Doi-Toilolo v. Kamaile Academy Public Charter School, et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF HAWAII
KEKA DOI-TOILOLO,
Plaintiff,
vs.
KAMAILE ACADEMY PUBLIC
CHARTER SCHOOL, PAUL KEPKA,
LORELLE WOOLSEY,
HO'OKAKO'O CORPORATION,
Defendants.
CIV. NO. 25-00550 SASP-RT
FINDINGS AND
RECOMMENDATION TO GRANT
APPLICATION TO PROCEED IN
DISTRICT COURT WITHOUT
PREPAYING FEES OR COSTS
AND DISMISS THE COMPLAINT
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION TO GRANT APPLICATION
TO PROCEED IN DISTRICT COURT WITHOUT PREPAYING FEES
OR COSTS AND DISMISS THE COMPLAINT
Pro se litigant, Plaintiff Keka Doi-Toilolo (“Plaintiff”), filed an Application
to Proceed in District Court without Prepaying Fees or Costs (“IFP Application”)
on December 31, 2025. ECF No. 2. The Court shall decide this matter without a
hearing pursuant to Rule 7.1(d) of the Local Rules of Practice for the United States
District Court for the District of Hawaii (“Local Rules”).
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The Court has carefully considered the IFP Application, First Amended
Complaint (ECF No. 4) (“FAC”)1 and applicable law, and FINDS that Plaintiff has
sufficiently demonstrated entitlement to proceed in forma pauperis and
RECOMMENDS that the district court GRANT the IFP Application. However,
the Court has conducted the mandatory screening of the FAC and
RECOMMENDS that the FAC be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE with
leave to amend.
DISCUSSION
I. 	IFP Application
Plaintiff submitted an IFP Application requesting to proceed in forma
pauperis in this case. The courts may authorize the commencement or prosecution
of a lawsuit without prepayment of fees if the litigant submits an affidavit stating
that the litigant is unable to pay the required fees. See Escobedo v. Applebees, 787
F.3d 1226, 1234 (9th Cir. 2015) (citing Adkins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co.,
335 U.S. 331, 339 (1948)) (the affidavit “is sufficient where it alleges that the
1 Plaintiff amended his Complaint (ECF No. 1) before the district court issued a
ruling on the IFP Application. Pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
(“Fed. R. Civ. P.”) 15, “a party may amend its pleading once as a matter of course”
prior to the completion of service or the filing of a responsive pleading. The Court
is well within its authority to recommend the dismissal of the FAC because the
district court has not yet ruled on the IFP Application. However, in the interest of
judicial economy, the Court recommends permitting the FAC but cautions Plaintiff
that he may no longer amend his pleading without seeking “the opposing party’s
written consent or the court’s leave.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15.
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affiant cannot pay the court costs and still afford the necessities of life”). In
determining whether to permit an applicant to proceed in forma pauperis, the Court
considers the Plaintiff’s annual income and whether it exceeds the poverty
threshold as determined by the Department of Health and Human Services
(“HHS”) 2026 Poverty Guidelines. See Office of the Assistant Secretary for
Planning and Evaluation, Poverty Guidelines, https://aspe.hhs.gov/topics/poverty-
economic-mobility/poverty-guidelines (last visited February 27, 2026). This
threshold is based on the number of people in the applicant’s household. It appears
that Plaintiff resides in a three-person household. The poverty guideline for a
three-person household2 is $31,420.00 annually. The Court also considers the
applicant’s liabilities or debt.
Plaintiff receives a monthly social security disability income of $1,001.00 or
$12,012.00 annually. ECF No. 2. Plaintiff owns a 1998 Toyota 4 Runner and has
monthly expenses of approximately $1,252.00 to $1,352.0. These expenses are for
rent, water and electricity, all of which are necessities of life. Plaintiff’s expenses
exceed Plaintiff’s monthly income. This is concerning because the IFP
Application relies on self-reporting, and it does not make sense as to how Plaintiff
2 The Court assumes that Plaintiff resides in a three-person household because the
IFP Application indicates that Plaintiff has two dependents, J.T and K.T. No
spouse was listed. However, even if Plaintiff is from a four-person household, the
Court’s analysis does not change as Plaintiff’s income is well below the poverty
guideline of both a three and four-person household.
