Millenkamp Cattle, Inc

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION - 1
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
DISTRICT OF IDAHO
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
INTRODUCTION
Before the Court is the Final Application of O’Melveny & Myers LLP (“OMM”)
for Allowance and Payment of Compensation and Reimbursement of Expenses (“Fee
Application”). Doc. No. 1506. Two objections to the Fee Application were filed: first by
IN RE:
MILLENKAMP CATTLE, INC.,
Debtor.
Case No. 24-40158-NGH
Filing relates to:
☒ 	ALL DEBTORS
☐ 	Millenkamp Cattle, Inc.
☐ 	Idaho Jersey Girls
☐ 	East Valley Cattle
☐ 	Millenkamp Properties
☐ 	Millenkamp Properties II
☐ 	Millenkamp Family
☐ 	Goose Ranch
☐ 	Black Pine Cattle
☐ 	Millenkamp Enterprises
☐ 	Idaho Jersey Girls Jerome Dairy
Jointly Administered With
Case Nos.:
24-40159-NGH (Idaho Jersey Girls)
24-40160-NGH (East Valley Cattle)
24-40161-NGH (Millenkamp Properties)
24-40162-NGH (Millenkamp Properties II)
24-40163-NGH (Millenkamp Family)
24-40164-NGH (Goose Ranch)
24-40166-NGH (Black Pine Cattle)
24-40167-NGH (Millenkamp Enterprises)
24-40165-NGH (Idaho Jersey Girls
Jerome Dairy)
Chapter 11 Cases
Case 24-40158-NGH Doc 1681 Filed 04/27/26 Entered 04/27/26 15:55:43 Desc Main
Document Page 1 of 22

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION - 2
the United States Trustee (“UST”), Doc. No. 930 (objecting to interim fee application);
Doc. No. 1521 (objecting to final fee application), and second by Creditor Land View,
Inc. (“Creditor”), Doc. No. 1522. OMM filed a response to Creditor’s objection. Doc.
No. 1563.
Following several hearings, the Court took the matter under advisement.
However, noting shortcomings and inconsistencies in the filings, on March 23, 2026, the
Court entered an order requiring supplementation of the record. Doc. No. 1643.
Pursuant to the order, both OMM and the debtors were required to clarify the amount the
debtors have already paid to OMM, and OMM was asked to provide a more detailed
itemization to support its request for expenses. On April 6, 2026, the supplemental
responses were filed. Doc. Nos. 1662 and 1663. Having now considered the record
before it, this decision constitutes the Court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law in
accordance with Rules 7052 and 9014.1
RELEVANT FACTS
The various debtor entities associated with the Millenkamp dairy, farming, and
cattle operations filed petitions under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code on April 2,
2024, and those cases were jointly administered under In re Millenkamp Cattle, Inc., 24-
40158-NGH. On May 14, 2024, the UST appointed an official committee of unsecured
creditors pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a) (the “Committee”), Doc. No. 297, after which
OMM filed an application for employment as counsel for the Committee, Doc. No. 335.
1 Unless otherwise indicated, all statutory citations are to the Bankruptcy Code, Title 11 U.S.C.
§§ 101–1532, and all citations to “Rule” are to the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure.
Case 24-40158-NGH Doc 1681 Filed 04/27/26 Entered 04/27/26 15:55:43 Desc Main
Document Page 2 of 22

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION - 3
On July 22, 2024, the Court approved OMM’s application to serve as lead counsel for the
Committee pursuant to § 327 and indicated any award of compensation would be
governed by § 330. Doc. No. 513.
On October 16, 2025, OMM filed its final Fee Application. The Court conducted
a hearing on November 13, 2025, which was continued to December 11, 2025. In the
interim, OMM and the UST reached an agreement by which OMM agreed to reduce the
fees requested by $125,000, attributable to a $75,000 reduction for work performed in
connection with investigating liens and a $50,000 reduction to address the instances of
overstaffing, where more than one attorney participated in hearings or meetings. Doc.
No. 1554. Moreover, on the day prior to the continued hearing, OMM and Creditor
reached an agreement by which OMM would further reduce its fees by $100,000, thereby
resolving Creditor’s objections to the Fee Application. Doc. No. 1571. At the hearing on
December 11, 2025, the Court requested more detailed briefing from OMM and set a
continued hearing. A supplement to the Fee Application was filed, Doc. No. 1601, and
following the January 22, 2026, continued hearing, the matter was taken under
advisement.
Pursuant to the Fee Application, OMM sought an order allowing $1,385,637.05 in
total fees and $36,244.91 in total expenses. Doc. No. 1506. After deducting the
voluntary reductions according to the agreements made with the UST and the Creditor,
OMM’s total fee request was $1,160,637.02. Of that amount, OMM asserts that it has
been paid $838,041.07 in fees and $23,935.24 in expenses. See Doc. Nos. 585, 660, 893
(covering 637, 694, 745, and 831), 974, 1154 (covering 873, 925, 1008, and 1151), 1279,
Case 24-40158-NGH Doc 1681 Filed 04/27/26 Entered 04/27/26 15:55:43 Desc Main
Document Page 3 of 22

