Nunnally v. Secretary of Veterans Affairs et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
BRADSHAW GENARD NUNNALLY,
Plaintiff,
v.
SECRETARY OF VETERANS
AFFAIRS, JUDGE PATRICK R.
FOLEY, in his official capacity,
MORGAN C. RAGSDALE, in her
official capacity, MORTGAGE
RESEARCH CENTER, LLC d/b/a
VETERANS UNITED HOME LAONS,
and LOGS LEGAL GROUP LLP,
Defendants.
Case No. 26-CV-00102-SPM
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
McGLYNN, District Judge:
Before the Court is an ex parte Emergency Motion for Temporary Restraining
Order 	and 	Preliminary 	Injunction 	filed 	by 	pro 	se 	Plaintiff 	Bradshaw 	Genard
Nunnally. (Doc. 3). In his Complaint, Nunnally purports to bring claims related to
the alleged foreclosure sale of real property located in Belleville, Illinois. (Doc. 2).
Nunnally states that he seeks a declaration that his Fourteenth Amendment rights
to procedural due process were violated; a declaration that the sale and deed of the
real property were constitutionally defective and that eviction without adequate
process is unlawful; an order to Quiet Title to the real property in question; and
temporary injunctive relief to preserve the status quo of the property at present and
halt eviction or dispossession. (Id.). Nunnally brings his claims against the Secretary
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of Veterans Affairs; Mortgage Research Center, LLC; LOGS Legal Group LLP; Judge
Patrick R. Foley; and Clerk Moran C. Ragsdale. (Id.). In his Emergency Motion for
Temporary 	Restraining 	Order 	and 	accompanying 	Memorandum 	in 	Support,
Nunnally seeks an order from this Court restraining Defendants and their agents
from executing or enforcing any writ of possession, conducting or attempting any
sheriff lockout or forcible removal, and transferring, recording, conveying, or altering
title to the property located in Belleville, Illinois. (Docs. 3, 4). For the following
reasons set forth, the Emergency Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and
Preliminary Injunction is DENIED to the extent he seeks an ex parte Temporary
Restraining Order. This Court reserves ruling on Nunnally’s Motion insofar as he
seeks a preliminary injunction.
R ELEVANT FACTS AND P ROCEDURAL HISTORY
Nunnally filed his Complaint on January 30, 2026, purporting to bring claims
against Defendants Secretary of Veterans Affairs; Mortgage Research Center, LLC;
LOGS Legal Group LLP; Judge Patrick R. Foley; and Clerk Moran C. Ragsdale. (Doc.
2). Nunnally alleges he executed the original mortgage and note for the real property
in 	question 	located 	in 	Belleville, 	Illinois, 	and 	occupies 	the 	premises 	as 	the
homeowner. (Id., ¶ 19). Nunnally alleges that on November 2, 2023, a foreclosure
judgment was entered in St. Clair County, and that a judicial foreclosure sale of the
property occurred on February 20, 2025. (Id., ¶¶ 20−21). Plaintiff alleges that “notice
reasonably calculated to apprise Plaintiff was not provided,” and also that he was
“personally served in the subsequent eviction action.” (Id., ¶¶ 23−24). From this
Court, he requests quiet title in his favor pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2409a, a declaration
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that the foreclosure sale and deed were constitutionally defective, a temporary
restraining order and preliminary injunction halting eviction or dispossession, fees
and costs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988, and other relief from this Court as just and
equitable. (Id., p. 6). Nunnally filed his Emergency Motion for Temporary Restraining
Order and Memorandum in Support on January 30, 2026. (Docs. 3, 4).
A PPLICABLE LEGAL S TANDARDS
A preliminary injunction is “an exercise of a very far-reaching power, never to
be indulged in except in a case clearly demanding it.” Finch v. Treto, 82 F.4th 572,
578 (7th Cir. 2023) (quoting Cassell v. Snyders, 990 F.3d 539, 544 (7th Cir. 2021)).