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is affording to live. However, it does make sense that as a result of this deficiency,
Plaintiff reports that his credit card debt is approximately $13,647.00. It is likely
that Plaintiff is using his credit card to pay expenses. The Court shall thus accept
Plaintiff’s representations, but cautions Plaintiff that he has declared under penalty
of perjury that the information provided in the IFP Application is accurate.
Plaintiff is reminded that there are penalties for inaccurate financial reporting in
the IFP Application.
Plaintiff’s reported monthly income is well below the poverty threshold, and
Plaintiff’s expenses make it nearly impossible for Plaintiff to pay court costs and
still afford the necessities of life. The Court thus finds that the IFP Application
sufficiently alleges poverty and RECOMMENDS that the district court GRANT
the IFP Application and GRANT Plaintiff in forma pauperis status.
II. 	Screening of the Complaint
A litigant seeking in forma pauperis status is subject to having his or her
complaint screened. This screening is mandatory pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e).
Because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the Court construes Plaintiff’s pleadings
liberally. Bernhardt v. Los Angeles Cty., 339 F.3d 920, 925 (9th Cir. 2003)
(citations omitted).
Plaintiff commenced this lawsuit on December 31, 2025, by filing a
Complaint. ECF No. 1. Plaintiff later filed a FAC on January 15, 2026. ECF No.
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4. The FAC includes additional defendants and clarifies Plaintiff’s claims. The
FAC names a Plaintiff and defendants who are citizens of the same state and thus,
there is no diversity jurisdiction. The FAC does not allege federal jurisdiction, but
the Court liberally construes the FAC and finds that this Court has federal question
jurisdiction—Plaintiff alleges disability discrimination and retaliation under federal
law. Because this is not a diversity jurisdiction case, there is no concern about
whether naming additional defendants in the FAC divests this Court of jurisdiction.
In the FAC, Plaintiff names four defendants: Kamaile Academy Public
Charter School (“Kamaile”); Paul Kepka, principal of Kamaile (“Kepka”); Lorelle
Woolsey, head custodian of Kamaile (“Woolsey”); and Hoʽokakoʽo Corporation,
governing organization for Kamaile (“Hoʽokakoʽo”) (collectively, “Defendants”).
Plaintiff alleges disability discrimination and retaliation. Plaintiff alleges that the
events occurred at Kamaile for “a continuing period beginning approximately
November 2024 and continuing through January 2026, during normal school and
administrative work hours.” ECF No. 4 at PageID.14. Plaintiff states that “[k]ey
events [giving rise to his claim] occurred on or around May 23, 2025, September-
October 2025, and January 7, 2026.” Id. Plaintiff alleges the following:
Plaintiff Keka Doi-Toilolo was a qualified substitute custodian at
[Kamaile], and has a disability known to Defendants. Beginning in late
2024, Plaintiff’s work hours were reduced and he was treated differently
than other custodian employees. On May 23, 2025, Defendants discussed
Plaintiff’s medical history and questioned his ability to perform the job
despite Plaintiff having performed the same duties for nearly two years.
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After Plaintiff complained of [sic] Discrimination, Defendants stopped
scheduling him for work after approximately May 14, 2025, while other
custodians continued working and new employees were hired. Plaintiff was
denied permanent positions in favor of less senior or related individuals.
These actions constitute disability discrimination and retaliation in violation
of the ADA.
Id. Plaintiff states that he “brings claims under the American with Disabilities Act
(42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.) [(“ADA”)]” and that he seeks:
Declaratory relief that Defendants violated the Americans with Disabilities
Act, injunctive relief preventing further discrimination and retaliation; back
pay and lost wages, compensatory damages for emotional distress;
reinstatement to a substitute [ ]3 custodial position or front pay in lieu
thereof; costs of suit; and any other relief the Court deems just and proper.
