being provided an opportunity to do so.’” (quoting Mass. Mut. Life
Ins. Co. v. Williamson, Nos. 4:15-cv-166- DMB-JMV & 4:15-cv-184-DMB-JMV, 2019 WL
7195318, at *3 (N.D. Miss. 2019))); Moore v. Harris, 600 F. App’x 201, 204-05 (5th Cir. 2015).
As such, reducing the award to judgment would be premature at this juncture.
Second, as to the individuals liable for paying the award, Rule 37(a) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure authorizes the Court to “require the party . . . whose conduct necessitated the
motion [to compel], the party or attorney advising that conduct, or both to pay the movant’s
reasonable expenses incurred in making the motion [to compel].” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(A). At
this juncture, in view of Defendant Lizama being the individual who responded to Plaintiff’s
discovery requests on behalf of the Guam Department of Revenue and Taxation and the lack of a
specific showing as to which individuals “advis[ed]” the discovery misconduct, id., the Court will
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hold Defendant Lizama in her official capacity, but not her counsel, liable for paying the award set
forth herein.
Third, the Court will exercise its discretion and set thirty days from the issuance of this
order as the time in which Defendants will pay Plaintiff. Should Defendant Lizama fail to pay in
accordance with the terms of this order, Plaintiff remains free to seek other means of enforcement.
III. CONCLUSION
Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorneys’ Fees (ECF No. 85) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED
IN PART. Rather than awarding the $46,095.00 requested by Plaintiff, the Court finds that
$41,485.50 is the amount of reasonable expenses for Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel under Rule
37(a)(5)(C) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Furthermore, the Court DENIES WITHOUT
PREJUDICE Plaintiff’s request for fees-on-fees. Defendant Lizama is liable in her official
capacity for paying Plaintiff $41,485.50 within thirty days of entry of this order.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 13th day of February, 2026.
____________________________________
RAMONA V. MANGLONA
District Judge
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