Norris v. U.S. Steel

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
JAMES NORRIS,
Plaintiff,
vs.
U.S. STEEL CORP.,
Defendant.
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Case No. 3:23-cv-3148-MAB
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
BEATTY, Magistrate Judge:
This matter is before the Court on Defendant U.S. Steel Corporation’s Motion for
Summary Judgment (Doc. 40; see also Docs. 41, 42). For the reasons set forth below,
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part
(Doc. 40).
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff James Norris filed this action in September 2023 seeking legal and
equitable relief against Defendant U.S. Steel Corporation for alleged violations of his
rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., as
well as corresponding state law violations under the Illinois Human Rights Act (“IHRA”),
775 ILCS 5/2-102, et seq., and 775 ILCS 5/6-101, et seq. (see Doc. 1). More specifically, the
Complaint alleges that Defendant discriminated against Plaintiff in his place of
employment due to his dyslexia diagnosis (Id.). The Complaint then raises an ADA and
IHRA claim for each of the following: disparate treatment (Counts I and IV), retaliation
(Counts II and V), and failure to accommodate (Counts III and VI) (see Id.).
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Defendant filed an Answer on November 20, 2023, which generally denied the
claims raised in Plaintiff’s Complaint (Doc. 7). A Scheduling Order was entered
approximately two months later and the parties commenced with discovery (see Doc. 20).
Discovery delays ensued and the deadline for Defendant to file a dispositive motion was
ultimately extended to April 25, 2025 (Doc. 39). Defendant filed the instant Motion for
Summary Judgment on that date (Doc. 40). Defendant’s Motion was supported by
Defendant’s Statement of Uncontroverted Material Facts (Doc. 41), numerous exhibits
(Docs. 41-1 through 41-13), and a Memorandum in Support (Doc. 42). After receiving an
extension (Doc. 46), Plaintiff filed a Response in Opposition on June 16, 2025 (Doc. 47). In
support of his Response, Plaintiff included a Response to Defendant’s Statement of
Uncontroverted Material Facts and a Statement of Additional Material Facts (Doc. 47-1),
and several supporting exhibits (Docs. 47-2 through 47-8). Finally, on July 14, 2025,
Defendant filed a Reply in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 51) and a
Response to Plaintiff’s Statement of Additional Material Facts (Doc. 52).
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The parties each submitted a statement of facts (see Docs. 41 and 47-1) and
responded to the opposing party’s statement of facts (Docs. 47-1 and 52). The facts
asserted by each party are deemed admitted to the extent that they are admitted and/or
supported by materials in the record and not genuinely disputed. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56;
Murphy v. Caterpillar Inc., 140 F.4th 900, 906 (7th Cir. 2025) (“To survive summary
judgment, a party must point to specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for
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trial.”). They are also supplemented by other facts the Court came across in its review of
the evidence that was pertinent to the issues presented.1
I. Defendant’s Operations and the Basic Labor Agreement
Defendant owns and operates Granite City Works, a facility in Granite City,
Illinois, that produces steel products (Doc. 47-1 at p. 1).2 The Hot Strip Mill is a facility
within Granite City Works that reheats solid slabs of steel to produce steel coils that meet
customer specifications (Id. at p. 2). Processes in the Hot Strip Mill are driven by computer
programming that is correlated to customer specifications (Id.). The steel slabs and coils
are tracked through the process by using five or six digit tracking numbers (Id.).
Equipment at the Hot Strip Mill is set up specifically for the product being produced
during a given shift (Id. at p. 3). If slabs are produced out of order, this could result in
damage, delays, or potential safety concerns (Id.). Furthermore, failure to make a product
as specified could put the customer at risk, expose Defendant to liability, and jeopardize
customer relations (Id.). Thus, inaccurately numbering a coil could have catastrophic
impacts (Id.). Employee bonuses at the Hot Strip Mill are negatively impacted by
production delays (Id.).
Defendant is a union company, and its workforce is subject to the provisions of a
Basic Labor Agreement (Id. at p. 4). Under the Basic Labor Agreement, employment
positions are assigned “Labor Grades” ranging from LG 1 to LG 5, with LG 1 being the
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1 Disputed material facts, as well as the evidence underlying those disputed facts, will be explained and
analyzed in the Discussion section of this Order as appropriate.
2 Because each party’s response to the other party’s statements of facts includes the original, underlying
statements of facts and their supporting evidentiary citations, the Court cites to the Response filings for
purposes of judicial economy (Docs. 47-1 and 52).
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lowest grade and LG 5 being the highest grade (Id.). Each successively higher grade
requires greater skill and includes an hourly pay increase (Id.). Defendant requires its
employees to master all functions of their respective labor grade to be qualified for that
position (Id. at p. 5). Employees are expected to train, or “break in,” on functions in the
next labor grade in the line of progression for their position (Id.).
The Basic Labor Agreement controls the bidding process for employment
opportunities at Granite City Works (Id.). The only jobs that are “available” are those
posted for bid, which requires an employee to bid on that position (Id.). To be awarded
an available position on which an employee has bid, among other qualifications, the
employee would need to have seniority over other qualified bidders (Id.). Moreover, the
Basic Labor Agreement does not provide Defendant with the authority to remove or
replace an employee with more seniority out of his or her incumbent position (Id. at p. 6).
In the Hot Strip Mill, the LG 1 position is referred to as a Utility Person, and an
employee holding that position is required to perform multiple functions including
Laborer, Depiler, Spellman Relief, and Bander (Id.). The Laborer function involves tasks
such as sweeping, taking out trash, and running errands (Id.). The Depiler function
involves the performance of tasks such as pushing stacks of steel slabs onto a conveyor
and reviewing slabs to confirm the tracking number found on the slab matches the
number on associated paperwork (Id. at pp. 6-7). The Spellman Relief function involves
confirming a roll’s diameter, recording that number into the computer system, and
ensuring the correct coil is sent to the speed finisher (Id. at p. 7). The Bander function
involves putting steel straps around the circumference of the coils (Id.).
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The LG 2 position in the Hot Strip Mill is referred to as a Utility Technician (Id.).
Utility Technicians are required to perform functions including Shear, Checker Helper,
Spellman, Burner, Craneman, and Charger (Id. at p. 8). The Shear function involves
following coil numbers throughout the mill, which includes using those numbers to
locate a coil, and manually filing out number-intensive reports (Id.). The Checker Helper
function involves reading a six-digit number from a computer screen several feet away,
transcribing that number onto a moving piece of steel with chalk, ensuring the number
written on the steel matches the number on associated paperwork, and reading test
weight calibration numbers to ensure they fall within an acceptable range (Id.). The
Spellman function involves confirming the diameter measurement on a roll is correct,
recording that number into the computer system, ensuring the correct roll is sent to the
speed finisher, and performing all the duties of the Shear and Charger functions (Id. at p.