Id. at 13 & 15. There are no other allegations or requests for relief. Plaintiff
claims that he sustained the following injures: “[l]oss of wages, loss of
employment opportunities, emotional distress, anxiety, and ongoing harm resulting
from disability discrimination and retaliation after asserting protected rights.” Id.
A. 	Discrimination Based on Disability Under the ADA
To establish a disability discrimination case under the ADA:
Plaintiff must put forth evidence that [he]: (1) is “disabled” within the
meaning of the statute; (2) is a “qualified individual” (that is, [Plaintiff] is
able to perform the essential functions of [his] job, with or without
reasonable accommodations); and (3) suffered an adverse employment
action because of [his] disability--i.e., Defendant failed to reasonably
accommodate [Plaintiff’s] disability.
3 Plaintiff’s handwriting is illegible. The Court could not decipher Plaintiff’s
handwriting and thus omitted the illegible word from the quote.
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Vanhorn, 979 F. Supp. 2d at 1091 (citing Samper v. Providence St. Vincent Med.
Ctr., 675 F.3d 1233, 1237 (9th Cir. 2012)) (citation omitted). Once Plaintiff
establishes a prima facie case, Defendants have the burden to “articulate a
legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its employment action.” Id. “If
Defendant[s] proffer[ ] such a reason, ‘the presumption of intentional
discrimination disappears, but the plaintiff can still prove disparate treatment by,
for instance, offering evidence demonstrating that the employer’s explanation is
pretextual.’” Id. (citation omitted).
The FAC fails to state sufficient facts that Plaintiff is entitled to the relief he
seeks. Disability is defined as:
(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more
major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment;
or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment.” 42 U.S.C. §
12102(1)(A)–(C).
Id. at 1091.
One is “regarded as” having an impairment “if the individual establishes that
he or she has been subjected to an action prohibited under this chapter
because of an actual or perceived physical or mental impairment whether or
not the impairment limits or is perceived to limit a major life activity.” 42
U.S.C. § 12102(3)(A). Although “mental impairment” is not defined in the
ADA, the ADA regulations recognize this phrase as including “[a]ny mental
or psychological disorder, such as . . . emotional or mental illness.” 29
C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(2);
Kagawa v. First Hawaiian Bank/Bancwest Corp., 819 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1128 (D.
Haw. 2011). First, Plaintiff conclusively claims he has an impairment by stating
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that he “has a disability known to Defendants” (ECF No. 4 at PageID.14), but
provides no other explanation establishing that he has an impairment as defined by
42 U.S.C. § 12102. Plaintiff must clearly state his condition and if necessary,
provide facts supporting how his condition qualifies as a disability under 42 U.S.C.
§ 12102.
Second, Plaintiff claims that he has performed the same job with the same
duties for nearly two years (ECF No. 4 at PageID.14) but omits explaining why he
believes he is qualified and able to perform the “essential functions” of his job.
See Vanhorn, 979 F. Supp. 2d at 1091 (citations omitted). In fact, Plaintiff admits
that Defendants questioned his ability to perform his job. ECF No. 4 at PageID.14.
Thus, without further facts, the Court is unable to determine whether Plaintiff is
able to meet the second element of his claim. Third, Plaintiff alleges that he
suffered from adverse employment actions and has not been scheduled for work
and denied permanent positions. However, Plaintiff has not alleged enough factual
allegations to show that these adverse employment actions were because of his
disability.
B. 	Retaliation Under the ADA
In order to establish a prima facie case of retaliation under the ADA,
Plaintiff:
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must show that he or she (1) engaged in a protected activity; and (2) suffered
an adverse employment action; and that (3) there was a causal link between
the two.
Crowley v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., Civ. No. 16-00293 SOM/RLP, 2018 WL
4345251, at *10 (D. Haw. Sept. 11, 2018) (citing Pardi v. Kaiser Found. Hosps.,
389 F.3d 840, 849 (9th Cir. 2004)). First, as discussed previously, it is unclear
whether Plaintiff has an impairment pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 12102. However,
assuming he is able to establish an impairment pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 12102, this
first element may be met with additional facts because Plaintiff states that he
“complained of [sic] Discrimination.” However, as it stands now, Plaintiff’s
factual allegations are deficient. Plaintiff must include: what he said to complain
of discrimination, to whom he complained to, and when he complained.
