Seifert v. Nationstar Mortgage LLC et al

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER – 1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO
RICHARD SEIFERT,
Plaintiff,
v.
NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE LLC
D/B/A MR. COOPER; LAKEVIEW
LOAN SERVICING, LLC, ALDRIDGE
PITE, LLP; SYDNEY K LEAVITT;
MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC
REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, INC.
(MERS); and DOE DEFENDANTS 1-10,
Defendants.
Case No. 4:25-cv-00645-DCN
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER
I. INTRODUCTION
Before the Court is Defendants Nationstar Mortgage LLC d/b/a Mr. Cooper
(“Nationstar”) and Lakeview Loan Servicing, LLC’s (together, “Nationstar Defendants”)
Motion to Dismiss. Dkt. 20.1 The Nationstar Defendants filed this Motion on April 27,
2026, meaning Plaintiff Richard Seifert had until May 18, 2026, to file a response. He
failed to do so. On May 21, 2026, however, Seifert filed a Motion for Extension asking that
he be permitted to respond by June 10, 2026. Dkt. 23. The Court granted Seifert his
requested extension. Dkt. 24. Seifert has still not filed a response.
1 The Nationstar Defendants also filed a Motion to Take Judicial Notice asking the Court to consider—to
the extent necessary—the underlying loan documents. Dkt. 21. As the Court previously held, see Dkt. 15,
at 8–9, because Seifert references the loan documents in his filings, it is appropriate to take judicial notice
of the same. The Motion is GRANTED.
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MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER – 2
Upon review, and for the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS Defendants’
Motion and dismisses Seifert’s Complaint WITH PREJUDICE and WITHOUT LEAVE
TO AMEND.2
II. BACKGROUND
The Court has previously described the background of this case in detail (Dkt. 15,
at 2–3) but will reiterate the pertinent points here for context. Seifert initially filed a 206-
page Complaint which contained fifty-five causes of action. Dkt. 1-2. His claims were
extremely diverse, encompassing federal and state statutory claims as well as common law
claims and claims for equitable relief. See generally id. Most of his claims have no
connection to mortgage servicing.
A discerning eye may (upon hours of study) learn that this suit essentially boils
down to a mortgage servicing dispute. Seifert alleges he obtained a Federal Housing
Administration (“FHA”) insured mortgage loan secured by real property at 113 5th Street,
Idaho Falls, Idaho, 83401 in May of 2024. Seifert initially made payments on the loan, but
his last payment—a partial payment—occurred in January 2025. At that point, The
Nationstar Defendants began default proceedings.
Seifert alleges he was later approved for a loan modification in July 2025 but claims
Defendants improperly scheduled a foreclosure sale on the property for October of 2025,
while his modification was still pending. This is partially true.
2 The Court finds the facts and legal arguments are adequately presented and will decide the Motion on the
record and without oral argument. Dist. Idaho Loc. Civ. R. 7.1(d)(1)(B).
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MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER – 3
Nationstar did approve a modification for Seifert and mailed him certain documents
in July of 2025 to get his final approval. The requested return deadline was August 15,
2025. Under the modification, Seifert’s monthly mortgage payment would have decreased.
That said, by his own admission, even this lesser amount was “not affordable” and so
Seifert never returned or executed the modification documents. Dkt. 19, at 16–17. Thus,
the Nationstar Defendants continued with default and foreclosure proceedings.
Seifert sued in Idaho state court, and the Nationstar Defendants subsequently
removed the case to this Court in November 2025. Dkt. 1.
On December 17, 2025, the Nationstar Defendants and MERS filed Motions to
Dismiss. Dkts. 11, 12. The next day, the Court sent Seifert its standard Notice to Pro Se
Litigants informing him of Defendants’ Motions and what was required in response. Dkt.
14. After Seifert failed to respond, the Court granted the Motions to Dismiss on February
12, 2026, but gave Seifer leave to amend his Complaint. Dkt. 15. Notably, the Court
specifically directed Seifert to adhere to Rule 8’s pleading standard by filing a short and
plain Complaint. Id. at 10.
One day before the deadline to file an amended Complaint, Seifert requested an
extension until April 15, which the Court granted. Dkts. 16, 18. Seifert then filed his
seventy-two 	page Amended 	Complaint 	on April 	14 	(Dkt. 	19), 	and 	the 	Nationstar
Defendants filed a new Motion to Dismiss on April 27. Dkt. 20.