9). The Burner function involves writing serial numbers on all test coupons, putting the
coil number on “pickle tests,” reading numbers off a micrometer, and taking reclaim
numbers from reclaim reports and marking them on reclaim cobbles (Id.). The Craneman
function involves identifying 24-hour hold coils, hot roll tests, and pickle tests by their
coil numbers and taking them off the line (Id.). The Charger function involves verifying
slab numbers and charging the correct slab in the correct furnace based off those
numbers, then ensuring the correct slab number is extracted from the correct furnace (Id.).
The Charger also tracks the slab numbers in and out of the furnace by following the slab
numbers of each slab on the computer tracking system (Id.).
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II. Plaintiff’s Initial Employment and Dyslexia Diagnosis
Plaintiff applied to work for Defendant in 2019 and, at that time, he indicated on a
pre-placement medical questionnaire that he did not have any physical or mental
limitations that would limit his ability to perform the job (Id. at p. 10). Plaintiff was hired
by Defendant on January 6, 2020, and since that date, has worked as a LG 1 Utility Person
(Id.). Plaintiff completed another medical questionnaire in March 2021, wherein he again
indicated he did not have any medical concerns that would impact his ability to perform
the essential physical or mental duties of his job (Id. at pp. 10-11; see also Doc. 41-13).
In February 2021, Plaintiff was breaking-in on a LG 2 Utility Technician function
as a Checker Helper (Doc. 47-1 at p. 11). Plaintiff completed the breaking-in period as a
Checker Helper and was placed on the schedule by Process Coordinator Jordan McBride
to work in that function of the LG 2 Utility Technician position (Id.). For reasons the
parties dispute, Plaintiff contacted McBride on February 13, 2021, and sought to be
excused from working as a Checker Helper (compare Doc. 41 at p. 8 with Doc. 47-1 at p.
11; see also Doc. 47-2 at pp. 61-62). In doing so, Plaintiff also disclosed his dyslexia to
McBride (Doc. 47-2 at p. 62). Thereafter, McBride sent an email to his colleagues wherein
he stated Plaintiff told him he didn’t want to work his newly scheduled position because
of his dyslexia (Doc. 41-7). McBride then expressed his fear that Plaintiff might claim
Defendant discriminated against him, before writing that Plaintiff “voiced his concerns
and we rectified the problem by moving him off the job which was his suggestion. He
said he did not want to mess up, have me get mad at him, or have any repercussions
because of his dyslexia.” (Id.). McBride then discussed recent issues with mismarked coils
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and their increased awareness and conversations with staff as a result (Id.). He then
wrote, “I am sure the concern of discipline has forced the situation.” (Id.). Ultimately,
because of Plaintiff’s conversation with McBride, Plaintiff was removed from the Checker
Helper schedule and returned to his previous position as a LG 1 Utility Person (Doc. 47-
1 at p. 13).
A few weeks later, Defendant provided Plaintiff with a Request for Medical
Information, which was to be taken to his medical provider (Id. at p. 14). The Medical
Request described the Checker Helper function as requiring a Checker Helper to:
[R]ead coil numbers from a monitor and write them on coils. Write location
on coils. Write customer shorty code on coils. Operate conveyers in both
manual and automatic mode. Trouble shoot conveyor issues. Adjust coiler
walking beam travel to ensure proper placement. Watch monitors to ensure
people are out of conveyor route prior to operating conveyers. Read the test
weight calibration weight and make sure it falls in tolerance. Clean up
cobbles. Change work rolls at the finishing mill. Housekeeping in the
checker shack. Any other assigned task.
(Id.; see also Doc. 41-3 at p. 3, Doc. 41-9). The Medical Request also specified that “[t]he
employee states that he has dyslexia that is impacting his job performance.” (see Doc. 41-
9).3 The Medical Request then asked the provider to “provide documentation verifying
the employees medical condition and recommend any restrictions that may be necessary
for him to work in a safety-sensitive industrial setting.” (Id.).
Plaintiff met with Dr. Margarita Nogin, a licensed clinical psychologist, in May of
2021 (Doc. 47-1 at p. 15; see also Doc. 41-10). Thereafter, Dr. Nogin prepared a report that
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3 Plaintiff denies having ever made such a statement (see Doc. 47-1 at p. 14). However, he does not dispute
that this statement is what was included on the Medical Request Form (Id.). Given this factual dispute, the
Court’s recounting of this statement is only being provided to reflect what was written on the Medical
Request Form. The Court does not reach any conclusion as to the veracity of the underlying statement.
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diagnosed Plaintiff with dyslexia (Doc. 47-1 at p. 15; Doc. 41-10 at p. 3). Dr. Nogin’s report
also indicated that Plaintiff may wish to discuss appropriate workplace accommodations
due to his diagnosis of dyslexia (Doc. 41-10 at p. 3). Dr. Nogin then wrote that “[i]t may
benefit [Plaintiff] to record instructions to refer to later, rather than having written
instructions or directions. He would also benefit from using audiobooks … [v]oice to text
commands … [and] continued extra time on tasks.” (Id.).
Dr. Nogin prepared another letter regarding Plaintiff’s diagnoses and work
capabilities on August 4, 2022 (Doc. 47-1 at p. 15; see also Doc. 41-11). That letter stated:
I evaluated [Plaintiff] in April and May 2021. The results of the evaluation
yielded diagnoses of dyslexia and ADHD inattentive type. Based on the
data from the evaluation and my conversations with [Plaintiff], I do not see
any reason that he would be unable to complete necessary tasks for work.
Given his diagnosis of dyslexia, I recommended reasonable workplace
accommodations, including extra time to read and comprehend written
information or having information presented in a verbal format that he can
refer to later (recording instructions or information). These
accommodations are meant to ease his ability to complete tasks in a timely
manner at work and in no way suggest he is unable to do his job
successfully. He should not be barred from advancing his career based on
this diagnosis as it is not a hindrance to his occupation. He may just require
some accommodation to reduce stress and increase efficacy at work. Please
let me know if you have any questions or concerns.
(Doc. 41-11; see also Doc. 52 at p. 3).
III. Workplace Accommodations and Bids on Other Positions
A Return to Work with Restrictions Form was prepared for Plaintiff by
Defendant’s medical department on July 30, 2021 (Doc. 41-12 at p. 1). That form indicated
Plaintiff had the restriction to “avoid work involving the precise recording and/or
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tracking of numbers/letters.” (Id.). It then included a note which stated, “medical review
at GCW Plant Medical is required prior to any future position changes.” (Id.).
Thereafter, Defendant allowed Plaintiff to perform the LG 1 position functions of
Bander and Laborer, but he was excused from certain functions such as Depiler (Doc. 47-
1 at pp. 19-20; see also Doc. 41-3 at p. 4). A Return to Work with Restrictions form from
February 2022, which was made in response to Plaintiff’s bid for a Standard Gauge
position, included the same restrictions found in the previous Return to Work form but
also marked that “employee will work incumbent job with restrictions.” (Doc. 41-12 at p.