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION - 4
1331, 1389, 1420, 1443, 1506, and 1663. Following the supplementation filed on April
6, 2026, OMM now seeks payment of the outstanding balance in the amount of
$322,595.95 in fees2 and $12,295.07 in expenses3 for a total of $334,891.02.
ANALYSIS
A. 	Standards for Compensation
The Court has a duty to review fee applications, including those from counsel to
the unsecured creditors’ committee, and to award only reasonable compensation. The
Court may award less than the amount requested. 11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(2). Fees awarded
under § 330(a) are administrative expenses paid from the bankruptcy estate ahead of most
unsecured creditor claims. 11 U.S.C. §§ 503(b), 507(a). This priority has real
consequences for creditors. In cases where the estate lacks sufficient assets to pay all
claims in full, attorney fee awards directly reduce the funds available for distribution to
unsecured creditors. Even in cases where full payment of all claims is anticipated,
administrative expenses must be satisfied first, meaning that every dollar awarded in
attorney fees can delay distributions to most unsecured creditors.
Under § 330(a)(1), a professional employed pursuant to § 327(a) may be awarded
reasonable compensation for actual, necessary services rendered by the professional and
any paraprofessional staff, as well as reimbursement for actual, necessary expenses. In
2 $1,385,637.05 - $125,000 - $100,000 - $838,041.07 = $322,595.95.
3 OMM voluntarily reduced its expense request by $14.60 due to an erroneous PACER charge,
Doc. No. 1663 at n.3, resulting in a request for expenses totaling $36,230.31 - $23,935.24 = $12,295.07.
Case 24-40158-NGH Doc 1681 Filed 04/27/26 Entered 04/27/26 15:55:43 Desc Main
Document Page 4 of 22

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION - 5
determining reasonable compensation, the Court must consider “the nature, the extent,
and the value of such services, taking into account all relevant factors,” including:
(A) the time spent on such services;
(B) the rates charged for such services;
(C) whether the services were necessary to the administration of, or
beneficial at the time at which the service was rendered toward the
completion of, a case under this title;
(D) whether the services were performed within a reasonable amount of
time commensurate with the complexity, importance, and nature of the
problem, issue, or task addressed;
(E) with respect to a professional person, whether the person is board
certified or otherwise has demonstrated skill and experience in the
bankruptcy field; and
(F) whether the compensation is reasonable based on the customary
compensation charged by comparably skilled practitioners in cases other
than cases under this title.
§ 330(a)(3). Moreover, the Court cannot allow compensation for unnecessary duplication
of services or those not reasonably likely to benefit the estate or necessary for
administration of the case. See § 330(a)(4)(A).
The burden rests on the applicant to demonstrate that the fees requested are
reasonable. In re Gilsvik, 673 B.R. 745, 751 (9th Cir. BAP 2025) (citing Hensley v.
Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437 (1983)). Relevant evidence of reasonableness includes
proof that the requested rates are consistent with those prevailing in the community for
similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience, and reputation.
Id. at 751–52 (citing Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 n.11 (1984)). The Court may
also consider fees awarded in similar cases in the same locality and may rely on its own
knowledge of customary rates and experience with reasonable fees. Id. at 751 (quoting
Ingram v. Oroudjian, 647 F.3d 925, 928 (9th Cir. 2011)); In re Thueson, No. 4-08-BK-
Case 24-40158-NGH Doc 1681 Filed 04/27/26 Entered 04/27/26 15:55:43 Desc Main
Document Page 5 of 22

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION - 6
10121-JMM, 2009 WL 1076888, at *14 (Bankr. D. Ariz. Mar. 12, 2009) (stating “a court
may utilize its own knowledge of, and experience with, market rates and fees charged in
comparable cases as a guide”).
B. 	Local v. National Rates
In determining whether an applicant’s fees are reasonable, courts consider fees
awarded in similar cases in the same locality. Since the fees at issue in this case were
incurred in a bankruptcy case filed in the District of Idaho, the entire district would be the
applicable market area for determining reasonable fees. Holland & Hart, LLP v.
Oversight Comm. Under Confirmed Plan of Liquidation (In re Hopkins Nw. Fund, LLC),
567 B.R. 590, 592 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2017). In support of its fees, however, OMM relies
in large part on rates approved in bankruptcy cases outside the district, and many outside
the Ninth Circuit. OMM argues the size and complexity of this bankruptcy case justifies
the expansion of the applicable market area. Thus, the Court must first determine
whether the applicable market area should be expanded beyond the District of Idaho.
OMM argues that in unusual circumstances, attorneys should be allowed to charge
fees based on the rates they would typically charge in their normal areas of practice. In
re Frontier Airlines, Inc., 74 B.R. 973, 977 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1987); Ramos v. Lamm, 713
F.2d 546 (10th Cir. 1983). An award of fees is generally based on the “lodestar” formula,
which utilizes the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the applicable
hourly market rate for legal services. See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (1983);
Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886 (1984). In the Ninth Circuit, a reasonable hourly rate
multiplied by the number of hours actually and reasonably expended, is presumptively a
Case 24-40158-NGH Doc 1681 Filed 04/27/26 Entered 04/27/26 15:55:43 Desc Main
Document Page 6 of 22

