Allen v. Experian Information Solutions, Inc. et al

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND O RDER - 1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO
JASON HENRY ALLEN,
Plaintiff,
v.
EXPERIAN INFORMATION
SOLUTIONS, INC., EQUIFAX
INFORMATION SERVICES LLC,
TRANS UNION LLC; FORD
MOTOR CREDIT COMPANY LLC;
M2 LAW GROUP P.C.; HOWELL &
VAIL LLP; MICHAEL J.
ARCHIBALD; and LISSETTE M.
CARRERAS,
Defendants.
Case No. 2:25-cv-00404-BLW
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER
INTRODUCTION
Before the Court are: (1) Defendants Equifax Information Services LLC,
Experian Information Solutions, Inc., and Trans Union LLC’s Joint Motion to
Dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint (Dkt. 32); (2) Plaintiff’s Motion to Grant
Plaintiff Access to the CM/ECF System (Dkt. 29); and (3) Plaintiff’s Motion for
Leave to File Sur-Reply (Dkt. 45). For the reasons set forth below, the Court will
grant the CRA Defendants’ motion to dismiss but will allow Allen one final
opportunity to amend his complaint.
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BACKGROUND
On July 23, 2025, Plaintiff Jason Henry Allen, proceeding pro se, filed a
complaint alleging violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”), 15
U.S.C. § 1681 et seq., against the three major credit reporting agencies—Equifax
Information Services LLC, Experian Information Solutions, Inc., and Trans Union
LLC (collectively, the “CRA Defendants”)—as well as M2 Law Group PC, its
predecessor Howell & Vail LLP, Michael J. Archibald (collectively, the “M2
Defendants”), and Ford Motor Credit Company, LLC.
The M2 Defendants and CRA Defendants both moved to dismiss the
complaint. See Dkts. 15, 16. While those motions were pending, Allen filed an
amended complaint. Dkt. 21. In a separate order, the Court granted the M2
Defendants’ motion to the extent it sought dismissal for insufficient service of
process under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(5), dismissing M2 Law Group
and Michael Archibald without prejudice and Howell & Vail with prejudice.
Because Allen’s amended complaint superseded the original, the Court denied as
moot the portions of both motions seeking dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) for
failure to state a claim.
The CRA Defendants have now filed a joint motion to dismiss the amended
complaint for failure to state a claim. See Dkt. 32. In the amended complaint, Allen
alleges that his credit reports from the three CRA Defendants contain “numerous
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discrepancies and inaccuracies,” including conflicting balances for the same
accounts, contradictory payment statuses, duplicate tradelines, mismatched account
totals, discrepant credit limits, and inconsistent personal identifiers including
addresses Allen claims never to have used. Dkt. 21 at 5. He also alleges that certain
“hard inquiries” from entities including CBNA, Lifted Tru, Lifted Truck, and
GeeAutomot appear on his reports without his authorization. Id. Allen maintains he
submitted certified disputes on May 31 and June 16, 2025, but the CRA
Defendants merely “parroted” furnisher responses via automated consumer dispute
verification processes without conducting independent investigations. Id. at 6. As a
result, Allen alleges, his FICO scores fell to 538 (Trans Union), 524 (Experian),
and 520 (Equifax). Id.
LEGAL STANDARD
A dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate where a complaint “fails to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Rule 8(a)(2)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires only a short and plain statement of
the claim, showing the plaintiff is entitled to relief and giving the defendant fair
notice of plaintiff’s claim and the grounds upon which it rests. Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Although a complaint challenged by a Rule
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss “does not need detailed factual allegations,” it requires
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“more than labels and conclusions.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. “[A] formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id.
To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a claim requires a complaint to have
enough factual basis which, if true, states a plausible claim for relief. Twombly, 550
U.S. at 556. A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content
allowing the court to draw a reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
alleged misconduct. Id. The plausibility standard is not akin to a “probability
requirement,” but it asks for more than a sheer possibility a defendant has acted
unlawfully. Id. Where a complaint pleads facts that are “merely consistent with” a
defendant’s liability, it “stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of
‘entitlement to relief.’” Id. at 557. Further, a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal is appropriate
where a plaintiff attempts to allege a claim for relief under a statute which does not
provide a private right of action.
