USA v. Glover

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
v.
LAMONT L. GLOVER,
Defendant.
Case No. 25-cr-30098-JPG
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on defendant Lamont L. Glover’s motion to dismiss
the Indictment on the grounds that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional on its face and as
applied to him in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in New York State Rifle & Pistol
Association v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022) (Doc. 21). The Government has responded to the
motion (Docs. 24 & 26). Glover has not replied to the response, although he was given an
opportunity to do so.
I. Background
On July 15, 2025, the grand jury returned an indictment charging Glover with one count
of being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and seeking
forfeiture of the firearm (a 9 mm pistol) and the ammunition in it (Doc. 1).
In the pending motion, Glover asks the Court to dismiss the Indictment on the grounds
that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional on its face and as it applies to him because the
Second Amendment covers his right to possess a firearm, and there is no historical tradition of
disarming felons like him, that is, those with felony convictions for vehicular hijacking,
aggravated unlawful use of a weapon, and unlawful possession of a firearm and
methamphetamine. In support, he points to the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Bruen.
Case 3:25-cr-30098-JPG Document 29 Filed 01/05/26 Page 1 of 11 Page ID
#<pageID>

2
The Government contends it should prevail at every stage of the Bruen inquiry. First, it
argues that Glover is not within the category of people the Second Amendment protects because
he was a felon and had demonstrated disdain for the law. Second, it argues that, even if the
Second Amendment protected Glover, there is a historical tradition of disarming those like him.
II. Analysis
A. Second Amendment
The Second Amendment provides, “A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the
security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”
U.S. Const. amend. II. In the recent years, the Supreme Court has made landmark rulings about
the Second Amendment’s meaning and application.
B. Supreme Court Precedent
1. Heller
The first of these cases, District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), was decided
after decades without any major Supreme Court decision considering the Second Amendment.
Heller rejected the understanding that the amendment applied only to arms for militia service.
In Heller, the Supreme Court considered a District of Columbia prohibition on, among
other things, possessing a handgun in the home. Id. at 574-75. It concluded that the Second
Amendment right to keep and bear arms is not confined to the context of militia service but
instead extends to an individual’s right to possess and carry weapons for self-defense in case of
confrontation. Id. at 595. Nevertheless, it acknowledged that the right is not limitless; the
Second Amendment does not “protect the right of citizens to carry arms for any sort of
confrontation.” Id. (emphasis in original). Indeed, historically “the right was not a right to keep
and carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose.” Id. at
Case 3:25-cr-30098-JPG Document 29 Filed 01/05/26 Page 2 of 11 Page ID
#<pageID>

3
626 (citing prohibitions on carrying concealed weapons, possession by felons and the mentally
ill, carrying in sensitive places, or conditions and qualifications for commercial sales); accord
New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1, 21 (2022); McDonald v. City of
Chi., 561 U.S. 742, 786 (2010). Heller concluded that the District of Columbia’s ban on
handguns—the overwhelming firearm of public choice for self-defense—held and used for self-
defense in the home violated the Second Amendment. Id. at 628-29, 635.
2. Bruen1
The Supreme Court in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S.
1 (2022), considered a New York regulation requiring an applicant for a license to carry a
firearm in public to have a heightened need for self-protection. The Bruen Court started by
quickly agreeing that the Second Amendment “right of an ordinary, law-abiding citizen to
possess a handgun in the home for self-defense” extended to carrying handguns for self-defense
in public, outside the home. Bruen, 597 U.S. at 32-33. It found no fault with non-discretionary
licensing schemes to exercise the public carry right based on objective criteria but condemned
New York’s additional requirement that a public carry license applicant demonstrate “proper
cause,” that is, a “special need for self-protection distinguishable from that of the general
community.” Id. at 12.2 New York justified the “proper cause” requirement as “substantially
related to the achievement of an important governmental interest,” preventing handgun violence
primarily in urban areas. Id. at 17, 27.
In determining that the “proper cause” requirement infringed on public carry applicants’
1 Before Bruen, the Supreme Court decided McDonald v. City of Chi., 561 U.S. 742 (2010), which applied the
Second Amendment to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause. That is not at issue in
this case.
2 Restricted licenses were available for non-self-defense uses such as hunting, target-shooting, or employment. Id.
at 12.
Case 3:25-cr-30098-JPG Document 29 Filed 01/05/26 Page 3 of 11 Page ID
#<pageID>