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION - 7
reasonable fee in a bankruptcy case. Burgess v. Klenske (In re Manoa Fin. Co.), 853
F.2d 687, 691–92 (9th Cir. 1988).
Under the lodestar formula, the applicable market rate is generally the forum in
which the trial court sits. Barjon v. Dalton, 132 F.3d 496, 500 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing
Davis v. Mason County, 927 F.2d 1473, 1488 (9th Cir.1991)). Rates outside the forum
may be used, however, “if local counsel was unavailable, either because they are
unwilling or unable to perform because they lack the degree of experience, expertise, or
specialization required to handle properly the case.” Id. (citation modified).
OMM contends that this bankruptcy case was larger and more complex than most
cases filed in the District of Idaho. As discussed below, the Court agrees. Nevertheless,
OMM presented no evidence that local counsel was unwilling or unable to serve as
counsel for the Committee.4 Without such evidence, the Court is unable to find that the
relevant market rate should extend beyond the District of Idaho.
C. 	Reasonableness Analysis
Turning to the factors set forth in § 330(a)(3), the Court’s analysis focuses on
three of those factors: the time spent, the rates charged, and the overall reasonableness of
the compensation requested compared to similarly skilled counsel in comparable
bankruptcy cases. The Court does not dispute that OMM’s attorneys are experienced
4 The hearing on OMM’s fee application was continued from December 11, 2025 to January 22,
2026 to allow OMM to submit additional briefing and declarations in support of its application. At the
December 11 hearing, the Court also offered OMM the option of an in-person evidentiary hearing. OMM
did not request an evidentiary hearing but did submit supplemental briefing and a supporting declaration.
See Doc. No. 1601.
Case 24-40158-NGH Doc 1681 Filed 04/27/26 Entered 04/27/26 15:55:43 Desc Main
Document Page 7 of 22

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION - 8
bankruptcy practitioners or that their services benefited the Committee and contributed to
plan confirmation.
1. 	Time Spent
The Court and the UST both had concerns about two aspects of OMM’s fee
request: (1) the time spent investigating liens and lien perfection issues, and (2)
duplicative staffing, including multiple attorneys attending weekly calls with debtors’
counsel and the Committee, as well as hearings. To resolve the UST’s objections on both
issues, OMM agreed to reduce its fee request by a total of $125,000, consisting of
$75,000 for the lien work and $50,000 for the duplicative efforts. Although OMM’s
invoices reflect at least $210,158 billed for lien-related work alone, the Court will not
impose further reductions for either issue beyond what OMM has already conceded.
2. 	Rates charged and overall reasonableness
The Court now considers the reasonableness of OMM’s hourly rates, as required
by § 330(a). OMM requests the following rates:
Partners and counsel: $1,155 – $1,595
Associates: $760 – $1,215
Summer associates: $370
Paralegals: $510
Other paraprofessionals: $230 – $415
As previously noted, this Court measures reasonable hourly rates against the
prevailing market rates in the District of Idaho. By that standard, the hourly rates
requested by OMM and the professional staff are not in accord with the market rate for
this legal community.
Case 24-40158-NGH Doc 1681 Filed 04/27/26 Entered 04/27/26 15:55:43 Desc Main
Document Page 8 of 22

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION - 9
The Ninth Circuit has recognized that determining an appropriate market rate for
the services of a lawyer can be inherently difficult. Camacho v. Bridgeport Fin., Inc.,
523 F.3d 973, 979 (9th Cir. 2008). A reasonable rate should account for the lawyer’s
experience, skill, and reputation, as well as the rates awarded in the legal community in
which the Court sits. Id. In evaluating hourly rates, the Court may consider declarations
regarding fees in the community, hourly rates paid in other cases, and a court may utilize
its own knowledge of, and experience with, market rates and fees charged in comparable
cases as a guide. Here, OMM declined to provide any declarations detailing fees
typically charged in the district. Neither did OMM identify the hourly rates approved in
other cases in the District of Idaho. Thus, despite holding the burden of demonstrating
that its requested fees are reasonable, OMM provided this Court little evidence on which
to make that determination.
Drawing on its own knowledge of and experience with rates charged in District of
Idaho bankruptcy cases, the Court finds that reasonable market rates are $200 to $475 per
hour for attorneys, and $75 to $190 per hour for paralegals. These amounts are consistent
with rates approved in non-bankruptcy cases in this district. See SBP LLLP v. Hoffman
Constr. Co. of Am., No. 1:19-CV-00266-DCN, 2025 WL 959517, at *5 (D. Idaho Mar.
31, 2025) (reducing a Washington attorney’s rate from $575 to $460 per hour,
notwithstanding more than 40 years of experience); J.R. Simplot Co. v. McCain Foods
USA, Inc., 713 F. Supp. 3d 904, 983 (D. Idaho 2024) (noting that rates above $400 per
hour for attorneys and $170 per hour for paralegals would not be unreasonable, but
declining to entertain requests that “amount to double or triple the applicable Boise
Case 24-40158-NGH Doc 1681 Filed 04/27/26 Entered 04/27/26 15:55:43 Desc Main
Document Page 9 of 22