ANALYSIS
A. The Fair Credit Report Act
Congress enacted the FCRA in 1970 “to ensure fair and accurate credit
reporting, promote efficiency in the banking system, and protect consumer
privacy.” Gorman v. Wolpoff & Abramson, LLP, 584 F.3d 1147, 1153 (9th Cir.
2009) (quoting Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47 (2007)). To achieve
these ends, the FCRA sought to ensure that “consumer reporting agencies exercise
their grave responsibilities [in assembling and evaluating consumers’ credit, and
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disseminating information about consumers’ credit] with fairness, impartiality, and
a respect for the consumer’s right to privacy.” See 15 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(4). The
FCRA expressly creates a private right of action for willful or negligent
noncompliance with its requirements. Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681n, 1681o).
Allen alleges the CRA Defendants violated §§ 1681e(b), 1681i, and 1681b
of the FCRA by reporting inaccurate information, failing to conduct reasonable
reinvestigations, and furnishing his consumer report without a permissible purpose.
The CRA Defendants move to dismiss the Amended Complaint for failure to state
a claim. They argue that Allen’s claims under §§ 1681e(b) and 1681i fail because
he does not identify any factual inaccuracy in his credit reports, and that his claim
under § 1681b fails because he alleges no facts giving rise to an inference that the
furnishing of his consumer report fell outside the permitted circumstances listed in
§ 1681b(a).
1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681e(b) and 1681i
Allen alleges the CRA Defendants willfully and negligently violated §§
1681e(b) and 1681i of the FCRA. Section 1681e(b) requires consumer reporting
agencies to “follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy”
in consumers’ credit reports. 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b). When a consumer disputes the
accuracy or completeness of any item in a credit report, § 1681i(a) requires
consumer reporting agencies to “conduct a reasonable reinvestigation to determine
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whether the disputed information is inaccurate.” 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a).
To state a claim under § 1681e(b), a plaintiff must allege facts tending to
show that a credit report “sports an actual inaccuracy.” DeAndrade v. Trans Union
LLC, 523 F.3d 61, 66 (1st Cir. 2008); see also Guimond v. Trans Union Credit
Info. Co., 45 F.3d 1329, 1333 (9th Cir. 1995) (“In order to make out a prima facie
violation under § 1681e(b), a consumer must present evidence tending to show that
a credit reporting agency prepared a report containing inaccurate information.”). A
claim under § 1681i similarly requires a plaintiff to make a “prima facie showing
of inaccurate reporting.” Carvalho v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, 629 F.3d 876, 890
(9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Dennis v. BEH–1, LLC, 520 F.3d 1066, 1069 (9th Cir.
2008)).
Under the FCRA, a report is “inaccurate” if it is “patently incorrect” or
“misleading in such a way and to such an extent that it can be expected to
adversely affect credit decisions.” Shaw v. Experian Info. Sols., Inc., 891 F.3d 749,
756 (9th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation omitted). To state a claim, a plaintiff must
identify which specific information is false—merely pointing to the fact that
different reports contain different information is insufficient.
Allen’s allegations fall short of this standard. He identifies various
discrepancies among his three credit reports: conflicting balances ($18,606, $0,
$135,019, $154,132), different account totals (22, 23, 24), inconsistent payment
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statuses, and differing personal identifiers. Dkt. 21 at 5; Dkt. 36 at 2. But Allen
does not allege which of these conflicting figures is false or misleading. He does
not, for example, allege that the correct balance on a particular account is $0 and
that one or more CRAs falsely reported $18,606. Instead, his theory appears to be
that the mere existence of discrepancies among the reports proves inaccuracy.
Allegations of inconsistencies or discrepancies among credit reports,
standing alone, do not permit an inference that any of the reports contains “false or
materially misleading” information. See Verlus v. Experian Info. Sols., Inc., No.