The purpose of a preliminary injunction is “preserve the relative positions of the
parties until a trial on the merits can be held.” Tully v. Okeson, 78 F.4th 377, 381 (7th
Cir. 2023) (quoting Univ. of Texas v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395 (1981)). The
issuance of a preliminary injunction should also “minimize the hardship to the parties
pending final judgment.” Faheem-El v. Klincar, 841 F.2d 712, 717 (7th Cir. 1988).
Crucially, “[t]he party seeking a preliminary injunction bears the burden of
showing that it is warranted.” Finch, 82 F.4th at 578 (quoting Speech First, Inc. v.
Killeen, 968 F.3d 628, 637 (7th Cir. 2020)). In the Seventh Circuit, “a district court
engages in an analysis that proceeds in two distinct phases to decide whether such
relief is warranted: a threshold phase and a balancing phase.” Valencia v. City of
Springfield, 883 F.3d 959, 965 (7th Cir. 2018). In order to proceed beyond the
“threshold phase,” the party seeking a preliminary injunction must satisfy three
requirements via a showing that: “(1) it will suffer irreparable harm in the period
before the resolution of its claim; (2) traditional legal remedies are inadequate; and
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(3) there is some likelihood of success on the merits of the claim.” HH Indianapolis,
LLC v. Consol. City of Indianapolis & Cnty. of Marion, 889 F.3d 432, 437 (7th Cir.
2018); see also Finch at 578 (citing Speech First, 968 F.3d at 637); Winter v. Nat. Res.
Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008) (“A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction
must establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer
irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips
in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.”).
Additionally, “[i]f it is plain that the party seeking the preliminary injunction
has no case on the merits, the injunction should be refused regardless of the balance
of harms.” Valencia, 883 F.3d at 966 (quoting Green River Bottling Co. v. Green River
Corp., 997 F.2d 359, 361 (7th Cir. 1993)). “The two most important considerations are
likelihood of success on the merits and irreparable harm.” Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S.
418, 434 (2009). Moreover, regarding the likelihood of success on the merits, “[i]t is
not enough that the chance of success on the merits be ‘better than negligible.’” Id.
(quoting and disapproving Sofinet v. INS, 188 F.3d 703, 707 (7th Cir. 1999)); see also
Ill. Republican Party v. Pritzker, 973 F.3d 760, 763 (7th Cir. 2020) (“[A]n applicant
for preliminary relief bears a significant burden, even though the Court recognizes
that, at such a preliminary stage, the applicant need not show that it definitely will
win the case. A ‘strong’ showing thus does not mean proof by a preponderance—once
again, that would spill too far into the ultimate merits for something designed to
protect both the parties and the process while the case is pending. But it normally
includes a demonstration of how the applicant proposes to prove the key elements of
its case.”).
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If the threshold requirements are met, “the court must balance the equities,
weighing the harm to the moving party if the requested injunction is denied against
the harm to the nonmoving party and the public—including third parties—if it is
granted.” Finch at 578 (citing Cassell, 990 F.3d at 545). In the second phase, “the
court weighs the harm of denying an injunction to the movant against the harm of
granting an injunction to the nonmovant.” Grubhub Inc. v. Relish Labs LLC, 80 F.4th
835, 844 (7th Cir. 2023). This is accomplished via “a sliding scale—the greater the
movant’s likelihood of success on the merits, the less the harms need be in its favor.”
Id. (citing Life Spine, Inc. v. Aegis Spine, Inc., 8 F.4th 531, 539 (7th Cir. 2021). The
court must also consider the public interest. Id.
Additionally, “[t]he Supreme Court has recognized that in some limited
situations, a court may properly issue ex parte orders of brief duration and limited
scope to preserve the status quo pending a hearing.” Am. Can Co. v. Mansukhani, 742
F.2d 314, 321 (7th Cir. 1984) (citing Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Teamsters, 415 U.S.
423, 438–39 (1974); Carroll v. President of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 180 (1968)).