2). Plaintiff’s bid for that LG 1 position in the Standard Gauge Department was accepted
(Doc. 47-1 at p. 21). However, Plaintiff did not accept that lateral position for reasons the
parties dispute related to advancement opportunities (see Id. at p. 22). In June 2022,
Plaintiff was offered an LG 2 Utility Technician Blast Furnace position (Id.). However,
Plaintiff declined to take that position for personal reasons including uncertainty as to
the position’s work schedule (Id.; see also Doc. 41-2 at pp. 44-45).
A Return to Work with Restrictions form was also completed in July 2022 when
Plaintiff bid on a position in the Slab Yard (Doc. 41-12 at p. 3). That form noted the same
restrictions and found that no work was available for Plaintiff in the slab yard with his
restrictions because “any job in the slab yard requires either recording or identifying slab
numbers or specific measurements.” (Id.). Furthermore, after receiving Dr. Nogin’s
August 2022 letter, Defendant determined that it did not need to modify Plaintiff’s
workplace restrictions (Doc. 41-8). Defendant did not independently perform any form
of functional testing to determine Plaintiff’s ability to work any of the jobs he was
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excluded from bidding or breaking in on (Doc. 52 at p. 5). Finally, a Return to Work with
Restrictions form was also completed in April 2023 when Plaintiff bid on a position in
“HSM-UT.” (Doc. 41-12 at p. 4). That form again noted Plaintiff’s restrictions and found
that “employee will not be awarded the U.T. bid with these restrictions.” (Id.).
DISCUSSION
I. Summary Judgment Standard
“Summary judgment is appropriate ‘if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure
materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and that the movant is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.’” Spivey v.
Adaptive Mktg. LLC, 622 F.3d 816, 822 (7th Cir. 2010) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)). “A
genuine dispute of material fact exists if ‘the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could
return a verdict for the nonmoving party.’” Dunn v. Menard, Inc., 880 F.3d 899, 905 (7th
Cir. 2018) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). Substantive
law determines which facts are considered material. See Jaranowski v. Indiana Harbor Belt
R.R. Co., 72 F.4th 744, 749 (7th Cir. 2023). Moreover, although a non-movant receives the
benefit of conflicting evidence and reasonable inferences, he or she is still required to
produce sufficient evidence to establish the essential elements of his or her claims. See
Jackson v. Sheriff of Winnebago County, Illinois, 74 F.4th 496, 500 (7th Cir. 2023).
II. Analysis of Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 40)
Defendant argues that it is entitled to summary judgment on each of Plaintiff’s
disparate treatment, retaliation, and failure to accommodate claims for the reasons
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discussed in its Memorandum in Support (see generally Doc. 42). The Court addresses
each of those arguments in turn.4
a. Qualified Person with a Disability
Defendant first argues that it is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s
disability discrimination (Counts I and IV) and failure to accommodate claims (Counts
III and VI) because Plaintiff has not established that he is a qualified person with a
disability. Specifically, Defendant contends that: (1) Plaintiff cannot show that he is a
qualified person with a disability because his condition does not substantially limit one
or more major life activities (Doc. 42 at pp. 6-7); and (2) Plaintiff’s claims fail because he
cannot show that he is able to perform the essential functions of the job he desires, with
or without reasonable accommodations (Id. at pp. 8-9). In response, Plaintiff avers that:
(1) reasonable jurors could find that he is a qualified person with a disability under any
of the three paths to establish such (Doc. 47 at pp. 4-8); and (2) evidence supports his
contention that he could perform the essential functions of the LG 2 Utility Technician
Position with or without reasonable accommodation (Id. at pp. 8-10).
The Court first considers the question of whether Plaintiff provided sufficient
evidence to allow a reasonable jury to find that he is a qualified person with a disability
under the ADA and IHRA. As defined by the ADA, “[t]he term “disability” means, with
respect to an individual--(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits
one or more major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment;
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4 The Court analyzes Plaintiff’s ADA claims concurrently with his IHRA claims “[b]ecause Illinois courts
analyze IHRA claims under a framework that is practically indistinguishable from the ADA framework.”
Tate v. Dart, 51 F.4th 789, 793 (7th Cir. 2022).
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or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1) (emphasis
added).
Here, ample evidence demonstrates that Plaintiff suffers from the mental
impairment of dyslexia (see, e.g., Doc. 41-10; Doc. 47-2 at pp. 276-277). See Jett v. Brookhart,
3:17-CV-517-MAB, 2020 WL 5602822, at *6 (S.D. Ill. Sept. 18, 2020) (“The federal
regulations interpreting the ADA indicate that a ‘specific learning disability’ can
constitute a mental impairment, and the regulations explicitly mention dyslexia as an
example of a mental impairment.”) (citing 28 C.F.R. § 35.108(b)(1)(ii), (b)(2)).
Additionally, those same records provide sufficient evidence to create a triable issue of
fact as to whether Plaintiff’s dyslexia substantially limits him in the major life activities
of reading, learning, and communicating (see, e.g., Doc. 41-10) (discussing Plaintiff’s
disabilities and noting that he previously received special education services related to
his reading ability). See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A); Murphy v. Kamphuis, 16-CV-1462-PP, 2020
WL 1550136, at *14 (E.D. Wis. Mar. 31, 2020), aff’d, 858 Fed. Appx. 939 (7th Cir. 2021) (“The
plaintiff has raised a genuine issue as to the material fact of whether he has a disability.
The record contains sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable factfinder to conclude that
the plaintiff has a disability that substantially limits a major life activity. He says that he
has a mental impairment that limits his ability to read, which is a major life activity[.]”).
Moreover, even if Plaintiff had not presented sufficient evidence to create a triable
issue as to whether he was substantially limited in a major life activity, he undoubtedly
presented sufficient evidence to establish that Defendant regarded him as having a
substantially limiting impairment. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(C). “An individual meets the
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requirement of ‘being regarded as having such an impairment’ if the individual
establishes that he or she has been subjected to an action prohibited under this chapter
because of an actual or perceived physical or mental impairment whether or not the
impairment limits or is perceived to limit a major life activity.” See 42 U.S.C. §
12102(3)(A) (emphasis added). “To satisfy [the ‘regarded as’] prong of the definition, [the
plaintiff] had to offer evidence indicating that [the defendant] believed, rightly or
wrongly, that he had an impairment that substantially limited one or more major life
activities.” Miller v. Illinois Dept. of Transp., 643 F.3d 190, 195 (7th Cir. 2011).