Second, Plaintiff must include additional details regarding the number of
times and the consistency in which Defendants stopped scheduling him to work.
Plaintiff should also provide further details about who these “less senior or related
individuals” are that were given permanent positions. This information will also
help establish whether a causal link exists between the alleged protected activity
and the adverse employment action. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s retaliation claims are
conclusory and deficient.
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C. 	The FAC Fails to State a Claim Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 sets forth the pleading standard and requires that a
complaint contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “The Federal Rules require
that averments ‘be simple, concise, and direct.’” McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172,
1177 (9th Cir. 1996). Although the federal rules adopt a flexible pleading policy, a
complaint must “give[ ] fair notice and state[ ] the elements of the claim plainly
and succinctly.” Jones v. Cmty. Redev. Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984)
(citation omitted).
Detailed factual allegations are not required under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8, but the
rule “demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me
accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “Threadbare recitals of
the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not
suffice.” Id. (citation omitted). “[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id.
(quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is
plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw
the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Id. Here, for the reasons stated above, Plaintiff’s one-paragraph, brief and
conclusory recitation of the facts of his claim is insufficient. The FAC does not
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meet the standards under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 and does not give the Defendants fair
notice of the claims against them and thus RECOMMENDS that the FAC be
DISMISSED.
The Court finds that despite these deficiencies, Plaintiff could potentially
cure them if provided with an opportunity to amend his FAC. See Tripati v. First
Nat’l Bank & Trust, 821 F.2d 1368, 1370 (9th Cir. 1987) (“pro se plaintiffs
proceeding in forma pauperis must also be given an opportunity to amend their
complaint unless it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint could
not be cured by amendment”) (citations omitted). The Court thus recommends that
the FAC be dismissed WITHOUT PREJUDICE and that Plaintiff be permitted
LEAVE TO AMEND the FAC.
Plaintiff shall not file a second amended complaint until the district court
issues a decision on this Court’s Findings and Recommendation to Grant
Application to Proceed in District Court Without Prepaying Fees or Costs and
Dismiss the Complaint (“Findings and Recommendation”) and grants Plaintiff
leave to amend the FAC. If the district court adopts this Findings and
Recommendation and Plaintiff is granted leave to amend, Plaintiff shall title the
amended pleading “Second Amended Complaint” and must address the
deficiencies noted in this Findings and Recommendation and/or in the district
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court’s order, as directed by the district court. Plaintiff shall also comply with the
deadline set forth by the district court to file the third amended complaint.
Failure to cure the deficiencies identified in the district court’s order or
failure to timely file an amended pleading that conforms with the district court’s
order may result in dismissal of this action without leave to amend. Plaintiff is
reminded that if a third amended complaint is filed, the original pleading may not
be incorporated into the amended pleading, and the original pleading—the FAC—
shall no longer serve any function in this case. The Court reminds Plaintiff to state
all claims clearly and concisely, but with enough factual allegations to determine
from the face of the amended complaint that Plaintiff has stated a claim upon
which relief can be granted.
CONCLUSION
The Court FINDS that Plaintiff is unable to pay the required fees and
RECOMMENDS that the district court GRANT the IFP Application. The Court
also FINDS that the First Amended Complaint (ECF No. 4) fails to state a claim
and RECOMMENDS that the FAC be DISMISSED without prejudice with leave
to amend.
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IT IS SO FOUND AND RECOMMENDED.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawaii, February 27, 2026.
Civ. No. 25-00550 SASP-RT; Keka Doi-Toilolo vs. Kamaile Academy Public
Charter School, Paul Kepka, Lorelle Woolsey, Ho‘okako‘o Corporation; Findings
and Recommendation to Grant Application to Proceed in District Court Without
Prepaying Fees or Costs and Dismiss the Complaint
Rom A. Trader
United States Magistrate Judge
Andrade
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