4
Second Amendment rights, applied to the states under the Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme
Court held that the constitutionality of a firearm regulation depends solely on whether the
restriction on conduct covered by the Second Amendment is consistent with “the historical
tradition that delimits the outer bounds of the right to keep and bear arms.” Id. at 19. There is no
“interest-balancing” or “means-end scrutiny” inquiry involved in this determination. Id. When a
regulation limits conduct covered by the Second Amendment, the Government “must
affirmatively prove” that the regulation is part of the historical tradition, or else the regulation is
unconstitutional. Id. at 19, 24. Thus, the two—and only—relevant inquiries are (1) does the
Second Amendment’s plain text cover the regulated conduct and (2) is the regulation consistent
with the country’s historical tradition. Id. at 17. If the regulated conduct is covered, it is
presumed that the Constitution protects that conduct, and if there is no historical tradition of
regulating that conduct, the regulation is unconstitutional. Id. at 24.
As noted above, the Bruen Court found that the petitioners—“two ordinary, law-abiding,
adult citizens—are part of ‘the people’ whom the Second Amendment protects.” Id. at 31-32.
Accordingly, their carrying firearms in public for self-defense fell within the plain text of the
Second Amendment, satisfying the first relevant inquiry. Id. 32-33.
Moving on to the second, the Bruen Court concluded that the “proper cause” requirement
for receiving a public carry license from New York was not within the nation’s historical
tradition. Id. at 70. Although “the right to keep and bear arms in public has traditionally been
subject to well-defined restrictions governing the intent for which one could carry arms, the
manner of carry, or the exceptional circumstances under which one could not carry arms,” the
Bruen Court found no “tradition of broadly prohibiting the public carry of commonly used
firearms for self-defense,” and no “historical tradition limiting public carry only to those law-
Case 3:25-cr-30098-JPG Document 29 Filed 01/05/26 Page 4 of 11 Page ID
#<pageID>

5
abiding citizens who demonstrate a special need for self-defense.” Id. at 38. Therefore, the
“proper cause” requirement was unconstitutional. Id. at 39.
3. Rahimi
The latest Supreme Court Second Amendment case is United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S.
680 (2024). There, the Supreme Court considered a challenge to the constitutionality of 18
U.S.C. § 922(g)(8), which forbids possession of a firearm by an individual subject to a domestic
violence restraining order that, among other things, finds that he “represents a credible threat to
the physical safety” of an intimate partner or child, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8)(C)(i). Rahimi, 602
U.S. at 688. The Supreme Court concluded that the statute, as applied, was constitutional since
the defendant posed a credible threat to an intimate partner. In so holding, the Supreme Court
noted, “Since the founding, our Nation’s firearm laws have included provisions preventing
individuals who threaten physical harm to others from misusing firearms.” Id. at 690.
Rahimi began with Bruen’s instruction to consider “whether the challenged regulation is
consistent with the principles that underpin our regulatory tradition.” Id. at 692. If a regulation
at our nation’s founding was adopted to address a particular problem, it is likely that a similar
modern law addressing a similar problem is permissible so long as it does not extend beyond the
founding era regulation’s reach and is at least analogous to the historical precursor. Id. The
modern court must ask the “why” and “how” of the regulations to determine if they are close
enough to pass constitutional muster. Id.
Rahimi recognized that a particular problem addressed by firearm regulation in founding
times was individuals who pose a clear threat of physical violence to another: “When an
individual poses a clear threat of physical violence to another, the threatening individual may be
disarmed.” Id. at 698. Thus, the disarming of individuals “found by a court to present a threat to
Case 3:25-cr-30098-JPG Document 29 Filed 01/05/26 Page 5 of 11 Page ID
#<pageID>