Pertinently, numerous pieces of evidence in the record support the determination
that Defendant regarded Plaintiff as having the impairment of dyslexia, which
substantially limited his ability to read, learn, and communicate. For example, the Return
to Work forms prepared by Defendant’s medical department cited the restrictions
Defendant imposed upon Plaintiff in recording and tracking numbers and then
determined that he could not be awarded certain positions that he bid on due to those
limitations (see Doc. 41-12 at pp. 3-4). See, e.g., Johnson v. Am. Chamber of Commerce
Publishers, Inc., 108 F.3d 818, 819 (7th Cir. 1997) (rejecting the argument that the plaintiff
could not have been regarded as having a disabling impairment unless he actually had a
disabling impairment, because the question was whether the employer regarded the
individual as disabled). Testimony from both David Coombes and Jordan McBride also
supports the assertion that Defendant regarded Plaintiff as being substantially limited
due to his dyslexia (see generally Doc. 47-3; Doc. 47-6). Tellingly, neither Defendant’s
Motion nor its Reply address this prong of the ADA’s disability definition or refute
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Plaintiff’s contention that Defendant regarded him as having such an impairment (see
Docs. 42, 51).
Turning to Defendant’s second contention—that Plaintiff cannot show he is able
to perform the essential functions of the job he desires, with or without reasonable
accommodations—the Court finds Plaintiff has provided sufficient evidence to create a
triable issue of fact. Admittedly, the Court agrees with Defendant that Plaintiff has
provided little to no evidence of reasonable accommodations that could be provided in
the context of Defendant’s fast-paced, industrial setting. However, Defendant’s argument
overlooks evidence Plaintiff provided that, when viewed in a light most favorable to
Plaintiff, evinces that he was able to perform the essential functions of an LG 2 Utility
Technician without any accommodations. In fact, Dr. Nogin’s August 2022 letter directly
states as much, specifying that “I do not see any reason that [Plaintiff] would be unable
to complete necessary tasks for work.” (Doc. 41-11). Dr. Nogin’s letter also states that her
recommended accommodations “in no way suggest [Plaintiff] is unable to do his job
successfully. He should not be barred from advancing in his career based on this
diagnosis as it is not a hindrance to his occupation.” (Id.).5
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5 Understandably, Defendant points to Plaintiff’s argument that Dr. Nogin only evaluated him regarding
his ability to perform the Checker Helper function to argue that Plaintiff only provided proof of his ability
to perform one of the several functions completed by LG 2 Utility Technicians (see Doc. 51 at p. 2; Doc. 47
at p. 10) (Specifically, Plaintiff’s Response states “Dr. Nogin only evaluated [Plaintiff] with regard to how
his dyslexia might impact his ability to perform the Checker Helper Position.”).
While this is an argument Defendant can continue to raise in the future, when viewing Dr. Nogin’s
August 2022 letter in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court does not construe that letter as only
providing evidence of Plaintiff’s ability to perform the Checker Helper function. Notably, the August 2022
letter provides no indication that Dr. Nogin was only considering Plaintiff’s ability to perform the Checker
Helper function and it instead talks about his ability to do his job successfully and advance his career (see
Doc. 41-11). Moreover, even if Dr. Nogin had intended for that letter to only discuss Plaintiff’s ability to
perform the Checker Helper function, attesting to Plaintiff’s ability to perform the Checker Helper function
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Furthermore, Plaintiff introduced evidence that he had never been counseled or
written up for his job performance (Doc. 52 at p. 2; Doc. 47-2 at pp. 262-268). On the
contrary, he testified to having caught numbering mistakes made by other employees on
a daily basis (Doc. 47-2 at pp. 262-263). Plaintiff also testified that after Defendant’s
restrictions were imposed upon him, he successfully worked several jobs that required
reading numbers, writing down numbers, or making precise measurements, including
Banding, Burning Reclaims, and Spellman Relief (Id. at p. 258). Moreover, Defendant does
not dispute the fact that Plaintiff successfully completed the breaking-in period for the
Checker Helper function without any accommodation (see Doc. 47-1 at p. 11).
Thus, when viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, Plaintiff has pointed to
sufficient evidence to create a triable issue of fact as to whether: (1) he was a qualified
person with a disability; and (2) he was able to perform the essential functions of the job
he sought. For all these reasons, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment as to Counts
I, III, IV, and VI based upon the above arguments is DENIED.
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(which includes reading a six-digit number from a computer screen several feet away, transcribing that
number onto a moving piece of steel with chalk, ensuring the number written on the steel matches the
number on associated paperwork, and reading test weight calibration numbers to ensure they fall within
an acceptable range) leads to the reasonable inference that Plaintiff was able to perform other LG 2 Utility
Technician functions which also involved the tracking of numbers. In any event, the Court notes that other
evidence, such as Plaintiff’s deposition testimony and the lack of any mistakes made by Plaintiff in the past,
would also allow a reasonable jury to infer that he could perform all LG 2 Utility Technician functions (see,
e.g., Doc. 47-2 at p. 61) (“I think I can perform them jobs. They’re just not giving me an opportunity to prove
myself because they put me on their restrictions.”).
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b. Reasonableness of Accommodations and Available Positions
Defendant contends that Plaintiff’s Failure to Accommodate claims6 contained in
Counts III and VI fail as a matter of law because: (1) the requested accommodations are
unreasonable, ineffective, infeasible and/or create undue hardship; (2) Plaintiff has failed
to identify any available, accommodating positions; and (3) Defendant provided Plaintiff
with a reasonable accommodation that necessarily defeats his failure to accommodate
claims (Doc. 42 at pp. 10-16). In response, Plaintiff avers that Defendant failed to provide
any accommodation and instead unreasonably imposed plantwide restrictions upon him
even when he was capable of performing all functions without any accommodations (see
Doc. 47 at pp. 10-13).
As discussed above, Plaintiff has provided evidence to support his claim that he
was able to perform all job functions without any accommodation (see supra Discussion §
II (a); see also Doc. 47 at p. 8) (“Norris was able to perform these tasks despite his disability,
proving his ability to do so without an accommodation.”). Ultimately, while this
argument strengthens Plaintiff’s other claims, it dooms his failure to accommodate claims
raised in Counts III and VI.
Put simply, “[a] disabled employee who is capable of performing the essential
functions of a job in spite of her physical or mental limitations is qualified for the job, and
the ADA prevents the employer from discriminating against her on the basis of her
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6 “In line with the statutory language, the elements of a claim for failure to accommodate an employee’s
disability are: (1) the employee was a qualified individual with a disability; (2) the employer was aware of
the disability; and (3) the employer failed to reasonably accommodate the disability.” Conners v. Wilkie, 984
F.3d 1255, 1260-61 (7th Cir. 2021).
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irrelevant disability. But since the employee’s limitations do not affect her ability to
perform those essential functions, the employer’s duty to accommodate is not
implicated.” Brumfield v. City of Chicago, 735 F.3d 619, 633 (7th Cir. 2013) (“In sum, the
ADA does not require an employer to accommodate disabilities that have no bearing on
an employee’s ability to perform the essential functions of her job.”). See also Johnson v.
