USA v. Brooks et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
v.
CHELCI R. JOHNSON,
Defendant.
Case No. 3:23-CR-30016-NJR-2
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
ROSENSTENGEL, District Judge:
Pending before the Court is a Motion for Compassionate Release filed by
Defendant Chelci R. Johnson. 1 (Doc. 84). Ms. Johnson asks the Court to release her
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) so that she can care for her young son, K.D. (Id.).
The Government filed a response in opposition. (Doc. 89). After considering the parties’
briefs and exhibits, the Court denies Ms. Johnson’s motion.
B ACKGROUND
On February 20, 2014, the undersigned sentenced Ms. Johnson to a term of
26 months’ imprisonment in the Bureau of Prisons after she pleaded guilty to knowingly
possessing with intent to unlawfully use five or more identification documents in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1028(a)(3), possessing 15 or more unauthorized access devices
with the intent to defraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1029(a)(3), and aggravated identity
theft in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1). (Doc. 73 p. 3). Ms. Johnson and her husband,
1 Ms. Johnson reports that she has married Jamaine Brooks, the co-defendant in her case, and has taken his
last name. For the avoidance of confusion, the Court will refer to the defendant by her former name.
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Jamaine Brooks, had been found by law enforcement with numerous fraudulent checks
and financial documents, including 23 state-issued identification cards and 39 fraudulent
credit and debit cards. (Id. at p. 6).
On November 3, 2023, the Court sentenced Mr. Brooks to a 25-month term of
imprisonment, to be followed by three years of supervised release. He was released from
custody in September 2024 and responsibility for his supervision was transferred to the
Northern District of Indiana. See (Doc. 89-2 p. 2). Unfortunately, Mr. Brooks violated his
conditions of supervised release in early 2025 by testing positive for various controlled
substances, including marijuana, ecstasy, and cocaine. (Id. at 2-3). The Honorable Holly
A. Brady sentenced him to an 18-month term of imprisonment followed by a new term
of 18 months of supervised release. See Doc. 50, United States v. Brooks, No. 24-00046 (N.D.
Ind.). His release from custody is scheduled for June 2, 2026. See Bureau of Prisons Inmate
Locator, https://www.bop.gov/inmateloc/ (last visited Feb. 11, 2026). Ms. Johnson
presently is scheduled to be released from BOP custody on October 29, 2026. Id.
In her Motion for Compassionate Release, Ms. Johnson states that she had
anticipated Mr. Brooks would be available to care for their young son, K.B, while she was
in custody. 2 With Mr. Brooks now in custody himself, responsibility for caring for their
child has fallen to her 76 year-old mother in-law, who she reports can take care of K.B.
“for a few days but not for weeks or months.” (Doc. 84-3 p. 3). Johnson notes that she did
well on pre-trial release and argues that the amount of time she has spent in prison is
2 Indeed, the Court delayed Ms. Johnson’s self-surrender date to align with the date of Mr. Brooks’s
anticipated release from BOP custody. (Doc. 92 pp. 15-16). K.B. was approximately nine-months old at the
time of sentencing. (Id. at p. 10).
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sufficient to promote respect for the law. In a follow-on letter to the Court dated
September 9, 2025, Johnson proposes that the remainder of her term could be converted
to home confinement.
In response, the Government argues that Johnson has failed to demonstrate that
she exhausted her request for relief with the warden of her prison. That aside, it contends
that the most-applicable policy statement defining “extraordinary and compelling
reasons” does not apply to these circumstances because Mr. Brooks’s incarceration does
not make him “incapacitated” as that term is defined by 	BOP regulations. The
Government adds that Ms. Johnson has failed to establish that she is her son’s only
available caregiver, as her mother-in-law presently is serving in that capacity. The
Government also argues that the § 3553(a) factors do not favor release. It highlights that
the BOP disciplined Ms. Johnson for possessing two bags of mushrooms. (Doc. 89-3).
DISCUSSION
Under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c), a district court “may not modify a term of imprisonment
once it has been imposed” unless an exception applies. See Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S.