Seifert then missed the May 18 deadline to respond and followed up by requesting
another extension, which the Court again granted, setting a new deadline of June 10 (the
date Seifert requested in his Motion). Dkts. 23, 24.
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MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER – 4
To date, Seifert has again failed to file any response to the Nationstar Defendants’
most recent Motion to Dismiss.
III. LEGAL STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) permits a court to dismiss a claim if the
plaintiff has “fail[ed] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” “A Rule 12(b)(6)
dismissal may be based on either a ‘lack of a cognizable legal theory’ or ‘the absence of
sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory’” Johnson v. Riverside Healthcare
Sys., LP, 534 F.3d 1116, 1121 (9th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 8(a)(2) requires a complaint to contain a “short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” in order to “give the defendant fair notice of
what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 554 (2007). “This is not an onerous burden.” Johnson, 534 F.3d at 1121. A
complaint “does not need detailed factual allegations,” but it must set forth “more than
labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at
555. The complaint must also contain sufficient factual matter to “state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court
must view the complaint in the light most favorable to the claimant and “accept[] all well-
pleaded factual allegations as true, as well as any reasonable inference drawn from them.”
Johnson, 534 F.3d at 1122.
Where a plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the complaint must be liberally construed,
and he must be given the benefit of any doubt. See Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447
(9th Cir. 2000). If dismissal is appropriate under Rule 12(b)(6), a court “should grant leave
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MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER – 5
to amend even if no request to amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that the
pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts. Ballinger v. City of
Oakland, 398 F. Supp. 3d 560, 567 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (quoting Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d
1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000)). The decision is within the discretion of the trial court.
IV. ANALYSIS
As explained previously, the Court first finds procedural grounds exist for granting
the Nationstar Defendants’ Motion. Dkt. 15, at 4–5. Just as the case was when Seifert failed
to respond to the Nationstar Defendants’ previous Motion to Dismiss, Seifert has again
failed to timely respond to the new Motion to Dismiss—even though this most recent
deadline was one that he himself proposed and the Court accepted. Seifert knew the
consequences of failing to respond in this case, because the Court made sure he did.3
Despite this knowledge, he has not filed any response.
This alone is enough to dismiss the case, and now with prejudice, as it would be the
second dismissal. However, in the interest of completeness, the Court will briefly explain
why Seifert’s Amended Complaint must be dismissed even were there no procedural
grounds for dismissal.
A. Shotgun Pleading
Aside from Seifert’s apparent neglect of this case, when the Court granted him leave
to amend his Complaint after the first dismissal, it specifically instructed him to
3 As mentioned in the Court’s previous Order, the Clerk of the Court sent Seifert the District of Idaho’s
standard Notice to Pro Se Litigants outlining what was required of him and making him aware that his case
could be dismissed if he failed to respond on time, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) and
Local Rule 7.1(e)(2).
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MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER – 6
significantly reduce the Complaint’s length to make it clear what he was alleging against
which defendants. See Dkt. 15, at 10.
The Court’s instruction that Seifert should indicate specifics about who did what
and why what they did was wrong was not a simple suggestion; it was a direction aimed at
helping Seifert to create a cogent set of claims.
However, Seifert has largely maintained the same methodology of shotgun pleading.
The issues with the Amended Complaint are numerous, but specifically, Seifert engages in
shotgun pleading by making conclusory and vague allegations and intermingling multiple
causes of action into the same counts. See Gibson v. City of Portland, 165 F.4th 1265, 1288
(9th Cir. 2026) (explaining how shotgun pleading violates Rule 8 by, among other things,
failing to separate claims into different counts and making vague and conclusory
allegations).
To Seifert’s credit, he reduced the length of his Complaint significantly—from 206
pages to seventy-two, and from fifty-five causes of action to nine. He also tried to
distinguish between the Defendants with some of the counts.
Nevertheless, the Amended Complaint still suffers from the same maladies as the
original Complaint. Rather than refining his Amended Complaint to indicate specific acts
that gave rise to specific causes of action against specific defendants, Seifert has merely
consolidated most or all of the same information from his fifty-five original causes of
action into nine omnibus causes of action, which mostly make vague and generic
allegations of wrongdoing against the Defendants. This approach is impermissible and
supports dismissal.
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MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER – 7
B. Lack of Cognizable Legal Theory
Defendants next assert Seifert’s Amended Complaint must be dismissed because he
has not alleged any plausible causes of action. Under the circumstances, the Court agrees.