City of Chicago Bd. of Educ., 142 F. Supp. 3d 675, 690 (N.D. Ill. 2015) (“Plaintiff’s own brief,
and the factual record supporting it, show that she cannot prevail on her failure to
accommodate claim because she was, in fact, able to perform the essential functions of
her job without accommodation.”). Here, given Plaintiff’s repeated assertions and
supporting evidence for his claim that he could perform all job functions without
accommodation, the Court finds Defendant cannot be held liable for failing to provide
Plaintiff with an accommodation that he did not need.
However, Defendant has argued and pointed to evidence it claims demonstrates
that Plaintiff could not perform all LG 2 Utility Technician functions without
accommodation (see Doc. 42 at pp. 8-9). Thus, to avoid any potential unfairness to Plaintiff
in the event the trier of fact finds that he could not perform all LG 2 Utility Technician
functions without accommodation, the Court briefly considers whether Plaintiff met his
burden by providing sufficient evidence to create a triable issue of fact as to whether a
reasonable accommodation existed. See Ford v. Marion Cnty. Sheriff’s Office, 942 F.3d 839,
850 (7th Cir. 2019) (“A plaintiff must first show that the requested accommodation is
reasonable on its face. That shifts the burden to the employer to prove that the
accommodation would impose on the employer an undue hardship as defined by the
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ADA.”); Majors v. Gen. Elec. Co., 714 F.3d 527, 535 (7th Cir. 2013) (“The defendant has the
burden to prove that the accommodation would create an undue hardship on the
business, but the plaintiff must first ‘show that the accommodation [she] seeks is
reasonable on its face.’”) (quoting Oconomowoc Residential Programs v. City of Milwaukee,
300 F.3d 775, 783 (7th Cir. 2002)).
Dispositively, the Court finds Plaintiff did not meet this burden. Again, Plaintiff
has repeatedly claimed that he could have performed the job functions in question
without accommodation (see generally Doc. 47). Moreover, on the few occasions where
Plaintiff discussed Dr. Nogin’s recommended accommodations, he admitted that most of
those proposed accommodations, such as recorded instructions and voice-to-text
commands, would not assist him or be feasible in Defendant’s industrial setting (see Doc.
47-1 at pp. 16-19). Likewise, Plaintiff failed to provide any explanation as to how the use
of audiobooks would aid him or how extra time could feasibly be provided in the context
of Defendant’s fast-paced, industrial setting. Beyond Dr. Nogin’s recommendations,
neither Plaintiff’s Response nor the record provides an example of a different, reasonable
accommodation that Plaintiff sought (see generally Doc. 47). Therefore, even if Plaintiff
had not contradicted this claim by arguing he did not need an accommodation, he has
failed to meet his burden of proof by providing sufficient evidence of a reasonable
accommodation that Defendant could have provided.
For the reasons discussed above, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is
GRANTED as to Plaintiff’s failure to accommodate claims raised in Counts III and VI.
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c. The Reasonableness of Defendant’s Restrictions
Defendant next argues that all of Plaintiff’s claims must be dismissed because it
offered him a reasonable accommodation (i.e., restrictions on his work) and he sought the
perceived employment downgrade (Doc. 42 at pp. 16-18). Therefore, according to
Defendant, this necessarily implies that it took no adverse action against Plaintiff (Id.). In
response, Plaintiff maintains that the restrictions Defendant imposed were not reasonable
and constituted an adverse employment action because they denied him advancement
opportunities (Doc. 47 at pp. 10-13).
When viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court finds
Plaintiff’s arguments compelling. First and foremost, Plaintiff has presented sufficient
evidence to support his assertion that the restrictions imposed by Defendant were not
reasonable accommodations for some or all of the time they were imposed. Again,
Defendant imposed plantwide restrictions upon Plaintiff that substantially limited his
opportunities for advancement based upon the report of a provider who only considered
Plaintiff’s ability to perform one function of an LG 2 Utility Technician and never
concluded that Plaintiff could not perform that function (see Docs. 41-9, 41-10). And even
more significantly, Defendant determined that those plantwide restrictions should
continue to be enforced even after receiving a letter from the same medical provider that
claimed Plaintiff could perform his job successfully with or without accommodation (see
Doc. 41-11) (noting that Plaintiff’s dyslexia diagnosis is not a hindrance to his occupation
and accommodations would only reduce stress and increase his efficacy). Thus, when
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court concludes that the
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plantwide restrictions Defendant imposed upon Plaintiff were not a reasonable
accommodation.
Moreover, when viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to Plaintiff, the
limitations on Plaintiff’s career advancement created by Defendant’s indefinite,
plantwide, restrictions could establish that Plaintiff suffered an adverse employment
action. “An adverse employment action is one that significantly alters the terms and
conditions of the employee’s job[.]” Griffin v. Potter, 356 F.3d 824, 829 (7th Cir. 2004). In
other words, “[a]n adverse employment action is a significant change in employment
status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different
responsibility, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits.” Moore-Fotso v. Bd.
of Educ. of the City of Chicago, 211 F. Supp. 3d 1012, 1032 (N.D. Ill. 2016) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted). “Additionally, ‘the question whether a change in an
employee’s job or working conditions is materially adverse, rather than essentially
neutral is one of fact ... and so can be resolved on summary judgment only if the question
is not fairly contestable.’” Taylor v. Eli Lilly & Co., 1:10-CV-01611-TWP, 2012 WL 4467655,
at *10 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 26, 2012) (quoting Williams v. Bristol–Myers Squibb Co., 85 F.3d 270,
274 (7th Cir. 1996)).
In this case, Plaintiff has presented evidence which, when viewed in the light most
favorable to him, establishes that he was prevented from breaking in on LG 2 Utility
Technician functions and ultimately being promoted to an LG 2 Utility Technician
because of Defendant’s restrictions (see, e.g., Doc. 41-12 at pp. 3-4). Compare Curtis v. City
of Chicago, 16 C 8042, 2018 WL 1316723, at *3-5 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 14, 2018) (finding that
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denying training opportunities that could lead to promotion could constitute an adverse
employment action); with Keen v. Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp., 819 Fed. Appx. 423, 426 (7th
Cir. 2020) (rejecting an argument that a reassignment left the plaintiff with reduced
opportunities for promotion because she presented no evidence of such). Moreover,
Plaintiff has presented evidence demonstrating the pay increase for employees holding
an LG 2 position (see Doc. 41-4). In addition, the evidence indicates that an employee who
is breaking in on a higher grade function/position is entitled to receive “the established
rate of pay for the job performed.” (see Doc. 41-4). In other words, Plaintiff has shown
that Defendant’s restrictions prevented him from receiving a promotion and/or
additional pay while breaking in on LG 2 Utility Technician functions.7
Defendant also argues that it cannot be said to have taken an adverse employment
action against Plaintiff because Plaintiff sought the perceived employment “downgrade.”