817, 819 (2010). One exception allows a court to grant an inmate compassionate release if
the inmate meets certain requirements. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). A federal prisoner
may bring a motion for compassionate release after exhausting the administrative
remedies provided by the BOP. Id.
The 	Government 	argues 	that 	Ms. 	Johnson 	failed 	to 	fully 	exhaust 	her
administrative remedies through the BOP. That may have been true when she filed her
motion, but it stands as no barrier to considering her motion now. Ms. Johnson attached
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to 	her 	motion 	several 	messages 	she 	sent 	to 	the 	warden 	of 	her 	facility 	seeking
compassionate release in connection with her son. (Doc. 84-3). The First Step Act of 2018
authorizes an inmate to bring a motion for a reduction in sentence after “the lapse of 30
days from the receipt of such a request by the warden of the defendant’s facility.”
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). At this point, more than 30 days have passed since Ms. Johnson
requested relief from her facility in February 2025. And even if her initial motion was
premature, the Court would construe her follow-on September 2025 letter to the Court
(Doc. 96) as a timely motion for compassionate release.
The Seventh Circuit has described a two-step process for evaluating a prisoner’s
motion for compassionate release. First, “the prisoner must identify an ‘extraordinary
and compelling’ reason warranting a sentence reduction.” United States v. Thacker, 4 F.4th
569, 576 (7th Cir. 2021). Second, “[u]pon a finding that the prisoner has supplied such a
reason,” a court “consider[s] any applicable sentencing factors in § 3553(a) as part of
determining what sentencing reduction to award the prisoner.” Id.
In 2023, the U.S. Sentencing Commission amended a policy statement to provide
that certain family circumstances of a defendant can constitute “extraordinary and
compelling reasons” for compassionate release. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(3). Relevant here,
these circumstances include “[t]he death or incapacitation of the caregiver of the
defendant’s minor child.” Id. § 1B1.13(b)(3)(A).
Here, it is obvious that Mr. Brooks is unavailable to care for K.B. The Government
argues that his incarceration does not satisfy the Policy Statement’s “incapacitation”
requirement because the BOP defines “incapacitation” to require that a caregiver suffer
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from a “severe injury” or “severe illness” that renders them incapable of caring for the
child. See BOP Program Statement 5050.50, at 7; United States v. Reedy, No. 18- 00087-2,
2024 WL 5247954, at *11 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 30, 2024) (construing “incapacitation” partially by
reference to the BOP’s program statements); but see United States v. Soto, No. 10-20635,
2024 WL 4846837, at *5 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 20, 2024) (observing that “the BOP’s views are
not necessarily those of the Sentencing Commission”).
This Court need not decide that question because the record reflects that Ms.
Johnson’s 	mother-in-law 	is 	K.D.’s 	caregiver. 	There 	is 	no 	indication 	that 	she 	is
incapacitated. Ms. Johnson writes that her mother-in-law can take care of K.D. “for a few
days but not for weeks or months.” (Doc. 84-3 p. 3). The Court is not able to derive from
this 	statement 	any 	suggestion 	that 	Ms. 	Johnson’s 	mother-in-law 	has 	become
incapacitated in any sense of the term. Absent additional evidence, the Court is unable to
find that Ms. Johnson’s desire to care for her son qualifies as an extraordinary and
compelling reason for release.
The undersigned is certainly sympathetic to Ms. Johnson’s request. But many
prisoners have children who would benefit from the presence of a parent. At present,
K.D. is being cared for by a family member, and there is no evidence that his life or safety
are at risk. Ms. Johnson’s preference to care for her child herself is not an extraordinary
and compelling reason for release. See United States v. Gonzalez, No. 11- 26, 2025 WL
2984715, at *4 (N.D. Ind. Oct. 22, 2025) (recognizing that “most prisoners’ families suffer
hardships due to the prisoners’ incarceration”).
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CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the Motion for Compassionate Release filed by Defendant
Chelci R. Johnson (Doc. 84) is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: 	February 11, 2026
____________________________
NANCY J. ROSENSTENGEL
United States District Judge
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