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION - 10
rates.”); Composite Res., Inc. v. Rood, No. 2:21-CV-00500-BLW, 2023 WL 2354831, at
*4–7 (D. Idaho Mar. 3, 2023) (reducing an out-of-state attorney’s rate of $650–$705 to
$450 to reflect Boise market rates and reducing the paralegal rate to $175 per hour); F.V.
v. Jeppesen, No. 1:17-CV-00170-CWD, 2022 WL 2150052, at *8 (D. Idaho June 8,
2022) (reducing a California attorney’s rate of $650-$675 per hour to $410 per hour);
Dickinson Frozen Foods, Inc. v. FPS Food Process Sols. Corp., 2021 WL 2444157, at
*15–16 (D. Idaho June 15, 2021) (awarding a newer partner $330 per hour and finding
$190 per hour was reasonable for paralegals).
In its objection to the Fee Application, Creditor expressed trepidation about the
billing rates of OMM attorneys, and the Court shares that concern. In fact, the Court
expressed its uneasiness with the proposed billing rates at the time OMM was appointed
and several times since. During this bankruptcy case, the lead attorneys and
paraprofessionals for OMM5 charged the following rates:
Professional
Hourly Rate 2024
and Balance of 2025 	Hourly Rate Q1 2025
Partner
Matthew P. Kremer 	$ 	1,405.00 	$ 	1,575.00
Julian Gurule 	$ 	1,385.00 	$ 	1,595.00
Counsel
Gabriel L. Olivera 	$ 	1,265.00 	$ 	1,375.00
Associate
Nicole Molner 	$ 	1,070.00 	$ 	1,215.00
Declan P. Kelly 	$ 	1,070.00 	$ 	1,215.00
5 The invoices reflect the involvement of numerous other professionals, including partners,
associates, paralegals, summer associates, a “librarian,” and a “project assistant” who worked on this
case. Doc. No. 1506.
Case 24-40158-NGH Doc 1681 Filed 04/27/26 Entered 04/27/26 15:55:43 Desc Main
Document Page 10 of 22

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION - 11
Paralegal
Lake Grey 	$ 	510.00
Regina Braman 	$ 	510.00
In contrast, Krystal R. Mikkilineni, counsel for the debtors based in Des Moines,
charged an hourly rate of $415, Doc. No. 933, while Matthew Christensen, debtors’
counsel in Boise, billed at $450 per hour and his paralegal charged $150 per hour, Doc.
No. 1447. By comparison, much of OMM’s counsel charged more than three times what
debtors’ counsel did. Notably, OMM’s paralegals billed at a higher hourly rate than
either of the debtors’ attorneys.
The Court acknowledges that rates in New York and Los Angeles, where OMM’s
attorneys are based, are generally higher than those in the District of Idaho. Even so, it
bears emphasis that debtors’ counsel carries a significantly broader and more complex
role than Committee’s counsel. By virtue of who they represent and the nature of that
representation, debtors’ attorneys must navigate a wider range of issues, including more
complicated ones, than counsel for the Committee. That OMM’s rates so dramatically
exceed those of debtors’ counsel is therefore difficult to justify on the basis of complexity
or responsibility alone.
During the final hearing on the Fee Application, counsel for OMM argued that the
position of the Committee in the case was most akin to that of creditor Conterra
Holdings, LLC (“Conterra”). In considering the claims at stake in the case, Conterra’s
claims were larger than those of the UCC members combined, yet the fees charged in this
case by Conterra’s counsel, John O’Brien, at their highest are just over half what OMM’s
lead partner, Matthew P. Kremer, charged. As of November 13, 2025, Conterra’s proofs
Case 24-40158-NGH Doc 1681 Filed 04/27/26 Entered 04/27/26 15:55:43 Desc Main
Document Page 11 of 22