(Doc. 42 at p. 16). See also Simpson v. Borg-Warner Auto., Inc., 196 F.3d 873, 876 (7th Cir.
1999) (finding no materially adverse employment decision existed because, among other
reasons, the plaintiff had sought her downgrade). Yet, when viewed favorably to
Plaintiff, Defendant’s argument fails to address the clear distinction between the limited
concern that Plaintiff shared with his supervisor, Jordan McBride (i.e., that he was
concerned he may “mess up on numbers” and he wasn’t sure if the Checker Helper
function was the “best fit” for him (see Doc. 47-2 at p. 91)), and the broad action taken by
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7 Moreover, Defendant argues that Plaintiff has not presented evidence of an alternative position that he
was qualified for that would have been equivalent to the LG 2 Utility Technician position he sought (see
Doc. 42 at pp. 17-18). However, for the reasons previously discussed, this argument is not persuasive
because Plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to create a triable issue of fact as to whether he could
perform each function of the LG 2 Utility Technician position. See supra Discussion § II (a).
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Defendant (i.e., imposing indefinite, plantwide restrictions that prohibited Plaintiff from
working or breaking in on any function/position that involved the reading, writing or
tracking of numbers). This distinction between the narrow concern Plaintiff expressed to
McBride and the broad restrictions Defendant imposed separates Plaintiff’s situation
from cases such as Simpson and Hirlston. See Simpson, 196 F.3d at 876; Hirlston v. Costco
Wholesale Corp., 2021 WL 3673784 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 19, 2021) (providing a leave of absence
to allow the plaintiff additional time to return to work did not constitute an adverse
employment action, and neither did demoting the plaintiff when she failed to identify
any positions she was qualified to perform). Furthermore, even if Plaintiff had requested
to be entirely and permanently excluded from one LG 2 Utility Technician function, this
would not necessarily equate to a request to be demoted or denied all advancement
opportunities because the evidence shows that Defendant allowed Plaintiff to work as an
LG 1 Utility Person even when he was prohibited from performing half of the functions
of that position (see, e.g., Doc. 47-1 at pp. 19-20; Doc. 41-3 at p. 4).
Consequently, the Court finds that Defendant is not entitled to summary
judgment under this theory. When viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
Plaintiff, Defendant did not provide Plaintiff with a reasonable accommodation and
Plaintiff did not seek the broad, plantwide restrictions and advancement limitations he
was subjected to.
d. Causation, Comparators and Pretext
Finally, Defendant argues it is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s
discrimination and retaliation claims (Counts I, II, IV, and V) because: (1) Plaintiff failed
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to identify comparators who were treated more favorably; (2) Defendant’s actions were
done for legitimate, nondiscriminatory and nonretaliatory reasons; and (3) Plaintiff failed
to show Defendant’s justifications were pretextual (Doc. 42 at pp. 18-19). Plaintiff rebuts
Defendant’s contentions and argues that he provided direct evidence that Defendant
imposed restrictions upon him based solely upon his dyslexia diagnosis and/or request
for accommodation (Doc. 47 at pp. 13-16).
“To establish disability discrimination, [a plaintiff] must show all three of the
following elements: (1) that he is disabled within the meaning of the ADA, (2) that he is
qualified to perform the essential functions of his job either with or without reasonable
accommodation, and (3) that he suffered from an adverse employment action because of
his disability.” Kersting v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 250 F.3d 1109, 1115 (7th Cir. 2001). See also
Monroe v. Indiana Dep’t of Transp., 871 F.3d 495, 504 (7th Cir. 2017) (“To establish the third
prong and survive summary judgment, a plaintiff must show a genuine issue of material
fact exists regarding whether his disability was the ‘but for’ reason for the adverse
action[.]”). Similarly, “[f]or a retaliation claim under the ADA, a plaintiff must submit
evidence that (1) she engaged in protected activity, (2) her employer took an adverse
action against her, and (3) there was a ‘but for causal connection between the two.’” Parker
v. Brooks Life Sci., Inc., 39 F.4th 931, 936 (7th Cir. 2022).8
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8 For the reasons previously discussed, Plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence to create a triable issue
of fact as to whether he was disabled under the ADA. See supra Discussion § II(a). Likewise, Plaintiff has
presented sufficient evidence to create a triable issue of fact as to whether he was qualified to perform the
essential functions of an LG 2 Utility Technician without any accommodation. See supra Discussion § II(b).
Furthermore, the Court has determined that Defendant’s restrictions imposed upon Plaintiff could
constitute an adverse employment action when the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to
Plaintiff. See supra Discussion § II(c). See also Kersting v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 250 F.3d 1109, 1115-16 (7th Cir.
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Defendant first argues that Plaintiff failed to provide sufficient evidence of
comparators who were treated more favorably (see Doc. 42 at pp. 18-19). Interestingly,
Plaintiff does not spend significant time disputing this contention (see Doc. 47 at pp. 15-
16). Instead, Plaintiff avers that comparator evidence is only required when attempting
to establish discrimination by way of indirect evidence and here, he is relying upon direct
evidence of Defendant’s allegedly discriminatory and/or retaliatory animus (see Doc. 47
at pp. 13-16). See Sneed v. City of Harvey, 6 F. Supp. 3d 817, 832 (N.D. Ill. 2013) (“Under the
direct method, the plaintiff must offer evidence that his or her disability, or protected
ADA activity, caused an adverse employment action.”). “Direct evidence requires an
admission by the decision maker that his or her actions were based upon the prohibited
animus.” Dickerson v. Bd. of Trustees of Cmty. Coll. Dist. No. 522, 657 F.3d 595, 601 (7th Cir.
2011). See also Bunn v. Khoury Enterprises, Inc., 753 F.3d 676, 684 (7th Cir. 2014) (Explaining
that circumstantial, direct evidence may include: “(1) suspicious timing; (2) ambiguous
statements or behavior towards other employees in the protected group; (3) evidence,
statistical or otherwise, that similarly situated employees outside of the protected group
systematically receive better treatment; and (4) evidence that the employer offered a
pretextual reason for an adverse employment action.”).9
__________________________________
2001) (“This court has held that the denial of a raise may constitute a materially adverse action.”). Relatedly,
in the context of Plaintiff’s retaliation claim, Plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence to allow a trier of
fact to determine that he engaged in the protected activity of requesting an accommodation (see, e.g., Doc.
47-1 at pp. 11-12). See Sanford v. Thor Indus., Inc., 286 F. Supp. 3d 938, 948 (N.D. Ind. 2018) (“Requests for
accommodation are protected activity under the ADA.”). Accordingly, the Court’s analysis focuses upon
the causation prongs of his retaliation and discrimination claims.