23-CV-11426-DJC, 2025 WL 836588, at *4 (D. Mass. Mar. 17, 2025) (allegations
of discrepancies between CRA reports insufficient without allegation of actual
inaccuracy); Cruel v. Experian, No. 22-cv-5236-KBH, 2023 WL 4140828, at *3
(E.D. Pa. June 22, 2023) (same). The reason is straightforward: when one CRA
reports a balance of $18,606 and another reports $135,019, both figures could be
accurate as of different reporting dates, or one could be accurate and the other not.
Without an allegation establishing which figure is false, the Court cannot infer
inaccuracy from inconsistency alone.
Allen attempts to avoid this problem by relying on Shaw for the proposition
that a report can be “inaccurate,” even if technically true, if it is misleading. Dkt.
36 at 3. But Shaw does not relieve a plaintiff of the burden to plead that at least one
piece of allegedly conflicting information is “misleading in such a way and to such
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an extent that it can be expected to adversely affect credit decisions.” Shaw, 891
F.3d at 757. Allen alleges no specific details about what information contained in
any of his credit reports was misleading, much less that any information was
misleading in such a way as to adversely affect credit decisions.
Allen’s only other specific allegation concerns personal identifiers. He
alleges that the CRAs report “inconsistent personal identifiers” including addresses
he claims never to have used. Dkt. 21 at 5. Even assuming this is true, the reporting
of personal identifying information generally does not give rise to FCRA liability
because such information does not bear on a consumer’s creditworthiness. See
Individual Reference Servs. Grp., Inc. v. F.T.C., 145 F. Supp. 2d 6, 17 (D.D.C.
2001), aff’d sub nom. Trans Union LLC v. F.T.C., 295 F.3d 42 (D.C. Cir. 2002)
(name, address, Social Security number, and phone number do not bear on
creditworthiness factors); Parker v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, No. 2:15-CV-14365,
2017 WL 4003437 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 12, 2017) (biographical information
including addresses does not constitute consumer report information).
Allen insists, however, that personal identifier errors can “enable mixed-file
harms”—situations where one consumer’s information is erroneously attributed to
another. This argument is equally unavailing. While the Court acknowledges that
mixed-file problems can give rise to FCRA claims, see Guimond, 45 F.3d at 1332-
33, Allen has not alleged a mixed-file situation. He alleges only that his reports
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contain addresses he never used, not that another person’s credit accounts have
been merged with his file. This is precisely the type of conclusory allegation that
cannot survive a motion to dismiss.
In sum, Allen has failed to plead a factual inaccuracy sufficient to state a
claim under either § 1681e(b) or § 1681i. Identifying differences among credit
reports, without alleging which information is false, does not state a plausible
claim for relief.
2. 15 U.S.C. § 1681b
Allen also alleges that the CRA Defendants violated § 1681b by furnishing
his credit report to certain entities without his authorization and without any
permissible purpose.
Section 1681b(a) identifies the circumstances under which a consumer
reporting agency may furnish a consumer report, including: (1) in response to a
court order; (2) “[i]n accordance with the written instructions of the consumer to
whom it relates”; or (3) to a person which it has reason to believe intends to use the
information for one of several listed purposes. 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(a)(1), (2),
(3)(A)-(G). Allen alleges that certain “hard inquiries” from CBNA, Lifted Tru,
Lifted Truck, and GeeAutomot were reported without his “consent or permission.”
Dkt. 21 at 5. But consumer consent is not required under § 1681b. A CRA may
furnish a report if it has reason to believe the requester has a permissible purpose.
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See Spencer v. Relx Inc., No. CV 23-65-H-BMM-KLD, 2024 WL 3315439, at *4
(D. Mont. May 24, 2024).
Allen’s reliance on Pintos v. Pacific Creditors Ass’n, 605 F.3d 665 (9th Cir.