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION - 12
of claim showed debts owing in the amounts of $3,483,212.90 and $23,560,389.68.
Claims Reg. Nos. 18-2 and 19-2. In contrast, the five members of the Committee filed
proofs of claim in the following amounts, totaling $13,690,199.17:
J.D. Heiskell Holding, LLC: $619,291.96 (Claims Reg. No. 89-1)
Wilbur Ellis Nutrition, LLC: $591,860.48 (Claims Reg. No. 69-2)
Bunge Canada: $1,159,843.85 (Claims Reg. No. 80-1)
Viterra USA Grain, LLC: $2,042,848.90 (Claims Reg. No. 34-1)
Land View, Inc.: $9,276,353.98 (Claims Reg. No. 31-2)
In 2024, Mr. O’Brien’s hourly rate was $745, and in 2025 his hourly rate was
$795. Claims Reg. Nos. 18-2 at 19; 19-2 at 24. He is based out of Denver with the firm
Spencer Fane. Spencer Fane’s paralegal billed for their work at a rate of $300 per hour in
2024 and $360 in 2025. Id.
In short, although this is a large and complex case, especially for this District,
other counsel, including those from other areas, did not charge fees anywhere near the
same tier as OMM, and in fact charged rates that were approximately half what OMM’s
counsel charged, or less. While especially large and complex cases may warrant
approving hourly rates above the community average, the Court has discretion in doing
so. Hopkins Nw. Fund, LLC, 567 B.R. at 596 (the court may consider the “overall size
and complexity of a case” when determining the reasonableness of a firm’s rates and
approve rates higher than those charged in the community).
The Court cannot find that OMM’s rates are reasonable in this district, even in a
large case such as this one and where the various parties spanned the country. Moreover,
the Court concludes OMM’s requested compensation is not wholly reasonable in light of
Case 24-40158-NGH Doc 1681 Filed 04/27/26 Entered 04/27/26 15:55:43 Desc Main
Document Page 12 of 22

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION - 13
the role it played. This is not to suggest the claims of the Committee or the role of its
counsel were unimportant or insignificant. Far from it. However, from the outset the
debtors expressed their intention to pay all unsecured creditors in full. OMM had only to
carefully monitor and protect that assertion. Its role took on greater significance when it
came to creditor Rabo Agrifinance’s competing “toggle” plan, which had the potential to
seriously impact the rights of unsecured creditors if certain scenarios came to fruition.
Nevertheless, the heavy lifting to adapt and modify debtors’ plan was done by debtors’
counsel along with Rabo Agrifinance and its counsel, leaving the Committee somewhat
on the sidelines to monitor the discussions in order to protect the interests of the
Committee’s members. As such, it is not appropriate for OMM to bill so many hours at
such high rates.
This was also not a case that required the Committee to investigate prepetition
transactions between the debtors and their insiders, assess potential causes of action
against the insiders, or evaluate avoidance actions under §§ 544, 547, or 548. Nor was
the Committee called upon to seek Court approval to pursue such actions on the estate’s
behalf. In short, the debtors’ consistent commitment to repaying unsecured creditors in
full simplified the issues the Committee needed to address.
Finally, OMM argues that its fees fell within the debtors’ monthly cash collateral
budget, citing this as evidence of reasonableness. The Court disagrees. Whether fees fit
within a budgeted amount is simply not relevant to the § 330(a) reasonableness analysis
and carries little persuasive weight.
Case 24-40158-NGH Doc 1681 Filed 04/27/26 Entered 04/27/26 15:55:43 Desc Main
Document Page 13 of 22

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION - 14
Considering the market hourly rate for the District of Idaho and adjusting that rate
upwards to reflect the complexity of this case, the Court concludes an award of fees
closer to what Conterra’s counsel charges is appropriate under the circumstances. To this
end, the Court has determined a reduction in the rates of each professional will be
imposed as set forth in the chart below. Attorney hourly rates vary based on years of
experience. The Court considers an award of fees in this range to be a concession to the
size and complexity of this case, and an outlier when compared to most other bankruptcy
and non-bankruptcy cases filed in this district.
Professional 	Years in Practice 	Hourly Rate 	Hours Billed 	Total Billed
Partner
Matthew P. Kremer 	12 	$775.00 	267.3 	$207,157.50
Matthew P. Kremer (1/2) 	$387.50 	6.0 	$2,325.00
Julian Gurule 	18 	$785.00 	139.5 	$109,507.50
Julian Gurule (1/2) 	$392.50 	4.4 	$1,727.00
Tim Evans 	25 	$790.00 	15.1 	$11,929.00
Ryan Cicero 	14 	$775.00 	3.5 	$2,712.50
Counsel
Gabriel L. Olivera 	12 	$725.00 	452.6 	$328,135.00
Zach Smith 	6 	$450.00 	9.4 	$4,230.00
Associate
Nicole Molner 	4 	$400.00 	242.2 	$96,880.00
Declan P. Kelly 	4 	$400.00 	95.4 	$38,160.00
Hattie McKinney 	2 	$350.00 	28.2 	$9,870.00
Daniel W. Leal 	2 	$350.00 	27.6 	$9,660.00
Sean Milde 	2 	$350.00 	21.7 	$7,595.00
Austin Damiani 	Summer Associate 	$100.00 	6.0 	$600.00
Gavin Reece Barrett 	Summer Associate 	$100.00 	3.6 	$360.00
Paraprofessionals
Lake Grey 	Paralegal 	$275.00 	15.8 	$4,345.00
Regina Braman 	Paralegal 	$275.00 	9.2 	$2,530.00
Christine A. Davis 	Librarian 	$175.00 	3.0 	$525.00
Alexander Roti 	Practice Assistant 	$100.00 	1.5 	$150.00
Case 24-40158-NGH Doc 1681 Filed 04/27/26 Entered 04/27/26 15:55:43 Desc Main
Document Page 14 of 22