9 Notably, although the Court has included the above caselaw discussing direct and indirect evidence, the
Court wishes to emphasizes that the ultimate question is:
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Here, when viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, there is sufficient
evidence to establish that but for Plaintiff’s dyslexia and/or requested dyslexia
accommodation, he would not have been subjected to an adverse employment action. To
reiterate, Plaintiff presented evidence that he was never previously counseled for poor
job performance or work errors, including during the break in process for the Checker
Helper function of an LG 2 Utility Technician (Doc. 52 at p. 2) (admitting that Plaintiff
has never been counseled for job performance) (see also Doc. 47-6 at p. 70). In fact,
Defendant’s representative, David Coombes, testified that Plaintiff needed to get medical
documentation of his dyslexia and, only after doing so, did Defendant’s medical
department develop restrictions based on that information (see Doc. 47-3 at p. 36).10
Moreover, after receiving Dr. Nogin’s August 2022 letter, Defendant determined that
Plaintiff should continue to be restricted because the results of Dr. Nogin’s prior
evaluation yielded “a diagnosis of dyslexia and ADHD inattentive type, and there’s
nothing in [the August 2022 letter] that says that that evaluation has changed.” (Doc. 47-
3 at p. 20). Thus, all of these statements and evidence support the reasonable inference
__________________________________
[S]imply whether the evidence would permit a reasonable factfinder to conclude that the
plaintiff’s race, ethnicity, sex, religion, or other proscribed factor caused the discharge or
other adverse employment action. Evidence must be considered as a whole, rather than
asking whether any particular piece of evidence proves the case by itself—or whether just
the “direct” evidence does so, or the “indirect” evidence. Evidence is evidence. Relevant
evidence must be considered and irrelevant evidence disregarded, but no evidence should
be treated differently from other evidence because it can be labeled “direct” or “indirect.”
Ortiz v. Werner Enterprises, Inc., 834 F.3d 760, 765 (7th Cir. 2016)
10 Furthermore, to the extent Defendant contends that it implemented restrictions due to Plaintiff’s
difficulty in reading and writing numbers, and not due to his underlying dyslexia diagnosis, Coombes’
testimony provides sufficient contradictory evidence to present this issue of to the jury (see generally Doc.
47-3).
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that Defendant’s restrictions were imposed upon Plaintiff based upon his disability
diagnosis and/or request for accommodation.
In fact, Defendant has consistently argued that its decision to impose plantwide
restrictions on Plaintiff was made because of Plaintiff’s dyslexia diagnosis and/or his
request to be excused from being scheduled as a Checker Helper due to his dyslexia (see,
e.g., Doc. 42 at p. 15) (“Here, due to Plaintiff’s own concerns about confusing numbers
and his doctor’s letters noting his Dyslexia and difficulty mixing up numbers, USS
restricted Plaintiff from certain job functions in LG 1 and LG 2 which require precision
with numbers.”). Given this concession, the Court agrees that Plaintiff has provided
sufficient evidence to create a triable issue of fact as to whether Defendant imposed
restrictions on him based upon his disability (whether real or perceived) and/or his
request for accommodation. See, e.g., Porter v. Dartmouth-Hitchcock Med. Ctr., 92 F.4th 129,
150 (2d Cir. 2024) (“In the present case, there is direct evidence that the decision by Dr.
Merrens to terminate, rather than continue, Dr. Porter’s employment was based on her
disability.”).
The next question, however, is whether Defendant provided an adequate
nondiscriminatory and nonretaliatory reason for adversely restricting Plaintiff. See, e.g.,
Kersting, 250 F.3d at 1117 (In the context of a retaliation claim, if the plaintiff “establishes
a prima facie case, [the defendant] must then offer a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason
for its adverse action.” Thereafter, the plaintiff must rebut the legitimate reason proffered
by the defendant.). Here, Defendant argues that it has provided several legitimate,
nondiscriminatory and nonretaliatory explanations for its actions including: (1) Dr.
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Nogin’s report, (2) evidence of the fast-paced and safety-focused nature of Defendant’s
facilities, and (3) Plaintiff’s admission that he requested to be taken off of Checker Helper
duties due to his concern about making mistakes tracking numbers (see Doc. 42 at p. 19;
Doc. 51 at p. 5). Furthermore, Defendant contends that even if the restrictions imposed
were considered an adverse employment action, they were made in response to Plaintiff’s
accommodation request and therefore, were not merely pretext for discrimination or
retaliation (Doc. 51 at p. 5) (citing Serino v. Potter, 178 Fed. Appx. 552, 556 (7th Cir. 2006)).
Even if the Court were to assume that Defendant relied upon its claimed
legitimate, nondiscriminatory and nonretaliatory reasons for imposing restrictions on
Plaintiff when he initially requested to be taken off Checker Helper duties, Defendant has
not provided corresponding, legitimate reasons for the continued imposition of those
restrictions after receiving Dr. Nogin’s letter in August 2022 (Doc. 41-11) and learning of
Plaintiff’s continued desire to work positions that involve numbers (see, e.g., Doc. 41-12
at pp. 3-4). Critically, Dr. Nogin’s August 2022 letter provides evidence that Dr. Nogin
believed Plaintiff could perform tasks in a timely manner and was able to do his job
successfully, with or without accommodation (Doc. 41-11). Moreover, Defendant has
claimed that it imposed limitations on Plaintiff based upon its understanding of Dr.
Nogin’s medical findings (see, e.g., Doc. 47-3 at p. 36). As such, when viewed in the light
most favorable to Plaintiff, this new letter alerted Defendant to the fact that it could not
rely upon Dr. Nogin’s earlier report to justify the continued imposition of plantwide
restrictions (see Id.).
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Yet, rather than conducting testing of Plaintiff’s functionality, reaching out to Dr.
Nogin for clarification, or providing some other legitimate reason for the continued
imposition of restrictions, Defendant instead determined that Dr. Nogin’s prior
diagnoses remained unchanged and justified the continued imposition of plantwide
restrictions (Doc. 47-3 at pp. 20-22) (testimony of David Coombes). In other words,
Defendant ignored Dr. Nogin’s updated findings and clarifications regarding Plaintiff’s
ability to “complete necessary tasks for work” (Doc. 41-11) and instead relied solely upon
Dr. Nogin’s prior disability diagnoses (Doc. 41-10). Tellingly, a reasonable jury could
infer that Defendant’s blind reliance on Plaintiff’s disability diagnoses, particularly after
being notified (from the very same provider who made those diagnoses) of Plaintiff’s
ability to function irrespective of those diagnoses does not constitute a legitimate reason
for the continued imposition of indefinite, plantwide restrictions. Put another way,
Plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence to rebut Defendant’s stated reasons and create
a triable issue of fact as to whether those reasons were pretextual.