2010), does not help him. Pintos addressed the obligations of the requester of a
consumer report, not the CRA that furnishes it. Id. at 674-75. For a CRA, the
standard is whether it had “reason to believe” the requester had a permissible
purpose. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(a)(3). Allen has not met this standard. He has not
alleged any facts suggesting the CRA Defendants lacked reason to believe the
inquiring entities had permissible purposes, nor has he alleged any facts suggesting
that the requesters or subscribers themselves lacked a permissible purpose.
Accordingly, Allen’s § 1681b claim fails.
B. Leave to Amend
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2), courts “should freely give
leave” to amend “when justice so requires.” Leave to amend may be denied where
amendment would be futile. Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962).
Amendment is futile “only if no set of facts can be proved under the amendment to
the pleadings that would constitute a valid and sufficient claim.” Miller v. Rykoff-
Sexton, Inc., 845 F.2d 209, 214 (9th Cir. 1988).
Although Allen has already amended once as a matter of course under Rule
15(a)(1)(B), the Court will permit one additional amendment. It is not clear that
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further amendment would be futile. Allen may be able to cure the deficiencies
identified herein by alleging specific facts establishing that particular information
in his credit reports is actually false—for example, by alleging that a specific
account balance is $0 as confirmed by the creditor, and that one or more CRAs
falsely reported a different balance. Similarly, Allen may be able to allege facts
suggesting the CRA Defendants lacked reason to believe that the entities making
the challenged inquiries had permissible purposes.
The dismissal is therefore without prejudice, and Allen shall have thirty (30)
days from the date of this order to file a second amended complaint. Failure to
timely file an amended complaint will result in dismissal of the claims against the
CRA Defendants with prejudice.
C. Motion for CM/ECF Access
Allen moves for access to the Court’s Case Management/Electronic Case
Files (“CM/ECF”) system, arguing that electronic filing would promote judicial
efficiency, remove undue burdens on him as a pro se litigant located 30 miles from
the courthouse, and that he has demonstrated competence in preparing rule-
compliant filings. Dkt. 29. The CRA Defendants oppose, arguing that Allen has
“demonstrated a disregard for the procedural requirements” of this Court by
making “numerous unnecessary filings,” including a premature motion for leave to
file a sur-reply before any reply had been filed. Dkt. 38 at 4.
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Pro se litigants typically do not have CM/ECF filing privileges. See D. Idaho
Loc. Civ. R. 5.1(c). “While an unrepresented individual may obtain the Court’s
permission to file his or her submissions electronically using the CM/ECF system,
such authorization is typically denied unless the pro se party makes a showing of
good cause or at least provide some explanation for why he requires access to
electronic filing or why paper filing is inadequate.” Simerlink v. Coll. of Idaho, No.
1:25-CV-00157-BLW, 2025 WL 1426056, at *1 (D. Idaho May 15, 2025).
The Court is not persuaded that Allen has shown good cause for CM/ECF
access at this time. Allen’s filing history in this case reveals some procedural
missteps, including filing a motion for leave to file a sur-reply before any reply
brief had been filed. Dkt. 23. And the CRA Defendants have legitimate concerns
about the potential for additional unnecessary filings if Allen is granted immediate
electronic access. Given the early stage of this litigation and the dismissal of
Allen’s claims with leave to amend, the Court will deny the motion without
prejudice. Allen may renew this motion if he files a second amended complaint
and demonstrates continued familiarity with procedural requirements.
ORDER
IT IS ORDERED that:
1. Defendants Equifax Information Services LLC, Experian Information
Solutions, Inc., and Trans Union LLC’s Joint Motion to Dismiss
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Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint (Dkt. 32) is GRANTED. All claims
against the CRA Defendants are DISMISSED without prejudice.
2. Plaintiff shall have thirty (30) days from the date of this order to file a
second amended complaint curing the deficiencies identified herein.
Failure to timely file an amended complaint will result in dismissal of the
claims against the CRA Defendants with prejudice.
3. Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File Sur-Reply (Dkt. 45) is DENIED as
MOOT.
4. Plaintiff’s Motion to Grant Plaintiff Access to the CM/ECF System (Dkt.
29) is DENIED without prejudice.
DATED: December 4, 2025
_________________________
B. Lynn Winmill
U.S. District Court Judge
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