6
others fits neatly within the tradition” of firearm regulation. Id. And 28 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8)’s
prohibition on possession of firearms by particular individuals—like Rahimi—that a court has
determined threaten the physical safety of another is similar enough to those early laws to be
constitutional. Id. at 698-700, 702.
In so holding, the Supreme Court rejected the notion that Rahimi could be disarmed
simply because he was not “responsible” and was not therefore covered by the Second
Amendment. Id. at 701.
C. Seventh Circuit Precedent
The felon in possession statute makes it unlawful for any person “who has been convicted
in any court of[] a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year . . .
to . . .possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition . . . which has been shipped
or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.” 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).
1. Atkinson
In Atkinson v. Garland, 70 F.4th 1018 (7th Cir. 2023), the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals offered post-Bruen guidance on how to approach challenges like Glover’s to 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(1), although the majority opinion remanded the case rather than conducting that
analysis itself. Id. at 1022. In that case, Atkinson had been convicted of felony mail fraud, had
maintained a clean record in the twenty-four years following that conviction, and wanted to
purchase a firearm. Id. at 1021-22. The Court of Appeals remanded the case with instructions
about what the lower court might consider.3 Judge Wood, on the other hand, conducted the
3 Those considerations are:
1. Does § 922(g)(1) address a “general societal problem that has persisted since the 18th century?” Bruen,
142 S. Ct. at 2131. If this problem existed during a relevant historical period, did earlier generations
address it with similar or “materially different means?” Id.
2. What does history tell us about disarming those convicted of crimes generally and of felonies in particular?
Among other sources, the parties could look to commentary from the Founders, proposals emerging from
the states’ constitutional ratifying conventions, any actual practices of disarming felons or criminals more
Case 3:25-cr-30098-JPG Document 29 Filed 01/05/26 Page 6 of 11 Page ID
#<pageID>

7
Bruen historical analysis in her dissent and concluded the statute was constitutional. Id. at 1025.
2. Gay
After Atkinson and only a few weeks before Rahimi, the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals considered the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) in United States v. Gay, 98
F.4th 843 (7th Cir. 2024). It rejected the defendant’s contention that the Second Amendment
protects felons’ rights to possess firearms notwithstanding § 922(g)(1). It found the defendant’s
facial challenge “hard to square” with the statement in Heller that “‘longstanding prohibitions on
the possession of firearms by felons’ are valid,” Gay, 98 F.4th at 846 (quoting Heller, 554 U.S.
at 626, 635), and statements in McDonald and Bruen that approved of this aspect of Heller. Id.;
compare Atkinson, 70 F.4th at 1022 (indicating Bruen’s historical analysis cannot be sidestepped
by reliance on such “observations” by the Supreme Court). The Gay court did not conduct the
second Bruen inquiry regarding historical analogues. In effect, it did what Atkinson said the
court could not do without even mentioning that case. However, the Gay court assumed for the
generally around the time of the Founding, and treatment of felons outside of the gun context (to the extent
this treatment is probative of the Founders' views of the Second Amendment). When considering historical
regulations and practices, the key question is whether those regulations and practices are comparable in
substance to the restriction imposed by § 922(g)(1). To answer the question, the district court and the
parties should consider how the breadth, severity, and the underlying rationale of the historical examples
stack up against § 922(g)(1).
3. Are there broader historical analogues to § 922(g)(1) during the periods that Bruen emphasized, including,
but not limited to, laws disarming “dangerous” groups other than felons? The parties should not stop at
compiling lists of historical firearms regulations and practices. The proper inquiry, as we have explained,
should focus on how the substance of the historical examples compares to § 922(g)(1).
4. If the district court's historical inquiry identifies analogous laws, do those laws supply enough of a
historical tradition (as opposed to isolated instances of regulation) to support § 922(g)(1)? On this front,
the parties should provide details about the enforcement, impact, or judicial scrutiny of these laws, to the
extent possible.
5. If history supports Atkinson’s call for individualized assessments or for a distinction between violent and
non-violent felonies, how do we define a non-violent or a non-dangerous felony? And what evidence can a
court consider in assessing whether a particular felony conviction was violent? For instance, can a court
consider the felony conviction itself, the facts of the underlying crime, or sentencing enhancements? Bruen
shows that these distinctions should also have firm historical support. See 142 S. Ct. at 2132-33
(explaining that the court must assess whether modern and historical regulations are “relevantly similar,”
including in terms of how and why the regulations burden gun rights).
Atkinson, 70 F.4th at 1023-24.
Case 3:25-cr-30098-JPG Document 29 Filed 01/05/26 Page 7 of 11 Page ID
#<pageID>