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION - 15
Grand Total 	1,352.06 	$838,398.50
Blended Rate 	$620.12
The Court is mindful that OMM agreed to reduce its fees by $100,000 in response
to Creditor’s objection, which was specifically targeted at the reasonableness of OMM’s
billing rates. OMM also reduced its first quarter 2025 invoices by $23,697.56 to negate
an automatic rate increase implemented by the firm. The Court will not apply these two
reductions separately since they are subsumed by the reductions imposed by the Court
above. In other words, because the Court is recalculating fees from scratch using new
rates, any prior voluntary adjustments to invoiced amounts are already reflected in the
new totals. Finally, to resolve the objection by the UST, OMM voluntarily reduced its
requested fees by $125,000 to account for the UST’s concerns regarding OMM’s robust
lien work and duplicative billings. The Court is aware that OMM agreed to such
reduction when its blended rate in this case totaled $1,024 per hour. OMM’s original
blended rate of $1,024 was reduced to $620.12, a reduction of approximately 39.4%;
applying that same percentage to the $125,000 agreed reduction yields a separate
reduction totaling $75,698.24.
6 The Court started its table utilizing the hours billed from Exhibit A, a summary sheet, attached
to the Final Application of O’Melveny & Myers LLP for Allowance and Payment of Compensation and
Reimbursement of Expenses. (Doc. No. 1506). However, the hours listed in the summary sheet added up
to 1,355 even though the summary sheet listed 1,352 hours as the grand total. After reviewing the
underlying, itemized billing statements, the Court found the 3-hour difference and adjusted the chart
accordingly. Thus, the hours for Matthew P. Kremer, which were mistakenly listed as 270.7 were
decreased in the Court’s table to 267.3, and the hours for Julian Gurule, which were mistakenly listed as
139.1, were increased to 139.5.
Case 24-40158-NGH Doc 1681 Filed 04/27/26 Entered 04/27/26 15:55:43 Desc Main
Document Page 15 of 22

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION - 16
Finally, while the Court takes issue with specific time entries, such as those billed
by summer associates, librarians, and project managers, as well as other excessive billing
that is not reasonably borne by a bankruptcy debtor, the Court finds the overall reduction
in fees is sufficient to address those items. As such, the Court will forego a line-item
approach to scrutinizing OMM’s invoices in this decision.
Given the foregoing, the figures are calculated as follows:
Total OMM fees billed at $620.12 blended rate: 	$838,398.50
Modified Deduction via agreement with UST: 	-$75,698.24
Total fees allowed: 	$762,700.26
Debtor has already paid OMM $838,041.07 and therefore has overpaid fees in the
amount of $75,340.81.
3. 	Costs and Expenses
The Court will now turn to OMM’s request for costs and expenses. As noted
above, OMM seeks approval of a total of $36,230.31 in expenses, asserting $23,935.24
has already been received from the debtor. Upon review of the Itemized Cost and
Expense Sheet, Doc. No. 1663-1, the Court finds the printing and the travel expenses are
reasonable, and they will be approved.
The Court will now discuss items that bear closer scrutiny. During the interim
approval process, the UST objected to the expenses associated with “online research,”
“document production,” and “other professionals.” See Doc. No. 930 at 10-11. The
Court similarly questions these charges. While the supplementation provided little
additional detail to support these charges, it is now clear that the category of “online
Case 24-40158-NGH Doc 1681 Filed 04/27/26 Entered 04/27/26 15:55:43 Desc Main
Document Page 16 of 22