A plaintiff’s complaint may be dismissed if it “lack[s] . . . a cognizable legal theory”
upon which a court may grant relief. Johnson, 534 F.3d at 1121. Here, the Amended
Complaint fails to state any legal theories upon which Seifert could recover.4 The Court
will briefly explain why each of Seifert’s causes of action lacks a cognizable legal theory.
1. 	Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (“RESPA”)/Regulation X Claim
(Count 1)
Under RESPA, mortgage servicers may not simultaneously advance a foreclosure
while evaluating a borrower’s loss mitigation or loan modification application unless one
of the exceptions from 12 C.F.R. § 1024.41(f) applies.
One of the exceptions applies here. Section 1024.41(f)(2)(ii) stipulates that the dual-
tracking prohibition does not apply if the borrower rejects the loss mitigation options
offered by the loan servicer, which is exactly what happened in this case. Following the
loan modification process, Seifert himself states he declined the terms proposed by
Nationstar because he still could not afford to pay the modified amount.
Because Seifert rejected the loss mitigation options offered by Nationstar, the dual-
tracking prohibition does not apply. Accordingly, Nationstar had the right to maintain
4 The Court noted in its previous Order that Seifert cited fabricated or hallucinated cases to support his
claims in his original Complaint and instructed him to verify that any case citations in the Amended
Complaint came from a recognized legal database. See Dkt. 15, at 10. It appears that rather than finding
precedential cases to support his claims, Seifert opted against citing to any caselaw at all in his Amended
Complaint. This indicates Seifert either could not find any cases that support his propositions or that he did
not try to do so. Either way, his claims are unsupported by both the facts and any prevailing caselaw.
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MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER – 8
foreclosure activity, and Seifert’s RESPA claim fails.
2. 	RESPA Notice of Error and Request for Information Claim (Count 2)
A plaintiff may recover for a servicer’s failure to respond to notices of error and
requests for information under RESPA. However, a plaintiff’s allegations of a servicer’s
failure to respond must include specificity about his own communications, including when
they were sent, to whom, why, and what the communications contained. See Kilgore v.
Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, 89 F. Supp. 3d 526, 538 (E.D.N.Y. 2015).
Here, as the Defendants point out, Seifert sets out fairly broad assertions of what he
said in his communications with Nationstar. On the other hand, as Seifert explains—and
indeed, under the language of the relevant code provisions here—what Seifert allegedly
included in his communications was probably enough to put Nationstar on notice of the
supposed error and requested information.
At bottom, it is evident from the Amended Complaint and Defendants’ Motion that
Seifert failed to allege when he sent the communications. In fact, Seifert merely said that
he sent “one or more” communications, so it would seem that even he is uncertain of when
or how many letters were sent.
Even if Seifert had more accurately identified his communications, he has not
alleged any cognizable harm and resulting damages. Simply put, there is no harm that
would not have otherwise occurred but for the alleged failure of Nationstar in responding
to his communications. Because of this, Seifert’s second claim fails.
3. 	Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”) Claim (Count 3)
Mortgage servicers must promptly credit periodic payments to consumer loan
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MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER – 9
accounts. 15 U.S.C. § 1639f(a). Periodic payments are defined as “amount[s] sufficient to
cover principal, interest, and escrow (if applicable) for a given billing cycle.” 12 C.F.R. §
1026.36(c)(1)(ii).
Here, Seifert alleges (and Nationstar agrees) he paid $1,761.50 in January of 2025.
The minimum monthly payment on his loan was $1,987.29. Seifert further alleges that even
if his payment is not considered a periodic payment subject to the prompt crediting
requirement, “Nationstar was still required to handle that payment in the manner prescribed
by Regulation Z.” Dkt. 19, at 30. That said, Seifert does not explain how or why the partial
payment should have been applied to his account rather than being held in suspense,
especially when the very same code provision dictates that partial payments may be held
in suspense. Nationstar was, therefore, within its right not to apply the payment to Seifert’s
account.
In sum, Seifert’s argument is unsupported by the law, so his TILA claim fails.
4. 	Wrongful Foreclosure Claim (Count 4)
Seifert alleges Defendants engaged in a wrongful foreclosure of the property in
question, in that the successor trustee was not appointed in compliance with Idaho law.
Specifically, Seifert alleges that “no valid and timely recorded substitution of trustee had
been executed and recorded.” Dkt. 19, at 34. These allegations fail for two reasons.
First, 	Idaho 	does 	not 	recognize 	attempted 	wrongful 	foreclosure. 	Wrongful
foreclosure is likened to conversion under Idaho law, in that it does not become actionable
until a foreclosure sale has actually been completed. See Houpt v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat.