8
purposes of argument that there may be room for an “as-applied” challenge by a “law-abiding,
responsible citizen.” Gay, 98 F.4th at 846.
The Court held that Gay was not such a citizen, having been convicted of twenty-two
felonies and having spent twenty-five years in confinement. Id. at 847. Additionally, he was on
parole and had agreed, as a condition of parole, not to possess a weapon. Id. The Court of
Appeals concluded that, for all of these reasons, Gay was “not a ‘law-abiding, responsible’
person who has a constitutional right to possess firearms.” Id.; compare Range v. Attorney
General, 124 F.4th 218, 229-32 (3d Cir. 2024) (en banc) (felon convicted of making a false
statement to obtain food stamps covered by Second Amendment; no longstanding historical
tradition of regulating possession of firearms by such individuals).
3. Prince
United States v. Prince, No. 23-3155, an appeal of a district court decision finding
§ 922(g)(1) unconstitutional, 700 F. Supp. 3d 663 (N.D. Ill. 2023), was orally argued before the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in December 2024. The decision in that case will likely shed
more light on the Second Amendment analysis that applies to this case.
D. Application to Glover
Glover challenges whether § 922(g)(1) is constitutional on its face and as it applies to
him. In a facial challenge, the defendant “must show that the statute is unconstitutional in all
applications.” United States v. Seiwert, 152 F.4th 854, 860 (7th Cir. 2025). In an “as-applied”
challenge, the defendant need only show that “the statute is unconstitutional in the manner as
applied to him and the particular facts of his case.” Id.
Under Bruen’s first text-based inquiry, Glover’s alleged conduct is not covered by the
plain text of the Second Amendment. Like Gay, he is not a “law-abiding, responsible” person
Case 3:25-cr-30098-JPG Document 29 Filed 01/05/26 Page 8 of 11 Page ID
#<pageID>

9
who is part of “the people” under the Second Amendment. Instead, he is a felon because he has
been convicted of multiple felonies, including a drug offense. Despite Rahimi’s skepticism of
what constitutes a “law-abiding, responsible” person, Gay indicates, albeit in dicta, that a felon is
not, and no Seventh Circuit case has held otherwise since then. See Seiwert, 152 F.4th at 862
(assuming without deciding that unlawful drug user is part of “the people” protected by the
Second Amendment). The Court is inclined to follow Gay’s dicta.
Additionally, and perhaps more importantly, under Bruen’s second inquiry, Glover’s
restriction from possessing a firearm is consistent with the nation’s historical tradition of firearm
regulation. The holding in Gay, which is not dicta like the “law-abiding, responsible” person
statement, found the defendant’s argument “hard to square” with the statement in Heller that
“‘longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons’ are valid,” Gay, 98 F.4th at
846 (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 626, 635); compare Atkinson, 70 F.4th at 1028 (Wood, J.,
dissenting) (recognizing passage from Heller may not be enough to resolve challenge to
§ 922(g)(1)). The Court must follow this holding, as it has done before in United States v.
Wooley, No. 4:23-cr-40028-JPG, Doc. 32, and United States v. Johnson, 3:25-cr-30086-JPG,
Doc. 22.
Notwithstanding Gay, the Court finds the restriction on felons’ possessing firearms is not
unconstitutional under the Bruen analysis. The Government has adequately shown that such a
restriction is consistent with “the historical tradition that delimits the outer bounds of the right to
keep and bear arms.” Bruen, 597 U.S. at 19. As Judge Wood noted in her Atkinson dissent,4
“the courts have long recognized that ‘[t]he preservation of the public peace, and the protection
of the people against violence, are constitutional duties of the legislature, and the guarantee of
4 The Court adopts the sources and the reasoning set forth in Judge Wood’s dissent.
Case 3:25-cr-30098-JPG Document 29 Filed 01/05/26 Page 9 of 11 Page ID
#<pageID>