For similar reasons, Plaintiff has presented evidence that adequately rebuts
Defendant’s justification based upon the fast paced and safety sensitive nature of their
industry. Again, Dr. Nogin’s August 2022 letter provides evidence to support the fact that
Plaintiff could perform functions involving reading, writing, and tracking numbers
without incident (Doc. 41-11). Moreover, the undisputed evidence was that Plaintiff had
not been cited for making errors with numbers in the past, including during the time he
was breaking in as a Checker Helper (see Doc. 52 at p. 2; Doc. 47-6 at p. 70). In addition,
Plaintiff presented evidence that other employees mismarked coils on occasion (see Doc.
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52 at pp. 6-7). Thus, Plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence to rebut this safety concern
by demonstrating that Defendant was not actually as concerned for safety as it now
claims and Plaintiff posed no greater safety concern than any other employee.
Additionally, the Court finds Plaintiff’s vocalized concerns about making
numerical errors as a Checker Helper and his request to be taken off Checker Helper
duties did not provide Defendant with a legitimate reason for the imposition of
indefinite, plantwide restrictions, particularly after receiving Dr. Nogin’s August 2022
letter. Pertinently, Plaintiff presented evidence that he only voiced concerns about
making errors with numbers in respect to one specific function of an LG 2 Utility
Technician (see Doc. 47-2 at pp. 90-98; Doc. 41-7).11 Similarly, Dr. Nogin’s initial report
only considered Plaintiff’s potential disabilities in the context of that function (see Doc.
41-9; Doc. 41-3 at p. 3). Accordingly, Defendant has failed to explain how Plaintiff’s
request to be taken off Checker Helper duties provided a legitimate justification for the
indefinite, plantwide restrictions it imposed. Quite simply, when viewing the evidence
in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, he never made such a broad request. As such,
Plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence to rebut this additional nondiscriminatory and
nonretaliatory reason Defendant has offered for its actions. Furthermore, even if
Plaintiff’s request initially provided Defendant with a legitimate justification for
imposing plantwide restrictions, Defendant failed to offer a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory and nonretaliatory reason for the continued imposition of plantwide
__________________________________
11 In fact, Plaintiff contends that he requested to be taken off the Checker Helper function primarily because
his supervisor, Jordan McBride, had warned him multiple times of the repercussions for making mistakes
and he feared losing his job (see Doc. 47-2 at pp. 96-97).
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restrictions after receiving Dr. Nogin’s August 2022 letter (see, e.g., Doc. 47-3 at p. 11)
(Coombes testimony that there was a discussion after receiving Dr. Nogin’s August 2022
letter, “and the conclusion was that [the restrictions] didn’t” need to be modified.).12
In conclusion, when viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court finds
that Plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence to establish that the adverse employment
action he experienced was made because of his dyslexia and/or his request for
accommodation of his dyslexia. And significantly, Defendant has not offered legitimate,
nondiscriminatory and nonretaliatory explanations for the continued imposition of
broad, indefinite plantwide restrictions against Plaintiff. Alternatively, to the extent
Defendant offered nondiscriminatory and nonretaliatory justifications for its actions,
Plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence to create a triable issue as to whether those
reasons were pretextual – particularly after receiving Dr. Nogin’s August 2022 letter.13
__________________________________
12 Alternatively, by providing both Dr. Nogin’s August 2022 letter and other evidence of Plaintiff’s ability
to work in various LG 1 and one LG 2 functions involving tracking numbers without making errors,
Plaintiff has successfully rebutted the nondiscriminatory and nonretaliatory reasons provided by
Defendant. This conclusion is further supported by the fact that Defendant has admitted that it took no
action whatsoever in response to Dr. Nogin’s letter and conducted no functional testing of its own (see, e.g.,
Doc. 47-3 at pp. 18-22).
13 Plaintiff has argued that he did not have to rebut Defendant’s nonretaliatory and nondiscriminatory
justifications because he provided direct evidence of causation (see Doc. 47 at p. 15). However, as was
previously discussed, “evidence is evidence” and the Court believes the best course of action is to simply
consider the evidence presented as a whole, rather than asking whether it is “direct” or “indirect.” See Ortiz
v. Werner Enterprises, Inc., 834 F.3d 760, 765 (7th Cir. 2016). Moreover, Plaintiff’s Response brief rebuts
Defendant’s given reasons and cites to ample evidence to create a triable issue as to whether Defendant’s
actions were discriminatory/retaliatory and its justifications pretextual. See Murphy v. Caterpillar Inc., 140
F.4th 900, 911 (7th Cir. 2025) (“Accordingly, our statements in Bless and Hitchcock and other cases to the
effect that the plaintiff must ‘also show that the explanations are a pretext for the prohibited animus’ should
not be understood to require additional evidence from a plaintiff, such as some further indication of
unlawful animus. Pretext does not require an inference of unlawful animus, but it does permit that
inference. This principle means that when a plaintiff has offered evidence permitting a reasonable inference
of pretext, summary judgment should be denied.”).
For example, Plaintiff argued and cited to evidence that: (1) he made clear to Defendant that he did
not want to be restricted in the manner he was and Defendant’s actions were not reasonably responding to
his accommodation request (Id. at p. 14); (2) he could perform jobs and functions involving numbers
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Any further dispute as to the merits of this evidence and the legitimacy of Defendant’s
reasons is more appropriately reserved for a jury. See Murphy v. Caterpillar Inc., 140 F.4th
900, 905 (7th Cir. 2025) (“Caterpillar may ultimately persuade a jury that its reasons for
implementing the performance action plan were not discriminatory, but the case calls for
trial on that issue rather than summary judgment.”). Consequently, the Court finds that
Defendant is not entitled to summary judgment under this theory and Counts I, II, VI,
and V shall proceed to trial.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons outlined above, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is
Granted in part and DENIED in part (Doc. 40). Specifically, Defendant’s Motion for
Summary Judgment is GRANTED as to the failure to accommodate claims contained in
Counts III and VI and those claims are hereby DISMISSED with prejudice. Conversely, it
is denied as to Plaintiff’s discrimination and retaliation claims raised in Counts I, II, IV,
and V, and those claims will proceed to trial. A Status Conference will be set by separate
order to discuss trial scheduling and the utility of conducting additional mediation.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: March 13, 2026
s/ Mark A. Beatty
MARK A. BEATTY
United States Magistrate Judge
__________________________________
without being provided accommodation (Id. at p. 8); (3) Defendant’s restrictions went well beyond the issue
posed to Dr. Nogin (Id. at p. 10); and (4) Defendant doubled down on its restrictions even after receiving
Dr. Nogin’s letter in August 2022 (Id. at pp. 12-13). Therefore, while the Court’s analysis may have been
simplified if Plaintiff had reiterated these arguments when discussing pretext, Plaintiff’s failure to do so
does not change the fact that he presented sufficient evidence to rebut Defendant’s given justifications and
support the inference that those reasons were pretextual.
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