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION - 17
research” applies to not only PACER charges but also to legal research through Westlaw
or Lexis-Nexis, and the “other professionals” category apparently corresponds to work
provided by “CT Lien Solutions.” Finally, under the category of “document production”
are apparently costs for “Text Editing/Proofreading.” The Court will consider each of
these expense requests in turn.
Concerning the PACER charges, the Court finds these are reasonable. Connected
with this case were a number of individual bankruptcy cases and adversary proceedings
in which OMM was not employed as counsel and therefore the firm would not have been
able to take advantage of PACER’s “one free look” policy available to litigants appearing
in a particular case. As such, the PACER charges will be approved as reasonable costs.
The Westlaw and Lexis-Nexis charges, totaling $7,627.16, present a closer
question. Doc. 1663-1. While some courts have permitted the recovery of online legal
research expenses as costs, others have found them to be more akin to overhead and
therefore included within the hourly fees charged.
Some courts flatly disallow online legal research expenses under § 330. 	In
re King, 546 B.R. 682, 734 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2016) (allowing charges for
online legal research would represent double-billing, as such amounts are
factored 	into 	the 	hourly 	rates 	of 	the 	professionals); 	In 	re 	Digerati
Technologies, Inc., 537 B.R. 317, 364 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2015) (finding
online legal research as a cost that is “reflected in an attorney’s billing rate
and is therefore subsumed into attorneys’ fees.”); In re Bob’s Supermarkets,
Inc., 146 B.R. 20, 23 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1992) (finding Lexis charges akin to
overhead and the costs of maintaining a library)7; In re Bicoastal Corp., 121
B.R. 653, 656 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1990) (“[T]o accept the proposition that
Lexis charges or any other computer research charges are compensable, one
should also then conclude that the cost of acquisition of the lawyer’s library
7 Since the Bob’s Supermarkets decision, Montana has enacted a local rule allowing as an
expense the actual cost of computerized legal research. See Mont. LBR 2016-1(e).
Case 24-40158-NGH Doc 1681 Filed 04/27/26 Entered 04/27/26 15:55:43 Desc Main
Document Page 17 of 22

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION - 18
and the cost of maintaining the library . . . would also be compensable.”). But
see In re Hillsborough Holdings Corp., 127 F.3d 1398, 1404 (11th Cir. 1997)
(reversing the bankruptcy court’s decision at the outset of the case that
several 	categories 	of 	expenses 	including 	legal 	research 	were 	non-
compensable 	because 	they 	were 	overhead 	costs, 	without 	considering
evidence as to the usual billing practices of the attorneys involved or those
of other comparable attorneys).
Other courts have found that online research expenses may be reimbursable
under limited circumstances. In re Cmty. Home Fin. Servs, Inc., No.
1201703EE, 2015 WL 6511183, at *28 (Bankr. S.D. Miss. Oct. 27, 2015);
In re McKenzie, 460 B.R. 181, 187 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 2011); In re
Fibermark, Inc., No. 04-10463, 2004 WL 2418317, at *5 (Bankr. D. Ver.
Oct. 22, 2004); In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, Inc., 133 B.R. 13, 32
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1991); Leonard Jed Co., 103 B.R. at 712. In Fibermark,
the court crafted a three part standard that requires the applicant to (1) show
the 	use 	charges 	incurred 	were 	reasonable 	and 	necessary 	(including 	a
description of the research topic and the length of time spent on each topic);
(2) affirm that the applicant bills its non-bankruptcy clients for computer
assisted legal research, including the rate at which it bills such clients; and
(3) certify the invoiced cost from the vendor. Fibermark, 2004 WL 2418317,
at *5. The court in Community Home specifically adopted the Fibermark
three-part standard. Community Home, 2015 WL 6511183, at *28. In
McKenzie, the court considered whether (1) the expense was actually
incurred; (2) the applicant customarily charges its clients separately for such
research; and (3) the amount of the charges is reasonable. In support of the
application in McKenzie, the applicant testified as to how the firm charged
its clients for computer assisted legal research. 460 B.R. at 186.
In re ASCO Liquidating Co., 611 B.R. 245, 249–50 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 2019). As the
Seventh Circuit explained:
The added cost of computerized research is normally matched with a
corresponding reduction in the amount of time an attorney must spend
researching. Therefore, we see no difference between a situation where an
attorney researches manually and bills only the time spent and a situation
where the attorney does the research on a computer and bills for both the time
and the computer fee. In both cases the total costs are attorney’s fees and may
not be recovered as “costs.”
Case 24-40158-NGH Doc 1681 Filed 04/27/26 Entered 04/27/26 15:55:43 Desc Main
Document Page 18 of 22

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION - 19
Haroco, Inc. v. Am. Nat. Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago, 38 F.3d 1429, 1440–41 (7th Cir.
1994). As such, the panel in Haroco held that the Westlaw fees were already factored
into the hourly rates of the employed professionals, and that to award those fees as
reimbursable expenses would result in double-counting, which is unreasonable.
This Court has considered the costs of computerized legal research when awarding
fees under Idaho Code § 12-120 and the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure in cases where
state law governs the substantive issues before the court. Specifically, Idaho Rule of
Civil Procedure 54(e)(3)(K) requires the court to consider “the reasonable cost of
automated legal research (Computer Assisted Legal Research), if the court finds it was
reasonably necessary in preparing a party’s case.” However, it is noteworthy that this
expense is to be considered in the context of the amount of attorney’s fees, and not as a
separate cost item.
Similarly, this Court’s Local Bankruptcy Rules do not include computer assisted
legal research as a cost item. Kilborn v. Haun (In re Haun), 396 B.R. 522, 535 n.28
(Bankr. D. Idaho 2008) (sustaining objection to charges for computerized legal research
in an exception to discharge case in part because costs incurred doing legal research are
not listed as taxable costs under LBR 7054-1(c)); High Country Bed & Breakfast, Inc. v.
AMRESCO Indep. Funding, Inc. (In re High Country Bed & Breakfast, Inc.), 02.2
I.B.C.R. 89, 90 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2002) (noting that Westlaw research is not a cost
allowable under LBR 7054-1). Finally, this Court noted that “as the modern-day
equivalent of a law firm’s library, it is hard to see how routine online legal research
should not simply be one component of a firm’s hourly rates.” Beach v. Wells Fargo
Case 24-40158-NGH Doc 1681 Filed 04/27/26 Entered 04/27/26 15:55:43 Desc Main
Document Page 19 of 22