That being said, “the circumstances in which an ex parte order should be granted are
extremely limited” and “they should be restricted to serving their underlying purpose
of preserving the status quo and preventing irreparable harm just so long as is
necessary to hold a hearing, and no longer.” Id. at 321; id. at 322 (citing Granny Goose
Foods at 438–39).
A NALYSIS
Federal Rule 65(b) is clear that a temporary restraining order will be issued
without notice to the other party only if (1) “specific facts in an affidavit or a verified
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complaint clearly show that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will
result to the movant before the adverse party can be heard in opposition” and (2) “the
movant’s attorney certifies in writing any efforts made to give notice and the reasons
why it should not be required.” F ED. R. CIV. P. 65(b). The Seventh Circuit has
recognized that “[e]x parte temporary restraining orders are most familiar to courts
where notice to the adversary party is impossible either because the identity of the
adverse party is unknown or because a known party cannot be located in time for a
hearing.” Mansukhani at 322; see F ED. R. CIV. P. 65(b).
Even if notice can be provided, an exception is provided for the “very narrow
band of cases in which ex parte orders are proper because notice to the defendant
would render fruitless the further prosecution of the action.” Mansukhani at 322
(citing In re Vuitton et Fils S.A., 606 F.2d 1, 5 (2d Cir. 1979)). In Vuitton, the Second
Circuit granted the plaintiff’s motion for temporary restraining order because “it was
highly probable that the [defendant trademark] infringer would dispose of the
infringing goods in the few hours before the hearing.” Vuitton at 5; see Mansukhani
at 322 (citing Vuitton at 5).
Regarding his Motion and Memorandum in Support (Docs. 3, 4), Nunnally has
failed to meet either of the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(b)(1).
First, Nunnally summarily states in his Complaint and in his Motion the that he has
shown a likelihood of success on the merits of his constitutional and quiet title claims,
that he will suffer immediate and irreparable harm absent temporary injunctive
relief, the balance of equities favors him, and the public interest favors the protection
of constitutional due process rights and orderly adjudication of title disputes. (Doc.
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3). Beyond this conclusory recitation of the elements for a preliminary injunction,
Nunnally goes on in his Memorandum in Support to state that “loss of one’s home
constitutes irreparable harm,” citing Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976), and that
“[m]aintaining possession during adjudication avoids permanent harm and does not
harm Defendants.” (Doc. 4). Nunnally additionally writes that “[p]ublic interest
supports due process, stability of title, and orderly judicial review.” (Id.). In his
Complaint, Nunnally states that he has been personally served in the subsequent
eviction action. This Court finds that Nunnally has wholly failed to provide specific
facts in an affidavit or a verified complaint clearly show that immediate and
irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the movant before the adverse party
can be heard in opposition. Nowhere does Nunnally propose he is facing irreparable
harm or damage to his rights such that this Court need to issue extraordinary
temporary relief. Secondly, he also fails to establish that ex parte relief is warranted
here. In fact, Nunnally pleads that he has been provided notice in a separate action
regarding the eviction proceedings for the property in question, and provides no basis
as to why judicial intervention by this Court is necessary, let alone warranted.
Without 	more, 	Nunnally 	falls 	far 	short 	of 	moving 	this 	Court 	to 	issue 	such
extraordinary relief as a temporary restraining order here, and therefore will decline
to do so.
In short, the Court does not find that Nunnally has provided sufficient
justification for an ex parte temporary restraining order in this matter. Therefore,
the Court does not reach the merits of his arguments, which will be addressed when
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the Court rules on his Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Doc. 3) once the Defendants
are provided with an opportunity to respond.
C ONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, pro se Plaintiff Bradshaw Genard Nunnally’s
ex parte Emergency Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (Doc. 3) is DENIED to
the 	extent 	he 	seeks 	a 	Temporary 	Restraining 	Order. 	This 	Court 	RESERVES
RULING on the Motion to the extent Nunnally seeks preliminary injunctive relief.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: 	February 3, 2026
s/ Stephen P. McGlynn
STEPHEN P. McGLYNN
U.S. District Judge
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