Thompson v. Continental Tire the Americas, LLC

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
KAELYNN THOMPSON, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly
situated,
Plaintiff,
v.
CONTINENTAL TIRE THE
AMERICAS, LLC,
Defendant.
Case No. 3:25-CV-1928-NJR
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
ROSENSTENGEL, District Judge:
This matter is before the Court sua sponte on the issue of federal subject matter
jurisdiction. See Morgan v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 129 F.4th 1043, 1047 (7th Cir. 2025);
Jakupovic v. Curran, 850 F.3d 898, 902 (7th Cir. 2017); Roberson v. Maestro Consulting Servs.
LLC, 507 F. Supp. 3d 998, 1009 (S.D. Ill. 2020) (“As a jurisdictional issue, the Court has a
responsibility to address standing sua sponte.” (quoting Snider v. Heartland Beef, Inc., 479 F.
Supp. 3d 762, 765–66 (C.D. Ill. 2020))). Article III standing is an unwaivable jurisdictional
prerequisite for bringing a case in federal court. Dinerstein v. Google, LLC, 73 F.4th 502,
511 (7th Cir. 2023) (citing Nettles v. Midland Funding LLC, 983 F.3d 896, 899 (7th Cir. 2020)).
On November 18, 2025, this Court ordered the parties to file supplemental briefing on the
question of Article III standing. (Doc. 17). Having reviewed the parties’ filings (Docs. 18,
19), the Court dismisses Plaintiff Kaelynn Thompson’s claim for injunctive relief for the
reasons set forth below.
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On September 16, 2025, Plaintiff Kaelynn Thompson filed a putative class action
complaint in Illinois state court against her former employer, Defendant Continental Tire
the Americas, LLC, alleging violations of the Illinois Genetic Information Privacy Act
(GIPA), 410 I LL. C OMP . S TAT. 513/1 et seq. (Doc. 3-1). She sought both monetary and
injunctive relief. Id. ¶ 62. On October 20, 2025, Continental Tire removed the case
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1446 and 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) (Doc. 3). It then filed an answer to
Thompson’s complaint on November 12, 2025. (Doc. 15).
“Standing doctrine traces its origins to Article III of the Constitution, which grants
federal courts the power to resolve ‘Cases’ and ‘Controversies.’” Morgan v. Fed. Bureau of
Prisons, 129 F.4th 1043, 1048 (7th Cir. 2025) (citing Dinerstein, 73 F.4th at 511). To have
standing to bring suit in federal court, “a plaintiff must have suffered (1) a concrete,
particularized, and actual or imminent injury (an ‘injury in fact’) (2) that is fairly traceable
to the defendant and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.”
Dinerstein, 73 F.4th at 511 (citing Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992)).
“Moreover, ‘standing is not dispensed in gross; rather, plaintiffs must demonstrate
standing for each claim that they press and for each form of relief that they seek.’” Id.
(quoting TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413, 431 (2021)).
To survive dismissal for lack of standing at the pleadings stage, “the plaintiff must
meet a pleading burden paralleling the ‘Twombly-Iqbal facial plausibility requirement,’
and allege sufficient factual matter to support the inference that standing exists.” In re
Recalled Abbott Infant Formula Prods. Liab. Litig., 97 F.4th 525, 528 (7th Cir. 2024) (quoting
Silha v. ACT, Inc., 807 F.3d 169, 173 (7th Cir. 2015)). The plaintiff must “‘allege facts
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demonstrating each element’ of the standing inquiry. ‘Courts must accept as true all
material allegations of the complaint, and must construe the complaint in favor of the
complaining party.’” Id. (first quoting Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 338 (2016); and
then quoting Silha, 807 F.3d at 173). The Court considers only the allegations as to
Thompson’s standing, as “[p]laintiffs in a class action cannot rely on unnamed plaintiffs
to satisfy Article III’s standing requirement.” Rivera v. Am. Honda Motor. Co., Inc.,
No. 24 CV 12883, 2025 WL 1309536, at *5 (N.D. Ill. May 5, 2025) (quoting In re Fluidmaster,
Inc., 149 F. Supp. 3d 940, 958–59 (N.D. Ill. 2016)).