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION - 20
Bank, NA (In re Beach), Case No. 10-8114-JDP, 2011 WL 4963003, at *8 (Bankr. D.
Idaho Oct. 19, 2011).
Having considered the case law, the approach taken in the Idaho Rules of Civil
Procedure, as well as this Court’s local bankruptcy rules, the Court concludes charges for
computerized legal research such as Westlaw or Lexis-Nexis are not compensable as
costs. Rather, those expenses are part of a law firm’s overhead and included in an
attorney’s hourly rate. As such, the Court concludes the $7,627.16 in Westlaw and
Lexis-Nexis charges cannot be claimed or paid as costs, and those charges will be
disallowed.
Next, the Court will consider the issue of OMM’s request to compensate “other
professionals” via an expense to be borne by the debtors. A careful review of OMM’s
expense sheet suggests the costs associated with “CT Lien Solutions” fall into this
category. There are two entries for CT Lien Solutions: the first is for $2,301 on June 12,
2024, and the second is for $7,804.81 on October 4, 2024. The “cost type” for both
entries is labeled as “Other Professional Services.” It is understandable that OMM does
not seek to have those expenses paid pursuant to § 330(a)(1)(A), because CT Lien
Solutions was never employed as an estate professional under § 327(a). Rather, OMM
seeks reimbursement as costs under § 330(a)(1)(B).
Here, the UST has already questioned the necessity of OMM’s investigation into
liens on the debtors’ property, and the Court has echoed that concern. Nevertheless, it is
not unreasonable for OMM to obtain copies of the various liens securing those creditors
ahead in priority of the Committee members. While extensive lien work was not justified
Case 24-40158-NGH Doc 1681 Filed 04/27/26 Entered 04/27/26 15:55:43 Desc Main
Document Page 20 of 22

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION - 21
given the purpose for which the Committee was established and its counsel employed,
which is to ensure the Committee’s members received payment in full through the
debtors’ chapter 11 plan on as favorable terms as possible, a review of the liens is not
beyond the mark, and obtaining copies of those liens is necessary to undertake that task.
Accordingly, the $10,105.81 in expenses sought by OMM for its use of CT Lien
Solutions is reasonable and compensable as a cost to be paid by the debtors.
Finally, the Court will disallow the charges for “TEXT EDITING /
PROOFREADING” listed on the itemized expense sheet as follows:
August 13, 2024 	$145.80
September 17, 2024 	$ 23.40
September 17, 2024 	$ 83.70
January 14, 2025 	$ 20.25
Total 	$273.15
The Court can find nothing in the record to explain how this is somehow a reimbursable
cost as opposed to merely a service encapsulated in the hours and fees charged by
attorneys and other professionals at OMM.
Based upon the foregoing analysis, the Court’s calculation is rendered as follows:
Total costs sought: 	$36,230.31
Disallowed Westlaw/Lexis-Nexis charges: 	-$7,627.16
Disallowed Text Editing/Proofreading charges: 	-$273.15
Total costs and expenses allowed: 	$28,330.00
As the debtor has already paid $23,935.24 to OMM, the balance owed to OMM by the
debtor is $4,394.76.
Case 24-40158-NGH Doc 1681 Filed 04/27/26 Entered 04/27/26 15:55:43 Desc Main
Document Page 21 of 22

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION - 22
CONCLUSION
Pursuant to the Court’s duty under § 330 to assure the reasonableness of
professional fees to be paid by a debtor in bankruptcy, the Court has reviewed the
invoices submitted by OMM in detail and has determined that the hours and rates sought
are not supported by the circumstances of this case. Accordingly, the Court will reduce
the hourly fees to more closely align the fee award with what is reasonable in a case such
as this in the District of Idaho. Additionally, the Court finds certain of the costs and
expenses to be unreasonable.
OMM will be allowed total fees of $762,700.26 and expenses in the amount of
$28,330. As such, according to the Court’s calculation, debtor has overpaid OMM for
attorney fees in the amount of $75,340.81 but owes a balance of $4,394.76 in costs,
resulting in a total overpayment of $70,946.05.
A separate order will be entered.
DATED: April 27, 2026
NOAH G. HILLEN
Chief U.S. Bankruptcy Judge
Case 24-40158-NGH Doc 1681 Filed 04/27/26 Entered 04/27/26 15:55:43 Desc Main
Document Page 22 of 22