10
the right to keep and bear arms is to be understood and construed in connection and in harmony
with these constitutional duties.’” Atkinson, 70 F.4th at 1035 (Wood, J., dissenting) (quoting Hill
v. State, 53 Ga. 472, 477 (1874)).
Our nation’s history “reveals that, since the founding, governments have been understood
to have the power to single out categories of persons who will face total disarmament based on
the danger they pose to the political community if armed.” Atkinson, 70 F.4th at 1035 (Wood, J.,
dissenting). Historically, those categories have included those who were disloyal to the nation,
those who could not be relied on to obey the law, and those who had committed serious crimes,
as described in the Government’s brief. Similar to those categorical disarmament laws aimed at
preserving public peace and protecting people from violence, in § 922(g)(1), Congress has
deemed felons categorically to be dangerous to the safety of the community and has therefore
disarmed them. Id. (“Section 922(g)(1) does precisely what statutes have been doing since the
mid-18th century. It identifies the group of persons deemed dangerous to the political
community—those convicted of the defined felonies—and it makes it unlawful for them to
possess a firearm.”). Glover falls within that category.
It is not unconstitutional to apply § 922(g)(1) to him, for he actually poses a danger based
on the nature of his prior felonies: a vehicular hijacking, aggravated use of a weapon, and drug
trafficking. He was sentenced to serve twelve years in prison for the first felony and five years
for the third, demonstrating the seriousness of those crimes and reflecting the danger Glover
poses to society in light of those crimes. Further, it is well-recognized that felony drug
trafficking offenses are closely associated with violence. See United States v. Bullock, 632 F.3d
1004, 1016 (7th Cir. 2011). Glover does not even suggest that his drug trafficking crime was not
violent. Thus, even without knowing the details of Glover’s prior crime, the Court can safely say
Case 3:25-cr-30098-JPG Document 29 Filed 01/05/26 Page 10 of 11 Page ID
#<pageID>

11
he falls into the category of people for whom there is a history of restricting firearm possession
because such people pose a danger of violence to the community.
For all of these reasons, the Court finds that Glover is not covered by the Second
Amendment and that, even if he were, he could be disarmed under a categorical bar to firearm
possession because his prior crimes show he poses a danger of violence to the community.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Glover’s motion to dismiss the Indictment
(Doc. 21). Should the forthcoming decision in Prince reveal this order to be erroneous in any
way, the Court would entertain a motion for reconsideration.
The Court further notes that the period from the filing of the motion on October 8, 2025,
through the end of the reply period on November 19, 2025, and up to December 19, 2025, the
reasonable time the Court had the motion under advisement after the end of the briefing period,
is EXCLUDABLE pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(D) and (H). Henderson v. United States,
476 U.S. 321, 331 (1986); United States v. Avila, 106 F.4th 684, 698 (7th Cir. 2024). Other days
before entry of this order may be excludable for other reasons as set forth in the Speedy Trial
Act.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: December 30, 2025
s/ J. Phil Gilbert
J. PHIL GILBERT
DISTRICT JUDGE
Case 3:25-cr-30098-JPG Document 29 Filed 01/05/26 Page 11 of 11 Page ID
#<pageID>