The Court first considers whether Thompson has standing to pursue monetary
relief and concludes that she does. Thompson alleges that in March 2022, while still an
employee of Continental Tire, she filed a workers’ compensation claim. (Doc. 3-1, ¶¶ 27–
28). In order to process her claim, Continental Tire required Thompson to submit to a
doctor’s 	examination. 	Id. ¶ 28. 	She 	alleges 	that 	this 	doctor—who 	was 	chosen 	by
Continental Tire—solicited information about her family medical history. Id. ¶¶ 28–29.
After Thompson answered the doctor’s questions, Continental Tire allegedly used that
information to deny her workers’ compensation claim. Id. ¶¶ 31, 37.
Thompson alleges a monetary harm: the denial of her workers’ compensation
claim. 	TransUnion, 	594 	U.S. 	at 425 	(“[C]ertain 	harms 	readily 	qualify 	as 	concrete
injuries . . . . If a defendant has caused . . . monetary injury to the plaintiff, the plaintiff
has suffered a concrete injury in fact under Article III.”). And Thompson appears to allege
that the doctor solicited this information at the direction of Continental Tire, in violation
of GIPA. See id. ¶¶ 36–38. She further alleges that this information was specifically used
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to deny her workers’ compensation claim, also independently in violation of GIPA. 1 The
denial of Thompson’s claim (her injury in fact) is thus fairly traceable to Continental Tire’s
conduct. Because the Court can redress Thompson’s monetary injury through the
monetary relief she seeks, the elements of standing are satisfied.
The Court’s determination that Thompson has standing to pursue monetary relief
at the pleading stage should not be read too broadly. “A plaintiff must demonstrate
standing ‘with the manner and degree of evidence required at the successive stages of the
litigation.’” TransUnion, 594 U.S. at 431 (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561). If, at the summary
judgment stage, no evidence could be produced to show that Continental Tire was
responsible for the solicitation of genetic information, or that Continental Tire used
Thompson’s 	genetic 	information 	in 	making 	its 	worker’s 	compensation 	decisions,
different questions would be presented than the ones discussed today. The Court
expresses no view, for instance, on whether a violation of GIPA divorced from any further
harm would constitute a concrete injury in fact.
The Court next considers whether Thompson has standing to pursue injunctive
relief and concludes that she does not. To satisfy Article III, a plaintiff seeking an
injunction must face a “‘real and immediate’ threat of future injury as opposed to a threat
that is merely ‘conjectural or hypothetical.’” Simic v. City of Chicago, 851 F.3d 734, 738 (7th
Cir. 2017) (quoting City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102 (1983)).
1 GIPA prohibits employers both from, inter alia, (1) directly or indirectly soliciting genetic information as
a condition of employment, subject to exceptions not relevant here, and (2) using genetic information to
affect the terms, conditions, or privileges of a person’s employment, irrespective of whether the information
was lawfully obtained. See 410 ILL . COMP . S TAT. 513/25(c), (j).
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Thompson cannot make the required showing. She is no longer employed by
Continental Tire (Doc. 3-1, ¶ 10). She fails to allege any risk that Continental Tire will
solicit her genetic information in the future. Nor can Thompson point to the risk that
Continental Tire will violate the GIPA rights of others in the future to establish her own
standing. In re Beyond Meat, Inc., Protein Content Mktg. & Sales Pracs. Litig., 718 F. Supp. 3d
800, 811 (N.D. Ill. 2024) (“[A] named plaintiff cannot acquire standing to sue by bringing
his action on behalf of others who suffered injury which would have afforded them
standing had they been named plaintiffs; it bears repeating that a person cannot predicate
standing on injury which he does not share.” (alteration in original) (quoting Payton v.
County of Kane, 308 F.3d 673, 682 (7th Cir. 2002))).
The Court lacks jurisdiction over Thompson’s claim for injunctive relief because
she lacks standing to bring it. In these circumstances, partial dismissal is the correct
course of action. See City of East St. Louis v. Monsanto Co., 720 F. Supp. 3d 674, 682–85
(S.D. Ill. 2024) (explaining that, where the Court lacks jurisdiction over some but not all
claims in a removed case, neither partial nor total remand is appropriate). Thompson’s
claim for injunctive relief is accordingly DISMISSED without prejudice. The Court will
set a conference to discuss the discovery schedule for class certification by separate order.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: 	February 25, 2026
____________________________
NANCY J. ROSENSTENGEL
United States District Judge
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