Gipple v. Commissioner of Social Security

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF IOWA
CEDAR RAPIDS DIVISION
LINDA MARIE G.,1 No. 25-CV-32-CJW-KEM
Plaintiff,
vs. ORDER
FRANK BISIGNANO,
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.
___________________________
I. INTRODUCTION
This case is before the Court on a January 9, 2026 Report and Recommendation
(“R&R”) filed by the Honorable Kelly K.E. Mahoney, Chief United States Magistrate
Judge. (Doc. 15). Judge Mahoney recommends that the Court reverse the decision
rendered by the Commissioner of Social Security (“the Commissioner”) denying Linda
Marie G.’s (“Claimant”) application for disability insurance (“DI”) benefits under Title
II of the Social Security Act, 42 United States Code, Sections 401–434, and remand the
case for further proceedings. Neither party has objected to the R&R. The deadline for
such objections has expired. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). For the
reasons stated below, the Court accepts Judge Mahoney’s R&R (Doc. 15) without
modification.
1 The Committee on Court Administration and Case Management of the Judicial Conference of
the United States has recommended that, due to significant privacy concerns in social security
cases, federal courts should refer to claimants only by their first names and last initials.
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II. APPLICABLE STANDARDS
A. Judicial Review of the Commissioner’s Decision
The Court must affirm the Commissioner’s decision “if it is supported by
substantial evidence on the record as a whole.” Pelkey v. Barnhart, 433 F.3d 575, 577
(8th Cir. 2006); see 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (“The findings of the Commissioner of Social
Security as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive . . . .”).
“Substantial evidence is less than a preponderance, but enough that a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Lewis v. Barnhart, 353 F.3d 642,
645 (8th Cir. 2003) (quoting Kelley v. Callahan, 133 F.3d 583, 587 (8th Cir. 1998)).
The Eighth Circuit describes the standard as “something less than the weight of the
evidence [that] allows for the possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions.”
Culbertson v. Shalala, 30 F.3d 934, 939 (8th Cir. 1994) (quoting Turley v. Sullivan, 939
F.2d 524, 528 (8th Cir. 1991)).
In determining whether the Commissioner’s decision meets this standard, the court
considers “all of the evidence that was before the [Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”)],
but [it does] not re-weigh the evidence.” Vester v. Barnhart, 416 F.3d 886, 889 (8th
Cir. 2005) (citing Guilliams v. Barnhart, 393 F.3d 798, 801 (8th Cir. 2005)). The court
considers both evidence that supports the Commissioner’s decision and evidence that
detracts from it. Kluesner v. Astrue, 607 F.3d 533, 536 (8th Cir. 2010) (citing Finch v.
Astrue, 547 F.3d 933, 935 (8th Cir. 2008)). The court must “search the record for
evidence contradicting the [Commissioner’s] decision and give that evidence appropriate
weight when determining whether the overall evidence in support is substantial.”
Baldwin v. Barnhart, 349 F.3d 549, 555 (8th Cir. 2003) (citing Cline v. Sullivan, 939
F.2d 560, 564 (8th Cir. 1991)).
In evaluating the evidence in an appeal of a denial of benefits, the court must apply
a balancing test to assess any contradictory evidence. Sobania v. Sec’y of Health & Hum.
Servs., 879 F.2d 441, 444 (8th Cir. 1989) (citing Gavin v. Heckler, 811 F.2d 1195, 1199
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(8th Cir. 1987)). A court, however, may not reverse the Commissioner’s decision
“merely because substantial evidence would have supported an opposite decision.” Baker
v. Heckler, 730 F.2d 1147, 1150 (8th Cir. 1984); see Goff v. Barnhart, 421 F.3d 785,
789 (8th Cir. 2005) (“[A]n administrative decision is not subject to reversal simply
because some evidence may support the opposite conclusion.”).
B. Review of Report and Recommendation
A district judge must review a magistrate judge’s R&R under the following
standards:
Within fourteen days after being served with a copy, any party may
serve and file written objections to such proposed findings and
recommendations as provided by rules of court. A judge of the court
shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or
specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is
made. A judge of the court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or
in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.
The judge may also receive further evidence or recommit the matter to
the magistrate judge with instructions.
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). Thus, when a party objects to
any portion of an R&R, the district judge must undertake a de novo review of that portion.
Any portions of an R&R to which no objections have been made must be reviewed
under at least a “clearly erroneous” standard. See, e.g., Grinder v. Gammon, 73 F.3d
793, 795 (8th Cir. 1996) (noting that when no objections are filed “[the district court
judge] would only have to review the findings of the magistrate judge for clear error”).
As the Supreme Court has explained, “[a] finding is ‘clearly erroneous’ when although
there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Anderson v. City of
Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985) (quoting United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co.,
333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948)). A district judge may, however, elect to review an R&R
under a more exacting standard even if no objections are filed:
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Any party that desires plenary consideration by the Article III judge of
any issue need only ask. Moreover, while the statute does not require
the judge to review an issue de novo if no objections are filed, it does
not preclude further review by the district judge, sua sponte or at the
request of a party, under a de novo or any other standard.
Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 154 (1985).
III. BACKGROUND
The Court has reviewed the record and finds that Judge Mahoney accurately
summarized the pertinent facts and procedural history of this case. (Doc. 15, at 1–5).
Claimant has a strong work history, employed for many years at a medical supply
manufacturing company and a bakery. (Id., at 1). Claimant suffers from depression and
anxiety and had been under a professional’s treatment for years. (Id., at 2). Claimant
lost her job in 2021, when she was 59 years old, when her employer shut down the plant
where she worked. (Id., at 1–2). Claimant continued to seek psychological care, but
her condition appeared to worsen over time, although there were ups and downs in her
condition. (Id., at 2–4).
On June 27, 2022, claimant applied for DI benefits, alleging an onset date of
December 10, 2021, asserting she was disabled due to depression and anxiety. (AR 61).2
The Social Security Administration denied claimant’s disability application on initial
review in October 2022 and reconsideration in March 2023. (AR 60–78). As part of those
reviews, state agency psychological consultants Beverly Westra, PhD, and Jennifer Ryan,
PhD, reviewed claimant’s treatment records and issued opinions on her mental
limitations. (AR 66–67, 75–77). Claimant sought further review. In November 2023,
an ALJ held a hearing. (AR 31–32). On March 7, 2023, the ALJ issued a ruling denying
claimant’s application. (AR 13–26). The ALJ found claimant suffered from depression
and anxiety, but found they were nonsevere. The ALJ did not include any mental
2 “AR” refers to the administrative record, filed at Doc. 6.
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limitations in claimant’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”) assessment. The ALJ
found claimant could return to her past work. In short, the ALJ found claimant was not
disabled. The Appeals Council denied claimant’s request for further review, and claimant
then timely filed suit in this Court.
IV. DISCUSSION
Claimant argues that the ALJ erred in finding her mental impairments were not
severe. An impairment is not severe if it “would have no more than a minimal effect on
the claimant’s ability to work.” Dixon v. Barnhart, 353 F.3d 602, 605 (8th Cir. 2003)
(quoting Simmons v. Massanari, 264 F.3d 751, 755 (8th Cir. 2001)). When evaluating
the severity of a mental impairment, the ALJ must consider the claimant’s limitations in
“four broad functional areas”: (1) understanding, remembering, or applying information;
(2) interacting with others; (3) concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace; and (4)
adapting or managing oneself. 20 C.F.R. 404.1520a(c)(3), 416.920a(c)(3); see also
Buckner v. Astrue, 646 F.3d 549, 556–57 (8th Cir. 2011). Although subject to exception,
as a general rule, if the claimant suffers no more than mild limitations in each category,
the claimant’s mental impairments are not severe. Kirby v. Astrue, 500 F.3d 705, 707–
8 (8th Cir. 2007) (citing Page v. Astrue, 484 F.3d 1040, 1043 (8th Cir. 2007)). In
finding claimant’s mental impairments were not severe, the ALJ relied largely on
claimant’s daily activities and the opinions of the state agency consultants and the
psychological consultative examiner.
Judge Mahoney examined the record about claimant’s daily activities at length and
ultimately agreed with claimant. Although claimant engaged in several daily activities in
the past, such as attending auctions, substantial evidence in the record simply did not
support the ALJ’s conclusion that claimant continued to engage in those activities after
the claimed onset of her disability. (Doc. 15, at 11). The ALJ relied on an erroneous
assessment of claimant’s daily ability to engage in these activities in concluding claimant’s
mental impairments were not severe. (Id., at 13). The Commissioner argued the error
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was harmless because the ALJ relied on other evidence as well, such as the medical
opinions. (Id., at 11). Judge Mahoney found, however, that the problem lies in the lack
of medical opinion evidence supporting the ALJ’s conclusion that claimant suffered only
mild adaptive limitations. (Id., at 12–13). Those opinions reflect a finding of moderate
impairment and limitations in adjusting to changes in the workplace that create stress.
(Id., at 13). Judge Mahoney ultimately concluded that the ALJ relied too heavily on a
mistaken understanding of claimant’s daily activities. (Id., at 13). Given the record,
Judge Mahoney found the errors not harmless. (Id.).
The Court agrees with Judge Mahoney’s sound analysis and conclusions. Perhaps
the ALJ may reach the same conclusion, but upon review the ALJ must deal with the
errors in the analysis and reconcile the extent of claimant’s true daily activities with the
medical opinions the ALJ found persuasive to determine if claimant’s mental impairments
are severe and whether she can return to her prior form of employment.
V. CONCLUSION
For these reasons:
1. The Court accepts Judge Mahoney’s R&R (Doc. 15) without modification.
See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
2. Consistent with Judge Mahoney’s recommendation, the Commissioner’s
determination is reversed, and this matter is remanded to the Commissioner under
sentence four of Section 405(g) for further proceedings consistent with this order and
Judge Mahoney’s R&R.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 5th day of March, 2026.
___________________________
C.J. Williams, Chief Judge
United States District Court
Northern District of Iowa
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