Ass’n, 370 P.3d 384, 393 (Idaho 2016).
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MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER – 10
Second, Seifert’s claim that the successor trustee was not appointed in compliance
with Idaho law is controverted by public records. As Defendants point out, the successor
trustee’s appointment was recorded on April 23, 2025, demonstrating that the appointment
was in fact done in compliance with Idaho law.
For these reasons, Seifert’s wrongful foreclosure claim fails as a matter of law.
5. 	Idaho Consumer Protection Act (“ICPA”) Claim (Count 5)
To recover for deceptive practices under the ICPA, a plaintiff must “allege which
specific prohibited unfair or deceptive practice” from the list of prohibited conduct in Idaho
Code § 48-603 the defendant engaged in. Taylor v. McNichols, 243 P.3d 642, 662 (Idaho
2010).
Here, Seifert alleges there was an ongoing evaluation of loss mitigation at the time
foreclosure proceedings commenced. Further, Seifert alleges the Nationstar Defendants
accepted the partial payment as a “trial/workout payment” and subsequently categorized it
as an unapplied partial payment. In sum, Seifert argues these actions constituted deceptive
and unfair practices and acts.
These allegations do not correspond to any act or practice prohibited by § 48-603.
Indeed, it seems Defendants were fully within their rights pursuant to the loan agreement
and the aforementioned regulations to hold the partial payment in suspense and not apply
it to the account, and that calling the partial payment a “trial/workout payment” does not
even constitute a misrepresentation, let alone a prohibited act under the ICPA.
For these reasons, Seifert’s ICPA claim fails.
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MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER – 11
6. 	Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing Claim (Count 6)
Under Idaho law, every contract has an implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing. However, as Defendants correctly note, “a party does not breach the covenant by
exercising express contractual rights.” Dkt. 20, at 15 (citing Gordon v. U.S. Bank Nat’l
Ass’n, 455 P.3d 374, 391 (Idaho 2019)).
Seifert alleges that his partial payment as well as his engagement in the loss-
mitigation discussion and attempts to “correct” the proposed loan modification after he
learned it was unaffordable to him were his good-faith efforts to preserve the loan and his
interest in the property. Dkt. 19, at 45. Seifert further alleges that Lakeview violated the
implied covenant by failing to apply the partial payment to his loan balance, “failing to
ensure a clear and good-faith resolution of the workout process, and by using the
contractual power of sale in a way that unfairly frustrated [Seifert’s] legitimate contractual
expectations.” Id. at 47. Seifert contends that by accepting his partial payment and refusing
to apply it to his loan balance, the Defendants “continued to assert a materially delinquent
default position on the loan” despite his belief that the loss-mitigation process was ongoing.
Id. at 46.
Defendants point to several provisions of the Deed of Trust that purport to authorize
this conduct. Specifically, the Deed allowed the “Lender [to] accept and either apply or
hold in suspense Partial Payments in its sole discretion.” Dkt. 20, at 16 (emphasis added).
The Deed also allowed the lender to work with Seifert “to avoid foreclosure and/or mitigate
Lender’s potential losses, but is not obligated to do so unless required by Applicable Law.”
Id. (emphasis added). In short, the alleged wrongful conduct was specifically allowed under
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MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER – 12
the contract, and Defendants were fully within their rights to both hold the partial payment
in suspense and to initiate foreclosure proceedings.
Further, Defendants argue the implied covenant only applies to terms agreed to by
the parties and “cannot inject external obligations.” Dkt. 20, at 16. Defendants then argue
Seifert’s contention that they were obligated by the good faith covenant to ensure the loss-
mitigation process was closed prior to initiating foreclosure proceedings is an attempt to
inject such external obligations into the agreement. The Court agrees.
The language of the Deed is clear, in that Defendants had no obligation to credit the
partial payment to the loan balance, to ensure the loss-mitigation process was fully closed,
or to refrain from beginning the foreclosure process until a later time. As such, the Court
finds Seifert’s claim under the implied covenant fails because the evidence directly
contradicts his contentions and caselaw does not support his interpretation of the applicable
law.
7. 	Promissory Estoppel Claim (Count 7)
The doctrine of promissory estoppel does not apply when the subject of a claim is
governed by a written agreement. See SilverWing at Sandpoint, LLC v. Bonner Cnty., 435
P.3d 1106, 1118 (Idaho 2019).
Seifert brings his promissory estoppel claim in the alternative to his implied
covenant claim. He alleges that by representing that the loss-mitigation process was open
until August 15, 2025, and then proceeding to schedule a foreclosure sale for October 2,
2025, Defendants made a promise to him to remain engaged in the loss-mitigation process,
upon which he relied to his detriment. He further alleges that he sustained damages due to
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MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER – 13
this reliance in the form of litigation expenses, costs for protecting the property, the
threatened loss of his residence, financial pressure, and lost opportunity to make informed
decisions about preventing the foreclosure sale.
Defendants correctly note that promissory estoppel does not apply in this case
because the subject matter of Seifert’s claim is governed by written contracts. Even if that
were not the case, the Court finds Seifert’s reliance on Defendants’ conduct as a promise
against initiating foreclosure to be unreasonable: the essence of Seifert’s claim is that the
loss-mitigation process would be open until August 15 and that somehow Defendants were
in the wrong for scheduling the foreclosure sale months later in October. It is unclear why
it would be reasonable for the Defendants to foresee Seifert’s reliance on these dates, as
Seifert himself concedes that the foreclosure sale was not scheduled to occur until nearly
two months after the loss-mitigation offer closed. In any event, the Court finds this claim
lacks merit and thus fails.
8. 	Equitable Accounting Claim (Count 9)
“Equitable claims will not be considered when an adequate legal remedy is
available.” Iron Eagle Dev., LLC v. Quality Design Sys., Inc., 765 P.3d 509, 514 (Idaho
2003) . Further, “[w]hen parties enter into an express contract, a claim based in equity is
not allowed because the express contract precludes enforcement of equitable claims.” Id.
Seifert’s equitable claim concerns the crediting of his partial payment to the loan
balance and his desire to have the account corrected as he believes Defendants’ refusal to
apply the partial payment was in error.
Defendants argue Seifert is barred from making this claim because he has adequate
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MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER – 14
legal remedies. Further, Defendants state that “[t]o the extent [Seifert] contends Nationstar
misapplied the [partial payment], that dispute sounds in breach of contract,” and Seifert
would have the opportunity to seek damages were he to convince the Court a breach
occurred. Dkt. 20, at 19.
The Court concurs with Defendants on this count. As there was an express contract
between the parties, and because Seifert has adequate legal remedies, equitable relief is not
appropriate here. Accordingly, Seifert’s equitable accounting claim fails.
9. 	Declaratory Relief Claim (Count 8)
“The Declaratory Judgment Act does not provide a cause of action when a party . . .
lacks a cause of action under a separate statute and seeks to use the Act to obtain affirmative
relief.” City of Reno v. Netflix, Inc., 52 F.4th 874, 878 (9th Cir. 2022). A declaratory relief
claim derives its viability from the substantive claims a plaintiff brings, and when the
substantive claims fail, so too does the declaratory relief claim. Id.
The substantive claims upon which Seifert bases this claim for declaratory relief
are, as explained above, all without merit. As the Declaratory Judgment Act does not
constitute an independent cause of action, this claim fails.
V. CONCLUSION
Seifert’s 	initial 	Complaint 	was 	extremely 	overlong 	and 	contained 	overbroad
allegations against the Defendants. While his Amended Complaint is significantly shorter
in length, he still fails to allege any viable causes of action and instead engages in vague
and 	conclusory 	pleadings 	that 	lack 	factual 	or 	authoritative 	legal 	support. 	Indeed,
Defendants have provided affirmative explanations for why Seifert’s claims fail. Where
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MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER – 15
Seifert’s arguments lack support, Defendants’ arguments against each claim are well-
founded in substantive legal authority.
The Court recognizes that Seifert is a pro se plaintiff. That said, Seifert already
received a chance to amend (and specific instructions on how to effectively do so in order
to avoid dismissal) from the Court. Even still, rather than crafting arguments that are
supported by the law, Seifert declined to cite any cases that support his propositions and
instead listed and re-listed the same factual allegations in apparent hopes that the Court
would decide that was sufficient.
Because the allegations in Seifert’s Amended Complaint are vague, conclusory, and
unsupported (and, in some cases, contradicted by the facts), his Amended Complaint is
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Further leave to amend will not be permitted.
VI. ORDER
The Court HEREBY ORDERS:
1. 	The Nationstar Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. 20) is GRANTED.
2. 	Nationstar Defendant’s Motion to Take Judicial Notice (Dkt. 21) is GRANTED.
3. 	Seifert is DENIED leave to further amend.
4. 	This case is CLOSED.
DATED: July 10, 2026
_________________________
David C. Nye
U.S. District Court Judge
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